Subject collection: Philosophy (254 titles, 1969–2015)

Much is known about the grammar of the modistae and about its eclipse; this book sets out to trace its rise. In the late eleventh century grammar became an analytical rather than an exegetical discipline under the impetus of the new theology. Under the impetus of Arab learning the ancient sciences were reshaped according to the norms of Aristotle’s Analytics, and developed within a structure of speculative sciences beginning with grammar and culminating in theology. Though the modistae acknowledge Aristotle, Donatus, Priscian and the Arab commentators, their roots also lie in Augustine and Boethius, and they took as much from their scholastic contemporaries as they gave them. This book traces the genesis of a grammar which communicated freely with other speculative sciences, shared their structures and methods, and affirmed its own individuality by defining its object as the causes of language.

This study of the workings of neural networks in perception and understanding of situations and simple sentences shows that, and how, distributed conceptual constituents are bound together in episodes within an interactive/dynamic architecture of sensorial and pre-motor maps, and maps of conceptual indicators (semantic memory) and individuating indicators (historical, episodic memory). Activation circuits between these maps make sensorial and pre-motor fields in the brain function as episodic maps creating representations, which are expressions in consciousness. It is argued that all consciousness is episodic, consisting of situational or linguistic representations, and that the mind is the whole of all conscious manifestations of the brain. Thought occurs only in the form of linguistic or image representations. The book also discusses the role of consciousness in the relationship between causal and denotational semantics, and its role for the possibility of representations and rules. Four recent controversies in consciousness research are discussed and decided along this model of consciousness:

• Is consciousness an internal or external monitoring device of brain states?

• Do all conscious states involve thought and judgement?

• Are there different kinds of consciousness?

• Do we have a one-on-one correspondence between certain brain states and conscious states.



The book discusses also the role of consciousness in the relationship between causal and denotational semantics, and its role for the possibility of representations and rules. (Series A)

Any study of communication must take into account the nature and role of speech acts in a broad context. This book addresses questions such as:

- What do we mean?

- How do we say it? and

- How is it understood?

in the broad context of universal, socio-cultural and psychological issues that bear on human communication. It presents an overview of current issues in speech act theory that are at the center of human and social sciences dealing with language, thought and action, building on John Searle’s famous article ‘How Performatives Work’ (included in this book).

The contributions by linguists, psychologists, computer scientists, and philosophers thus address issues of communication that are crucial in conversation analysis, cognitive science, artificial intelligence, psychology and philosophy, and a general understanding of how we communicate.

The book is suitable for courses with an extensive bibliography for further reading and an Index.

Umbrüche ist keine lückenlose Darstellung aller Wendepunkte in der Philosophiegeschichte, sondern eine Sammlung von Beiträgen, die sowohl bekannte Neuanfänge als auch bislang wenig beachtete Denkbewegungen analysieren ­ bis hin zu Auseinandersetzungen mit Anregungen, die für sich selbst genommen Umbrüche bedeuten, als solche jedoch nicht historisch wirksam werden konnten. Folgende Autoren bzw. Themen werden berücksichtigt: die Sprach- und Erkenntnistheorie Platons, Naturphilosophie und Philosophiekritik bei Augustin, Meister Eckharts Predigt 21, wissenschaftstheoretische und ontologische Neuansätze bei Adam de Wodeham, Hervaeus Natalis und Wilhelm von Ockham, atheistische Tendenzen im 14. Jahrhundert, Niccolò Machiavellis politische Philosophie, philosophiehistorische Überlegungen zum Epochenbegriff, Kants kritische Transzendentalphilosophie und ihre Wende bei Fichte, die Bedeutung der Französischen Revolution für den Freiheitsbegriff Fichtes, die Vollendung des Anselmianischen Arguments durch Schellings Begriff des Überseienden, die Sprachphilosophie W. von Humboldts sowie die Dionysius-Pseudo-Areopagita-Rezeption bei Hugo Ball.

Beiträgen von: Burkhard Mojsisch; Arne Malmsheimer; Udo Reinhold Jeck; Franz-Bernhard Stammkötter; Jens Maassen; Christian Rode; Martin Lenz; Olaf Pluta; Bernhard Milz; Christiane Schultz; Christoph Asmuth; Annette Sell; Orrin F. Summerell; Klaus Kahnert; Matthias Bloch.The volume Umbrüche ­ the German word means “radical changes” ­ presents not a seamless account of the many turning points in the history of philosophy, but instead contributions individually reflecting on both well-known and little regarded crises in the development of philosophical thought, including some whose promise was never fully realized. At issue are the following authors and themes: Plato’s epistemology and theory of language, Augustine‘s philosophy of nature and his critique of philosophy, Meister Eckhart’s German sermon 21, Adam de Wodeham’s, Hervaeus Natalis’s and William of Ockham’s revolutionary theories of science and ontology; atheistic tendencies in the 14th century; Niccolò Machiavelli’s political philosophy; philosophical-historical deliberations on the concept of an ‘epoch’; Kant’s transcendental philosophy and its reception and change by Fichte; the significance of the French Revolution for Fichte’s concept of freedom; the culmination of the Anselmian argument in Schelling’s concept of what is ‘beyond being’; Wilhelm von Humboldt’s philosophy of language and Hugo Ball’s reception of Dionysius Pseudo-Areopagita.

