**The Relation of Language to Context in Children's Speech
The Role of HAFTA Statements in Structuring 3-year-old's Discourse***

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1. Introduction

Even a quick glance at the list of sentences typically considered recalcitrant to traditional speech act taxonomies (see Searle 1979:36; Levinson 1983:264) is enough to incite the worries of anyone engaged in research on the English modal auxiliaries. Why do the majority of these problem sentences contain modal auxiliary forms? To illustrate, some examples from Searle's list of sentences which require a special speech act analysis (referred to as 'indirect speech acts') follow: (i) *Can you pass the salt?*; (ii) *I want you to do this for me, Henry.*; (iii) *Will you quit making that awful racket?*; (iv) *You should leave immediately.*, etc.¹ Indeed, Searle begins the discussion of his controversial proposal for indirect speech acts with an example which contains the form which is the focus of the present study, i.e. HAFTA²: (v) Student X: *Let's go to the movies tonight*; Student Y: *I have to study for an exam.* In each of these examples, a problem arises due to the fact that the situated meaning of the utterance departs from its literal meaning³. That is, typically sentences (i) - (iv) function as directives though being syntactically packaged in a declarative or interrogative sentence format; analogously, the second sentence in example (v) is intended as a refusal while being expressed as an assertive. In other words, the syntactic packaging of the modalized sentence encodes one meaning while the interpretation of the utterance with respect to the discourse or situational context conveys another meaning.

The problem raised by these examples is instructive as it sharpens our awareness of the different possibilities for utterance interpretation. According to speech act theory, the primary resource for utterance interpretation is the literal meaning and literal force of an utterance encoded in its semantic-syntactic structure. Context is appealed to only if the literal meaning yields a situationally anomalous interpretation. If this occurs, a contextually based speech act force is computed by virtue of a process of inferential reasoning which takes contextual conditions into account. The resultant speech act has been called an 'indirect speech act' in acknowledgement of the process of inference which is involved (Searle 1975:60). In contrast, according to pragmatically based theories, utterances are interpreted from the very outset in terms of their situatedness in a larger context (Levinson 1979; 1983:279). For example, according to conversational analysis, utterances not only occur in a sequential discourse context but their primary interpretation is determined by reference to their structural role within the sequential context (Schegloff & Sacks 1973; Schegloff 1984). Similarly, according to contextually based activity theories, utterances are initially processed in terms of the norms of the activity-context in which they occur (Ervin-Tripp 1976; Gumperz 1982;

Levinson 1979; 1983). The point is that from both the conversational-analytic and activity based perspective, various aspects of the speech event provide a framework of expectations about the nature of the context which serves as an inferential basis for utterance interpretation.

Now, initially the present study was not intended as a head-on confrontation with the complex controversies surrounding the problem of utterance interpretation. Rather, the purpose of this study was merely to discover whether any significant patterns obtained with respect to the way children's HAFTA statements were used in conversational discourse. This endeavor was conceived as part of a larger endeavor investigating the way the modal auxiliaries are used in children's speech (see references for other papers on the same children's use of other modal forms). However, as the analysis proceeded, the problem of utterance interpretation had to be confronted since the HAFTA statements accrued certain meanings in context which were not reducible to their semantic representation. Therefore, in order to understand the child's use of this particular modal form, it was necessary to develop a means of analyzing the contextual meanings which the HAFTA statements give rise to.

Thus the present study has a twofold aim. On the one hand, the study's descriptive goal is to give an account of the various uses of the children's HAFTA statements in face-to-face interaction. Once certain patterns of use are presented, it will be argued that even the 3-year-old orients to what Heritage and Atkinson (1984:5) call the 'turn-within-sequence-character of utterances' in conversational interactions. That is, even very young children choose a HAFTA statement in terms of its function in the larger discourse context (for supporting evidence see Garvey 1975; Ervin-Tripp 1976; 1977; Shatz 1978; Eisenberg & Garvey 1981; Corsaro 1985; McTear 1985). However, this study has a more explanatory goal as well which is to work out a plausible solution to the problem of utterance interpretation - at least for the set of HAFTA statements included in the children's corpus. The solution to be proposed is an extension of the conversation-analytic view which, as noted above, grants interpretive priority to the set of expectations established by the sequential context. Nevertheless, adopting this position will not require that we reject speech act theory's claim that the literal meaning of an utterance (see Note #3) is a basic source of utterance interpretation. Indeed, based on the view that speech is organized in terms of multiple levels of meaning, it will be argued that the child's use of a HAFTA statement involves a nested hierarchy of functions such that its semantic meaning is interpreted in terms of its situated meaning whose prior accessibility derives from strong probability inferences which emerge within a particular context.

To demonstrate this claim, the results of a distributional analysis will be presented which centers on the patterns of use of each of the utterances which contains the modal form HAFTA in the children's corpus (N=73). The main line of argument will be that once the modalized utterances are analyzed with respect to their role in helping to structure certain functions inherent to face-to-face discourse, a different way of conceptual-

izing the meaning of such utterances emerges which avoids having to make the fatal choice: semantic sentence meaning vs. situated utterance meaning - as though the two sources of meaning were incompatible with each other.

