Volume 9, Issue 2
  • ISSN 1877-9751
  • E-ISSN: 1877-976X
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Two fundamental problems remain unsolved: “what counts as experiential basis, [or] … what the typology of experiential bases might be” (Grady, Taub & Morgan, 1996), and the concrete-abstract distinction (Gibbs, 1996). The paper distinguishes between concrete entities as material, and abstract as non-material. In the material domain, we claim that the object schema is the ultimate, i.e. subject to no further metaphorization, source domain. All other domains depend on the object.We analyse expressions referring to the abstract entities THOUGHT, FEAR and RACE (contest), and discuss neuroembryological evidence, psychological issues, the Great Chain of Being and Kotarbiński’s reism. In consequence of the sharp distinction between material and non-material entities, a new typology of metaphors is proposed: metonymy-based, concrete-to-abstract and abstract-to-abstract metaphors.We suggest that in this order, the metaphorical processes may reflect the phylogenetic development of concrete-to-abstract thought. Furthermore, concrete-to-abstract metaphorization (objectification1), may have played the greatest role in the development of abstract thinking, through identifying, conceptualizing and assigning language expressions to abstract entities.


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