Gemeinhin gilt der Platonische Dialog ‘Philosophos’, auf den Platon selbst im ‘Sophistes’ verweist, als verschollen. Eine genaue Analyse des ‘Theaitetos’ sowie der sog. Eleatischen Dialoge kann jedoch erweisen, dass Platon die Trilogie ‘Sophistes’, ‘Politikos’ und ‘Philosophos’ mit dem ‘Parmenides’ abschloss – dass der verschollene ‘Philosophos’ also mit dem existierenden 'Parmenides' identisch ist. Die dialektische Übung des ‘Parmenides’ führt dabei eine Art Subjektivitätsphilosophie vor, in der das Eine sich als menschliche Seele zeigt. Die Seele des Menschen lässt in der Vielheit ihrer Sätze und der dialogischen Einheit dieser Sätze Wirklichkeit überhaupt erst entstehen, ist in diesem subjektiven Entwurf von Welt aber immer auf die dialogische Prüfung eigener Vorstellungen durch den Anderen angewiesen.

Ein ganz anderes Verständnis des ‘Parmenides’ offenbart Marsilio Ficino in seinem ‘Parmenides’-Kommentar. Ficinos Exegese folgt im wesentlichen der des Proklos, so dass Wirklichkeit hier nicht als von der Seele entworfene, sondern als hierarchisch gestufte beschrieben wird. Das vorliegende Buch geht dieser Deutung nach, um sie schließlich als unhaltbar zurückzuweisen.

The Platonic dialogue ‘Philosophos’, which Plato himself mentions in the ‘Sophistes’, is usually considered to be a lost work. A detailed analysis of the ‘Theaitetos’ as well as the so-called Eleatic dialogues reveals that Plato completed the trilogy ‘Sophistes’, ‘Politikos’ and ‘Philosophos’ with the ‘Parmenides’ — hence, that the lost ‘Philosphos’ is identical with the existing ‘Parmenides’. The dialectical exercise of the ‘Parmenides’ demonstrates a kind of theory of subjectivity in which the One reveals itself to be the human soul. The human soul — through the multiplicity of its sentences and their dialogical unity — therefore creates reality. Nevertheless, the human soul is dependent on the examination of this very reality in dialogue with another.

In his ‘Parmenides’-commentary Marsilio Ficino shows a quite different understanding of the ‘Parmenides’. Ficino’s exegetical approach mainly follows Proclus’ commentary. As a result, reality is not described as a creation of the human soul — on the contrary, it appears to be a well-organised hierarchy. This volume analyzes Ficino’s argumentation and finally rejects it.

No single theoretician provoked a greater tradition of the reception of his thought throughout changing times and across diverse cultures than did Aristotle, and so Hegel, who calls him the ‘teacher of the human race’, well describes the man known for ages simply as ‘the philosopher’. The present volume examines from a philosophical-historical standpoint the intellect-theory of De Anima III 4-5, which stands in the center of the Aristotelian system and composes one of the most provocative Aristotelian theories. It concentrates on the critical engagement with Aristotle’s conception of nous in Theophrastus and his colleagues (Dicaearchus, Aristoxenus) and students (Demetrius of Phaleron, Menander, Erasistratus) in the Peripatos as well as in the Academic, Socratic, Epicurean and Stoic schools. The analysis of the relevant texts leads to a new assessment of Theophrastus’s philosophical-historical significance in the Aristotelian tradition and documents that in early Hellenism the Aristotelian theory itself played a surprisingly limited role, so that the loss of the original Aristotelian manuscripts as reported by Strabo and Plutarch — a matter hotly debated in recent studies — was of only marginal importance.Kein Theoretiker provozierte über eine ähnlich lange Zeitspanne eine so intensive, kontinuierliche und multikulturelle Rezeption wie Aristoteles. Die Geschichte der Philosophie verlangt es daher geradezu, unter der Perspektive der ebenso konstanten wie vielgestaltigen Auseinandersetzung mit “dem Philosophen” analysiert zu werden. Den geeignetsten Kristallisationspunkt hierfür stellt die in “De Anima” G 4-5 präsentierte Nous-Theorie dar, denn zum einen stand sie im Zentrum des aristotelischen “Systems”, zum anderen handelt es sich bei ihr um die mit gröîter Kontinuität, höchster Intensität und unterschiedlichsten Resultaten rezipierte philosophische Theorie überhaupt.