In order to work out an analysis of the entire set of HAFTA utterances, it was necessary to go beyond the analytic tools offered by conversational analysis. According to this paradigm, the basic unit of conversation is the adjacency pair (Schegloff & Sacks 1973). Adjacency pairs are sequentially constrained pairs of utterances the first of which makes relevant a particular type of second such that the non-occurrence of the latter constitutes an official absence. Examples of adjacency pairs consist of question-answer pairs, request-refusal/acceptance pairs, etc. Moreover, adjacency pairs are defined as pairs of utterances where each pair part is spoken by a different speaker adopting the role inherent to the interrelated pair of actions (i.e. questioner-responder; requestor-requestee, etc.). However, as it turns out, the different types of sequences which the children's HAFTA statements enter into cannot all be characterized as instances of adjacency pairs. Though adjacency pair units capture one type of use of the children's HAFTA statements, the remaining uses occur as part of a sequence where the relevant utterances are produced by the same speaker rather than by different speakers. Nevertheless, the relations between these utterances are just as structured as the relations which obtain between the utterances produced by different speakers in adjacency pairs⁴.

Thus, in order to have a framework which is general enough to accommodate the various types of structural relations existing between sequenced utterances whether they are spoken by the same speaker or by different speakers, we will extend Fillmore's construct of a frame (1982; 1985)⁵ to the realm of discourse and propose various types of 'discourse frames'. However, whereas Fillmore uses the frame concept to refer to the schematization of knowledge and experience presupposed by the use of a set of lexical items, we shall employ this concept to refer to the knowledge that participants display concerning the norms of various modes of speaker-hearer interaction in face-to-face discourse. The notion of a discourse frame is intended as a generalization over the concept of an adjacency pair in that it is meant to characterize particular structural domains of systemically interrelated acts whereby the occurrence of a particular head act establishes the appropriateness of a set of ancillary acts given the tasks which are inherent to both the speaker and hearer roles specified by the head act. (Also see Garvey 1975 for a discussion of 'the domain of a request').

The purpose of the present study is to demonstrate that in order to understand the child's use of HAFTA, the HAFTA statements need to be viewed in terms of the role they play in particular discourse frames. Analogously, for the uses of HAFTA which do not occur as part of a discourse sequence, the HAFTA statements will need to be viewed in terms of their role in particular 'activity frames'. The advantage of such a frame-based approach is that it provides us with a way of conceptualizing how the two sources of utterance meaning (semantic sentence meaning and situated meaning) can be combined in one utterance.

However, before presenting our findings, it is worth taking some time to spell out the assumptions in terms of which the data has been analyzed. Therefore, six different assumptions will be presented which underlie the present analysis. These assumptions are based on various pragmatic approaches to linguistics - especially conversational analysis. In order to highlight the differences between these assumptions and the corresponding assumptions associated with speech act theory, we shall proceed by setting up pairs of contrasts between the version of each assumption which is most compatible with speech act theory (1a-6a below) with the version which is most compatible with pragmatic theories (1b-6b below). Though the assumptions associated with speech act theory have not all been stated as such, each assumption can be inferred from the types of analyses carried out in this tradition (Gordon & Lakoff 1971; Labov & Fanshell 1977; Searle 1979) and from the critical commentary this approach has received (Ervin-Tripp 1976; Ervin-Tripp, Strage, Lampert & Bell 1987; Levinson 1983; Stubbs 1983; Atkinson & Heritage 1984). Similarly, the assumptions associated with pragmatic approaches may not have all been formulated as such before, but can be inferred from the literature (Sacks & Schegloff 1973; Sinclair & Coulthard 1975; Goffman 1976; Ervin-Tripp 1976; 1977; Hopper 1979; Gumperz 1982; Levinson 1983; Stubbs 1983; Atkinson & Heritage 1984; Du Bois 1987; Schiffrin 1987). According to the results of the present analysis, only by adopting the pragmatic version of each assumption, i.e. the second option in the pairs below, will it be possible to give an account of the complex functioning of the HAFTA statements in the children's speech.

We shall present the six assumptions by treating them as answers to hypothetically posed questions. The assumptions to be considered go as follows:

1) Is the role of context primary or secondary in utterance interpretation?

1a) Context is secondary: According to speech act theory, the primary unit of functional analysis is the isolated sentence where the semantic-syntactic features of the sentence provide the basis for interpreting its literal meaning and its illocutionary force. Context is accorded a secondary role and is appealed to only if the sentence's literal meaning has been interpreted and found wanting (Searle 1979). vs.

1b) Context is primary: According to pragmatically based theories, utterances receive their primary interpretation by reference to the context in which they occur. Moreover, not only do utterances occur in a discourse context or speech event context, but they occur in a 'structurally defined place' (Schegloff 1984:34) in the context such that the structural location is strongly determinative of utterance function.

2) Are speech acts autonomous or are they components of discourse frames?

2a) Speech acts are autonomous: According to speech act theory, utterances are assigned a function on the basis of their form independent of the possible relations they exhibit with respect to surrounding utterances. Hence, the five basic speech act functions proposed by Searle (1979) are non-relational and autonomous in nature. vs.

2b) Speech acts are components of discourse frames: Speech acts are not autonomous but are components of various discourse frames. Discourse frames are functional structures which provide different slots for the component acts which make them up. Different acts group together as they

are functionally inherent to the realization of a particular purpose whose accomplishment is typically carried out by means of a set of interrelated speech acts (i.e. a request plus a reason are often used in tandem to get the recipient to carry out a particular act, Eisenberg & Garvey 1981; or, a refusal plus a reason are both considered necessary as the appropriate way of carrying out non-compliance, Garvey 1975; Goffman 1976; Labov & Fanshell 1977). The implication of this claim is that utterances are not processed autonomously, and thus, it is possible to assign an utterance an inherently relational speech act value on the basis of its role within a particular discourse frame, i.e. a reason is a relational speech act which accrues its subordinate status in terms of the supportive role it plays with respect to a more primary speech act.

