Journal of Language Aggression and Conflict - Volume 4, Issue 2, 2016

Whilst there has been much investigation of courtroom testimony and other linguistic aspects of legal process, there has been little consideration of the linguistic basis of war crimes tribunals such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), which provides the data for this article. The testimony of witnesses in ICTY rape trials is investigated to discover how their examination by counsel may affect these alleged victims of a brutal war. The approach taken is textual as well as discoursal, focusing on the co-construction of meaning between counsel and witnesses — and its failures. The frequent meta discussions about the nature of truth in the testimony shows up some disjunction between the parties in their understanding of the process they are engaged in, leading to the conclusion that the witnesses may have been ‘revictimised’

The second largest party in the Italian Parliament, the ‘5-Star Movement’, is led by comedian-turned-politician Beppe Grillo. Grillo is well-known for a distinctive and often inflammatory rhetoric, which includes the regular use of humorous but insulting epithets for other politicians, such as Psiconano (‘Psychodwarf’) for Silvio Berlusconi. This paper discusses a selection of epithets used by Grillo on his blog between 2008 and 2015 to refer to Berlusconi and three successive centre-left leaders. We account for the functions of the epithets in terms of Spencer-Oatey’s (2002, 2008) multi-level model of “face” and of Culpeper’s (2011) “entertaining” and “coercive” functions of impoliteness. We suggest that our study has implications for existing models of face and impoliteness and for an understanding of the evolving role of verbal aggression in Italian politics.

This paper analyses the phenomenon of participatory ambiguity in aggressive ritualistic interactions. One can ‘participate’ (Goffman 1979, 1981) in an interaction in different statuses, and these statuses entail different interactional constraints and obligations, also within the realms of language aggression and conflict. We are interested in a specific aspect of participation, namely ratification — the assumed right to participate in an interaction. ‘Ambiguity’ describes forms of behaviour which deviate from participant and observer expectations of interacting in certain discursive roles, without clearly violating (un)ratified participation roles. Examining the relationship between participatory ambiguity and language aggression fills an important knowledge gap in the field, as this area has been relatively ignored. We take heckling in experimental performing arts as a case study.

The burgeoning literature on studies of swearing suggests that any acceptable definition of swearing involves three features: (a) non-literal meanings, (b) taboo subjects, and (c) emotions. It also suggests that swearwords fall into one of the three classes: aggressive, cathartic, or social. Driven by a rich corpus of swearwords from Persian, this paper argues that swearing in Persian does not necessarily involve these three features, and that a redefinition of swearing is needed. It then borrows ideas from ethics to suggest that any precise definition of swearing will have to involve the distinction between teleological and deontological ethics. It further envisages a continuum for swearing, with teleological ethics at one end and deontological ethics at the other, on which different forms of swearing can be arranged based on the degree to which they lean towards either end.

This study investigated lexical labelling of people and their actions in terms of ownership and non-ownership of territories by the Nigerian and Cameroonian newspaper reports on the Bakassi Peninsula border conflict, with a view to uncovering ideologies underlying the representations. Van Dijk’s socio-cognitive model of Critical Discourse Analysis which relates discursive practices to social and psychological dimensions was used to analyse instances of labelling in three Nigerian and three Cameroonian English-medium national newspapers. The analyses revealed that the newspapers generally labelled Nigerians in Bakassi as both owners (natives and indigenes) and non-owners (inhabitants and residents). Specifically, the Cameroonian news reports deployed more labels of non-ownership to project Nigerians in Bakassi as mere tenants and occupants of the region while the Nigerian news reports employed more labels of ownership to depict Nigerians as aboriginals and owners of the peninsula. The ideologies of economic interests and ancestral roots motivated the labelling of territorial ownership and non-ownership in both nations’ newspapers.

This paper delves into the problem of aggression in Turkish foreign-policy discourse on Syria which tries to legitimize a military operation. In order to understand how the policymaking preferences of a military operation are legitimized and promoted in governmental discourse, 166 governmental texts, from 2011 to 2013, are investigated in terms of the implementation of strategies proposed by several scholars (van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999; Reisigl and Wodak 2001, 2009; van Leeuwen 2007, 2008; Reyes 2011). The results show that the increasing willingness of the Turkish government to take military action in Syria is systematically operationalized in several stages within each type of legitimation strategy (van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999) to overcome international reluctance and provide support for a prospective conflict. At the end of the paper, the results are evaluated in light of recent political developments for a comprehensive understanding of the meaning and limits of the strategies implemented.

The paper investigates how (de)legitimization and impoliteness are interconnected in the ethno-sectarian conflicts that take place in online news response threads. (De)legitimization is conceptualized as a micro argumentative practice that can index the interlocutors’ sociopolitical stances and position them in relation to each other in inter-group contestations. Using multi-tiered positioning analysis, a distinction was made between exogenous and endogenous impoliteness assessments each of which occurred at a different spatiotemporal level of the interactions. This distinction elucidates how impoliteness assessments can trigger and be triggered by (de)legitimization. To understand how (de)legitimization might trigger impoliteness assessments, I differentiate between face-related and identity-related impoliteness, which were both used strategically to deepen the ethno-sectarian divisions in this online context. In the online conflicts in question, collective impoliteness was sometimes motivated by legitimization, rather than delegitimization, even though legitimization involves no violation of the genre-sanctioned interactional norms or the moral order. That was because legitimization functioned in binary oppositions, and, as such, was perceived by out-group members as provocative impingement on their ethno-sectarian communities’ sociopolitical rights.