Der vorliegende Band thematisiert, im Anschluî am die “Topographie” der aristotelischen Noetik, die frühhellenistische Resonanz. Den ersten Schwerpunkt bildet Theophrasts philosophisch-kritische Auseinandersetzung mit der Nous-Konzeption seines Lehrers, den zweiten die “De Anima”-Rezeption in der damaligen Philosophie-Szene, die im wesentlichen durch drie Gruppen konstituiert wurde: Theophrasts Kollegen im “Peripatos” (Dikaiarch, Aristoxenos); Theophrasts eingene Hörerschaft (Demetrios v. Phaleron, Menander, Erasistratos); und die zahlreichte philosophische Konkurrenz: die “Akademiker”, “Sokratiker”, und die Schulen Epikurs bzw. Zenons. Die Analyse der relevanten Texte führt erstens zu einder grundsätzlichen Neubewertung der philosophiehistorischen Position Theophrasts. Zweitens dokumentiert sie, daî die aristotelische Theorie entgegen der heutigen opinio communis gerade im Frühhellenismus eine erstaunlich bescheidene Rolle spielte. Rezeptionsgeschichtlich kommt dem von Strabon/Plutarch berichteten und in der neueren Forschung heiîdiskutierten Verlust der aristotelischen Originalmanuscripte deshalb allenfalls eine sekondäre Bedeutung zu.

Together with its sister volume on Descriptive Cognitive Approaches, this volume explores the contribution which cognitive linguistics can make to the identification and analysis of overt and hidden ideologies. As a theory of language which sees language as the accumulation of the conventionalised conceptualisations of a given linguistic and/or cultural community or sub-group within it, cognitive linguistics is called upon to make its own inroads in the study of ideology. This volume offers theoretical approaches and first discusses the philosophical foundations of cognitive linguistics. The question whether cognitive linguistics is not an ideology itself is not tabooed. The speaker’s deictic centre is the anchoring point, not only for spatial, temporal or interactional deixis, but also for cultural and ideological deixis. Cognitive linguistics is also confronted with a severe Marxist critique, but the potential convergence between the two ‘philosophies’ is highlighted as well. Further the question is raised to what extent the central nervous system and the grammatical system of a language impose sexually biased, and hence ideological representations on cognition. Finally, linguistics itself is seen as a potential bearer of ideological deviations as was the case with the ‘politics of linguistics’ in Nazi Germany, and even with the quest for the Indo-European homeland in comparative and historical linguistics throughout the 19th century and well into the 20th century.

“Schelling has undergone his philosophical education before the public” — so G. W. F. Hegel in criticism of the novel systematic projects which his philosophical ally and later rival F. W. J. Schelling successively made public. Today, however, Hegel’s derisive judgment can be seen not to hold: Instead, it is much rather the case that Schelling’s productivity expresses the genuine continuity of his thought. Moreover, his thought is attractive precisely because it embodies an inconclusive — perhaps the never-ending — search for an abiding philosophical orientation in an ever more complex world.

Schelling — zwischen Fichte und Hegel / Schelling — Between Fichte and Hegel: The title both emphasizes the singularity of Schelling’s thought and recognizes its profound relation to that of his contemporaries. This volume, which connects the latest work in Fichte-, Hegel- and Schelling-studies, contains original contributions in English and German on Schelling’s philosophy from international group of researchers. “Schelling hat seine philosophische Ausbildung vor dem Publikum gemacht,” urteilte G. W. F. Hegel und tadelte damit die Folge von immer neuen philosophischen Entwürfen, mit denen Schelling vor die Öffentlichkeit trat. Aus heutiger Sicht muî Hegels Urteil in verschiedener Hinsicht revidiert werden: Einerseits ist das Schaffen Schellings durch klare Kontinuität geprägt; andererseits ist sein Produktionsprozeî unter einer modernen Perspektive von hoher Attraktivität, zeigt er doch sinnfällig die unabgeschlossene, vielleicht unabschlieîbare Suche nach einer philosophischen Orientierung in einer immer komplexer werdenden Welt.

Schelling — zwischen Fichte und Hegel / Schelling — Between Fichte and Hegel: Mit diesem Titel ist die Aufgabe verknüpft, die Singularität des Schellingschen Denkens herauszustellen sowie die vielfältigen Beziehungen zu seinen Zeitgenossen angemessen zu würdigen. Das Buch schlägt eine Brücke zwischen den neuesten Arbeiten der Fichte-, Hegel- und Schellingforschung. Dabei bleibt es stets fokussiert auf die Philosophie Schellings. Es konnte für dieses Buch eine internationale Autorenschaft gewonnen werden. Alle Beiträge — teils in deutscher, teils in englischer Sprache — sind speziell für diesen Band konzipiert.

The aim of this book is to present significant aspects of cognitive grammar by adopting an interdisciplinary approach. The book provides an interplay of contributions by some exponents of cognitive grammar (Langacker, Croft, Wood, Geeraerts, Kövecses, Wildgen), and philosophers of language (Albertazzi, Marconi, Peruzzi, Violi) who, in most cases, share a phenomenological and Gestalt approach to the problem of semantics.

The topics covered include themes that are central to the debate in cognitive grammar, such as, metaphor, construal operations, prototypicality, Gestalt schemes and field semantics. The book offers evidence to support the cognitive hypothesis in semantics and the existence of a close connection between the structures of perception and the categories of natural language.

Because of the approach employed, with its consideration of borderline aspects among semantics, linguistics, theoretical reflection and historical analysis, the book marks out a route for a philosophical inquiry complementary to a cognitive approach to the semantics of natural language.