Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter - Volume 3, Issue 1, 1998

AbstractA series of writings describes Hellenistic philosophy as spiritual guidance. Starting from a selection of Heraclitean fragments, this essay considers whether it is possible to read pre-Socratic philosophy as spiritual guidance. Its conclusion is that one cannot talk about spiritual guidance in the case of Heraclitus since he does not accompany the scholar in his search for understanding and because his teachings are not meant to be followed strictly and diligently. Finally, Heraclitus sets the impersonal Logos as a teacher; he himself does not accept any human teachings. The only accepted learning comes through one's own experience; no-one can pass his wisdom on to anyone else. Moreover, the teachings of Heraclitus do not soothe man's grief or offer any eschatol-ogy; on the contrary, they are meant to deprive his listeners of all security. His teaching goes no further than to encourage the scholar in his own search for understanding. Only insofar as Heraclitus' teachings lead to psychic autonomy can we call them therapeutic.

AbstractThis essay first differentiates the various meanings of the term as it appears in Plato's dialogues Theaetetus and The Sophist. These are: the colloquy of the soul with itself, a single sentence, a proposing aloud, the enumeration of the constitutive elements of a whole and the giving of a specific difference; further, opinion and imagination. These meanings are then related to Plato's determination of knowledge (episteme) and therewith truth and falsity. One can be said to possess knowledge only when the universal contents of thought - dialogical thought - are set in relation to the perceivable, imagination or opinion. Reflections on the principle significance of possibility as such - a thematic not addressed by Plato - conclude the essay.

AbstractTranscendent thinking as a basic feature of metaphysical philosophy has always claimed to be more than a mere cognition of reality in terms of its phenomena. Transcendent philosophy intends to consider reality from the perspective of a fundamental ground transcending the reality ordered by that ground. Plato, who created the very notion of philosophy, described the love of wisdom as an ascent to the absolutely transcendent One and Good, which he believed to be the principle and source of all being. Plotinus both took over and renewed the Platonic view of philosophy as transcendent thinking. In his view, the philosopher can only relate to that principle which transcends even thinking itself by practicing a mystical philosophy and thereby leaving behind his own dialectical thinking.

AbstractThis essay intends to contribute to the history of the ideas of omnipresence and infinity as two related attributes of God in the theology of the Latin Church Fathers and in the philosophical and theological thinking of the early Middle Ages. The classical Christian doctrine of the infinite presence of God was developed within the early Latin context by Hilarius of Poitiers and foremost by Augustine, who set forth the unique omnipresence of God through the formula that God is «wholly everywhere in himself» (in se ipso ubique totus). Gregory the Great expanded upon this formula and passed it on to the early Middle Ages. Boethius comprehended the omnipresence of God primarily as his omniscience and defined his timeless presence - his eternity - as the simultaneously entire and perfect possession of unlimited life. While Eriugena's comprehension of the omnipresence of God is mostly rooted in Maximus Confessor's doctrine of God's omnipresence, his teaching of the essential infinity of God is quite original. The clearly most important contribution to the history of the omnipresence and infinity of God in the early Middle Ages was made by Anselm of Canterbury in chapters 20-24 of his Monologion, in chapters 13,18 and 19 of his Proslogion and in his famous reply to Gaunilo.

AbstractThis essay examines Henry of Ghent's reaction to the Thomistic criticism of the Au-gustinian theory of divine illumination. By grounding epistemology in the psychology of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas made divine illumination appear to be an unwieldy theory incorrect in its basic assumptions. Even though Henry reworked the Augustinian theory, he did not completely reject the Aristotelian-Thomistic epistemology. Unlike so many of his predecessors, Henry did not attempt to avoid difficult questions raised by the fallibility of sense experience in developing his epistemology. Rather, he attempted to synthesize the intellectualist tendencies of the Augustinian theory with some of the empirical concerns of the Aristotelian-Thomistic account of human knowledge. Henry moved away from the strict metaphor of illumination, while at the same time exploring the relationship between the divine art and the human agent intellect. He was thus able to retain much of the Aristotelian terminology and still defend what he understood to be Augustine's intention for the doctrine of illumination.

AbstractGiles of Orleans' philosophy evolved from an orthodox Christian interpretation of Aristotle to an Averroism; and his successive commentaries testify to this evolution: De generatione version I, De generatione version II, Physics version I and Physics version II. The first work presents orthodox Christian solutions, the second and the third testify to some Averroistic influences and the last is a clearly Averroistic commentary. Giles did not obey the regulation of 1272 which forbade the masters of the facilitas artium to discuss theological problems. De generatione I discusses the question of world history as a chain of eternal reversions and solves it according to Christian orthodoxy. De generatione II and Physics I put forward the question whether accidents can exist without substance. The first work cites amply the Aristotelian solution and tries to reconcile it with a Christian understanding of the problem, whereas the second commentary accepts the opinion of Thomas Aquinas. In De generatione II and Physics II, Giles inquires whether an annihilated substance can reappear. The first commentary cites arguments for the negative answer, but it also gives a short declaratio fidei. The second commentary cites an and an orthodox solution, stating that one can solve the problem on two different planes - Christian or philosophical, both offering a different solution and unable to be reconciled. All three questions are listed in Tempier's Condemnation of 1277 - propositions 92, 196 and 215 - censuring heterodox answers.

AbstractIn reply to the question whether articles of faith can be demonstrated, William of Ockham articulated a peculiar thesis: Even though it is impossible to prove articles of faith in this life, the blessed in heaven could demonstrate our creditive propositions. In contrast to traditional views, William held that both conclusions drawn in heaven and conclusions drawn in this life are subject to the same criteria. This assumption led to a controversy between William's contemporaries, namely, Walter Chatton and Adam Wodeham, who discussed whether theories of propositions are applicable to articles of faith. This essay tries to explain why the problem of demonstrating creditive propositions arose and in what way William's answer gave a new meaning to the dispute.