Pragmatics & Cognition - Volume 17, Issue 2, 2009

The paper discusses in detail John Perry’s important article “Davidson’s Sentences and Wittgenstein’s Builders”. Perry argues, on the basis of Wittgenstein’s famous block/slab language, that words make direct metasemantic contact with the world. The present paper urges that, while Perry’s conclusions are correct and important, the arguments provided for them, in his 1994 article, ignore essential features of genuine words in natural language. A more empirically-oriented alternative tactic for supporting the same philosophical conclusions is then provided, and its advantages and disadvantages are weighed.

It is argued that genuinely subsentential phrases, such as a discourse-initial utterance of “From France” to indicate the provenance of an item, provide evidence for the reality of the pragmatic process of free enrichment. I consider recent attempts to treat such discourse-initial fragments as linguistic ellipsis of some kind while accommodating the difference between these cases and accepted types of ellipsis such as sluicing and gapping (for example Merchant 2007a,b). I claim that the mechanisms they posit to save an ellipsis story have no role in an account of performance (an account of the processes of utterance interpretation). An argument against the enrichment approach from the indeterminacy of the content of subsentential utterances is discussed, and refuted, and it is shown how this indeterminacy is accommodated in a contextualist pragmatic theory.

We do not always talk in complete sentences; we sometimes speak in “fragments”, such as ‘Fire!’, ‘Off with his head’, ‘From Cuba’, ‘Next!’, and ‘Shall we?’. Research has tended to focus on the ellipsis wars — the issue of whether all or most fragments are really sentential or not. Less effort has been put into the question of exactly how fragments are to be interpreted, especially their force. We separate off the issue of fragment interpretation from the issue of systematically accounting for their linguistic properties — the issue of how to generate fragments. We review two projects directed at the issue of fragment interpretation: Stainton (2006), who approaches the issue obliquely (concentrating more on legitimizing the use of fragments and its consequences), and Barton (1990), who approaches the issue of interpretation directly and systematically. We find areas of agreement and disagreement with both studies. In the end we conclude that what may be needed is a more speech act oriented approach, one that fits fragment interpretation into a framework for performing, and communicating through, speech acts in general.

The aim of this paper is to discuss a basic assumption tacitly shared by many philosophers of mind and language: that whatever can be meant, can be said. It specifically targets John Searle’s account of this idea, focusing on his Principle of Expressibility (PE henceforth). In the first part of the paper, PE is exposed underlining its analyticity (1) and its relevance for the philosophy of language (2), mind (3), society and action (4). In the critical part, the notion of Background is taken into account in order to re-evaluate two basic distinctions: the one between sentence and utterance meanings (5), and the one between native and type speakers (6). PE is reconsidered in the light of the previous arguments as a methodological strategy that does not prevent uses of language from eventual semantic excesses and deficits (7), and a complementary Principle of Expression Fallibility is finally proposed (8).

This paper assumes that crucial mental activities involved in scientific discovery and literary reponse are nonconceptual. Some of the greatest scientific discoveries were made in states of extreme mental passivity induced in “the Bus, the Bath, or the Bed”(Köhler 1972: 163). Universities usually teach techniques and conceptual systems required for scientific research, but have no courses in achieving moments of extreme mental passivity, that is, taking a hot bath or dozing off on a rocking bus. I have adopted from the psychology of perception-and-personality the notion of “delayed closure” (here applied as “delayed categorization”). Delayed closure is an essential condition for adequate adjustment to reality in everyday life, as well as in scientific research and literary response. Some people display intolerance of delayed closure, whereas rapid closure may involve loss of important precategorial information. The problems of “teaching” delayed closure are explored in the context of teaching literature in a university setting.

This paper argues that current pragmatic theories fail to describe common ground in its complexity because they usually retain a communication-as-transfer-between-minds view of language, and disregard the fact that disagreement and egocentrism of speaker-hearers are as fundamental parts of communication as agreement and cooperation. On the other hand, current cognitive research has overestimated the egocentric behavior of the dyads and argued for the dynamic emergent property of common ground while devaluing the overall significance of cooperation in the process of verbal communication. The paper attempts to eliminate this conflict and proposes to combine the two views into an integrated concept of common ground, in which both core common ground (assumed shared knowledge, a priori mental representation) and emergent common ground (emergent participant resource, a post facto emergence through use) converge to construct a dialectical socio-cultural background for communication.
Both cognitive and pragmatic considerations are central to this issue. While attention (through salience, which is the cause for interlocutors’ egocentrism) explains why emergent property unfolds, intention (through relevance, which is expressed in cooperation) explains why presumed shared knowledge is needed. Based on this, common ground is perceived as an effort to converge the mental representation of shared knowledge present as memory that we can activate, shared knowledge that we can seek, and rapport, as well as knowledge that we can create in the communicative process. The socio-cognitive approach emphasizes that common ground is a dynamic construct that is mutually constructed by interlocutors throughout the communicative process. The core and emergent components join in the construction of common ground in all stages, although they may contribute to the construction process in different ways, to different extents, and in different phases of the communicative process.

