1887
Volume 5, Issue 1
  • ISSN 1566-5852
  • E-ISSN: 1569-9854
USD
Buy:$35.00 + Taxes

Abstract

In Presumptive Meanings: The Theory of Conversational Implicature, Levinson (2000) argues that in historical as well as synchronic work there is need to distinguish three types of pragmatic principles, which he labels the Q-, M-, and I- “heuristics”. This is in contrast to Horn (1984), who argues for two types of “principles”: Q- and R-. In the present paper I argue that the proposed distinction between Q- and M- Heuristics is not necessary or consistently maintainable. Two of Levinson’s examples are considered: the development of anaphora (reflexive -self in English), and constraints on innovations in word formation (e.g. informer/informant). The conclusion is that a single heuristic (Q) is adequate, as proposed by Horn.
Loading

Article metrics loading...

/content/journals/10.1075/jhp.5.1.02clo
2004-01-01
2019-10-21
Loading full text...

Full text loading...

References

http://instance.metastore.ingenta.com/content/journals/10.1075/jhp.5.1.02clo
Loading
  • Article Type: Research Article
This is a required field
Please enter a valid email address
Approval was successful
Invalid data
An Error Occurred
Approval was partially successful, following selected items could not be processed due to error