Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter - Volume 4, Issue 1, 1999

AbstractSocrates was one of the great innovators of Greek philosophy inasmuch as he discovered the principal role of the general notion as such in finding truth. Without a doubt, his criterion in doing so was, besides an absolute confidence in reason, something like a response to an instance he believed to be somehow divine. This included a certain distance, rational and existential, from all the principles and values of the community in which he lived. A deeper analysis of Socrates' essential intentions reveals a special view of existential honor which made it impossible for Socrates to escape what he considered his destiny. This existential attitude took the form of irony, as his fellow-citizens were quite incapable of understanding what he meant.

AbstractIn Meno 80d5-e5, we find two sets of objections concerning the possibility of inquiry in the absence of knowledge: the so-called Meno's paradox and the eristic arguments. This essay first shows that the eristic argument is not simply a restatement of Meno's paradox, but instead an objection of a completely different kind: Meno's paradox concerns not inquiry as such, but rather Socrates' inquiry into virtue as is pursued in the first part of the Meno, whereas the eristic argument indicates a manner in which Meno's paradox can be generalized. This implies that they cannot be resolved by the same argument. It is then argued that the theory of recollection, as presented in Socrates' experiment with the slave, cannot resolve Meno's paradox, its target being only the eristic argument. Only the hypothetical method of inquiry is the effective answer to Meno's paradox. Finally, this essay contends that, contrary to what the text might suggest, Socrates, by introducing the hypothetical method, does not abandon his principle that knowing what something is precedes knowing what something is like.

AbstractIn his late dialogue The Sophist, Plato intends to show that the universal contents mo-tion, rest, being, identity and difference differ from and yet intermingle with each other. Plato develops this theory using the universal content motion as an example, whereas the present essay concentrates on dialogue as a further universal content linked with all the other contents. It thereby aims to deepen the understanding of Plato's late theory of ideas, arriving at the conclusion that for Plato the possibility of philosophy is due to the possibility of the relational community of the universal contents. Plato, however, does not investigate the possibility of possibility itself - an issue which can indeed be seen as the principle of the very possibility of universal contents and their relation.

AbstractInterpretation of Cicero's De officiis mostly focuses on questions of traditional Quellen-forschung, especially on its relationship with the lost works of Panaetius, Posidonius and Hecato. This essay, on the contrary, tries to illuminate Cicero's work by confronting a pivotal passage of De off. (3, 19-32) with Kant's famous categorical imperative. Cicero's invention of a formula to decide moral dilemmas as well as its anthropological grounds and socio-political implications foreshadow the Kantian concept in the Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. This suggests that there may even be a direct influence of Cicero on Kant.

AbstractProclus' complex arguments developed in the context of his theory of evil often seem to reflect various earlier discussions of this topic. Above all, his predecessor Iamblichus seems to be a major source for his concept of evil. This becomes plausible when we attempt to outline Iamblichus' own philosophy of evil as revealed in such works as De mysterüs or De communi mathematica scientia. Particularly the latter work has not been sufficiently exploited in this respect, although the similarities with Proclus are significant. All relevant ideas with regard to Proclus' notion of papnpóstasis are prepared and prefigured in Iamblichus. This essay discusses the mode of the existence of evil, the causation of evil and its relation to being according to Iamblichus. Moreover, comparison of Iamblichus' doctrines with those of his predecessors Plotinus and Porphyry reveals the design of his concept of evil as apparently directed at Plotinus.

AbstractRecent philosophical and theological writing on Augustine in France, England and North America is sharply divided between readings which serve either a historicist, anti-metaphysical, postmodern retrieval or an ahistorical, metaphysical, modern reassertion. The postmodern retrieval begins from a Heideggerian «end of metaphysics» and goes at least some distance with Jacques Derrida's development of its consequences. This essay starts from engagements with Augustine by Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion, moving then to Rowan Williams on the De trinitate, read to prevent comparison with Descartes' Meditations, and considers how Williams relates Augustine to Plotinus. The opposed modernist interpretation appears in Stephen Menn's Descartes and Augustine, which sees a continuity between Plotinus, Augustine and Descartes. Finally, the essay treats Plotinus and Augustine on God and self-knowledge, maintaining that Augustine's De trinitate is better understood from within a modern ahistorical stance which, within metaphysics, places Augustine together with Plotinus and Descartes. This view better captures his difference from Plotinus than the alternative postmodern perspective tending to assimilate Augustine to Plotinus.

AbstractLate medieval philosophers in the Aristotelian tradition developed two theoretical models in order to explain the signication of words. Some - including Thomas Aquinas - claimed that spoken words immediately signify concepts, but extramental things only mediately, while others - such as William of Ockham - held the view that they immediately signify things. The present essay analyzes these two semantic models, paying particular attention to their metaphysical and epistemological background. It shows that the «indirect signication model» defended by Thomas is not a model committed to representationalism or semantic idealism, as some recent commentators have claimed. It is rather a model that relies upon two crucial theses: (i) human beings form concepts by abstracting universal forms from extramental things; and (ü) spoken words signify those universal forms having an immaterial existence in the intellect. Ockham's refusal of the «indirect signication model» is mainly motivated by his rejection of these controversial claims.

AbstractMore often than not Cusanus is interpreted in a theological manner, under strong theological presuppositions and within a religious range. This is understandable since he was a cardinal and had important functions in the Papal States. The inadequacy of this approach, however, is evident when one considers that not all of his texts are meant to assert traditional beliefs but instead to reflect upon their presuppositions. A word-for-word interpretation of the first proposition of the appendix of the dialogue De non aliud («Definitio, quae se et omnia definit, ea est, quae per omnem mentem quaeritur») reveals a shift in the concept of definitio during the dialogue. Cusanus begins in a quite traditional manner and ends in a supremely abstract and speculative intuition. The not-other determines itself in a vision, setting everything in its proper place; a vision we aspire to repeat in our mental life. In this way, Cusanus does what all great philosophers do: he reflects in a given set of traditions and beliefs upon their presuppositions.