Studies in Language. International Journal sponsored by the Foundation “Foundations of Language” - Volume 28, Issue 3, 2004

The paper discusses the relevance of typological evidence for the construction of a theory of Universal Grammar (UG). After introducing UG-based approaches to typology, it goes on to argue that most typological generalizations are in no sense ‘knowledge of language’. In fact, some of the best-established typological generalizations have explanations based on language use, and so it is either empirically unmotivated or redundant to attempt to encompass them within UG theory. This conclusion is reinforced by a look at the widely-accepted Lexical Parameterization Hypothesis and by the current shift of interest to ‘microparameters’. The paper goes on to take a critical look at Mark Baker’s Parameter Hierarchy.

I argue that the following two assumptions are incorrect: (i) The properties of the innate Universal Grammar can be discovered by comparing language systems, and (ii) functional explanation of language structure presupposes a “correct”, i.e. cognitively realistic, description. Thus, there are two ways in which linguistic explanation does not presuppose linguistic description. The generative program of building cross-linguistic generalizations into the hypothesized Universal Grammar cannot succeed because the actually observed generalizations are typically one-way implications or implicational scales, and because they typically have exceptions. The cross-linguistic generalizations are much more plausibly due to functional factors. I distinguish sharply between “phenomenological description” (which makes no claims about mental reality) and “cognitively realistic description”, and I show that for functional explanation, phenomenological description is sufficient.

What constitutes linguistic evidence for Universal Grammar (UG)? The principal approach to this question equates UG on the one hand with language universals on the other. Parsimonious and general characterizations of linguistic variation are assumed to uncover features of UG. This paper reviews a recently developed evolutionary approach to language that casts doubt on this assumption: the Iterated Learning Model (ILM). We treat UG as a model of our prior learning bias, and consider how languages may adapt in response to this bias. By dealing directly with populations of linguistic agents, the ILM allows us to study the adaptive landscape that particular learning biases result in. The key result from this work is that the relationship between UG and language structure is non-trivial.

This paper deliberates for a number of linguistic features whether they are part of UG, i.e., specific to human language, or whether they are adapted from other cognitive capacities which were evolutionarily prior to language. Among others, it is argued that the distinction between predication and reference already belongs to the conceptual system, whereas the distinction between verb and noun (which is not identical with the former one) is one of the innovations of UG. It is furthermore argued that syntax in the sense that it deals with displacement (‘movement’) is a property of human language that lies outside of UG. The paper then discusses whether linguistic typology can contribute to our knowledge of UG, and whether aiming at this is a reasonable goal for typological research. It stands against Newmeyer’s position (this special issue) that typological evidence is essentially irrelevant for the construction of UG, as well as against Haspelmath’s position (this special issue), who argues that typological research can do without a concept of UG.

Data from natural languages (in contrast to, say, the results of psycholinguistic experiments) are still a major source of evidence used in linguistics, whether they are elicited through grammatical judgments, as in generative linguistics, or by collecting samples, as preferred in typology. The underlying assumption is that data are alike in their value as evidence if they occur in natural languages. The present paper questions this assumption in showing that there is a difference in the naturalness of languages because languages like German or English have originally emerged as secondarily learned written languages, that is they once were languages without native speakers. Although they are nowadays acquired as first languages, their grammars still contain inconsistent properties which partly disqualify standard languages as a source of evidence.

This paper considers the question of explanation in second language acquisition within the context of two approaches to universals, Universal Grammar and language typology. After briefly discussing the logic of explaining facts by including them under general laws (Hempel & Oppenheim 1948), the paper makes a case for the typological approach to explanation being the more fruitful, in that it allows more readily for the possibility of ‘explanatory ascent’, the ability to propose more general, higher order explanations by having lower-level generalizations follow from more general principles. The UG approach, on the other hand is less capable of such explanatory ascent because of the postulation that the innate, domain-specific principles of UG are not reducible in any interesting way to higher order principles of cognition (Chomsky 1982).

The main aim of this paper is to establish the position of historical linguistics in the wider field of linguistics. Section 1 centres on the immediate and long term goals of historical linguistics. Section 2 discusses the type of data that play a role and looks at tools to be used for the analysis of the data. It also addresses the question whether the explanation of the data should be in terms of grammar change (as advocated by formalist linguists) or language change. This latter point automatically leads to the question as to what type of grammatical model or theory the historical linguist should work with, and more particularly, in how far the innate, syntacto-centric generative model is adequate for studying grammar change (Section 3). This is followed by a brief conclusion in which a semi-independent position for the historical linguist is advocated.