Belgian Journal of Linguistics - Volume 28, Issue 1, 2014

Based on natural language use, we examine the contextual environment of some negative constructions (e.g., Punctuality is not her forte/best attribute). Previous findings show that, as predicted by the view of default nonliteral interpretations, such negative constructions are interpreted nonliterally by default: (a) when presented in isolation, they are interpreted sarcastically and rated as sarcastic compared to affirmative counterparts; (b) when embedded in equally strongly biasing contexts, they are processed faster in sarcastically than in literally biasing contexts (Giora et al., 2013; Giora, Drucker et al., 2014). Here we test a third prediction that, unlike affirmative sarcasm, (c) such negative utterances will convey a sarcastic interpretation and their natural environment will echo their nonsalient (sarcastic) interpretation rather than their salience-based (literal) interpretation (Giora et al., 2010, 2013). Findings from 2 corpus-based studies of (Hebrew and English) negative constructions lend usage-based support to the view of default nonliteral interpretations (Giora et al., 2010, 2013; Giora, Drucker et al., 2014). They show that when occurring in natural discourses, such utterances communicate sarcasm significantly more often than their alternative affirmatives. Their neighboring utterances further reflect their nonsalient sarcastic interpretation rather than their salience-based nonsarcastic interpretation.

How realistic is it to assume that psychologists, linguists, philosophers and others may someday be able to construct a general theory of utterance interpretation? Over the past 50 years, scholars have uncovered a tremendous amount about the processes and products of human language understanding. We have proposed a huge assortment of theories to explain how very specific types of utterances may be interpreted (e.g., syntactically ambiguous expressions, figurative language, pragmatic implicatures), with some of us working hard to articulate more comprehensive theories that could be applicable to all aspects of utterance interpretation. Yet the empirical data reveals many complexities that, on the surface, make some doubt whether a general theory of utterance interpretation is a feasible possibility. This paper describes some of these complexities in the empirical literature, focusing on figurative language use. I go on to argue that language scholars must embrace the diverse ways that people use and understand utterances and suggest concrete steps that we all should take if we are to one day find a more general theory, one which is perhaps tied to how people engage in any intentional action.

Standard accounts of indirect speech share two assumptions: that indirect speech always has a direct alternative, and that it is strategic. I survey a number of cases that challenge one or both of these assumptions and propose a new nomenclature for indirect speech that crucially includes, in addition to cases where indirect speech is strategic, cases where it is ‘enabling.’ The enabling potential of indirect speech lies in allowing us to give voice to thoughts or experiences that may be possible to express propositionally only in part. In such cases, the speaker does not start off with a direct alternative in mind but rather uses speech to invite the hearer to help her develop an inchoate thought. Including these cases under the same scheme allows us to consider ways other than recognition of the speaker’s intention in which indirect meanings may arise, such as through shared experience and the interlocutors’ habitus. The proposed nomenclature thus yields a multi-faceted view of indirect speech that goes beyond its current, formally driven, understanding.

The assumption that pragmatic processes are inferential is standardly held by Gricean and post-Gricean pragmatic theories. Recently, however, it has been challenged by accessibility-based approaches to pragmatics. Recanati (2002, 2004) proposes that primary pragmatic processes (i.e. processes that contribute to the recovery of the explicit content of the utterance) are underpinned by a simple dynamics of activations-and-associations, with no need for any further (specifically inferential) step or ‘confirmatory stage’ to warrant the selected interpretation. Mazzone (2009, 2011) extends this account to secondary pragmatic processes (i.e. processes of implicature derivation): the recovery of the explicit and implicit content of the utterance is the result of a unified associative comprehension process. This paper argues that, on close analysis, the role played by information about the speaker’s mental states (i.e. her beliefs and intentions) indicates that inference is indispensable in an adequate account of pragmatic processing.

In recent years, a lively debate has emerged about the question of correctly defining lying. Two strands of argumentation have evolved in the philosophy of language: First, the idea that lying is not necessarily connected to an intention of the speaker to deceive the hearer (e.g., Carson 2010); second, the idea that there is a fundamental distinction between lying and mere misleading (e.g., Saul 2012). This paper deals with both assumptions from the vantage point of the semantics-pragmatics interface and relates them to the question of how it is possible to lie while drawing on implicit content of an utterance. It is argued that lying necessarily involves an intention to deceive and that many cases of misleading are either cases of misunderstanding or cases of untruthful implicature (Meibauer 2014a).