Subject collection: Philosophy (254 titles, 1969–2015)

The ten volumes of Handbook of Pragmatics Highlights focus on the most salient topics in the field of pragmatics, thus dividing its wide interdisciplinary spectrum in a transparent and manageable way. While the other volumes select specific cognitive, grammatical, social, cultural, variational, interactional, or discursive angles, this 10th volume focuses on the interface between pragmatics and philosophy and reviews the philosophical background from which pragmatics has taken inspiration and with which it is constantly confronted. It provides the reader with information about authors relevant to the development of pragmatics, trends or areas in philosophy that are relevant for the definition of the main concepts in pragmatics or the characterization of its cultural context, the neighbouring field of semantics (with particular respect to truth-conditional semantics and some main branches of formal semantics), and recent philosophical debates that involve pragmatic notions such as indexicality and context. While most of the references are to the analytic philosophical field, also perspectives in so-called continental philosophy are taken into account. The introductory chapter outlines some unifying routes of reflection as regards meaning, speech as action, and self and mind, and suggests some connections between doing pragmatics and doing philosophy.

Ce volume se propose d’évaluer la place de Pomponazzi dans la philosophie de la Renaissance, à la fois son ancrage dans des traditions médiévales et sa force d’innovation. A côté de contributions sur le De immortalitate animae (1516), ses antécédents, les débats qu’il a suscités, le volume comprend aussi des interventions sur d’autres questions de philosophie de la nature, ou sur la liberté et le destin, ainsi qu’une contribution davantage centrée sur l’interprétation qui a été réservée à la pensée de Pomponazzi au début du XXe siècle. Les textes de Pomponazzi, et notamment le traité sur l’âme apparaissent ainsi comme des textes frontaliers. Leur étude permet d’évaluer le transfert de certaines thématiques philosophiques médiévales, et en particulier de la noétique aristotélicienne, alexandriste et averroïste, dans le contexte intellectuel de la Renaissance, au sein d’une réflexion générale sur le sens anthropologique et éthique de la finitude constitutive de la nature humaine. This book proposes to evaluate the importance and signification of Pietro Pomponazzi in the philosophy of the Renaissance. It considers both its rooting in Medieval traditions and its innovative force. Besides contributions on Pomponazzi’s De immortalitate animae (1516), its antecedens and the debates that arose, the volume contains contributions on other aspects of the philosophy of nature, or on liberty and fate, and one dedicated to the interpretation of Pomponazzi at the beginning of the twentieth century. So, the texts of Pomponazzi, and especially his treatise on the soul appear as frontier texts. Their study allows an evaluation of the transfer of some medieval thematics, especially of Aristotelian, Alexandrinian and Averroist noetics, in the intellectual context of Renaissance, inside a general reflection upon the anthropological and ethical meaning of the finitude, which is constitutive of human nature.

The focus of this book is on the theory of infinity in Lawrence of Lindores’ commentary on Aristotle’s “Physics”. Written shortly before 1400, Lindores’ text played an important role in disseminating the natural philosophy of John Buridan and his disciples in the 15^th century. In the first part of this book, Lindores’ concept of science is discussed and a detailed analysis of his treatment of infinity and related topics (continuity, the eternity of the world) is given. Subsequently an assessment of his ideas from the point of view of modern mathematics is attempted and some interesting similarities between medieval theories of infinity and recent developments in mathematics are outlined. The second part contains the relevant questions from Lindores’ commentary (book I, qu. 1-5, 10; book III, qu. 13-18; book VI, qu. 9-10; book VIII, qu. 3), which are presented here for the first time in a critical edition based on all seven manuscripts of the text.

Die vorliegende Studie untersucht die Theorie des Unendlichen in dem kurz vor 1400 verfaßten Kommentar des Lorenz von Lindores zur „Physik" des Aristoteles, der im 15. Jh. eine wichtige Rolle spielte bei der Verbreitung der Naturphilosophie Johannes Buridans und seiner Schüler. Im ersten Teil des Buches wird die Wissenschaftstheorie Lindores’ in ihren Grundzügen dargestellt, danach werden seine Ausführungen zum Unendlichen und zu damit zusammenhängenden Themen (Struktur des Kontinuums, Ewigkeit der Welt) detailliert analysiert. Abschließend wird eine Bewertung dieser Theorien aus der Sicht der modernen Mathematik versucht, wobei sich bemerkenswerte Ähnlichkeiten zwischen mittelalterlichen Theorien des Unendlichen und neueren Entwicklungen in der Mathematik zeigen. Der zweite Teil bietet erstmals eine kritische Edition aller einschlägigen Quaestionen aus Lindores’ Physikkommentar (Buch I, qu. 1-5, 10; Buch III, qu. 13-18; Buch VI, qu. 9-10; Buch VIII, qu. 3) auf der Basis aller sieben Handschriften des Textes.

