1887
Volume 4, Issue 1
  • ISSN 1566-5836
  • E-ISSN: 1569-9706
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Abstract

This paper has two aims: (1) to point the way towards a novel alternative to cognitive theories of emotion, and (2) to delineate a number of different functions that the emotions play in cognition, functions that become visible from outside the framework of cognitive theories. First, I hold that the Higher Order Representational (HOR) theories of consciousness — as generally formulated — are inadequate insofar as they fail to account for selective attention. After posing this dilemma, I resolve it in such a manner that the following thesis arises: the emotions play a key role in shaping selective attention. This thesis is in accord with A. Damasio’s (1994) noteworthy neuroscientific work on emotion. I then begin to formulate an alternative to cognitive theories of emotion, and I show how this new account has implications for the following issues: face recognition, two brain disorders (Capgras’ and Fregoli syndrome), the frame problem in A.I., and the research program of affective computing.
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/content/journals/10.1075/ce.4.1.06meg
2003-01-01
2019-10-18
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References

http://instance.metastore.ingenta.com/content/journals/10.1075/ce.4.1.06meg
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