Volume 9, Issue 3
  • ISSN 2211-4742
  • E-ISSN: 2211-4750
Buy:$35.00 + Taxes



This article moves from the premise that a bilateral relationship between law and economics requires the contribution of the theory of legal argumentation. The article shows that, to be legally relevant, economic consequences have to be incorporated into interpretive arguments. In this regard, the jurisprudential preface strategy proposed by Craswell goes in the right direction, but begs the question of why the legally relevant consequences have to be assessed in terms of total welfare maximization instead of, in the EU context at least, consumer welfare maximization. After having identified five points of divergence between total and consumer welfare approaches, the article draws from legal inferentialism to propose an analytical tool – the explanatory scorekeeping model – for assessing the explanatory power of these two approaches. The model is then applied to the reasoning in .


Article metrics loading...

Loading full text...

Full text loading...


  1. Alchourrón, Carlos E. and Eugenio Bulygin
    1971Normative Systems. Wien: Springer. 10.1007/978‑3‑7091‑7118‑9
    https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7091-7118-9 [Google Scholar]
  2. Alexy, Robert
    1978Theorie der juristischen Argumentation. Die Theorie des rationalen Diskurses als Theorie der juristischen Begründung. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
    [Google Scholar]
  3. Armour, John , Henry Hansmann , Reiner Kraakman and Mariana Pargendler
    2017 What Is Corporate Law?In R. Kraakman . The Anatomy of Corporate Law, 3rd ed.Oxford: Oxford University Press. 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198739630.003.0001
    https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198739630.003.0001 [Google Scholar]
  4. Averitt, Neil W. and Robert H. Lande
    1997 Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory of Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law. Antitrust Law Journal65: 713–756.
    [Google Scholar]
  5. Ayal, Adi
    2014Fairness in Antitrust: Protecting the Strong from the Weak. Oxford: Hart Publishing.
    [Google Scholar]
  6. Brandom, Robert
    1994Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press.
    [Google Scholar]
  7. 2000Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press.
    [Google Scholar]
  8. Beccaria, Cesare
    1764Dei delitti e delle pene. Livorno: Marco Coltellini.
    [Google Scholar]
  9. Beck, Gunnar
    2013The Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU. Oxford: Hart Publishing.
    [Google Scholar]
  10. Bengoetxea, Joxerramon
    1993The Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice: Towards a European Jurisprudence. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    [Google Scholar]
  11. Bridgeman, Curtis
    2009 Contracts as Plans. University of Illinois Law Review2009: 341–401.
    [Google Scholar]
  12. Buchanan, James M.
    1974 Good Economics. Bad Law. Virginia Law Review60: 483–492. 10.2307/1072438
    https://doi.org/10.2307/1072438 [Google Scholar]
  13. Calabresi, Guido
    1970The Cost of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis. New Haven: Yale University Press.
    [Google Scholar]
  14. 2016The Future of Law and Economics. Essays in Reform and Recollection. New Haven: Yale University Press.
    [Google Scholar]
  15. Canale, Damiano and Giovanni Tuzet
    2005 Interpretive Scorekeeping. In R. Guastini and P. Comanducci (eds.), Analisi e diritto 2005, pp.81–97. Turin: Giappichelli.
    [Google Scholar]
  16. 2007 On Legal Inferentialism. Toward a Pragmatics of Semantic Content in Legal Interpretation?Ratio Juris20: 32–44. 10.1111/j.1467‑9337.2007.00345.x
    https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9337.2007.00345.x [Google Scholar]
  17. 2008 On the Contrary: Inferential Analysis and Ontological Assumptions of the A Contrario Argument. Informal Logic28: 31–43. 10.22329/il.v28i1.512
    https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v28i1.512 [Google Scholar]
  18. 2009 The A Simili Argument: An Inferentialist Setting. Ratio Juris22: 499–509. 10.1111/j.1467‑9337.2009.00437.x
    https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9337.2009.00437.x [Google Scholar]
  19. 2010 What is the Reason for This Rule? An Inferential Account of the Ratio Legis. Argumentation24: 197–210. 10.1007/s10503‑009‑9171‑x
    https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-009-9171-x [Google Scholar]
  20. 2011 Use and Abuse of Intratextual Argumentation in Law. Cogency. Journal of Reasoning and Argumentation3: 33–52.
    [Google Scholar]
  21. 2016 What the Legislature Did Not Say. Legislative Intentions and Counterfactuals in Legal Argumentation. Journal of Argumentation in Context5: 249–270. 10.1075/jaic.5.3.02can
    https://doi.org/10.1075/jaic.5.3.02can [Google Scholar]
  22. Carbonell, Flavia
    2013 Reasoning by Consequences: Applying Different Argumentation Structures to the Analysis of Consequentialist Reasoning in Judicial Decisions. In C. Dahlman and E. Feteris (eds.), Legal Argumentation Theory: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives, pp.1–19. Dordrecht: Springer. 10.1007/978‑94‑007‑4670‑1_1