3) Are utterances expected to have a single function or many functions?

3a) Utterances are not expected to have more than a single function: The default assumption of speech act theory seems to be that each utterance has a single illocutionary force unless there is something unusual about it. vs.

3b) Utterances are expected to have more than a single function: The default assumption held by pragmatically based approaches is that every utterance is used to express more than a single function on any occasion of use. (Analyses in Goffman 1976 and Labov & Fanshell 1977 are illustrative).

4) Are all speech acts on the same level or are they hierarchically organized?

4a) All speech acts are on the same level: If the primary resource of utterance interpretation is the isolated sentence, as it is for speech act theory, it follows that each sentence is assigned a speech act function which is of equal value or weight as any other speech act function. vs.

4b) Within a frame utterances are hierarchically organized: According to discourse based approaches, utterances exhibit hierarchic dependency relations. For example, utterances can be distinguished as to whether they express the speaker's primary functional intent (as in a directive) vs. relatively more subordinate material (as in a reason or an acknowledgement; see Sinclair & Coulthard 1975 and Garvey 1975 for the distinction between head acts vs. subordinate acts). In other words, not all utterances are equally significant. Some utterances receive their functional specification in terms of their relevance to other utterances which are considered more primary. Problems of analysis arise when a subordinate act (e.g. a reason) is used metonymically to stand in for a head act (e.g. a request) so that a single utterance is chosen to express a nesting of functions internal to the same discourse frame.

5) If speech acts are hierarchically organized, does this imply indirectness?

5a) The presence of hierarchical relations between speech acts implies indirectness: If an utterance is assigned two functions (i.e. a directive by means of an assertion), the context determined function (the directive) is considered to be the product of an indirect computation on the hearer's part after the literal meaning of the utterance is decoded and found inappropriate (Searle 1979). vs.

5b) The presence of hierarchical relations between speech acts does not imply indirectness: If an utterance is assigned two functions, the

contextually based function is not necessarily indirect in the sense of being a secondary construction. For instance, if we reconceptualize Searle's example of the HAFTA statement presented in the first paragraph in terms of the constraints of adjacency pair organization (i.e. as an invitation/refusal pair as in Schegloff & Sacks 1973), then the function of the HAFTA statement as a refusal is determined by reference to the expectation set which the sequentially prior utterance makes relevant. As an underlying schema, the adjacency pair (or, as will be argued below, the relevant discourse frame) functions to guide the interpretation of the HAFTA statement to one of the options established by the prior act. Thus, given one part, the hearer can project the whole. This type of metonymic inferencing results in a high degree of automaticity with respect to processing frame-based interpretations so that the claim that such utterances are processed indirectly is not necessary.

6) Is discourse-type relevant to the assignment of utterance function?

6a) Discourse-type is irrelevant: According to speech act theory, the function of an utterance can be determined without considering the type of discourse the utterance occurs in. vs.

6b) Discourse-type is relevant: Consonant with pragmatic theories is the idea that utterance interpretation is sensitive to the particular type of discourse that the utterance occurs in (Hopper 1979; Gumperz 1982; Gee & Savasir 1985; Schiffrin 1987; Gerhardt 1988). To explicate this claim let us first note that within the genre of conversational interaction, there are various subtypes of discourse which frequently occur. In the children's corpus, the easiest modes to identify are the following: narrative discourse, planning discourse, negotiation, argument and self-regulative discourse. Given their relevance to the data herein, a brief discussion of argument and self-regulative discourse follows.

According to Schiffrin, argument is a mode of discourse where 'speakers support disputable positions' (1987:18). Crucial to Schiffrin's definition is the idea that an argument involves both a monologic component (i.e. support for a position already stated) and a dialogic component (i.e. two participants are engaged in a dispute or disagreement). A similar characterization of argumentative discourse is given by Eisenberg & Garvey (1981) in their discussion of 'adversative episodes'. Now, as we shall see, the majority of the children's HAFTA statements typically occur in arguments. More specifically, the HAFTA statements are used to serve both a monologic purpose (they are used to support a previously stated position) and a dialogic purpose which is oppositional in nature (each use of HAFTA involves some kind of disagreement on the speaker's part). Though the children's arguments do not concern differing beliefs about decontextualized states of affairs, what they revolve around is getting others to allow the speaker to have her own way or getting others to act in ways which are commensurate with the speaker's desires. The remainder of the children's HAFTA statements occur in self-regulative discourse. Self-regulative discourse will be defined as a type of egocentric speech (as characterized by Vygotsky (1962)) which is used by the speaker to regulate and carry out her own multi-phase activity in a social setting. Self-regulative uses of HAFTA appear to be the most advanced uses and derive from the argument uses.

