1887
Volume 7, Issue 1-2
  • ISSN 0302-5160
  • E-ISSN: 1569-9781
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Abstract

SUMMARYAt the theoretical level, Ockham's semantics does not show much interest in the demonstratives. It suggests that they are reducible to proper names and that mental discourse, which is logically pure, does not need them. In practice however, it systematically calls them to task in some of the most delicate parts of the theory, for instance in the definitions of "genus", "significare", "suppo-sitio", in the theory of suppositio personalis and in the theory of induction, whenever it strives to establish a direct and immediate link between the domain of signs, to which generality is confined, and the ontological domain, where only individuals exist. This discrepancy can be explained in the following way. On the one part, Ockhamism is bound up with the grammatical tradition according to which pronouns are substitutes for nouns. On the other hand, its own internal logic requires a special category of signs — here called "direct designators"—of which it does not give the theory and which closely correspond to the logically proper names of Russell's logical atomism; in ordinary language, to which Ockham limits himself, it is precisely demonstratives that are the most akin to these direct designators, and that is why Ockham spontaneously uses their services. In practice demonstratives thus make a linguistic pendant to the intuitive apprehension theoretically envisaged in Ockham's epistemology.RÉSUMÉSur le plan theorique, la semantique de Guillaume d'Occam n'accorde pas aux pronoms demonstratifs beaucoup d'interet. Elle laisse soupÇonner qu'au niveau du discours mental — qui est logiquement pur —, ils sont reductibles aux noms propres. Sur le plan operatoire cependant, Occam recourt systematique-ment a leurs services dans certains des passages les plus delicats de la theorie semantique, notamment dans les definitions de "genus", "significare", "suppo-sitio", dans la theorie de la suppositio personalis et dans la theorie de l'induc-tion, la ou il s'agit d'e'tablir, entre le domaine des signes, ou se trouve confinee la generalite, et le domaine ontologique, habite seulement par des individus, un lien direct et immediat. Cet ecart peut s'expliquer de la facon suivante. D'une part, l'occamisme est tributaire de la tradition grammaticale pour laquelle les pronoms ne sont que les substituts des noms. D'autre part il a besoin, de par sa logique interne, d'une categorie speciale de signes — appeles ici des designa-teurs directs - dont il ne donne pas la theorie et qui correspondent etroitement aux "noms propres logiques" de l'atomisme logique de Russell; dans le langage ordinaire, auquel Occam se limite, ce sont précisément les demonstratifs qui sont le plus apparentes a ces designateurs directs, et c'est pourquoi Occam fait spontanement appel a eux. Les demonstratifs constituent ainsi en pratique le pendant linguistique de l'apprehension intuitive theorisee dans la gnoseolo-gie occamiste.
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/content/journals/10.1075/hl.7.1-2.14pan
1980-01-01
2019-09-21
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References

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  • Article Type: Research Article
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