Gemeinhin gilt der Platonische Dialog ‘Philosophos’, auf den Platon selbst im ‘Sophistes’ verweist, als verschollen. Eine genaue Analyse des ‘Theaitetos’ sowie der sog. Eleatischen Dialoge kann jedoch erweisen, dass Platon die Trilogie ‘Sophistes’, ‘Politikos’ und ‘Philosophos’ mit dem ‘Parmenides’ abschloss – dass der verschollene ‘Philosophos’ also mit dem existierenden 'Parmenides' identisch ist. Die dialektische Übung des ‘Parmenides’ führt dabei eine Art Subjektivitätsphilosophie vor, in der das Eine sich als menschliche Seele zeigt. Die Seele des Menschen lässt in der Vielheit ihrer Sätze und der dialogischen Einheit dieser Sätze Wirklichkeit überhaupt erst entstehen, ist in diesem subjektiven Entwurf von Welt aber immer auf die dialogische Prüfung eigener Vorstellungen durch den Anderen angewiesen.

Ein ganz anderes Verständnis des ‘Parmenides’ offenbart Marsilio Ficino in seinem ‘Parmenides’-Kommentar. Ficinos Exegese folgt im wesentlichen der des Proklos, so dass Wirklichkeit hier nicht als von der Seele entworfene, sondern als hierarchisch gestufte beschrieben wird. Das vorliegende Buch geht dieser Deutung nach, um sie schließlich als unhaltbar zurückzuweisen.

The Platonic dialogue ‘Philosophos’, which Plato himself mentions in the ‘Sophistes’, is usually considered to be a lost work. A detailed analysis of the ‘Theaitetos’ as well as the so-called Eleatic dialogues reveals that Plato completed the trilogy ‘Sophistes’, ‘Politikos’ and ‘Philosophos’ with the ‘Parmenides’ — hence, that the lost ‘Philosphos’ is identical with the existing ‘Parmenides’. The dialectical exercise of the ‘Parmenides’ demonstrates a kind of theory of subjectivity in which the One reveals itself to be the human soul. The human soul — through the multiplicity of its sentences and their dialogical unity — therefore creates reality. Nevertheless, the human soul is dependent on the examination of this very reality in dialogue with another.

In his ‘Parmenides’-commentary Marsilio Ficino shows a quite different understanding of the ‘Parmenides’. Ficino’s exegetical approach mainly follows Proclus’ commentary. As a result, reality is not described as a creation of the human soul — on the contrary, it appears to be a well-organised hierarchy. This volume analyzes Ficino’s argumentation and finally rejects it.

No single theoretician provoked a greater tradition of the reception of his thought throughout changing times and across diverse cultures than did Aristotle, and so Hegel, who calls him the ‘teacher of the human race’, well describes the man known for ages simply as ‘the philosopher’. The present volume examines from a philosophical-historical standpoint the intellect-theory of De Anima III 4-5, which stands in the center of the Aristotelian system and composes one of the most provocative Aristotelian theories. It concentrates on the critical engagement with Aristotle’s conception of nous in Theophrastus and his colleagues (Dicaearchus, Aristoxenus) and students (Demetrius of Phaleron, Menander, Erasistratus) in the Peripatos as well as in the Academic, Socratic, Epicurean and Stoic schools. The analysis of the relevant texts leads to a new assessment of Theophrastus’s philosophical-historical significance in the Aristotelian tradition and documents that in early Hellenism the Aristotelian theory itself played a surprisingly limited role, so that the loss of the original Aristotelian manuscripts as reported by Strabo and Plutarch — a matter hotly debated in recent studies — was of only marginal importance.Kein Theoretiker provozierte über eine ähnlich lange Zeitspanne eine so intensive, kontinuierliche und multikulturelle Rezeption wie Aristoteles. Die Geschichte der Philosophie verlangt es daher geradezu, unter der Perspektive der ebenso konstanten wie vielgestaltigen Auseinandersetzung mit “dem Philosophen” analysiert zu werden. Den geeignetsten Kristallisationspunkt hierfür stellt die in “De Anima” G 4-5 präsentierte Nous-Theorie dar, denn zum einen stand sie im Zentrum des aristotelischen “Systems”, zum anderen handelt es sich bei ihr um die mit gröîter Kontinuität, höchster Intensität und unterschiedlichsten Resultaten rezipierte philosophische Theorie überhaupt.