    https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4670-1_1 [Google Scholar]
  23. Coleman, Jules L.
    2001The Practice of Principle: In Defence of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    [Google Scholar]
  24. Craswell, Richard
    1993 Default Rules, Efficiency, and Prudence. Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal3: 289–302.
    [Google Scholar]
  25. Cseres, Katherine
    2007 The Controversies of the Consumer Welfare Standard. The Competition Law Review3: 121–173.
    [Google Scholar]
  26. Cserne, Peter
    2012 Consequence-Based Arguments in Legal Reasoning: A Jurisprudential Preface to Law and Economics. In K. Mathis (ed.), Efficiency, Sustainability, and Justice to Future Generations, pp.31–54. Berlin: Springer. 10.1007/978‑94‑007‑1869‑2_2
    https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1869-2_2 [Google Scholar]
  27. Demsetz, Harold
    1969 Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint. The Journal of Law & Economics12: 1–22. 10.1086/466657
    https://doi.org/10.1086/466657 [Google Scholar]
  28. Driesen, David and Richard P. Malloy
    2017 Critiques of Law and Economics. In F. Parisi (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    [Google Scholar]
  29. Dworkin, Ronald
    1980 Is Wealth a Value?The Journal of Legal Studies9(2): 191–226. 10.1086/467636
    https://doi.org/10.1086/467636 [Google Scholar]
  30. Epstein, Richard A.
    2013 Harmonization, Heterogeneity and Regulation: CESL, the Lost Opportunity for Constructive Harmonization. Common Market Law Review50: 207–224.
    [Google Scholar]
  31. Esposito, Fabrizio
    2013 Alcune note su di un approccio economico ordinalista allo studio del diritto. Ars Interpretandi 2013/2: 151–183.
    [Google Scholar]
  32. 2016 Efficienza paretiana ed efficienza allocativa. Considerazioni teoriche per giuseconomisti. Materiali per una storia della cultura giuridica 2016/1: 225–236.
    [Google Scholar]
  33. 2017a Alcune note sui disaccordi teorico-interdisciplinari del diritto con l’economia. Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia del Diritto 2017/1: 91–117.
    [Google Scholar]
  34. 2017b How The Behavioural Turn In Law And Economics Vindicates The New Haven School. Oeconomia7(3): 375–406. 10.4000/oeconomia.2756
    https://doi.org/10.4000/oeconomia.2756 [Google Scholar]
  35. 2018 Law and Economics United in Diversity: Minimalism, Fairness, and Consumer Welfare in EU Antitrust and Consumer Law (PhD Thesis). Fiesole: European University Institute.
  36. 2020 Reverse Engineering Legal Reasoning. In P. Cserne and F. Esposito (eds.), Economics in Legal Reasoning, pp.139–154. London: Palgrave. 10.1007/978‑3‑030‑40168‑9_9
    https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40168-9_9 [Google Scholar]
  37. . Forthcoming. Uniting Law and Economics in Diversity. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
    [Google Scholar]
  38. Esposito, Fabrizio and Lucila De Almeida
    2017 A Shocking Truth for Law and Economics: Consumer Welfare Explains the Internal Market for Electricity Better Than Total Welfare. In K. Mathis and B. Huber (eds.), Energy Law and Economics in Europe, pp.101–133. Cham: Springer.
    [Google Scholar]
  39. Esposito, Fabrizio and Stefan Grundmann
    2017 Investor-Consumer or Overall Welfare: Searching for the Paradigm of Recent Reforms in Financial Services Contracts. EUI Law Department Research Paper Series 2017/5.
    [Google Scholar]
  40. Feteris, Eveline
    2005 The Rational Reconstruction of Argumentation Referring to Consequences and Purposes in the Application of Legal Rules: A Pragma-Dialectical Perspective. Argumentation19: 459–470. 10.1007/s10503‑005‑0512‑0
    https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-005-0512-0 [Google Scholar]
  41. Garoupa, Nuno , Carlos Gómez Ligüerre and Lela Mélon
    2017Legal Origins and the Efficiency Dilemma. London: Routledge.
    [Google Scholar]
  42. Geradin, Damien , Anne Layne-Farrar and Nicholas Petit
    2012EU Competition Law and Economics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    [Google Scholar]
  43. Jolls, Christine , Cass R. Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler
    1998 Theories and Tropes: A Reply to Posner and Kelman. Stanford Law Review50: 1593–1608. 10.2307/1229307
    https://doi.org/10.2307/1229307 [Google Scholar]
  44. Kaplow, Louis
    2012 On the Choice of Welfare Standards in Competition Law. In D. Zimmer (ed.), The Goals of Competition Law, pp.3–26. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 10.4337/9780857936615.00007
    https://doi.org/10.4337/9780857936615.00007 [Google Scholar]
  45. Kaplow, Louis and Steven Shavell
    2002Fairness versus Welfare. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press.
    [Google Scholar]
  46. Kraus, Jody S.
    2001 Reconciling Autonomy and Efficiency in Contract Law: The Vertical Integration Strategy. Philosophical Issues11: 420–441. 10.1111/j.1758‑2237.2001.tb00052.x
