Subject collection: Philosophy (254 titles, 1969–2015)

The essays that are collected in Controversy and Confrontation provide a closer insight into the relationship between controversy and confrontation that deepens our understanding of the functioning of argumentative discourse in managing differences of opinion. Their authors stem from two backgrounds. First, the controversy scholars Dascal, Marras, Euli, Regner, Ferreira, and Lessl discuss historical controversies in science, both from a theoretical and an empirical perspective; Saim concentrates on a historical controversy; Fritz provides a historical perspective on controversies by analyzing communication principles. Second the argumentation scholars Johnson, van Laar, van Eemeren, Garssen and Meuffels address theoretical or empirical aspects of argumentative confrontation; Aakhus and Vasilyeva examine argumentative discourse from the perspective of conversation analysis; Jackson analyzes argumentative confrontation in a recent debate between scientists and politicians. Last but not least, two contributors, Kutrovátz and Zemplén, make an attempt to bridge the study of historical controversy and the study of argumentation.

The volume deals with the relationship between dialogue and rhetoric. The actual state of the art in dialogue analysis is characterized by a tendency to overcome the distinction between competence and performance and to combine components from both sides of the dichotomy, in a way which includes rules as well as inferences. The same is true of rhetoric: the guidelines proposed here no longer state that rationality and persuasion are mutually exclusive but suggest that they interact in what might be called the ‘mixed game’. The concept of a dialogic rhetoric thus poses the question of how to integrate the different voices. Part I of the volume assembles several ‘rhetorical paradigms’ which are applied to real-life performance. Part II on ‘rhetoric in the mixed game’ contains a selection of papers which illustrate the interaction of various components. The Round Table discussion in Part III brings proponents of different paradigms face to face with each other and shows how they justify their own positions and present arguments against rival paradigms.

Combining phenomenological insights from Brentano and Sartre, but also drawing on recent work on consciousness by analytic philosophers, this book defends the view that conscious states are reflexive, and necessarily so, i.e., that they have a built-in, “implicit” awareness of their own occurrence, such that the subject of a conscious state has an immediate, non-objectual acquaintance with it. As part of this investigation, the book also explores the relationship between reflexivity and the phenomenal, or “what-it-is-like,” dimension of conscious experience, defending the innovative thesis that phenomenal character is constituted by the implicit self-awareness built into every conscious state. This account stands in marked contrast to most influential extant theories of phenomenal character, including qualia theories, according to which phenomenal character is a matter of having phenomenal sensations, and representationalism, according to which phenomenal character is constituted by representational content. (Series A)

Controversies may be particularly prominent in one or another culture. Yet, there is hardly any culture where they do not exist. This book assumes that the practice of controversy, along with its theorization, constitutes – in each of the cultures and disciplines where it develops – a tradition. Whether there are enough shared elements in these traditions to consider them as, fundamentally, universal or not is something that can only be determined on the basis of a rich sample of controversies and theorizations thereof belonging to different traditions. This is what this volume provides to the reader. By presenting side by side controversies from the East and from the West, from the ancient past up to the present, from different domains of scholarship and action, the reader is in a position not only to admire the widespread nature, role, and richness of the phenomenon, but also to begin to evaluate its variety as well as universality. While the editors have purposefully avoided comparative studies of traditions of controversy, in order to focus on each tradition so to speak from its practitioners’ point of view, some of the chapters take a bird’s eye view and exemplify how such studies can be systematically conducted. In a world that is globalizing itself at a fast pace, the awareness of the multiplicity of traditions of controversy is fundamental for ensuring both that the integration of the various perspectives is harmonious and that each one of them is granted its place in a plural universe.

To understand a cat: methodology and philosophy rests on the realization that the everyday behavior of a cat (but other animals too) should be understood through a new approach, namely methodological dualism. It appeals to mechanistic explanation models and to mentalistic explanation models. It puts up the methodological idea that these models have to be combined in one theoretical structure according to the scientific game-rules. This approach shows that specific mentalistic explanations are generated from explanation models or schemes, which meet the demands of the scientific games-rules; and it proposes a new theoretical structure called the multi-explanation theory to generate particular theories, which provide us with efficient explanations for behavioral phenomena. The book delves deep into anthropomorphism, and the complex question of whether a cat has consciousness and free will, and examines the intricate relations of the mental, the computational, and the neurophysiological.(Series A)

What is it to have a concept? What is it to make an inference? What is it to be rational? On the basis of recent developments in semantics, a number of authors have embraced answers to these questions that have radically counterintuitive consequences, for example:

• One can rationally accept self-contradictory propositions (e.g.

Smith is a composer and Smith is not a composer). • Psychological states are causally inert: beliefs and desires do nothing.

