1887
Volume 1, Issue 1
  • ISSN 1566-5836
  • E-ISSN: 1569-9706
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Abstract

How are the states of consciousness intrinsically so that they all qualify as “feelings” in William James’s generic sense? Only a small, propaedeutic part of what is required to address the intrinsic nature of such states can be accomplished here. I restrict my topic mainly to a certain characteristic that belongs to each of those pulses of mentality that successively make up James’s stream of consciousness. Certain statements of James’s are intended to pick out the variable “width” belonging to a stream of consciousness as it flows. Attention to this proposed property brings me to a discussion of (a) the unitary character of each of the states of consciousness however complex they may frequently be and (b) how to conceive of their complexity without recourse to a misleading spatial metaphor.
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/content/journals/10.1075/ce.1.1.08nat
2000-01-01
2019-10-21
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References

http://instance.metastore.ingenta.com/content/journals/10.1075/ce.1.1.08nat
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  • Article Type: Research Article
Keyword(s): consciousness , ego , feeling , intentionality , self , stream of consciousness and unconscious
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