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- Volume 18, Issue, 2010
Pragmatics & Cognition - Volume 18, Issue 1, 2010
Volume 18, Issue 1, 2010
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On the pluralistic conception of logic
Author(s): Zoltán Vecseypp.: 1–16 (16)More LessBeall and Restall (2000, 2006) argue for a pluralistic conception of logic, which may be called Background Pluralism. In the first part of this paper, I outline the core tenets of Beall and Restall’s position. In the second part I consider a particular line of criticism presented in Read (2004, 2006) and Priest (2006). Finally, in the last part of the paper, I develop a new argument which is directed against the fundamental thesis of Beall and Restall’s pluralistic theory. Since the argument attempts to show that the fundamental thesis incorporates a self-defeating feature, it will be called the Instability Argument.
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Assertion and false-belief attribution
Author(s): Mark Jarypp.: 17–39 (23)More LessThe ability to attribute false-beliefs to others — the hallmark of a representational theory of mind — has been shown to be reliant on linguistic ability, specifically on competence in sentential complementation after verbs of communication and cognition such as ‘say that’ and ‘think that’. The reason commonly put forward for this is that these structures provide a representational format which enables the child to think about another’s thoughts. The paper offers an alternative explanation. Drawing on the work of the philosophers Michael Dummett and Robert Brandom, it argues that the available data better fits an account that grounds the notion of representation in the commitments undertaken by asserters. The competence in sentential complementation that precedes false-belief attribution is viewed as a result of the child developing a meta-awareness of the syntactic forms employed in assertion. This meta-awareness gives the child access to discourse about the commitments undertaken by speakers and the consequences of these for their behaviour. This understanding constitutes the child’s grasp of the representational nature of discourse and thought. The paper thus offers an illocutionary account of theory-of-mind development.
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Communicative signs meaning naturally
Author(s): Jonas Pfisterpp.: 40–67 (28)More LessPaul Grice distinguishes between natural meaning and non-natural meaning, where the first notion is especially connected to something’s being a natural sign and the second to communication. It is argued that some of the arguments against the distinction being exhaustive are based on a misinterpretation of Grice, but also that the distinction cannot be exhaustive if one takes into account both the criterion of factivity and the connection to communication. If one makes a distinction between natural and non-natural communication, then there are different types of natural communication to be distinguished: goal-directed communication, intentional communication and open intentional communication. Given the empirical evidence, the behavior of chimpanzees and of human infants may be described as goal-directed communication, but there are also important differences between the communicative behavior of the two.
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Cognitive, cultural, and constructional motivations of polysemy and semantic change: The case of the Greek psuche
Author(s): Sophia Marmaridoupp.: 68–110 (43)More LessWithin the framework of cognitive linguistics and construction grammar (as in Lakoff 1987; Langacker 2000; Goldberg 1995; and Fried and Östman 2004), it is claimed in this paper that the semantics of psuche (psyche) is motivated by cognitive, cultural, and constructional parameters of meaning. More specifically, it is argued that psyche, as the immaterial nature of a human being, and the seat of emotions and feelings in particular, is understood in terms of image-based metaphors, a cultural model of the self, and a cultural narrative of existence. It is also argued that the frequent occurrence of psyche in a number of collocations and idioms motivates and constrains constructional meaning. At the same time, constructions motivate extended senses of this word, thereby contributing to its polysemy and ultimately to semantic change. The evidence presented within this framework argues against a fixed borderline between lexical and constructional meaning. This view, long and tacitly adopted in lexicographic practice by necessity, is gaining further support within current research in the framework of lexicography (Fillmore 2008; Hanks 2008), corpus linguistics (Fellbaum 2007), lexical semantics (Taylor et al. 2003), language change (Bybee 2006a), and construction grammar (Boas 2008).