Nevertheless, the significance of the fact that the HAFTA statements only occur in particular modes of discourse (i.e. argument and self-regulative discourse) goes beyond the mere finding of a correlation. However, in order to conceptualize what this significance might be, we must first consider a proposal, recently put forth, about the interaction between grammar and discourse. In short, it has been claimed that grammatical paradigms often get used to carry out specific functions inherent to particular modes of discourse (Hopper 1979; Fleischman 1985; Du Bois 1987). Exemplary illustrations concern the relation of grammar to narrative discourse. For example, according to Hopper (1979: 213), 'it is a universal of narrative discourse' that it be structured in terms of a foreground/background format. Given this, Hopper argues that certain types of languages use specific grammatical subsystems (such as tense/aspect morphology) to serve as the vehicle for organizing the foreground/background distinction. Similarly, according to Du Bois (1987), the pattern of ergative morphology derives from and is used for a specific mode of information distribution which differentiates old vs. new information in narrative discourse. This pattern of information distribution is especially rife in third person narratives where new protagonists are frequently introduced. What both examples suggest is that particular grammatical subsystems have been recruited by the needs of narrative discourse to carry out specific functions inherent to that genre.

Now, what about the domain of modality? Should it also be conceived as a grammatical domain which serves a specific function in a particular mode of discourse? The hypothesis to be put forward here favors this interpretation. In other words, our claim is that the modal auxiliaries come to play a pivotal role in the organization of a particular type of discourse: namely, the discourse of persuasive argument. One way of thinking about this discourse type is that it is prescriptive in nature. According to Hare (1951:1), the role of prescriptive language is 'to guide conduct' - both the speaker's and the hearer's. Thus, whereas descriptive utterances (and therefore most types of narrative discourse) are basically used to indicate that something is the case, prescriptive utterances are used to make something the case - to induce others to believe or to act in particular ways. Language which is used to guide conduct often involves the expression of reasons and excuses (Austin 1961). We can tell someone what to do ('Leave the room') or we can motivate the request by offering a reason ('Leave the room; I have to be alone now'). Indeed, the only polite way of refusing a request is to accompany the refusal with a reason (Goffman 1976; Labov & Fanshell 1977). Reasons are important as they serve as one type of support in terms of Schiffrin's tripartite structural characterization of arguments, i.e. position/dispute/support. According to this schema, the concept of a reason needs to be viewed as an inherent part of argumentative discourse.

In light of this claim, the hypothesis to be put forth here is that the occurrence of a modalized statement in the context of an argument will be co-opted by the demands of the discourse to carry out this 'reason-giving' function. Indeed, modalized statements serve as a unique source domain for reasons since the modals express different intentional stances (i.e. desire, intention, constraint, etc.) such that in context, the very expression of

these stances can convey various motive conditions for action. In the present research, this claim will be worked out with respect to the children's HAFTA statements. Thus, we shall attempt to show that when an assertive statement with HAFTA occurs in an argument, its value as an assertion is typically subordinate to its value as a reason for a position in need of support. In a previous report (Gerhardt, in press⁶), it was claimed that HAFTA refers to the type of requirement associated with the existence of social conventions. Therefore, the occurrence of a HAFTA statement following a speech act which expresses non-compliance will be co-opted by the discourse to provide a socially sanctioned reason.

In order to explicate the notion of a 'reason' we will be working with, consider the following example from Melden: 'If someone stops his car and is asked 'Why?', the statement 'There is a restaurant nearby' is not to be understood as a bit of information but as a reason for the action. It is one thing to play the game of reporting one's observations, it is quite another thing to give reasons for one's conduct' (1961:160). In this example, a description of a particular state of affairs is offered to explain the agent's actions to another party. Melden considers such explanations reasons. Although action-explanations which refer to reasons are by no means uniform in nature, for purposes of the present research we will assume that reasons achieve their explanatory status when they meet two criteria: (i) they must be proffered as causal (i.e. they must give the circumstances because of which the agent acts or will act); and (ii) they must be proffered/profferable as accounts given to others.

At this point, having reviewed the six assumptions in terms of which the current analysis is carried out, it may be wondered how this discourse based view differs from the recent view that the modal system has developed to express 'the speaker's subjectivity' or 'point of view' (Palmer 1986; also, see Lyons 1977 [the modals refer to 'the opinions or attitudes of the speaker']; Fleischman 1982 [the modals refer to 'the speaker's attitude toward the propositional content of his utterance']; and Traugott 1989 [the epistemic modals reflect 'the speaker's subjective belief state']). First, it is important to note what the discourse position and the subjectivity position have in common: basically, both positions interpret the modals from a pragmatic perspective. That is, according to both positions, the function of the modal system is to convey a meaning which emerges in the context of use - either that the proposition is a mere conjecture on the speaker's part, or, that the proposition serves as a reason for another proposition. In this way, both positions present alternatives to the traditional view which defines modality in terms of the logical relations between propositions (i.e. necessity or possibility; see Givón 1989, on the limits of such accounts of modality).

However, the primary difference between these two positions is that the subjectivity position rests on characterizations which emerge by examining utterances independent of the context. To be sure, out of context, epistemic modals do seem to express a particular attitude on the speaker's part: i.e. 'That HASTA be John' where HASTA⁷ is used to signal the absence of speaker

certainty and/or that the speaker is making a prediction. Nevertheless, this characterization can be misleading if the utterance has been abstracted from a context in terms of which it is playing a more specific functional role. Let us consider the following fabricated yet plausible scenario: A. & B. are waiting for John; A. expects John, B. assumes John will not show up. A. & B. have already presented their differing views to each other. At some point, A. finally hears John's characteristic knock. In this context, A.'s use of HASTA in 'That HASTA be John' can mean that A. now believes she has a good reason (i.e. evidence) for assuming it is John. To characterize the use of HASTA as an index of subjectivity due to the process of inference misses a crucial point: namely, that in a context where opposing positions have already been expressed, the HASTA statement conveys the speaker's belief that she has a good reason which supports her position. This meaning is lost when the utterance is examined independent of the context - as is the indexical function of the modal which relates the utterance to the context in a particular way. (Also see Givon's 1989 discussion of the role of the 'communicative contract' underlying the use of epistemic modals).

