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Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter

image of Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter
ISSN 1384-6663
E-ISSN 1569-9684

<p>This journal is devoted to the philosophy of antiquity and the Middle Ages. It concentrates on research documenting the connections between ancient and medieval philosophy; focuses on the interrelations among various cultural and philosophical traditions, such as the Arabic, Judaic, Byzantine and Latin; informs about major research trends in ancient and medieval philosophy and publish reviews of important new studies in these fields; offers a forum for discussions of controversial or divergent interpretations of these topics; presents previously unpublished sources and translations too short to appear in another format; and features a miscellany of reports and information, including interviews with prominent scholars.</p><p> In keeping with its international character, the journal publishes contributions in English, German, French, and Italian. The journal does not aim only to appeal to professional historians of philosophy, but also intends to publish introductory articles of interest to students which along with new source material and lively interviews should provide a fresh perspective on and unique access to ancient and medieval thought.</p>

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  • Monismus und Dualismus in Platons Prinzipienlehre
    • Author: Jens Halfwassen
    • Source: Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter, Volume 2, Issue 1, 1997, pages: 1 –21
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    • AbstractOne of the main problems of Plato's unwritten doctrine has to do with whether his theory of principles has a strictly dualistic or rather a more monistic character. The thesis of this essay is that Plato combines monism and dualism in a particular fashion. Both the dialogues and the testimony of the unwritten doctrine reveal that in Plato's metaphysics the One is the genuinely absolute principle; Plato's second principle, the Many, is not a second absolute - otherwise it would dissolve the very concept of the absolute. Instead, Plato conceives the principle of multiplicity itself as a unity, therefore as in some - in any event ineffable - way as being derived or having emanated from the absolute One. The One itself is wholly transcendent and thus ineffable, knowable neither by reason nor by intellective intuition. Nonetheless, being and knowledge are constituted by the coordination of the One and the Many, for which reason the latter is a principle. Hence, Plato's metaphysics combine a monistic ascent to the absolute with a dualistic derivation of being, a combination made necessary because the One transcends not only all being, but also all knowledge.
  • Philosophie als Transzendieren. Der Aufstieg zum höchsten Prinzip bei Platon und Plotin
    • Author: Jens Halfwassen
    • Source: Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter, Volume 3, Issue 1, 1998, pages: 29 –42
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    • AbstractTranscendent thinking as a basic feature of metaphysical philosophy has always claimed to be more than a mere cognition of reality in terms of its phenomena. Transcendent philosophy intends to consider reality from the perspective of a fundamental ground transcending the reality ordered by that ground. Plato, who created the very notion of philosophy, described the love of wisdom as an ascent to the absolutely transcendent One and Good, which he believed to be the principle and source of all being. Plotinus both took over and renewed the Platonic view of philosophy as transcendent thinking. In his view, the philosopher can only relate to that principle which transcends even thinking itself by practicing a mystical philosophy and thereby leaving behind his own dialectical thinking.
  • Zum Außenweltproblem in der Antike: Sextus' Destruktion des Repräsentationalismus und die skeptische Begründung des Idealismus bei Plotin
    • Author: Markus Gabriel
    • Source: Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2007, pages: 15 –43
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    • Miles Burnyeat famously argued that there could, in principle, be no idealism in Greek philosophy, because it was not yet prepared to regard the existence of an external world beyond our veil of perception as a serious philosophical problem. I believe that this thesis is historically and systematically false. Burnyeat’s claim is backed up by a short sketch of the most important philosophical systems in Greek philosophy that might seem to contradict his no-idealism view, viz. ancient skepticism and Neo-Platonism. In this paper, I argue against Burnyeat’s view on the basis of a reconstruction of Sextus Empiricus’ epistemological skepticism regarding the external world. Then, I try to show that Plotinus’ idealism and his theory of νοῦς are built on the assumption that metaphysical realism entails the problem of the external world and is, therefore, potentially inconsistent because of its skeptical results. Plotinus shows how skepticism about the external world can be avoided by idealism which can, thus, be seen as an explicit overcoming of epistemological skepticism. This whole train of thought explicitly refers to the problem of an external world. Therefore, Plotinus can be seen as answering the skeptical challenge with an idealistic metaphysic of experience.
  • What’s in a name? Students of William of Champeaux on the vox significativa
    • Author: Margaret Cameron
    • Source: Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter, Volume 9, Issue 1, 2004, pages: 93 –114
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    • William of Champeaux (1170-1121) is best known as Peter Abelard’s teacher and the proponent of realism of universals. In recent years, many works on the linguistic liberal arts – grammar, dialectic and rhetoric – have been attributed to him. However, at least in the case of the dialectical commentaries, these attributions have been hastily made and are probably incorrect. The commentaries themselves, correctly situated in the time and place when Abelard and William worked at Notre Dame, nonetheless deserve close attention. The commentaries on Aristotle’s De interpretatione are examined here: in them we find a new theory of signification which developed as a critical response to William of Champeaux’s view of the vox significativa, as well as an important clue to the origins of the doctrine of the proprietates terminorum.
  • Temporalia, maxime respectu aeternorum, nihil sunt: Über den angeblichen Thomismus des jungen Meister Eckhart
    • Author: Andrés Quero-Sánchez
    • Source: Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter, Volume 10, Issue 1, 2005, pages: 37 –66
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    • Master Eckhart’s metaphysics is an idealistic one: Being is not what there is, but only and exclusively what is truthful, i. e. the normativity which reason (God Himself) sets. Further: What is truthful comes about by negation of what there is, because this is itself nothing, pure negation as such. What is truthful is therefore the negation of negation. This is an idealistic thesis which cannot be described as being thomistic, but rather which corresponds to the metaphysics of German Idealism, especially of Fichte. This essay shows that the thesis that Eckhart was thomistic until his Parisian idealistic turn at the beginning of the 14th century is not correct. It argues that Eckhart’s metaphysics is unambiguously idealistic, i. e. non-thomistic, and that this is also the case in works which he certainly wrote before the Parisian Questions. This applies especially to the Rede der underscheidunge und the Tractatus super oratione dominica.
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