1887
Volume 3, Issue 3
  • ISSN 2210-4119
  • E-ISSN: 2210-4127
USD
Buy:$35.00 + Taxes

Abstract

In recent years, the standard account of epistemic modal discourse has been criticized from two directions. Expressivists and dynamic semanticists argue that simple epistemic modal sentences should be understood as non-truth-conditional. Relativists hold that the truth values of epistemic modal sentences are determined by the features of their contexts of assessment. I argue below that one can integrate the core insights of these critical stances without falling into contradiction.
Loading

Article metrics loading...

/content/journals/10.1075/ld.3.3.05vec
2013-01-01
2019-12-15
Loading full text...

Full text loading...

References

http://instance.metastore.ingenta.com/content/journals/10.1075/ld.3.3.05vec
Loading
  • Article Type: Research Article
Keyword(s): content , epistemic modals , integration , meaning , non-truth-conditional frameworks and semantic relativism
This is a required field
Please enter a valid email address
Approval was successful
Invalid data
An Error Occurred
Approval was partially successful, following selected items could not be processed due to error