1887
The Emergence of Consciousness: A top-down, social phenomenon?
  • ISSN 0929-0907
  • E-ISSN: 1569-9943
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Abstract

In this review article I examine Michel Tye’s recent reassessment of the phenomenal concept strategy. The phenomenal concept strategy is employed in the attempts to respond to the classical arguments that challenge materialism. I examine Tye’s reasons for abandoning the phenomenal concept strategy (a strategy that he himself advocated in his earlier writings), and I examine the elements of his new position according to which the materialist response should involve ‘singular when filled’ content schema, as well as a version of the Russellian distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. In the final part I criticize the adequacy of Tye’s theory not as a response to the dualists but rather as a response to opponents of representationalism from the materialist camp.
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/content/journals/10.1075/pc.18.3.08sen
2010-01-01
2019-12-16
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References

http://instance.metastore.ingenta.com/content/journals/10.1075/pc.18.3.08sen
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