The claim that a domain of grammar may be sensitive to certain parameters of discourse has different construals: from the diachronic claim that a formal pattern of marking develops by means of the grammaticization of recurrent patterns in the discourse (Hopper 1979; Du Bois 1987) to the synchronic claim that the use of certain grammatical forms is discourse conditioned (Zubin 1979; Givon 1982; 1984; Schiffrin 1987). The present research offers a version of the synchronic claim. We shall attempt to show that early in the child's development the occurrence of the target form HASTA is motivated by both semantic considerations (see Note 6) as well as certain discourse-pragmatic requirements.

1.1 The data

The current analysis is part of a larger investigation into the modal system of the two children A and E (see references). At the time of data collection, E is 3;3-3;5 and A is 3;2-3;4. Both children come from professional families. The children were observed playing together in three different naturalistic play settings in the home: doll-play, tea-party play and block-play. The situations were chosen to facilitate face-to-face interaction and episodes of negotiation. Each play situation was presented twice, for an hour each, over a period of two months. Basically, the children were told to 'Have a tea-party with your dolls'; 'Have a tea-party for yourselves'; and 'Make something with the blocks' - and then given general instructions where they were prohibited from certain actions: i.e. leaving the filming area, taking each other's toys, etc. Sessions were video-recorded and the analyses were developed on the basis of very richly detailed transcriptions. The overall coding method was a type of distributional analysis distilled from Harris (1951) Pike (1964) and Ricœur (1976) such that linguistic and actional behaviors, those which in the process of inquiry were found to be relevant to the selective occurrence of the target forms, were coded for. The relevant coding categories will be presented below.

To prepare the reader for the discussion which follows it should be noted that certain uses of HAFTA will be characterized as 'warranted' (the term is from Toulmin 1958). This judgement refers to the results of a previous analysis (Gerhardt, in press) where each use of HAFTA was evaluated as to whether it could be considered 'true' or not. That is, certain occurrences of HAFTA are used to govern activities which are associated with pre-existing social conventions or norms (You HAFTA eat on a plate). In such cases, the token use of HAFTA functions to invoke a procedure which exists independent of the speech act. Therefore, the use of HAFTA can be considered 'true'. In other cases, the HAFTA token is used despite the fact that there is no pre-existent convention which would render its use 'true'. Instead, the HAFTA form functions as an index to entail the belief that a particular requirement exists - whether or not this is 'really' the case (I HAFTA eat my ice-cream). The former uses of HAFTA are considered warranted since they are associated with pre-existing conventions, while the latter uses are not considered warranted since they are not associated with pre-existing conventions. Thus, in the upcoming discussion, when a particular use-type of HAFTA is presented as having a certain percentage of warranted uses, this means that a certain percent of the tokens of HAFTA in that particular use-type are associated with pre-existent conventions or norms.

2. The Use of HAFTA Statements in Conversational Discourse

There are 73 utterances which contain the modal-catenative² form HAFTA in the present corpus. E produces 40 of them, A, 33. Their distribution with respect to grammatical person is as follows: I=24; WE=18; YOU=12; Third=12; 0-person=7 (0-person refers to a HAFTA statement without an overt subject). It might be noted that these figures contrast with those for the children's use of NEEDTA and WANNA in that the latter catenative forms do not occur in the third person, nor do they occur without an overt subject marker.

To anticipate the results of the analysis, there are three major patterns of use which have been identified in the data:

- (1) THE DEFENSIVE USE-TYPE [N=21]
- (2) THE OFFENSIVE USE-TYPE [N=22]
- (3) THE SELF-REGULATIVE USE-TYPE [N=16]

In addition, two derivative use-types obtain:

- (4) THE DEFENSIVE & OFFENSIVE MIXTURE USE-TYPE [N=9]
- (5) THE IMPLICIT DEFENSIVE USE-TYPE [N=5]

The DEFENSIVE and OFFENSIVE use-types are employed in order to realize particular functions within the genre of argument. More particularly, the DEFENSIVE and OFFENSIVE uses occur in a dialogic format and are triggered by the real or potential statement or action of another party that the speaker wants to resist. For example, the purpose of the DEFENSIVE use-type is that the HAFTA utterance is used as part of an attempt to maintain the speaker's ongoing activity once it has been threatened with change or extinction. The purpose of the OFFENSIVE use-type is that the HAFTA utterance is used as part of an attempt to alter the other party's activity. As will become

apparent, verbal strategies for realizing both of these communicative functions are required when children come together to negotiate various activity-goals. Analogous strategies are also used by adults to negotiate differing beliefs. In contrast, the SELF-REGULATIVE use-type is not dialogically structured but appears to be said for the self as a means of regulating the speaker's own activities. However, since the semantic meaning of HAFTA refers to the existence of joint norms (see Note 6), it will be argued that the SELF-REGULATIVE uses generate the inference that the speaker is maintaining a cooperative stance even in the absence of overtly interactive behavior. As such, even the SELF-REGULATIVE uses are claimed to serve a particular social purpose. At this point, each of the different use-types will be presented in succession.

