The contingency of prophetic semantics in Walter Chatton’s Lectura

Abstract

This paper examines Walter Chatton’s discussion of the problem of prophesied future contingents in his Lectura super Sententias. Faced with the challenge of reconciling the supposedly veridical character of divine prophecy with human freedom to do otherwise, Chatton casts the relation of prophecy to event in the form of a logical consequentia and formulates two rules which depend on the character of the antecedent in question. In the case of antecedents involving divine knowledge and related phenomena, the freedom of the wayfarer to do otherwise is secured by the assumption that the consequence is necessary but the antecedent is semantically contingent. In the case of concrete utterances and phenomena, on the other hand, the wayfarer’s freedom is secured by the assumption that the consequence itself is contingent. Chatton’s treatment, while analytically subtle and rigorous, leaves a number of important questions unanswered, most notably that of the ontological openness or closure of the future. Nevertheless, it is interesting both in its own right and insofar as it provides a clarifying source for Chatton’s later discussion of the same topic in his Quodlibet.