1887
Volume 2, Issue 1
  • ISSN 0929-0907
  • E-ISSN: 1569-9943
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Abstract

The idea that human thought requires the execution of mental algorithms provides a foundation for research programs in cognitive science, which are largely based upon the computational conception of language and mentality. Consideration is given to recent work by Penrose, Searle, and Cleland, who supply various grounds for disputing computationalism. These grounds in turn qualify as reasons for preferring a non-computational, semiotic approach, which can account for them as predictable manifestations of a more adquate conception. Thinking does not ordinarily require the execution of mental algorithms, which appears to be at best no more than one rather special kind of thinking.
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/content/journals/10.1075/pc.2.1.01fet
1994-01-01
2019-10-15
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References

http://instance.metastore.ingenta.com/content/journals/10.1075/pc.2.1.01fet
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  • Article Type: Research Article
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