Pragmatics & Cognition - Volume 14, Issue 3, 2006

Speakers often construct their utterances based on the immediately co-present utterances of dialogue partners. They array their linguistic resources parallel to their partners’ and activate resonance. Based on the theories of dialogic syntax and cognitive linguistics, this study undertakes to explain how speakers activate resonance and how parallelism contributes to constructing linguistic forms as well as to shaping the ongoing flow of conversation. Three phases of resonance activation are illustrated in relation to cognitive processes: (a) parallelism constituted with extension of multiple categories in synthesis; (b) parallelism meeting or failing the previous speaker’s intention due to schematization; and (c) parallelism achieved as a consequence of priming through schematization and extension. It is concluded that linguistic forms develop in the ongoing flow of socially coordinated cognition, where patterns emerge through activation of mapping relations between linguistic elements. This process is anchored in speakers’ concepts of grammatical equivalences, ability of categorization, and grasp of linguistic conventions.

The present investigation challenges the traditional distinction between cohesion and coherence; i.e., the distinction between the syntactical rules governing the composition of lexical units within the scope of the clause and the semantic-pragmatic rules guiding the composition of text units beyond the scope of the clause. To this end it exposes two major principles of semantic combination that are active through all levels of linguistic composition: viz. frame-schematic structure and narrative structure. These principles are considered as being components of a semantic combinatorial system to be determined in terms of dependency relations.

In this paper, I wish to face the old problem of demarcation from a new point of view. I aim at pointing out that there are distinction criteria between scientific and non-scientific knowledge. I intend to investigate whether it is possible to define demarcation criteria by studying the social dimension of science. There are social necessities, which force the scientific production of knowledge to distinguish itself from non-scientific production. Science is not what scientists freely decide it should be, but what they are compelled to acknowledge it is. The paper discusses the nature of this constraint, which has a social origin but is also capable to be reflected on the cognitive contents of science. Through a discussion of the theories of Bruno Latour and Pierre Bourdieu, attention is drawn on the cycle of credibility as the crucial social mechanism determining scientific knowledge.