Pragmatics & Cognition - Volume 7, Issue 1, 1999

Adults and children spontaneously produce gestures while they speak, and such gestures appear to support and expand on the information communicated by the verbal channel. Little research, however, has been carried out to examine the role played by gesture in the listener's representation of accumulating information. Do listeners attend to the gestures that accompany narrative speech? In what kinds of relationships between gesture and speech do listeners attend to the gestural channel? If listeners do attend to information received in gesture, how is this information represented— is it 'tagged' as originating in the gestural channel? In this article research is described that addresses these questions. Results show that listeners do attend to information conveyed in gesture, when that information supplements or even contradicts the information conveyed by speech. And information received via gesture is available for retelling in speech. These results are taken to demonstrate that gesture is not taken by the listener to be epiphenomenal to the act of speaking, or a simple manual translation of speech. But they also suggest that the information conveyed in a discourse may be represented in a manner that is neither gesture nor language, although accessible to both channels.

Since listeners usually look at the speaker's face, gestural information has to be absorbed through peripheral visual perception. In the literature, it has been suggested that listeners look at gestures under certain circumstances: 1) when the articulation of the gesture is peripheral; 2) when the speech channel is insufficient for comprehension; and 3) when the speaker him- or herself indicates that the gesture is worthy of attention. The research here reported employs eye tracking techniques to study the perception of gestures in face-to-face interaction. The improved control over the listener's visual channel allows us to test the validity of the above claims. We present preliminary findings substantiating claims 1 and 3, and relate them to theoretical proposals in the literature and to the issue of how visual and cognitive attention are related.

An approach is provided to the prediction and explanation of quantity implicata (implicata whose calculation depends on adversion to Grice's maxim of Quantity) that, unlike the majority of approaches available, does not construe Quantity as requiring speakers to make the strongest claim that their evidence permits. Central to this treatment is an elaboration of the notion of what a conversation requires as appealed to in the Cooperative Principle and the Quantity maxim. What a conversation requires is construed as depending, at any given point, upon (i) the aim(s) of the conversation taking place, (ii) the conversational record, which includes such features as common ground and salience relations among objects, and (iii) any proffered illocution calling for a reply. In accounting for this third dimension a partial characterization is provided of the speech acts of assertion and interrogation in terms of their role in constraining the progress of the conversation in which they occur.

The present study discusses the mechanism and formalism of conversational planning. It is argued that the planner engages in a variety of metacognition as s/he perceives, interprets, evaluates, and produces cognitive actions that require careful attention and analysis. Following Flavell's (1981) model of cognitive monitoring, a metacognitive model of conversational planning is proposed. The model consists of several cognitive and metacognitive components that are grouped into three categories: Causal Knowledge, Working Knowledge, and Conscious Experiences. Next, to elaborate the metacognitive components of the model, several examples of metacognitive variables in problem-solving situations are proposed. Then, focusing on these variables, the proposed model of conversational planning is illustrated using natural data taken from a clinical supervision session. In the last section, the relevance of the present study to pragmatics is briefly discussed with respect to mental operations involved in interpretation.

Ancient Greek mathematics developed the original feature of being deductive mathematics. This article attempts to give a (partial) explanation f or this achievement. The focus is on the use of a fixed system of linguistic formulae (expressions used repetitively) in Greek mathematical texts. It is shown that (a) the structure of this system was especially adapted for the easy computation of operations of substitution on such formulae, that is, of replacing one element in a fixed formula by another, and it is further argued that (b) such operations of substitution were the main logical tool required by Greek mathematical deduction. The conclusion explains why, assuming the validity of the description above, this historical level (as against the universal cognitive level) is the best explanatory level for the phenomenon of Greek mathematical deduction.

In this paper, it is shown how formal dialectic can be extended to model multi-agent argumentation in which each participant is an agent. An agent is viewed as a participant in a dialogue who not only has goals, and the capability for actions, but who also has stable characteristics of types that can be relevant to an assessment of some of her arguments used in that dialogue. When agents engage in argumentation in dialogues, each agent has a credibility function that can be adjusted upwards or downwards by certain types of arguments brought forward by the other agent in the dialogue. One type is the argument against the person or argumentum ad hominem, in which personal attack on one party's character is used to attack his argument. Another is the appeal to expert opinion, traditionally associated with the informal fallacy called the argumentum ad verecundiam. In any particular case, an agent will begin a dialogue with a given degree of credibility, and what is here called the credibility function will affect the plausibility of the arguments put forward by that agent. In this paper, an agent is shown to have specific character traits that are vital to properly judging how this credibility function should affect the plausibility of her arguments, including veracity, prudence, sincerity and openness to opposed arguments. When one of these traits is a relevant basis for an adjustment in a credibility function, there is a shift to a subdialogue in which the argumentation in the case is re-evaluated. In such a case, it is shown how the outcome can legitimately be a reduction in the credibility rating of the arguer who was attacked. Then it is shown how the credibility function should be brought into an argument evaluation in the case, yielding the outcome that the argument is assigned a lower plausibility value.