Cognitivism, adaptationism and pointing
- Author(s): Timothy P. Racine 1
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View Affiliations Hide AffiliationsAffiliations:1 Simon Fraser University
- Source: Developments in Primate Gesture Research , pp 165-180
- Publication Date June 2012
I analyze the conceptual foundations of Tomasello and colleagues’ influential theory of the origins of pointing gestures in an attempt to clarify its aims and limit its scope. After some preliminary remarks, I consider the postulated cognitive mechanisms that are claimed to be the developmental basis for the sharing of intentional states with others, and then turn to the postulated evolutionary mechanisms that are said to serve as a basis for cognitive abilities. I discuss the strengths and limitations of this account in terms of its parent meta-theoretical positions of cognitivism and adaptationism respectively. Keywords: pointing; mental states; adaptations; intentions; shared intentionality
- Affiliations: 1: Simon Fraser University
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