1887
Volume 31, Issue 1
  • ISSN 0929-0907
  • E-ISSN: 1569-9943
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Abstract

Abstract

Prior research shows mixed findings regarding individuals’ belief-revision strategies. The current research is aimed to test (a) whether individuals’ reasoning across abstract vs real-world content shows similarity, and (b) whether individuals’ syllogistic reasoning predicts their belief-revision strategies. Experiment 1, testing 76 participants (50 females), provides evidence for the similarity in reasoning across abstract and real-world content ( < .05). In Experiment 2, testing 84 participants (58 females), we find no significant effect of reasoning performance on belief-revision strategies ( > .05). Individuals seem to revise the conditional statement in the AC and DA inferences, especially when the content poses a threat. In contrast, individuals prefer to revise the categorical premise in the MT inferences, especially when the content poses a threat. These findings suggest that in the face of inconsistency individuals’ decision about which of their prior beliefs they should revise is influenced by the structure and content of the belief-contravening problem rather than their reasoning ability.

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2024-10-11
2024-11-09
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