Pragmatics & Cognition - Volume 6, Issue 1-2, 1998

As is well known, according to the "new" theory of reference, the reference relation can be carried out by means of rigid designators whose relationship with the object they designate cannot be analyzed away. Moreover, the new theorists claim, the category of proper names in a natural language marks almost invariably rigid designators. In this paper, both claims are rejected. Using distinctions between the referential system (which determines which entities the primitive symbols of language refer to in each possible world) and the identification system (which determines which member of one world is identical with which member of another), and between two types of object identification (public and perspectival), it is argued that the use of a noun phrase as a rigid designator is predicated on the assumption that a language user knows who (or what) the noun phrase refers to in the actual world. The conclusion is that rigid designation is not a conceptually irreducible reference relation, nor are proper names always used as rigid designators.

Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski (1993) propose a framework whereby different referring forms conventionally signal different cognitive statuses on an implica-tional 'givenness hierarchy'. Interaction of the hierarchy with Grice's Maxim of Quantity gives rise to scalar implicatures which further constrain the choice among forms and their interpretations when necessary conditions for more than one form are met. Wilson (1992) and Matsui (1995) show that reference assignment for NPs introduced by the definite article is constrained within Relevance Theory by the automatic selection of an interpretation that yields adequate contextual effects for minimal processing effort. This paper proposes that an optimal account of how people understand the intended referent of an NP must appeal to both the Givenness Hierarchy and Relevance Theory. Such an account still requires the first part of the Quantity Maxim, however, either as a socially based assumption or as part of the Principle of Relevance itself

In the study of reference assignment, the question of what pragmatic criteria are used to evaluate the resulting interpretation seems not yet to have been properly dealt with. This paper addresses the issue by examining factors which affect the acceptability of various cases of bridging reference. It demonstrates that even highly successful accounts of reference assignment which place major emphasis on accessibility factors, e.g. the accessibility of candidate referents and the accessibility of contextual assumptions, must nonetheless involve some pragmatic criterion with which hearers can evaluate the resulting interpretation. Moreover, it argues that the pragmatic criterion used in reference assignment is not the truth-based one, which has been widely accepted, but the criterion of consistency with the principle of relevance proposed by Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995). Various accounts are tested against a wide range of examples on which I have conducted experimental tests with several sets of subjects.

The term 'referring expression' is often used without definition, and models of referring usually ignore the question of how NP's are recognized as referring expressions in discourse. In this paper, I review some relevant distinctions from the research in generics and, on that basis, provide a definition of referring expressions as specific and non-kind-referring noun phrases. I discuss some complications to the definition. Using Kronfeld's model of referring as my framework, I discuss the interaction of the recognition of referring expressions and the recognition of relevant identification criteria. I propose that all present suggestions for identification constraints fall into three groups, and argue that the recognition of referring expressions always depends on the recognition of some identification constraints. On this basis, I extend the framework with procedural information.

In this paper we report on an investigation into the principles underlying the choice of a particular referential expression to refer to an object located in a domain to which both participants in the dialogue have visual as well as physical access. Our approach is based on the assumption that participants try to use as little effort as possible when referring to objects. This assumption is operational-ized in two factors, namely the focus of attention and a particular choice of features to be included in a referential expression. We claim that both factors help in reducing the effort needed to, on the one hand, refer to an object and, on the other hand, to identify it. As a result of the focus of attention the number of potential target objects (i.e., the object the speaker intends to refer to) is reduced. The choice of a specific type of feature determines the number of objects that have to be identified in order to be able to understand the referential expression. An empirical study was conducted in which pairs of participants cooperatively carried out a simple block-building task, and the results provided empirical evidence that supported the aforementioned claims. Especially the focus of attention turned out to play an important role in reducing the total effort. Additionally, focus acted as a strong coherence-establishing device in the studied domain.

