Pragmatics & Cognition - Volume 16, Issue 1, 2008

We discuss robotic art, emotion in robotic art, and compassion in the philosophy of art. We discuss a particular animated artwork, survivor, the walking chair, symbolising survivors of landmine blasts, learning to use crutches, and maimed emotionally as well as physically. Its control incorporates mutual relations between very rudimentary representations of distinct emotions. This artwork is intended for sensitising viewers to the horror experienced by those who survive, and those who don’t. We can only give a small sample, here, of the reactions of viewers on various occasions when survivor was exhibited. Regardless of how much which pertains to human mental functions the tool embodies or doesn’t (actually, such replication is minimalist), it is the effect on the human perceivers which matters most to us, and enables us to understand something more about human cognition. Arguably this project is instructive in respect of the ethical-social implications of the synthetic method, i.e. the construction of inorganic systems in order to understand autonomous intentional action; in this project, the latter pertains to the humans involved.

Although work on computational and robotic modelling of cognition is highly diverse, as an empirical method it can be roughly divided into at least two clearly different, though non-exclusive branches, motivated to evaluate the sufficiency or the necessity of theories when it comes to accounting for data and/or other observations. With the rising profile of theories of situated/embodied cognition, a third non-exclusive avenue for investigation has also gained in popularity, the investigation of agent-environment embedding or more generally, exploration. Still in its infancy, and often confused with sufficiency testing, this relatively new kind of modelling, which is theory- rather than data-driven, investigates the role of the environment in shaping the ontogenetic and/or phylogenetic development of situated agency. Each of these three approaches presents many issues that modellers must be sensitive to, both in the design of experiments, and in the conclusions that can be drawn from them. This paper highlights some of these issues, provides examples, and addresses the contribution of computational/robotic modelling to cognitive science, as well as some of its limitations.

The present study focuses on the observation of learning processes as they emerge in the context of conversations among two students in three successive tasks designed to foster conceptual change in proportional reasoning. The three tasks were set according to a pre-test treatment post-test paradigm. In the pre-test and the post-test tasks, the two students solved individually several items in the presence of an experimenter. In the treatment task, the two students worked as a dyad to solve similar items; they used a balance to check their conclusions and subsequently continued solving the items when the weighing did not match their expectations. We adopt a micro-genetic approach and develop new analytical tools to observe what happened in the conversation (both socially and cognitively). Throughout the three successive tasks, we observed the interplay between tools, peers, experimenter, and task demands and how they are managed through the rules of conversation. We identified four processes that involved the emergence of new high-order strategies from coordinated actions distributed among peers, the guidance of the experimenter in coordinating actions, and ways the participation in solving a previous task was actualized in a successive one.

This study investigates a few Anglo English and Singapore English tags. The focus is on their meaning and the ways of thinking they reflect, rather than their forms and functions. The study contrasts the so-called Anglo English tag questions and the Singapore English tag is it? and tries to show that their semantic and pragmatic differences relate to differences in ways of thinking in the two cultures. For the purposes of this research, meaning is articulated in a paraphrase couched in natural semantic metalanguage (NSM), which comprises a set of empirically established semantic primes and a universal grammar.

This is a theoretical and methodological statement of what isn’t and what is Cognitive poetics. It is focused on Peter Stockwell’s discussion of deixis; but, I claim, much of what I have to say on Stockwell’s work would apply to some degree to the work of many other critics. I argue that Stockwell translates traditional critical terms into a “cognitive” language, but does not rely on cognitive processes to account for issues related to the texts discussed; and that he uses these terms to label or classify poetic expressions rather than point out their interaction in generating poetic effects. The present paper does not presume to tell what is the “correct” way to handle those terms, but attempts to give examples of how the same terms could be used with reference to cognitive processes, so as to account for poetic effects.