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Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter - Volume 13, Issue 1, 2008
Volume 13, Issue 1, 2008
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The moral intellectualism of Plato’s Socrates: The case of the Hippias Minor
Author(s): Oded Balabanpp.: 1–14 (14)More LessCommentators do not take Socrates’ theses in the Hippias Minor seriously. They believe it is an aporetic dialogue and even that Socrates does not mean what he says. Hence they are unable to understand the presuppositions behind Socrates’ two interconnected theses: that those who do wrong and lie voluntarily are better than those who do wrong unintentionally, and that no one does wrong and lies voluntarily. Arguing that liars are better than the unenlightened, Socrates concludes that there are no liars. Instead, there are only those who know and those who don’t. The unenlightened cannot lie, and alien volitions, desires, or emotions are unlikely to mislead and deceive those who know, i. e., the wise. Why, then, is a thinker like Socrates ready to defy the experience and moral convictions of his contemporaries and even our own to such an extent?
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Das Lachen der thrakischen Magd: Über die ›Weltfremdheit‹ der Philosophie
Author(s): Christina Schüespp.: 15–31 (17)More LessThe laughter of the Thracian handmaid. About the ›unworldliness‹ of philosophy. Interpreting Plato’s story of the Thracian handmaid, this essay focuses on questions concerning the supposition of an opposition between common sense and philosophical thinking. Taking the laughter of the maid seriously the author discusses the role of laughter for Plato’s approach. By reevaluating the function of laughter she argues for its strength in revealing ideological thinking or an undisclosed hypothesis, and in enabling philosophical thinking. Thus, the author argues that the alliance of laughter and thinking unsettles the state of being enclosed in ideology, everydayness or thoughtlessness, and both distances and unsettles human beings. And hence, it may free us to pose again the question as to how we are thinking what.
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Die Natur des Organischen: Zur wissenschaftlichen Bedeutung der Aristotelischen Biologie
Author(s): Martin F. Meyerpp.: 32–53 (22)More LessThe nature of the organic. On the scientific significance of Aristotelian biology. The core thesis of the paper is that the constitution of biological science begins with a conceptual innovation with far-reaching consequences with effect up to the present: by conceiving the parts of living beings as organs (that is, as tools), Aristotle laid the foundation stone for a functional explanation of animate nature. Comparative anatomy is thus transformed from a merely descriptive to an explanatory theory. The point of the discussion is above all that a functional explanation must not be confused with the sort of teleology according to which the function of an organ is understood as the cause of its existence. The first section outlines the theoretical motives that Aristotle adduces in arguing for biology (against contemporary contempt for biological research). The second step addresses the significance of the parts of animals in Aristotle’s larger collection of zoological material, the Historia animalium. The third section demonstrates how in the major explanatory work De partibus animalium the term organon takes on the status of a key methodological concept. Finally, the fourth section discusses the significance of the Aristotelian determination of the organic with respect to current discourses in natural science.
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Zur Einheit der modalen Syllogistik des Aristoteles
Author(s): Klaus J. Schmidtpp.: 54–86 (33)More LessOn the unity of modal syllogistics in Aristotle. The goal of this paper is an interpretation of Aristotle’s modal syllogistics closely oriented on the text using the resources of modern modal predicate logic. Modern predicate logic was successfully able to interpret Aristotle’s assertoric syllogistics uniformly, that is, with one formula for universal premises. A corresponding uniform interpretation of modal syllogistics by means of modal predicate logic is not possible. This thesis does not imply that a uniform view is abandoned. However, it replaces the simple unity of the assertoric by the complex unity of the modal. The complexity results from the fact that though one formula for universal premises is used as the basis, it must be moderated if the text requires.Aristotle introduces his modal syllogistics by expanding his assertoric syllogistics with an axiom that links two apodictic premises to yield a single apodictic sentence. He thus defines a regular modern modal logic. By means of the regular modal logic that is thus defined, he is able to reduce the purely apodictic syllogistics to assertoric syllogistics. However, he goes beyond this simple structure when he looks at complicated inferences.In order to be able to link not only premises of the same modality, but also premises with different modalities, he introduces a second axiom, the T-axiom, which infers from necessity to reality or – equivalently – from reality to possibility. Together, the two axioms, the axiom of regularity and the T-axiom, define a regular T-logic. It plays an important role in modern logic. In order to be able to account for modal syllogistics adequately as a whole, another modern axiom is also required, the so-called B-axiom. It is very difficult to decide whether Aristotle had the B-axiom. Each of the two last named axioms is sufficient to achieve the required contextual moderation of the basic formula for universal propositions.
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Der glückliche Tod des Stoikers: Weisheit und Endlichkeit in der stoischen Philosophie
Author(s): Andree Hahmannpp.: 87–106 (20)More LessThe happy death of the Stoic. Wisdom and finitude in Stoic philosophy. This paper attempts to furnish a Stoic reply to an accusation addressing the Stoics’ ideal of the wise man according to which it is impossible to realize their ideal and therefore their whole system has to face a paradox: How is wisdom possible when all people are fools and it is impossible for them to become good? In addition to this question there is another important problem connected with the ideal of wisdom. The Stoic philosophers deny transcendental ideas. Instead they are well known for their thorough-going materialism. Therefore, even their idea of the wise man must be based on experience. How would it otherwise be possible to form the idea of wisdom by a method of analogy if experience did not provide any example of truthful virtue to us? A possible answer to this problem can be found in the writings of Seneca, a Stoic of the first century A.D. Seneca emphasizes the close relation between wisdom and human mortality owing to which it is at least possible for the philosopher who has made sufficiently progress in his efforts to gain wisdom to find lasting happiness in death.