We propose a model of reference that contrasts with standard linguistic approaches in that it focuses on the role of interaction in reference, arguing that referring expressions in conversations are not designed for interchangeable audiences but rather exploit the common ground between partners. Our model also differs from psycholinguistic approaches in that it uses conversational data, since critical aspects of natural conversations are absent from laboratory tasks used so far and thus are not captured by current models. Examples from conversations are presented to demonstrate that speakers often try to manage the accessibility of a problematic referent to an addressee by presenting a context for it as well as a referring expression, even at the cost of syntactic orthodoxy. We also present examples demonstrating that partners negotiate as to what representation is good enough for present purposes and whether that has been achieved. While strategies may vary as to explicitness, we believe these negotiations underlie all formulations of referring expressions.

Definite referring expressions have been studied almost exclusively with respect to their ability to uniquely identify objects. Based on examples of NPs with the drawn from naturally occurring texts, I argue that definite referring expressions serve other functions, as well — they indicate the prominence of a referent, the referent's status as a role function (rather than an individual) or the viewpoint from which the referent is presented. All of this information contributes to the construction of discourse referents and is therefore part of the speech act of referring. In general, speakers do not talk about objects in a neutral fashion, but rather attempt to induce addressees to accept them into the discourse under different guises. Thus, the notion of a successful reference cannot be restricted to cases in which an object is uniquely identified.

However one conceives of the relation between a sign and its significate, referring is a communicative act in which a speaker must intentionally direct the attention of an interlocutor to some object, event, or state of affairs that the speaker has in mind. This article examines the ontogenesis and phylogenesis of acts of referring, with special concern for the possible nature of sign-significate relationships. Findings from developments psychology indicate that a group of abilities and skills underlie the ability to refer. Infants follow the gaze of others to objects of attention, and enjoy joint attention with others. Interactions with caregivers in routines well known to the child enable her to achieve joint attention with the adult on a particular ingredient in the routine. In this way, the ability to refer develops from certain "language games ", interactions that combine goal-seeking and joint attention.

My approach to reference focuses on naturally occuring processes of communication, and in particular on children's earliest referential activities. I begin by describing three different kinds of child gesture — ritualizations, deictics, and symbolic gestures — and then proceed to examine young children's early word learning. The account focuses on the joint attentional situations in which young children learn their earliest gestures and linguistic symbols and on the social-cognitive and cultural learning processes involved in the different cases.

This paper investigates the gradual transformation of prelinguistic joint attention routines into resources of referential communication. It is argued that the child uses linguistic means of reference to recode and re-represent joint attention procedures in various ways. While semanticists stress the fact that pronouns, proper nouns, and definite descriptions may refer to the same entity, various modes of establishing, identifying and tracking discourse referents are considered here to be structural amplifications of joint attention routines, actively reorganized by the child in language acquisition.

Researchers interested in children's understanding of mind have claimed that the ability to ascribe beliefs and intentions is a late development, occurring well after children have learned to speak and comprehend the speech of others. On the other hand, there are convincing arguments to show that verbal communication requires the ability to attribute beliefs and intentions. Hence if one accepts the findings from research into children's understanding of mind, one should predict that young children will have severe difficulties in verbal communication. Conversely, if this prediction fails, this casts doubt on the claim that young children lack meta-representational skills. Using insights from Relevance Theory, an experiment was designed to test children's ability to recover a speaker's intended referent in situations in which the speaker's words underdetermine the referent. Results suggest that children's skills are comparable to those of untutored adults in similar situations. Thus this study indirectly casts doubt on the claim that young children lack meta-representational skills.

The distinction between symbolizing, i.e., representing concepts or propositions, and simulating allows a simple description of (a) representations where symbolizing and simulating coincide ("iconic symbols", like in pictograms and onomato-poetic words), (b) representations realizing simulating and symbolizing functions by separate elements (as in charts and graphs), and (c) representations combining figurai symbols with linguistic symbols, such as logical pictures. These figurai symbols seem to derive their form from spatial metaphors. A more specific assumption was tested in two experiments: the more precise the mapping between logical picture and spatial metaphors in the text, the higher the efficiency of this two-dimensional analogy in reducing the cognitive load of the text. The experiments had to meet the requirement of an equivalent "meaning " of the text-picture combinations to be compared. In both experiments the data of the guessing-tests used for measuring the "cognitive load" showed the expected tendency.