Verneinen als Absprechen bei Aristoteles oder: Muß man Aristoteles durch die Russellsche Brille lesen?
Pardey, Ulrich,, 5, 17-42 (2000),
doi = https://doi.org/10.1075/bpjam.5.03par,
publicationName = John Benjamins,
issn = 1384-6663,
abstract= Two counter-examples stand against the Aristotelian thesis of De interpretatione 6 that negation principally means denial: Neither can the negation of general propositions be understood as denial, nor is this possible in the case of propositions whose grammatical subject is an empty singular term. While the first counter-example can be ea­sily refuted through the analysis which Aristotle gives of general propositions in De interpretatione 7, the second counter-example seems to be able to invoke Categoriae 10. According to the usual view of Categoriae 10, Aristotle himself delivers examples for negations which cannot be understood as denials. The present essay holds this interpretation to be incorrect, and attempts to show with reference to indexical propositions and an Aristotelian two-term concept of truth that even these negations are to be understood as denials. Specifically, it is argued that this errant interpretation relies upon a reading of the Aristotelian text through a Russellian lens.,
language=,
type=