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The history of the theory of the Platonic ideas in Damascius as an expression of the relation between the One and the Manifold
Author(s): Christos Terezis and Elias Tempelispp.: 107–122 (16)More LessThis paper addresses the relation between the intelligible and the material world in the works of the Neoplatonic philosopher Damascius (ca. 460–ca. 538 AD), who uses the theory of the Platonic Ideas in order to discuss the evolution from the One to the Manifold. This relation arises through specific laws that lead to the development of a harmonious cosmic system. The vertical and the horizontal segmentation of metaphysical causes is implemented in the process of the generation of the empirical world, which is nevertheless imperfect in the sense that it is an image of the metaphysical world and is subject to generation and decay. The metaphysical world constitutes a normative basis for the beings of the world of experience to the same extent in the ontological as in the aesthetic and ethical area. The vertical segmentation cannot be understood without the horizontal because in that case the generation of tangible beings, which are complex realities, would be implausible. At the same time, the horizontal segmentation without the vertical would result in inactive metaphysical causes. The simple fact that the empirical world exists excludes such alternatives.
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Der Begriff der inneren Erfahrung bei Petrus Johannis Olivi
Author(s): Christian Rodepp.: 123–141 (19)More LessThe concept of inner experience in Peter John Olivi. This article discusses the notion of inner experience and self-knowledge in Peter John Olivi. According to Olivi, each act of cognition is accompanied by some sort of self-awareness or self-experience. Therefore, the problem of an infinite regress of acts of self-awareness arises. Olivi tries to solve this problem by drawing on a theory of reflection which bears a striking resemblance to modern self-representational or dispositional accounts of (self)consciousness. Thus, in order to be said to be »known« or »certain« it is not necessary for each single act of intellect to be followed by a higher-order act; Olivi argues that in many cases a simple first-order cognitive act suffices.
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»Neque quidquam intelligi potest esse sine esse«: Zur Seinsnotwendigkeit als erkenntnistheoretischem Grundsatz bei Meister Eckhart und Nikolaus von Kues
Author(s): Hubert Benzpp.: 142–170 (29)More Less»Neque quidquam intelligi potest esse sine esse.« On the necessity of being as an epistemological principle in Meister Eckhart and Nicholas of Kues. The paper analyses the plausibility of the reasoning for the rational necessity of being. The decisive point for the question as to why for Meister Eckhart being alone is necessary, unvarying in itself and self-evident is the conviction that nothing can be thought which is distinct from being, outside of being or without being. Eckhart states this basic philosophical insight repeatedly using the how-question: How could something be knowable as being which is not and cannot be? Nicolas Cusanus concurs with Eckhart’s claim that nothingness is absolutely excluded from being and embraces his strategy of argumentation, including the way it is stated. Cusanus adopts the central principle of Eckhart’s thought that being must be absolutely knowable by founding all multiplicity in unity, that is, in the being of unity, taking recourse in this point to the quomodo-question typical for Eckhart. Cusanus claims to have proved philosophically that being is rationally necessary, that it is a comprehensive, ultimate and incontrovertible certainty: Nothing can be truer and more secure than the presupposition of being, which is indispensable for all thinking.
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Die erste philosophische Fakultät in Sachsen bis zum Beginn der Reformation im lokalen, regionalen und überregionalen Kontext
Author(s): Hans-Ulrich Wöhlerpp.: 217–240 (24)More LessThe first philosophical faculty in Saxony up to the beginning of the Reformation in its local, regional, and supraregional context. The University of Leipzig was founded in the year 1409. In the faculty of arts – the heart and the basis of the old university as a whole – there were numerous controversies during the first century of its existence. From the very beginning it competed with the older University of Prague, its historic mother, for an independent manner of philosophical thinking. The so-called »Wegestreit« between the via moderna and the via antiqua, and the »Poetenstreit« between traditional and new humanistic patterns of science and philosophy were constituents of late medieval philosophy in Germany. Especially the various forms of academic disputation, that is ordinary, extraordinary and quodlibetal disputations, played an important part within the first hundred years of existence of this university, specifically its faculty of arts. The famous disputation between Johann Eck and Martin Luther at Leipzig in the year 1519 was one of the culminating points of this practice. Considerable work remains to be done on the exploration of late medieval philosophy. The analysis of the collection of medieval philosophical manuscripts originating from the old University of Leipzig could provide some new material for our historical knowledge of this period.
Volumes & issues
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Volume 25 (2022)
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Volume 24 (2021)
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Volume 23 (2020)
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Volume 22 (2019)
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Volume 21 (2018)
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Volume 20 (2017)
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Volume 19 (2016)
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Volume 18 (2015)
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Volume 17 (2014)
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Volume 16 (2013)
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Volume 15 (2012)
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Volume 14 (2011)
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Volume 13 (2008)
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Volume 12 (2007)
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Volume 11 (2006)
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Volume 10 (2005)
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Volume 9 (2004)
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Volume 8 (2003)
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Volume 7 (2002)
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Volume 6 (2001)
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Volume 5 (2000)
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Volume 4 (1999)
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Volume 3 (1998)
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Volume 2 (1997)
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Volume 1 (1996)
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