    https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1758-2237.2001.tb00052.x [Google Scholar]
  47. Landes, William M.
    1983 Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations. The University of Chicago Law Review50: 652–678. 10.2307/1599506
    https://doi.org/10.2307/1599506 [Google Scholar]
  48. MacCormick, Neil and Richard S. Summers
    (eds.) 1991Interpreting Statutes: A Comparative Study. Aldershot: Dartmouth.
    [Google Scholar]
  49. Monti, Giorgio
    2007EC Competition Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 10.1017/CBO9780511805523
    https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511805523 [Google Scholar]
  50. Navarro, Pablo E. and Jorge L. Rodríguez
    2014Deontic Logic and Legal Systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 10.1017/CBO9781139032711
    https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139032711 [Google Scholar]
  51. Nazzini, Renato
    2011The Foundations of European Union Competition Law: The Objective and Principles of Article 102. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226153.001.0001
    https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226153.001.0001 [Google Scholar]
  52. Ogus, Anthony
    2010 Law And Economics in The Legal Academy, or, What I Should Have Said to Discipulus. University of Toronto Law Journal60: 169–175. 10.3138/utlj.60.2.169
    https://doi.org/10.3138/utlj.60.2.169 [Google Scholar]
  53. Papayannis, Diego M.
    2013 Spiegazione funzionale e analisi concettuale. Sull’incidenza dei modelli economici nello studio della pratica giuridica. Ars interpretandi 2013/2: 69–109.
    [Google Scholar]
  54. Patterson, Dennis
    2005 Interpretation in Law. San Diego Law Review42: 685–709.
    [Google Scholar]
  55. Posner, Richard A.
    1979 Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law. The University of Chicago Law Review46: 281–306. 10.2307/1599454
    https://doi.org/10.2307/1599454 [Google Scholar]
  56. 1985 Wealth Maximization Revisited. Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy2(1): 85–105.
    [Google Scholar]
  57. 2001Antitrust Law, 2nd ed.Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 10.7208/chicago/9780226675787.001.0001
    https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226675787.001.0001 [Google Scholar]
  58. 2015 Norms and Values in the Economic Approach to Law. In A. Hatzis and N. Mercuro (eds.), Law and Economics: Philosophical Issues and Fundamental Questions, pp.1–15. London: Routledge. 10.4324/9781315730882‑1
    https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315730882-1 [Google Scholar]
  59. Sankari, Suvi
    2013European Court of Justice Legal Reasoning in Context. Amsterdam: Europa Law Publishing.
    [Google Scholar]
  60. Sarmiento, Daniel
    2012 The Silent Lamb and the Deaf Wolves: Constitutional Pluralism, Preliminary References and the Role of Silent Judgments in EU Law. In M. Avbelj and J. Komárek (eds.), Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond, pp.285–317. Oxford: Hart.
    [Google Scholar]
  61. Smith, Adam
    2007An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of The Wealth of Nations. Hampshire, UK: Harriman House. Original ed. 1776.
    [Google Scholar]
  62. Tuori, Karlo
    2015European Constitutionalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 10.1017/CBO9781316091883
    https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316091883 [Google Scholar]
  63. Tuzet, Giovanni
    2019 Calabresi and Mill: Bilateralism, Moral Externalities and Value Pluralism. Global Jurist19(3): 1–8. 10.1515/gj‑2019‑0012
    https://doi.org/10.1515/gj-2019-0012 [Google Scholar]
  64. von Wright, Georg H.
    1963Norm and Action. A Logical Enquiry. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
    [Google Scholar]
  65. Walton, Douglas
    2009 Dialectical Shifts Underlying Arguments from Consequences. Informal Logic29: 54–83. 10.22329/il.v29i1.684
    https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v29i1.684 [Google Scholar]
  66. Wils, Wouter P. J.
    2006 Optimal Antitrust Fines: Theory and Practice. World Competition29(2): 183–208.
    [Google Scholar]
  67. Wróblewski, Jerzy
    1974 Legal Syllogism and Rationality of Judicial Decision. Rechtstheorie5: 33–46.
    [Google Scholar]
  68. Zamir, Eyal and Doron Teichman
    2018Behavioural Law and Economics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 10.1093/oso/9780190901349.001.0001
    https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190901349.001.0001 [Google Scholar]
  69. Zhou, Qi
    2017 What Can Economists Learn from Contract Lawyers?In S. E. Weishaar , N. Phillipsen and W. Xu (eds.), Regulatory Reform in China and the UK. A Law and Economics Perspective, pp.117–138. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 10.4337/9781785368547.00012
    https://doi.org/10.4337/9781785368547.00012 [Google Scholar]
This is a required field
Please enter a valid email address
Approval was successful
Invalid data
An Error Occurred
Approval was partially successful, following selected items could not be processed due to error