2.1 The DEFENSIVE Uses of HAFTA Statements

We begin by examining those uses of the children's HAFTA statements which have been characterized as DEFENSIVE. In order to understand the nature of this use-type, we will first consider examples of the most paradigmatic instances: first person singular HAFTA statements.

- (1) E: Hey Amy! Let's see! She's just beautiful
 E takes A's doll from A and begins to fix-up doll's hair
 A: Give me her!
 A looks at E and requests her doll
 E: Well, I HAFTA do someping-
 E continues to smooth the doll's hair, admiring doll
 A: Give me her! //whiney//
 E: I HAFTA do someping to her! //pre-emptory//
 A continues to smooth the doll's hair
 A: Hi baby!
 A picks up another doll
- (2) J: Go over there and you'll get in the movies
 J tries to get A to move into filming area
 A: (Neg. head shake) Because! See! I HAFTA sit right here!
 A sits in one spot and continues sucking on a piece of rubber
- (3) A: OK! Here's the castle! //pre-emptory//
 A is waiting for E to finish to display castle to J; A draws
 J's attention to their castle as a request to get E to finish
 E: Wait a minute! I HAFTA get it ready!
 E continues to build the castle
- (4) J: I want you to build just one this time
 J wants A to build one castle together with E
 A: But, I HAFTA make a big one
 A brings blocks closer & continues to build on her own
- (5) J: You HAFTA do it together
 A: But I'm gonna -
 A: No! I HAFTA (build it)
 as A continues to build on her own

What is most striking about these examples is that in each case, the HAFTA statement occurs as part of a non-compliant response to the potentially encroaching behavioral control of another party. The typical scenario is

the following: One party (the future HAFTA-speaker) is engaged in an ongoing activity when another party makes a request which threatens to disrupt that activity; the requestee then responds by stating 'I HAFTA VP' where VP is a representation of her temporally concurrent activity. In other words, the speaker states 'I HAFTA VP' as part of an attempt to maintain her ongoing activity once it has been threatened with change or disruption. The reason for referring to this use-type as DEFENSIVE is that the HAFTA statement is used merely to sustain a pre-existing state of affairs rather than to bring about something novel. As it turns out, DEFENSIVE procedures are quite prevalent in argumentative discourse. While the range of agendas which are defended with HAFTA statements is vast in adult speech⁹, the children's agendas consist of their own immediate activities (see #6 for the only exception in this corpus). In order to specify the basic characteristics of this use-type, it can be conceptualized in terms of a set of values on six different dimensions. Figure 1 illustrates these dimensions.

Figure 1: THE DEFENSIVE USE-TYPE

1. Response: HAFTA statement is part of a negative response to an utterance with a directive intent; or, by extension, it is a response to an utterance with a preferred positive response (see ex. #6)
2. What is NOT to Change: HAFTA-speaker's ongoing activity trajectory is to be preserved. (The HAFTA-speaker is warranted in what she says she has to do in 71% of the DEFENSIVE uses¹⁰)
3. What IS to Change: Other party's announced plan/intent to alter HAFTA-speaker's activity is to change
4. Desire: HAFTA-speaker desires HAFTA-governed activity to continue
5. Temporal Reference: HAFTA-statement refers to an ongoing activity
6. Functions As: HAFTA-statement functions as a move of non-alignment with another party's previous utterance

Each of the different use-types can be plotted and compared in terms of the same set of six dimensions represented in Figure 1. Two of the dimensions are central and constitute the core of each of the use-types: dimensions 2 and 3. These dimensions embody the force-dynamic construct of change (see Talmy 1985; 1988 on the role of force dynamics in modality). The essence of the DEFENSIVE use-type is that the speaker attempts to protect her ongoing activity from change (dimension #2) by attempting to alter the interlocutor's intent (dimension #3). Whereas the values for dimensions 2 and 3 remain relatively invariant across development, the values for the other parameters will expand to reflect a more elaborated use of the DEFENSIVE discourse stance: the HAFTA statement will come to serve as a response to an assertion as well as to a directive; it will be used to regulate activities which are not desired as well as those which are desired; and, it will be used to govern activities in the future as well as those in the present (see ex. #6 below). The usefulness of defining the DEFENSIVE uses of HAFTA in terms of these six constituent dimensions is twofold. First, together they provide a schema for representing the differences between the adult's use of HAFTA vs. the child's (see Section 3 for a comparison between Talmy's analysis of the adult's use of HAFTA vs. the child's.) Second, the values

on each of the dimensions provide a basis for comparing the different meaning-structures associated with each of the different use-types (see below).

