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- Volume 3, Issue, 2002
Consciousness & Emotion - Volume 3, Issue 2, 2002
Volume 3, Issue 2, 2002
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Fear and the focus of attention
Author(s): Luc Faucher and Christine Tappoletpp.: 105–144 (40)More LessPhilosophers have not been very preoccupied by the link between emotions and attention. The few that did (de Sousa, 1987) never really specified the relation between the two phenomena. Using empirical data from the study of the emotion of fear, we provide a description (and an explanation) of the links between emotion and attention. We also discuss the nature (empirical or conceptual) of these links.
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Phenomenal, access and reflexive consciousness: The missing “blocks” in Ned Block’s typology
Author(s): Bill Fawpp.: 145–158 (14)More LessThis paper adds five “blocks” (cells) to Ned Block’s 2-by-2 P- and A-Consciousness typology, by converting “phenomenal” and “access” into two orthogonal dimensions of Primary Conscious, and by introducing gradations along each dimension, with P0 (no phenomenal experience), P1 (attenuated phenomenal experience), and P2 (full phenomenal experience); and A0 (no access of mental content to either involuntary or voluntary cognitive/behavioral responses), A1 (access of mental content to involuntary responses), and A2 (access of mental content also to voluntary responses). This leads to a 3x3, 9-block grid, with Phenomenality on the X-axis and Access on the Y-axis. Each combination of P and A is examined for known conscious states. It is concluded that there are no known phenomenal states without at least A1 or A2 access. Neither are there states with A2 access without P2 phenomenality. At the end of the paper, Block’s concept of Reflexive Consciousness is introduced tantalizingly as a third (Z) dimension for consciousness in humans.
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The problem of affectivity in cognitive theories of emotion
Author(s): Mikko Salmelapp.: 159–182 (24)More LessDespite their paradigmatic status in the modern philosophy of emotions, cognitive theories have been criticized for failing to provide a satisfactory account of affectivity in emotions. I agree with much of this criticism, but I argue that an amended cognitive theory can overcome the flaws of the two main theories, strong cognitivism and componential cognitivism. I argue that feeling cannot be reduced to the evaluative content of emotion and attitudinal mode of holding it as strong cognitivists suggest. Typical emotional feelings are induced by either propositionally explicable or biologically “hard-wired” evaluations instead of being involved in the latter. We, then, face the challenge of explaining why the feeling and the evaluative construal that figure into an emotion are aspects of the same state, unlike occasional feelings and thoughts that happen to occur in us at the same time. I propose that evaluative content and feeling are different kinds of representations of the formal property of an emotional object. This is a second-order property that is ascribed to every individual object of a particular emotion-type in virtue of its perceived first-order properties and that is experienced as a property of those objects in a state of emotion. Evaluative content involves a conceptual representation of the formal property while feeling represents its inherent affective quality.
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How are the cognitive and non-cognitive aspects of emotion related?
Author(s): Maria Magoula Adamospp.: 183–195 (13)More LessMost scholars of emotions concede that although cognitive evaluations are essential for emotion, they are not sufficient for it, and that other elements, such as bodily feelings, physiological sensations and behavioral expressions are also required. However, only a few discuss how these diverse aspects of emotion are related in order to form the unity of emotion. In this essay I examine the co-presence and the causal views, and I argue that neither view can account for the unity of emotions. In particular, both views face the problem of fortuitous connection, and, as a result, they fail to identify and distinguish an emotion from other mental states. Consequently, they fail to account for our first person authority over our emotions. I finally argue that only an internal, conceptual relation between the cognitive/evaluative and affective/physiological aspects of emotion can avoid such problems, and suggest that the Aristotelian distinction of form and matter can provide such internal relation.
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The veil and veracity of passion in Chinese poetics
Author(s): Louise Sundararajanpp.: 231–262 (32)More LessThe ideal poetry is speech that capitalizes on indirection, avers the literary critic Yang Tsai (1271–1323): “Sorrow and grief are held in reserve and no pain is expressed; praise and attack are indirect and not obvious.” To spell out this vision of the Confucian poetics, a reformulation of the IND-COL (Individualism-Collectivism) hypothesis is proposed to anchor cross-cultural differences in terms of Novelty-focus versus Authenticity-focus, with the former being privileged in individualistic cultures, and the latter, collectivistic cultures. The Authenticity-focus hypothesis sheds light on two major functions of indirect expression of emotions: (a) As anti-exploitation device, with the sender’s skills consisting primarily of suppression of emotions; and the receiver’s skills, mind-reading and attunement. (b) As means to achieve inter- and intra-personal harmony, with poetry in particular functioning as a “ritual dance with words” to shape and mold emotions. Data that support the “Authenticity-focus” hypothesis challenge the conventional dichotomy of expression versus inhibition in emotion research, by showing that indirect expression of emotion functions like a veil that reveals and conceals at once the truth of the emoter.
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Damasio's Error?
Author(s): Jaak Panksepp
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Fear and the focus of attention
Author(s): Luc Faucher and Christine Tappolet
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