Pragmatics & Cognition - Volume 22, Issue 3, 2014

According to the Common Ground account proposed by Stalnaker (2002, 2009), speakers involved in a verbal interaction have different propositional attitudes towards presuppositions. In this paper we propose an experimental study aimed at estimating the psychological plausibility of the Stalnakerian model. In particular, the goal of our experiment is to evaluate variations in accepting as appropriate a sentence that triggers a presupposition, where different attitudes are taken towards the presupposition required. The study conducted suggests that if a speaker has the attitude of belief towards the content of a presupposition, she may evaluate an utterance as more appropriate in a shorter time than in cases where she holds an attitude of presumption or of assumption. Therefore, data collected support the psychological soundness of what might be considered the main, but also most debated, theory of presupposition on the market.

In this paper we seek an inferential and cognitive model explaining some characteristics of abduction to composite hypotheses. In the first section, we introduce the matter of composite hypotheses, stressing how it is coherent with the intuitive and philosophical contention that a single event can be caused not only by several causes acting together, but also by several kinds of causation. In the second section, we argue that gossip could serve as an interesting model to study the generation of composite hypotheses at a larger scale: several characteristics of gossip (for instance its being diluted over time and its collaborative dimension) make it extremely prone to produce composite hypotheses considering different levels of causation. In the third and final section, we try to illustrate some specificities of abduction to composite hypotheses for individual agents basing on the analysis of collective agents.

This study examined the interrelationships among selected cognitive characteristics of Iranian EFL learners including English self-efficacy, metacognitive awareness, and their test performance. For this purpose, a model was proposed based on empirical studies and was tested using structural equation modeling (SEM). Following this, two questionnaires were administrated to 200 Iranian EFL learners of two language institutes in Mashhad, Iran. Results of this study indicated that Iranian EFL learners perceived themselves self-efficacious. They were also metacognitively aware of their learning process. Correlation analysis results showed that metacognitive awareness statistically correlated with English self-efficacy and foreign language test performance. It was found that English self-efficacy significantly correlated with foreign language test performance as well. The proposed SEM model adequately fitted the data. Results of the SEM indicated that self-efficacy was the strongest direct predictor of learners’ test performance. Metacognitive awareness directly affected learners’ English self-efficacy. It also indirectly affected test performance through affecting English self-efficacy.

This paper defends a theory of speech act that I call concurrentism. It receives support from a psychological study and goes well with evolutionary theory. It sheds light on what the hearer believes when he hears an indicative sentence, what the speaker believes when he says an indicative sentence, what the speaker does after he says an indicative sentence contrary to what he believes, why Moore’s paradox occurs, why it is puzzling to say some variants of Moorean sentences, and why it is not absurd to say other variants of Moorean sentences. It will become clear that other things being equal, we believe that other people speak as they believe, and we speak in accordance with what we believe. It will also become clear that after we speak contrary to what we believe, we keep to ourselves the discrepancy between what we speak and what we believe, ceteris paribus.

Searle’s (1963/1991) account of the communicative intentions in speech acts purports to be an advance over that of Grice (1957), in acknowledging the ineliminable role of the linguistic (usage) rules in enabling the hearer to recognize the speaker’s communicative intentions. In this paper we argue that, given some plausible assumptions about ordinary speech exchanges, Searle’s insight on this score is incompatible with his (1983) commitment to internalism in the philosophy of mind. As a result, Searle cannot have it both ways: either he must give up his core insight regarding the ineliminable role of linguistic (usage) rules in the hearer’s recognition of a speaker’s communicative intentions, or he must give up his commitment to internalism the philosophy of mind. We conclude by arguing that this lesson is generic: the forced choice is one that all theorists must face, insofar as we theorize about the role of language in the communication of thought through speech.

Although researchers have paid much attention to the journey metaphor (e.g., Forceville, 2006a, 2011a, 2011b; Forceville & Jeulink, 2011), little seems known about its role for moral political cognition. Using data from the US and UK public discourses on the Euro crisis as an example, this paper draws on Lakoff’s (1996) Moral Politics Theory, demonstrating that the journey metaphor can play a crucial role for political cognition, and especially for moral political judgment.

This paper features a critical review of the book Politeness and Audience Response in Chinese-English Subtitling. A brief introduction of the book’s content is given first, followed by a critical appraisal on merits and loopholes in the book. Furthermore, some interdisciplinary amendments — based on House’s (1998) comprehensive politeness theory and Lakoff’s (1987) embodiment concept — are put forward to remedy the loopholes in question. It is argued that covert translation works better in subtitling for it is compatible with different social norms at the micro level and universally explanative politeness maxims at the macro level. Another issue discussed in this paper is the pretextual influence on audience interpretation. Pretextual influence — or embodiment system which we render more pertinent in cognitive interpretation practice — can barely be mitigated in the audience’s interpretation. Given the audience’s potential misunderstanding derived from access to various pretextual experiences, the translator may as well transfer the right implications underneath paralinguistic behaviors to the subtitling in domesticalized terms.