HAPPEN is a member of the Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) inventory of primes (cf. Goddard and Wierzbicka (eds) 1994, 2002). Its English exponent ‘happen’ has been popularly expounded as fa1sheng1 in Mandarin Chinese (e.g., Chappell 2002). This article argues that fa1sheng1 is not the correct exponent of HAPPEN as it is marked for ‘adversity’ as well as what I call ‘serious mention’ or ‘noteworthiness’ of the event, i.e., that an event is sufficiently serious or noteworthy to fare a mention. This article puts forward you3 lit. ‘have, exist, happen’ and zen3(me)yang4/zhe4(me)yang4 lit. ‘like how/like this’ instead, as allolexic exponents of HAPPEN in Mandarin Chinese. Though highly polysemous each in its own way, the HAPPEN sense of you3 and zen3(me)yang4/zhe4(me)yang4 can, respectively, be shown to be semantically irreducible and pragmatically neutral. This article delineates some of the syntactic and contextual distribution attesting to the viability of you3 and zen3(me)yang4/zhe4(me)yang4 as expounding HAPPEN.

According to Dascal (1998), controversy is characterised by a special kind of rationality, one result thereof being the unique contribution of this kind of polemics to the growth of knowledge. This, in turn, implies that complete cooperation may be detrimental for the efficiency of communication. In this article I discuss the kind of rationality that characterises controversy in legal discourse, in order to provide additional support to Dascal’s thesis about the uniqueness of the rationality of this kind of polemic exchange. I present empirical evidence supporting the conclusion that we may characterise the rationality inherent in controversy by its tolerance to inconsistency; I elucidate the tolerance to inconsistency of the rationality of legal polemic by showing that the norms recommended by the Israeli Supreme Court in the domain of conjugal relationships between men and women verge on inconsistency: On the one hand, the legal system defends the right of women over their bodies, including a woman’s right to establish a romantic relationship, regardless of the nature of the relationship she has with other men; on the other hand, the court acknowledges a man’s uncontrolled tendency to impose monogamous behaviour on his female partner.

Geoffrey Lloyd, in his book Cognitive Variations (2007), addresses the puzzle of cognitive diversity vs. cognitive unity of our mental life by analyzing a number of debates related to it. Accounting for the fact that human mental life across cultures both shares many of its fundamental features and differs in many others, no less fundamental ones, apparently cannot but engender a dilemma, as long as only reductionist solutions are considered, for neither radical diversity is reducible to unity nor vice versa. The situation is further complicated by the fact that ‘division of labor’ solutions involving a sort of schizophrenic fragmentation of the mind, are also unlikely, since even the most diverse mental tasks complement each other in what appears to be a seamless unity. In this review article, I undertake to highlight what I take to be the cornerstone of Lloyd’s account, namely an approach that rejects the dichotomy ‘diversity vs. unity’ and thus creates an alternative, ‘pragmatic’ path for their essential cooperation-through- opposition. This proposal is supported by an analysis of Lloyd’s treatment of several of the debates discussed in the book’s chapters, as well as by references to my own work in pragmatics and controversies.

Part of current pragmatics research aims at opening up new avenues of inquiry by revisiting and revising some of its central topics and keywords, such as implicature, explicature, truth, varieties of meaning, meaning inference, relevance, politeness, and face. This review article attempts to contribute to this endeavor by making some comments on and beyond Kecskes and Horn’s (2007) Explorations in Pragmatics: Linguistic, Cognitive and Intercultural Aspects. With reference to certain Chinese linguistic and interactional actualities, this paper argues, among other things, that a speaker who conveys some truth to a hearer does not necessarily mean that the speaker is committed to that truth, that people with little social power may also manipulate the power of words in actual interaction, and that when it comes to making politeness evaluations, what one does may turn out to be more important and decisive than what one says.