Pragmatics & Cognition - Volume 21, Issue 1, 2013

We provide conceptual and empirical support for the core tenet in pragmatic theory that speakers make their communicative intention about the pragmatic meaning of their utterances recognizable to hearers. First, we attribute skepticism about this tenet to conceptualizing communicative intentions as private cognitive states that hearers cannot reliably discern. We show it is more parsimonious to conceptualize communicative intention as arising from communally shared knowledge of discursive means to ends that is the basis for pragmatic reasoning about utterance meaning by speaker and hearer alike. Second, we address skepticism based on experiments interpreted as finding an egocentric bias where people regard communicative intentions as more obvious to others than they are. We report two original experiments we carried out that found that participants as third party observers and as communicators routinely engaged in pragmatic reasoning about the meaning of utterances in context that took others’ perspectives into account.

In this paper a connection between intentionality, intensionality, language and emotion will be drawn up through a demonstration of an intimate relationship between the intentionality of emotion and intensionality in language. What will be shown is that the intentionality of emotion can ultimately be traced to the intensionality of emotional contexts. For this purpose, emotive predicates will be categorized in terms of their intensional behavior and regularities. They will then be brought forward for an explication of why and how far the intentionality of emotion is unique. The insights derived from the relevant analyses will then be employed for the implications and ramifications that might be thrown upon the fabric of emotion and language within the space of cognition.

This paper sets out to explore the relation between social argumentation and inner debate by taking into account suggestions from argumentation studies and from social and discursive psychology. It develops Dascal’s (2005) claim that there are metonymical and structural relations between the two realms of debate by substantiating it with data taken from international migrants’ inner debates at moments of difficult decisions. The data are drawn from the experience of migrating mothers who have to decide whether to go back or to remain in their host country (the UK). I show that others are present in migrants’ multivoiced decisions in two important senses: first, inner debates can be reconstructed as critical discussions (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984). Second, the locus from analogy has the special function of allowing the comparison between the migrant’s experience and someone else’s experience.

Stance is inherent in conversational interaction and is interactional in nature. When speakers take a stance, they pay attention to both prior stances and stance relations, as well as to the anticipated consequences of their stancetaking. They manage stance relations as a way of dealing with the “sociocognitive relations” of intersubjectivity (Du Bois 2007). Using the dialogic framework proposed by Du Bois, this paper shows that the discourse marker well in American English works as a resource for the management of relationships among stances. With its referential and grammatical flexibility, it is uniquely characterized as a meta-stance marker because, rather than indexing a specific stance, it negotiates and regulates stance relations. Well is analyzed in two contextual categories: first, at stance divergence among utterances, and second, at stance shifts embedded in topic shift.

This article intends to reveal the unity between intention and other Gricean notions of signification, cancellability, and context. We argue that the total signification of an utterance is ultimately determined by speaker’s intention. We start with Grice’s conception of meaningNN and then proceed to argue that what is actually meant (both what is said and what is implicated) is hard to cancel without rendering the whole utterance self-contradictory. It is noted that cancelling p be differentiated from correcting p. It is also noted that contextual factors do not bear upon implicatures though a hearer or an analyst relies heavily on them for inference or interpretation. We suggest that any Gricean account of meaning be ontologically clear that it is the speaker’s intention that we are really invoking and consequently capture the metaphysics of meaning in order to remove the fallacy that the meaning of an utterance is its interpretation.

This study examined the ability to comprehend conventional and non-conventional implicatures, and the effect of proficiency and learning context (foreign language learners vs. heritage learners) on comprehension of implicature in L2 Chinese. Participants were three groups of college students of Chinese: elementary-level foreign language learners (n=21), advanced-level foreign language learners (n=25), and advanced-level heritage learners (n=25). They completed a 36-item computer-delivered listening test measuring their ability to comprehend three types of implicature: conventional indirect refusals, conventional indirect opinions, and non-conventional indirect opinions. Comprehension was analyzed for accuracy (scores on a multiple-choice measure) and comprehension speed (average time taken to answer items correctly). There was a significant effect of implicature type on accuracy, but not on comprehension speed. A significant effect of participant group was observed on accuracy, but the effect was mixed on comprehension speed.

The concept of communicative competence has been studied widely for over 40 years in several fields, including linguistics, psychology, and speech communication. Different definitions of communicative competence and measurement of communicative competence exist in these fields. A clear approach to communicative competence for typical speaking individuals and its measurement of communicative competence is unclear. This paper aims to: (1) review four main approaches to communicative competence and highlight strengths and weaknesses of each approach; (2) develop an integrated approach to communicative competence for typical speakers; and (3) address measurement of communicative competence. An integrated approach to communicative competence for typical speakers provides a fundamental access to communicative competence in different fields. For examples, scholars and speech, language pathologists have clear knowledge assessing communicative competence of individuals with communication disorders.

The coupling-constitution fallacy claims that arguments for extended cognition involve the inference of “x and y constitute z” from “x is coupled to y” and that such inferences are fallacious. We argue that the coupling-constitution fallacy fails in its goal to undermine the hypothesis of extended cognition: appeal to the coupling-constitution fallacy to rule out possible empirical counterexamples to intracranialism is fallacious. We demonstrate that appeals to coupling-constitution worries are problematic by constructing the fallacious argument against the hypothesis of extended cognition. We consider several objections to our argument and find them insufficient to rebut our conclusion.

Previous accounts of hedges assume that they cause language to become vague or fuzzy (Lakoff 1973); however, hedges can actually sharpen numerical concepts by giving explicit information about approximation, especially where bare numbers appear misleadingly round or precise. They can also tell hearers about the direction of approximation (greater or less than). This article provides a first empirical account of interactions between hedging and rounding in numerical expressions. We demonstrate that hedges occur more commonly with round numbers than with non-round ones. However, we also provide evidence from user studies that in the absence of hedges, readers interpret round numbers as approximations and non-round ones as precise; and that placing a hedge before a round number has no effect on its interpretation, whereas placing it before a non-round number shifts people’s interpretations from precise towards approximate. We attempt to explain this conundrum.

Speech act theory describes units of language as acts which function to change the behavior or beliefs of the partner. Therefore, with every utterance an individual seeks a communicative goal that is the underlying motive for the utterance’s production; this is the utterance’s function. Studies of deaf and hearing human children classify utterances into categories of communicative function. This study classified signing chimpanzees’ utterances into the categories used in human studies. The chimpanzees utilized all seven categories of communicative functions and used them in ways that resembled human children. The chimpanzees’ utterances functioned to answer questions, request objects and actions, describe objects and events, make statements about internal states, accomplish tasks such as initiating games, protest interlocutor behavior, and as conversational devices to maintain and initiate conversation.