1887
New Theoretical Insights into Untruthfulness
  • ISSN 0929-0907
  • E-ISSN: 1569-9943
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Abstract

This paper addresses the following three claims that Frankfurt makes about the concept of bullshit:

1. Bullshit requires the intention to deceive others.

2. Bullshit does not constitute lying (bullshit is “short of lying”).

3. The essence of bullshit is lack of concern with the truth of what one says.

I offer counterexamples to all three claims. By way of defending my counterexamples, I examine Cohen’s distinction between bullshiting and bullshit and argue that my examples are indeed cases of bullshiting that Frankfurt’s analysis is intended to cover. My examples of bullshitters who are very concerned to say only things that are true show that Frankfurt is mistaken in claiming that the “essence” of bullshit is lack of concern with the truth of what one says.

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/content/journals/10.1075/pc.23.1.03car
2016-09-26
2019-12-11
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References

http://instance.metastore.ingenta.com/content/journals/10.1075/pc.23.1.03car
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  • Article Type: Research Article
Keyword(s): bullshit , Cohen , deception , Frankfurt , lying and truth (concern for)
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