Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter - Volume 8, Issue 1, 2003

Socrates’ autobiography in Phaedo signifies an attempt to incorporate earlier philosophical thinking in a progressive evolution culminating in the Platonic theory of Forms. In the “second sailing”, the “hypothesis of Forms” is not a hypothetical assumption, an arbitrary claim or conjecture, but something to be “sup-posed” prior to any further knowledge or statement. The careful reading and reconstruction of the famous simile of the “sun in eclipse” leads to crucial consequences concerning the attempt to “take refuge in the logoi”. The Forms “sup-posed” in the logoi do not indicate a new “transcendent” object, but aim at the same target as that of the senses: at the truth of beings of our world. The “second sailing” follows a different route, but has the same direction as the “first sailing” of the physiologoi.

Aristotle construed metaphysics primarily in terms of ontology, whereas Plato had developed a different approach to the philosophy of principles. The main task of the metaphysical theory of principles is the quest for the absolute. For Plato, however, the absolute is the one; and this idea – most influentially advocated by Plotinus – is the foundation of a tradition that construes metaphysics mainly in terms of henology. The central aspects of this doctrine are the idea of the transcendence of the absolute one, the perspective of negative theology, and – in Plotinus – a genuinely philosophical kind of mysticism.

In his Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle gives us two definitions of happiness (eudaimonia): In book I he defines eudaimonia as activity in accordance with the best and most perfect virtue, and very much later in the treatise, in book X, he states that the contemplative life of the philosopher is the most blessed life, and the life of the politician only second in rank. This paper argues that most interpreters have misunderstood the first definition (i.e. they have not correctly identified the best and most perfect virtue) due to the temptation to read the first book with the tenth in mind. A new interpretation of the first definition is corroborated and linked with Aristotle’s statements in book X, so that the entire work seems to be more consistent. Furthermore, a solution to the vexed problem whether moral virtues play a role in the contemplative life is suggested.

This essay deals with the contrary opinions of Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart on synderesis and conscience. In his theory, Thomas Aquinas focuses more on prudence and less on conscience. Meister Eckhart is the proponent of an attitude ethics focusing on the notion of scintilla animae. For Thomas Aquinas, the Aristotelian thinker, the practical syllogism links judgement to spiritual values, whereas Meister Eckhart gives priority to self-predication. By means of self-predication, action and normativity can be combined immediately; the practical syllogism combines them in an indirect way.

This article tries to point out the dialectical and paradoxical character of Eckhart’s thought, which permits him at once to affirm and to negate categories such as being, nothingness, personality, substance, origin, creation, image. In this way, Eckhart can unite a personal-theistic and a non-personal-atheistic view. A dialectical structure can also be seen in Eckhart’s ethics. Further, the dialectical interpretation can elucidate the ambivalence in the concept of the scintilla animae. The origin and aim of Eckhart’s dialectics proves to consist in the concept of non-distinction.

We know of three commentaries on Aristotle by Theodoricus de Magdeburg: The Quaestiones super De physica, the Quaestiones super De substantia orbis, and the Quaestiones super De anima. This paper presents an analysis of some of Thedoricus’ s questions with regard to three main topics: (1) Matter and Substance, (2) God (Quaestiones super De physica, super De substantia orbis), and (3) Man and Soul (Quaestiones super De anima). The investigation of the first two works – and of the first two topics respectively – starts with an assessment of their contents. It turns out, however, that Super De physica scarcely differs from Super De substantia orbis and that the few differences are rather superficial. Theodoricus’ s Super De anima mainly expounds the theory of the intellect. The analysis concentrates on his role in the debates with other Latin Averroists such as John of Jandun. It is evident that Theodoricus, even in his disagreement with other philosophers, essentially relies on Averroistic thought; but he also strikes out in new directions. These two characteristics of his philosophy – consistency and originality – mark him as an outstanding thinker in the tradition of Latin Averroism.