Der vorliegende Band thematisiert, im Anschluî am die “Topographie” der aristotelischen Noetik, die frühhellenistische Resonanz. Den ersten Schwerpunkt bildet Theophrasts philosophisch-kritische Auseinandersetzung mit der Nous-Konzeption seines Lehrers, den zweiten die “De Anima”-Rezeption in der damaligen Philosophie-Szene, die im wesentlichen durch drie Gruppen konstituiert wurde: Theophrasts Kollegen im “Peripatos” (Dikaiarch, Aristoxenos); Theophrasts eingene Hörerschaft (Demetrios v. Phaleron, Menander, Erasistratos); und die zahlreichte philosophische Konkurrenz: die “Akademiker”, “Sokratiker”, und die Schulen Epikurs bzw. Zenons. Die Analyse der relevanten Texte führt erstens zu einder grundsätzlichen Neubewertung der philosophiehistorischen Position Theophrasts. Zweitens dokumentiert sie, daî die aristotelische Theorie entgegen der heutigen opinio communis gerade im Frühhellenismus eine erstaunlich bescheidene Rolle spielte. Rezeptionsgeschichtlich kommt dem von Strabon/Plutarch berichteten und in der neueren Forschung heiîdiskutierten Verlust der aristotelischen Originalmanuscripte deshalb allenfalls eine sekondäre Bedeutung zu.

This interdisciplinary work addresses the question, What role should psychological conceptualization play for thinkers who believe that the brain is the organ of the mind? It offers readers something unique both by systematically comparing the writings of eliminativist philosophers of mind with the writings of the most committed proponents of biological psychiatry, and by critically scrutinizing their shared “anti-anthropomorphism” from the standpoint of a diagnostician and therapist. Contradicting the contemporary assumption that common sense psychology has already been proven futile, and we are just waiting for an adequate scientifically-based replacement, this book provides explicit philosophical and psychological arguments showing why, if they did not already have both cognitive and psychodynamic psychologies, philosophers and scientists would have to invent them to better understand brains. (Series A)

Will our everyday account of ourselves be vindicated by a new science? Or, will our self-understanding remain untouched by such developments? This book argues that beliefs and desires have a legitimate place in the explanation of action. Eliminativist arguments mistakenly focus on the vehicles of content not content itself. This book asks whether a naturalistic theory of content is possible. It is argued that a modest biosemantic theory of intentional, but nonconceptual, content is the naturalist’s best bet. A theory of this kind complements connectionism and recent work on embodied and embedded cognition. But intentional content is not equivalent to propositional content. In order to understand propositional content we must rely on Davidsonian radical interpretation.

However, radical interpretation is shown to be at odds with physicalism. But if the best naturalised theory of content we are likely to get from cognitive science is only a theory of intentional content, then a naturalistic explanation of scientific theorising is not possible. It is concluded that cognitive science alone cannot explain the nature of our minds and that eliminativism is intellectually incoherent. (Series A)

Most of the essays collected in this book were presented at the Charles S. Peirce Sesquicentennial Congress (Harvard University, September 1989). The volume is devoted to themes within Peirce's value theory and offers a comprehensive view of less known aspects of his influential philosophy, in particular Peirce's work on ethics and aesthetics.The book is divided in four sections. Section I discusses the status of ethics as a normative science and its relation with logic; some applications are presented, e.g. in the field of bioethics. Section II investigates the specific position of Peircean aesthetics with regard to classical American philosophy, especially Buchler, to Husserlian phenomenology, and to European structuralism (Saussure, Jakobson). Section III contains papers on internal aspects of Peirce's aesthetics and its place in his thought. The final section presents applications of Peirce's aesthetic theory: analyses of visual art (mainly paintings), of literary texts and of musical meaning.

It has often been claimed that the aim of semiotics is to establish a general theory of systems of signification. However, as Jean-Claude Coquet notes in a recent collection of essays, what distinguishes one school of semiotics from another is the initial definition given of sign. If, for certain semioticians, the sign is first of all an observable phenomenon, for the Paris School it is first of all a construct and this point of departure has crucial theoretical and practical consequences. The essays appearing in these two volumes are representative of recent work carried out by members of this semiotic school. Essays in Volume I study problems more closely related to theoretical issues, while Volume II focuses more specifically on various fields of application.