Pragmatics & Cognition - Volume 33, Issue 1, 2026

A distinctive feature of verbal irony is the expression of a dissociative attitude. Although attitude understanding represents a key element of irony comprehension and its development, the experimental research in this area remains fragmented and often yields mixed findings. This paper reviews the measures employed to target distinct aspects of irony understanding, including attitude recognition, and examines inconsistencies in their application. Furthermore, it explores how features of experimental stimuli — including contextual, verbal, and paraverbal cues — can affect children’s performance. Our analysis lays the foundation for refining the conceptualisation of the dissociation expressed by the ironical attitude and overcoming methodological challenges such as ensuring consistency in the design of measures and their alignment with experimental stimuli. Adopting a more rigorous and integrative approach has the potential to illuminate the developmental trajectory of ironical attitude comprehension and support the establishment of more systematic and reliable research in this domain.

Irony comprehension is a complex pragmatic skill developing late in childhood, with inconsistent findings regarding the acquisition age. One reason for this inconsistency could be that previous studies focused on different components of irony comprehension (e.g., speaker belief, emotion, meaning, intent), relied on metapragmatic questions, or used offline measures. Building on recent methods combining offline tasks with eye-tracking, we developed LEIRO, a tool for testing irony comprehension in children aged 3 and older. LEIRO presents vignette stories, requiring children to select objects based on target utterances, while eye-tracking and pupillometry measure implicit comprehension. A pilot study with German-speaking 7-year-olds (n = 15) and adults (n = 13), conducted primarily to test the method in practice, showed only limited irony comprehension in children compared to adults. LEIRO will be made available for cross-linguistic and cross-cultural studies to advance the research on, and thus our understanding of, the development of irony comprehension.

In verbal irony, there is a contrast between the literal meaning of what is stated and the intended meaning of the words. As successful comprehension of irony requires going beyond lexical meaning, the ability to understand it tends to develop late compared to literal language and it is challenging for children. Numerous explanations have been proposed for the late development of irony comprehension, including emerging language and perspective-taking skills, working memory, and metapragmatic knowledge. Irony training studies have the potential to be an effective means of testing these explanations and moving beyond correlational designs. We review recent studies that tested this possibility. The results suggest that even short-term irony training can be effective for improving children’s irony comprehension accuracy, and that metapragmatic knowledge is a key mechanism of irony understanding. We outline directions for future training studies and link those to possibilities for both intervention and theory development.

Understanding irony requires epistemic vigilance towards both the content and source of communication. We conducted two experiments to investigate whether children’s early epistemic vigilance abilities aid in detecting verbal irony. The first experiment focused on children’s vigilance towards utterance content, hypothesizing that utterances whose explicit (or literal) content is more inappropriate in the context would be easier to recognize as ironic. The second experiment examined children’s vigilance towards the source of the utterances, hypothesizing that children would find ironic (but accurate) informants more trustworthy than inaccurate ones. Both tasks proved challenging for 3- to 7-year-olds, providing no direct evidence of irony understanding. While adults performed as predicted in the first experiment, they did not trust ironic (but accurate) informants, suggesting that the trustworthiness paradigm may not suit the complexity of verbal irony, where the speaker is both dismissive and correct. Our results contribute to a better understanding of the role of epistemic vigilance in irony development.

Young children are notoriously bad at understanding ironical statements, with irony comprehension emerging around the age of 6 and appearing resistant to task manipulation. What can explain this late emergence? We propose that children’s epistemic vigilance is a pivotal component of the constellation of socio-cognitive abilities underpinning irony comprehension. Epistemic vigilance enables children to detect the contextual incongruity of an ironical statement, discern that the ironical speaker is neither mistaken nor deceptive, and infer the critical, dissociative attitude expressed through verbal irony. By highlighting the role of epistemic vigilance, this account provides insight into the developmental puzzle of irony comprehension. It elucidates why its developmental trajectory diverges from that of other forms of figurative or humorous language and why it is closely linked to lie understanding and second-order false belief reasoning.

Unlike other figurative language abilities, irony emerges rather late, and its mastering takes place over a protracted window of development. Whilst its late emergence reflects the later development of prerequisite skills, its protracted development is likely to reflect the fact that some ironies are easier to grasp than others. In this paper, we discuss how conventionality is one factor which is likely to contribute to how easily ironies are mastered, yet despite this the nature of conventionality in irony and its effects on irony development are mostly unexplored. We argue for the existence of multiple sources of conventionality for irony likely to play a crucial role in its development. Since some of these sources facilitate adult irony processing, we investigate whether conventionality is likely to be a help to achieve proficient irony comprehension or rather a hinderance, as it has been found to be elsewhere in pragmatic development.

Several theories explain how adults understand verbal irony, but only a few have been generalized to explain children’s comprehension of verbal irony. In this narrative review paper, we identify cues to verbal irony (Theme 1), related cognitive skills (Theme 2), and social experience (Theme 3) as three main themes in the existing developmental verbal irony literature. Next, we review papers where researchers have directly tested theories with children to determine which theories have been generalized to explain these themes. This allows us to identify which research domains have received a theoretical interpretation, and which ones should be theoretically examined in future research. Based on our summary, we suggest that the Parallel Constraint Satisfaction (PCS) framework provides a promising verbal irony theory, and we identify directions for future research for testing the PCS framework.

Studies find that irony comprehension emerges around the ages of 6–7, aligning with second-order theory of mind (ToM) abilities. This study follows up on previous research suggesting that children younger than this age might be to some extent sensitive to irony uttered with a parodic tone of voice. Using picture selection and eye gaze measures, 4–7-year-old children were tested on a parodic irony comprehension task. We also investigated the proposed connection between second-order ToM abilities and parodic irony comprehension. Given that parodic irony has an affinity with pretense we also explored how pretend play skills influenced comprehension. Results corroborate existing evidence that children only reliably pass the irony task by age 6, and that second-order ToM abilities contribute to irony comprehension but only in 6–7-year-olds. Pretend play also positively correlates with comprehension scores, suggesting that this aspect of cognitive and social development might contribute positively to children’s irony understanding.

As a pragmatic competence, irony comprehension plays an important role in everyday communication and social relationships. Research to date has mainly focused on irony comprehension in typically developing children and children with autism spectrum disorder. More recently, pragmatic competences of children with ADHD have also received attention, although the focus has been more on global pragmatic competences. A few studies have examined irony comprehension in children with ADHD as a specific pragmatic sub-competence, but many questions remain unresolved. Therefore, the aim of this article is to map the state of research regarding irony comprehension in children with ADHD and, on this basis, to outline a research agenda for future studies investigating this important pragmatic sub-competence in children with ADHD.

Humans are endowed with a suite of cognitive mechanisms that enable them to mitigate the risk of misinformation and underlie their epistemic vigilance. When direct access to the initial source of information is unavailable, individuals often rely on the vigilance of others to acquire beliefs. Moreover, monitoring the critical alertness of one’s interlocutors is essential for interpreting their communicative intentions, particularly in cases of deliberately conveying false information, such as lies or verbal irony. However, little is known about the human capacity to track others’ epistemic vigilance and use this information to guide belief formation and pragmatic interpretation. This study investigates whether children aged from 4 to 8 selectively trust vigilant over gullible informants. Our findings suggest that selective trust based on informant vigilance towards inaccuracy begins to emerge around the age of 6.