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Mood in complementizer phrases in Spanish: How to assess the semantics of mood
Author(s): Lotte Dam and Helle Dam-Jensenpp.: 111–135 (25)More LessThis article argues that language provides instructions for the interpretive work of the addressee. The result of this interpretive process is the establishment of linguistic meaning. On this assumption, the article aims at explaining how meaning is established on the basis of the category of mood in Spanish. It is often assumed that the meaning of mood in Spanish is explainable in terms of assertion vs. non-assertion. Contrary to this, we shall claim that assertion belongs to the level of subordination. Instead of the assertion theory, it is suggested that mood may be explained with reference to the notion of factuality. This claim is tested by means of an analysis of mood in complementizer phrases.
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Computational modelling of spoken-word recognition processes: Design choices and evaluation
Author(s): Odette Scharenborg and Lou Bovespp.: 136–164 (29)More LessComputational modelling has proven to be a valuable approach in developing theories of spoken-word processing. In this paper, we focus on a particular class of theories in which it is assumed that the spoken-word recognition process consists of two consecutive stages, with an ‘abstract’ discrete symbolic representation at the interface between the stages. In evaluating computational models, it is important to bring in independent arguments for the cognitive plausibility of the algorithms that are selected to compute the processes in a theory. This paper discusses the relation between behavioural studies, theories, and computational models of spoken-word recognition. We explain how computational models can be assessed in terms of the goodness of fit with the behavioural data and the cognitive plausibility of the algorithms. An in-depth analysis of several models provides insights into how computational modelling has led to improved theories and to a better understanding of the human spoken-word recognition process.
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On the use and misuse of the “Two Children” brainteaser
Author(s): Mel D. Rutherfordpp.: 165–174 (10)More LessCognitive scientists employ brainteasers, or “cognitive illusions” in service of cognitive research. In some cases, rewording or paraphrasing a question can change the correct answer, without the experimenter realizing. In recent published articles describing cognitive research, participants have pondered brainteasers, including what is here called the “Two Children” problem. Although many accounts of this problem in the academic literature navigate its nuances correctly, in the popular press it is usually presented such that the wording of the question does not actually compel the answer that is offered as correct. Unfortunately, cognitive scientists who have used this problem in research have adopted the more informal and ambiguous version that has become common in the popular press. Recent experiments have used the problem to demonstrate that people make common intuitive errors, but they unfortunately employ an ambiguous form of the question and the answer to the problem is not determinate, as they imply.
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A commentary on Mel Rutherford’s ‘On the use and misuse of the “two children” brainteaser’
Author(s): Maya Bar-Hillelpp.: 175–179 (5)More LessRutherford (2010) criticizes the way some people have analyzed the 2-children problem, claiming (correctly) that slight nuances in the problem’s formulation can change the correct answer. However, his own data demonstrate that even when there is a unique correct answer, participants give intuitive answers that differ from it systematically — replicating the data reported by those he criticizes. Thus, his critique reduces to an admonition to use care in formulating and analyzing this brainteaser — which is always a good idea — but contributes little what is known, analytically or empirically, about the 2-children problem.
Volumes & issues
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Volume 31 (2024)
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Volume 30 (2023)
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Volume 29 (2022)
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Volume 28 (2021)
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Volume 27 (2020)
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Volume 26 (2019)
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Volume 25 (2018)
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Volume 24 (2017)
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Volume 23 (2016)
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Volume 22 (2014)
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Volume 21 (2013)
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Volume 20 (2012)
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Volume 19 (2011)
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Volume 18 (2010)
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Volume 17 (2009)
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Volume 16 (2008)
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Volume 15 (2007)
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Volume 14 (2006)
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Volume 13 (2005)
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Volume 12 (2004)
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Volume 11 (2003)
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Volume 10 (2002)
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Volume 9 (2001)
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Volume 8 (2000)
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Volume 7 (1999)
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Volume 6 (1998)
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Volume 5 (1997)
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Volume 4 (1996)
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Volume 3 (1995)
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Volume 2 (1994)
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Volume 1 (1993)
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