1887
Volume 21, Issue 1
  • ISSN 0929-0907
  • E-ISSN: 1569-9943
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Abstract

The coupling-constitution fallacy claims that arguments for extended cognition involve the inference of “x and y constitute z” from “x is coupled to y” and that such inferences are fallacious. We argue that the coupling-constitution fallacy fails in its goal to undermine the hypothesis of extended cognition: appeal to the coupling-constitution fallacy to rule out possible empirical counterexamples to intracranialism is fallacious. We demonstrate that appeals to coupling-constitution worries are problematic by constructing the fallacious argument against the hypothesis of extended cognition. We consider several objections to our argument and find them insufficient to rebut our conclusion.
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/content/journals/10.1075/pc.21.1.08kag
2013-01-01
2019-10-23
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References

http://instance.metastore.ingenta.com/content/journals/10.1075/pc.21.1.08kag
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  • Article Type: Research Article
Keyword(s): Coupling-constitution fallacy , extended cognition and intracranialism
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