However, in order to conceptualize the functioning of the DEFENSIVE uses of HAFTA from the child's point of view, it will be necessary to examine the target statements in terms of the infrastructure of the discourse sequence in which they occur. As such, the first major finding is that the DEFENSIVE uses of HAFTA typically occur following an action request. Twenty of the 21 DEFENSIVE uses follow this format and the remaining case is a derivative use. This suggests that the DEFENSIVE uses of HAFTA tend to occur in the second pair part of an adjacency pair where the action request functions as a first pair part and constrains what follows to serve as a response (Sacks & Schegloff 1973). The import of the adjacency pair characterization is in the idea that by the time the HAFTA-speaker responds, the interpretation that some form of compliant or non-compliant response is in the offing has already been prepared for by the sequential implication of the prior request

The consistency of this sequential pattern in the data is the first piece of evidence which forces us to question the speech act theoretic claim that utterances are initially processed in terms of their sentence form independent of the surrounding context. In each case, the HAFTA statement appears to be deliberately placed so that it fills a particular slot in the structured discourse context. Therefore, the question which this raises is whether there is any evidence that the children themselves pay attention to the sequential location of the HAFTA statements. In order to address this question, a schematic layout of the particular discourse sequence that the DEFENSIVE HAFTA statements occur in is presented in Figure III. This sequence will be referred to as an **'Action Request Frame'**. The reason for adopting this terminology - rather than that of an action request adjacency pair - is to be consistent with the analyses of the other use-types which will be characterized in terms of various other discourse frames. As noted above, the construct of a discourse frame is employed as a way of specifying the functional relations which obtain between sequenced utterances whether they are spoken by the same speaker or by different speakers. Moreover, according to Figure II, in order to conceptualize the total functioning of the DEFENSIVE uses of HAFTA, we will also need to posit a **'Non-Compliance Frame'** as a subcomponent of the Action Request Frame. The argument to be put forth here is that only by interpreting the DEFENSIVE HAFTA statement in terms of its role in both discourse frames will it be possible to understand how its situated meaning can depart from its semantic meaning and yet be recovered in the context of use. Figure II illustrates the nature of the interrelation between the two frames.

Figure II: Action Request Frame

Turn 1:	[Occurs]	Action Request	
Turn 2:	[Projected]	Compliance	vs. Non-Compliance
	[Occurs]	Non-Compliance	
		by-means-of	

Non-Compliance Frame

[Projected]	Non-Alignment Part	+	Reason Part
	by-means-of		by-means-of
[Occurs]	Refusal Marker		HAFTA statement
	Contrastive Marker		of constraint
	Perseverative Marker		

The DEFENSIVE uses of HAFTA typically occur as part of the projected turn structure of an Action Request Frame. Given the expectations projected by the request, the HAFTA statement is used to realize one of the turns generated by the frame: specifically, the turn of non-compliance. To support this claim, we shall examine the details of the child's response.

One of the most striking findings concerning the children's corpus is that the DEFENSIVE uses of HAFTA do not occur on their own. Instead, what occurs is a two-part response consisting of a 'discourse marker' (Schiffrin, 1987) plus an assertive HAFTA statement (see Fig. II). In fact, all 21 instances of the DEFENSIVE uses of HAFTA follow suit: i.e. they are preceded by, or in the scope of (i.e. the second HAFTA utterance in #1), a particular discourse marker. According to Schiffrin, discourse markers are 'sequentially dependent' forms which function explicitly to connect an utterance with another part of the discourse. In the above examples, the discourse markers function to connect the HAFTA statement to the prior action request. Therefore, under this interpretation, the very occurrence of these markers indicates that the children are aware of and orient to the sequential placement of the HAFTA statement.

Given that the HAFTA statement is regularly preceded by a marker, the question which arises is how to conceptualize the interrelation between the parts which serve as the response to the initial action request. It is for this reason that a second frame is proposed, i.e. the Non-Compliance Frame, whose constituents are uttered by the same speaker rather than by different speakers. The idea is that what surfaces to realize the turn of non-compliance consists of two components which serve different yet interrelated functions such that the first component contributes to the relevance and interpretation of the second. The reason for utilizing the construct of a discourse frame is to suggest that the functions associated with each component of the frame can be realized even if the means of expression differ each time the turn of non-compliance is instantiated. To explicate the internal structure of the Non-Compliance Frame more fully, we will focus on the different parts which make it up.

Let us first consider the particular discourse markers used by the children in the DEFENSIVE use-type: *Well, Wait a minute!*, *But, No!*, *(Negative head*

shake) (see Table I). Clearly, each of the different markers conveys a negative intent on the speaker's part toward the interlocutor's prior utterance. Moreover, the occurrence of the marker is consistently coupled with non-compliant behavior on the child's part. That is, the child continues to carry on her own activity as she speaks rather than capitulate to the demands of the request. This suggests that the markers are used as the first part of a turn designed not to comply with the prior action request. Hence, these markers will be referred to as different kinds of 'non-alignment markers', i.e. forms which function to indicate a lack of alignment on the speaker's part with the expectations associated with the prior request. From the perspective of the interaction, the markers serve as signals which alert the hearer that some kind of non-aligned or negative response is in the offing. In other words, as non-alignment markers, they function to guide the hearer's interpretation to the non-compliance option of the Action Request Frame. It should be noted that all uses of these markers follow suit in the children's corpus - even those which do not co-occur with HAFTA. (See Schiffirin's analysis of adult's use of *Well* [...'well is a response marker which anchors its user in an interaction when an upcoming contribution is not fully consonant with prior coherence options' 1987:102; and *But* which 'marks an upcoming unit as a contrasting action', 1987:152)). Thus, even though *No!* is the only categorical refusal marker in the data, since the children never go on to comply after they use one of the other markers (unless further prodded), each of the markers in first position will be viewed as comprising a functional class of non-alignment markers which vary with respect to degree but not kind.