• The mind cannot be understood in terms of folk-psychological concepts (e.g. belief, desire, intention).

• One can have a single concept without having any others: an otherwise conceptless creature could grasp the concept of justice or of the number seven.

• Thoughts are sentence-tokens, and thought-processes are driven by the syntactic, not the semantic, properties of those tokens.



In the first half of Conceptual Atomism and the Computational Theory of Mind, John-Michael Kuczynski argues that these implausible but widely held views are direct consequences of a popular doctrine known as content-externalism, this being the view that the contents of one’s mental states are constitutively dependent on facts about the external world. Kuczynski shows that content-externalism involves a failure to distinguish between, on the one hand, what is literally meant by linguistic expressions and, on the other hand, the information that one must work through to compute the literal meanings of such expressions.

The second half of the present work concerns the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM). Underlying CTM is an acceptance of conceptual atomism – the view that a creature can have a single concept without having any others – and also an acceptance of the view that concepts are not descriptive (i.e. that one can have a concept of a thing without knowing of any description that is satisfied by that thing). Kuczynski shows that both views are false, one reason being that they presuppose the truth of content-externalism, another being that they are incompatible with the epistemological anti-foundationalism proven correct by Wilfred Sellars and Laurence Bonjour. Kuczynski also shows that CTM involves a misunderstanding of terms such as “computation”, “syntax”, “algorithm” and “formal truth”; and he provides novel analyses of the concepts expressed by these terms. (Series A)

In this collective volume the origins, neurosocial support, and therapeutic implications of (pre)verbal intersubjectivity are examined with a focus on implications of the discovery of mirror neurons. Entailing a paradigmatic revolution in the intersection of developmental, social and neural sciences, two radical turnabouts are entailed. First, no longer can be upheld as valid Cartesian and Leibnizian assumptions about monadic subjects with disembodied minds without windows to each other except as mediated by culture. Supported by a mirror system, specified in this volume by some of the discoverers, modes of participant perception have now been identified which entail embodied simulation and co-movements with others in felt immediacy. Second, no longer can be retained the Piagetian attribution of infant egocentricity. Pioneers who have broken new research grounds in the study of newborns, protoconversation, and early speech perception document in the present volume infant capacity for interpersonal communion, empathic identification, and learning by altercentric participation. Pertinent new findings and results are presented on these topics:

(i) Origins and multiple layers of intersubjectivity and empathy

(ii) Neurosocial support of (pre)verbal intersubjectivity, participant perception, and simulation of mind

(iii) From preverbal sharing and early speech perception to meaning acquisition and verbal intersubjectivity

(iv) New windows on other-centred movements and moments of meeting in therapy and intervention. (Series B)

Social stimuli are important proximate determinants of human thought, action, and behaviour. But does the social environment also have deeper, profounder, and possibly more distal impact on more lasting psychological structures and forms, generalizing across time and domains, such as traits, self-consciousness, abilities, and talents? This volume takes an interdisciplinary approach to the question of if, how, and how far the mind is socially fabricated: Philosophical contributions address conceptual tools for analyses of how person perceivers shape the psychological structures of the person perceived. Social psychologists consider some of the more local mechanisms of “mind making”, including self fulfilling prophecies, attributions, and self-verification. Moreover, they address the dramatic consequences of being ostracised. From a clinical perspective it is investigated how patients’ immediate social environment (e.g., the family) impacts on schizophrenic relapse. In addition, developmental psychologists report on investigations of the role of social factors, e.g., imitative learning, for the development of the social self. Finally an ethological perspective demonstrates the susceptibility of animals to social stimuli. These papers were previously published as Interaction Studies 6:1 and 6:3 (2005).

One of the most lively and contentious issues in contemporary linguistic theory concerns the elusive boundary between semantics and pragmatics, and Professor Laurence R. Horn of Yale University has been at the center of that debate ever since his groundbreaking 1972 UCLA dissertation. This volume in honor of Horn brings together the best of current work at the semantics/pragmatics boundary from a neo-Gricean perspective. Featuring the contributions of 22 leading researchers, it includes papers on implicature (Kent Bach), inference (Betty Birner), presupposition (Barbara Abbott), lexical semantics (Georgia Green, Sally McConnell-Ginet, Steve Kleinedler & Randall Eggert), negation (Pauline Jacobson, Frederick Newmeyer, Scott Schwenter), polarity (Donka Farkas, Anastasia Giannakidou, Michael Israel), implicit variables (Greg Carlson & Gianluca Storto), definiteness (Barbara Partee), reference (Ellen Prince, Andrew Kehler & Gregory Ward), and logic (Jerrold Sadock, Francis Jeffry Pelletier & Andrew Hartline). These original papers represent not only a fitting homage to Larry Horn, but also an important contribution to semantic and pragmatic theory.