Journal of Argumentation in Context - Volume 5, Issue 3, 2016

This paper argues that surface-level analysis of political argument fails to explain the effectiveness of ideological enthymemes, particularly within the context of presidential debates. This paper uses the first presidential debate of the 2012 election as a case study for the use of “Obamacare” as an ideological enthymeme. The choice of a terminological system limits and shapes the argumentative choices afforded the candidate. Presidential debates provide a unique context within which to examine the interaction of ideological constraints and argument due to their relatively committed and ideologically homogenous audiences.

The paper is about the uses of the argument from legislative counterfactual intention, in the field of legal interpretation and argumentation. After presenting the argument from intention in general, it distinguishes the varities of the argument from counterfactual legislative intention and discusses their justification conditions.

This paper examines the argumentation in the case Janowiec and Others vs. Russia, heard before the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg (ECtHR, or Court), primarily based on the hearings with additional references to the two judgments issued. The proffered analysis focuses on the types and forms of argumentation used in the counsels’ oral arguments, as well as their rhetorical strategies and tactics, as based on Douglas Walton’s argumentation schemes and Stephen Toulmin’s model of argumentation. The starting point of the analyzed dispute is the verbal classification of the subject of the dispute, which reflects the different historical perspectives in the narratives about the Katyń crime, as related by the litigating parties and the court. The political and media context of this dispute in the Polish, Russian, and international public space is also considered.

Contemporary theory of argumentation offers many insights about the ways in which, in the context of a public controversy, arguers should ideally present their arguments and criticize those of their opponents. We also know that in practice not all works out according to the ideal patterns: numerous kinds of derailments (fallacies) are an object of study for argumentation theorists. But how about the use of unfair strategies vis-à-vis one’s opponents? What if it is not a matter of occasional derailments but of one party’s systematic refusal to take other parties seriously? What if one party continually forgoes any form of critical testing and instead resorts to threats or blackmail? Can this be countered by the tools of reason? Or should one pay one’s opponent back in the same coin? To gain some grasp of these issues, we describe a number of strategies used in the public controversy about induced earthquakes in Groningen. We check whether these strategies are fair, i.e. balanced, transparent, and tolerant. We also investigate the effects of the choice for a particular kind of strategy. It appears that, in circumstances, choosing a fair strategy may be detrimental for resolving the controversy and choosing an unfair one beneficial. Following up ideas from social psychology and political science, we formulate some guidelines for the choice of strategies. At the end, we stress the importance — especially for those whose opinions carry little weight — of having a society in which the knowledge and skills needed for assessing the fairness of strategies are widespread.