Journal of Argumentation in Context - Volume 8, Issue 2, 2019

Philosophical argumentation presents a puzzle for pragma-dialectics: both from the perspective of 2500 years of history and from what we can ourselves witness in the present, philosophers seem to be exclusively intent on strengthening and elaborating their differences of opinion. Nothing like that happens in other academic endeavors. This is an anomaly in pragma-dialectical terms because, if philosophical discussants do not want to resolve their differences of opinion, then they would seem to be unreasonable by definition. In other words, no critical discussion would be possible in philosophy because of the peculiar way philosophers argue. The anomaly can, however, be dispelled by using the elementary distinction between single and multiple differences of opinion. It is argued that, in spite of occasional appearances, all philosophical differences of opinion are multiple. From that it is argued that the ‘institutional point’ (van Eemeren, 2010) of philosophy is to create the broadest map of arguable positions. If this is true, then philosophers may after all be pursuing a higher-order kind of consensus, bearing in particular on how many arguments can be marshaled around any given philosophical question.

This paper focuses on the use of scientific insights for justifying decisions in policy-making. Because in policy-making the politician argues for a future course of action by pointing at its positive consequences, the burden of proof should concern not only the scientific arguments, but also the pragmatic arguments. We show how the political justificatory process takes place that combines the two argument types, and we propose criteria for assessing the quality of the justifications. Based on our theoretical findings, we provide a case-study analysis of the Paris Agreement on climate change in which we demonstrate how the politicians attempt to meet their burden of proof imposed by pragmatic and scientific argumentation.

With the help of the extended pragma-dialectical theory, this paper aims to analyze how Al Aswany, an Egyptian political columnist who argued in favor of the feasibility of democratization before the Arab Spring, maneuvered strategically by argumentation from example in two of his columns in supporting the standpoint that the Egyptian people had become no longer politically inactive. The analysis is conducted in view of the institutional preconditions of political columns and the specific rhetorical exigency a columnist may face in this specific argumentative situation.

Impartiality is one of the core values underlying the administration of justice. A complaint about a judge’s supposed lack of impartiality may be filed on the grounds of the judge’s verbal behavior. In this article I will analyze complaints that concern the judge’s use of rhetorical questions during court hearings. I will explore what role these complaints may play in the strategic maneuvering of a party who seeks the judge’s disqualification.

In this paper, we analyze the persuasive effects of conspiracy theories from a rhetorical and argumentative perspective. In particular, we scrutinize a case-study – the story of the “Stamina cure” in Italy –, interpreting it as a particular instance of conspiracy theory. First, we explain what conspiracy theories are, and why they are relevant within the contemporary health debate. Second, we situate our analysis in relation to other theoretical accounts, explaining why a discursive approach may be required to study conspiracies. Third, we investigate our case-study through the lenses of the three “entechnic” proofs of rhetoric: logos, ethos, and pathos. We conclude that a rhetorical approach can shed significant light on how conspiracies achieve their persuasive effect and it provides a first step toward the elaboration of a more comprehensive model to better address the practical and political implications of conspiracy argumentations.