Table I: Discourse Markers which Co-occur with the HAFTA statements in the DEFENSIVE use-type

	Wait a minute!	No!	But	Well	Only	(Negative Head Shake)
I	1	1	4	4	1	1
[N=12]						
3rd	4		2			
[N=6]						
VE	1	1	1			
[N=3]						

Another way of viewing the function of these markers is that they may also be marking 'dispreferred responses' (Pomerantz 1984). That is, not only do they signal that the requestee's response will not be in alignment with the previous request, but they may also signal the speaker's recognition that the response given is not the one desired. If this interpretation is correct, it suggests that even the 3-year-old is able to recognize and mark her response as dispreferred with respect to the preference organization established by a request.

However, for present purposes, the import of these markers is the light they shed on the role of the co-occurring HAFTA statement: namely, as non-alignment markers, they function as signals which establish the expectation that some kind of account may follow. That is, it has been claimed (Garvey

1975; Goffman 1976; Labov & Fanshell 1977; Brown & Levinson 1978/1987) that moves of non-compliance must be accompanied by an account if the addressee is to observe the proper deference to the interlocutor's face. What this implies is that the mere occurrence of a non-alignment marker following an action request sets up an expectation that some kind of account should follow. According to previous research (Garvey 1975; Keller-Cohen, Chalmer, & Remler 1979; Eisenberg & Garvey 1981; Ervin-Tripp & Gordon 1985), children as young as three years of age are familiar with this convention. Therefore, the hypothesis to be put forth here is that once the initial discourse marker is processed as a non-alignment marker by the child, it engenders an expectation that some kind of reason should follow. As such, the subsequent expression of constraint as expressed by the HAFTA statement will be interpreted as a reason for the negative reply.

Nevertheless, interpreting the HAFTA statement as a reason raises the further problem of specifying criteria in terms of which a mere assertive statement can be said to function as a reason - where reasons are defined as relational statements which provide support for something else (see Melden's [1961] and Schiffrin's [1987] definitions in the Introduction). Consistent with the approach adopted here, it is suggested that reasons be defined with respect to their role in specific discourse frames: in the case of the DEFENSIVE use-type, the more inclusive Action Request Frame and the more particular Non-Compliance Frame. What this means is that given the expectations established by the frame(s), the modalized statement of constraint as expressed by HAFTA will be interpreted as a reason for the speaker's non-compliant reply.

That the children would use an expression of constraint as a reason for non-compliance is not surprising. According to D'Andrade (1987), Western adults have certain folk beliefs about the nature of human action, i.e. that actions are the result of intentions which are formed on the basis of certain beliefs, desires and constraints. In fact, it has even been suggested that statements of constraint play a more crucial role in providing explanations of action than statements of desire as only the former have truth-conditional status and thus can serve as a justification as well as a reason (White 1975; Kenny 1963). In a similar vein, the notion of necessity (as the logical equivalent of agent-based constraint) is accorded a more privileged role than possibility with respect to explanation as only the former is invoked as a reason (i.e. 'I did it because I had to' vs. '?I did it because I could'; White 1975). Thus, it is not surprising that the expression of constraint plays a prominent role in causal accounts of human action in adult discourse. Apparently, the children have internalized this mode of reasoning about action and have assigned the HAFTA utterance qua statement of constraint an official reason-serving function.

To illustrate the mechanics of the 'reason interpretation', let us first consider example #5 since it is the only example with a categorical non-alignment marker ('No!') and as such presents the clearest case. The encounter begins with a request for A to change her activity. A responds with a non-alignment marker ('But') and then an interrupted challenge (see

Gee & Savasir 1985 for the role of GONNA in challenges). This is followed by 'No!' plus 'I HAFTA (build it)' - a statement to the effect that A is constrained to do what she is already doing. Given the expectation that a non-alignment marker should be followed by a reason - plus the background knowledge that a constraint to engage in one activity may impede one's ability to engage in another activity - it is proposed that the statement of constraint will be interpreted as a reason for the speaker's non-compliant reply.

Now of course, this characterization is quite commonsensical. Its significance lies in the complex form-function relation that is implied: that is, identifying the utterance as a reason does not provide a full account of its functioning since the children can express a diverse array of reasons for refusing orders or requests. Rather, the HAFTA statement functions as a reason of a particular kind. According to the semantic analysis of HAFTA (see Note 6), HAFTA represents a requirement to act based on the existence of certain social norms. Therefore, the statement 'I HAFTA VP' expresses that the speaker is compelled to act in the manner specified due to the existence of certain norms. What this means is that although 'I HAFTA VP' functions in the discourse as a reason, its illocutionary value as an assertive statement about the speaker is not thereby lost; as an assertion, it also expresses a proposition which can be evaluated with respect to certain norm-based truth-functional criteria.

Hence, in order to represent the meaning-structure associated with the children's DEFENSIVE uses of HAFTA, both levels of functioning (the level of the assertion and the level of the reason) need to be accounted for. In other words, the claim is that the DEFENSIVE uses of HAFTA function to realize a complex intention on the child's part: namely, the HAFTA statement functions as a reason for the speaker's non-compliance by means of an assertion that a particular activity, other than the requested activity, is required. The assertion of a requirement serves as the means by which the speaker gives a reason for her non-compliant reply. It was for this reason that the schema in Figure 11 has a hierarchic mode of organization.

The import of this characterization is that it provides a link between the different levels of utterance functioning without requiring the attendant claim of indirectness. That is, it might be noted that the present analysis is commensurate with the claim from speech act theory that two different acts are accomplished in cases like the HAFTA examples above. Indeed, according to Searle (1979), in such cases one speech act (such as the non-compliant response) is performed 'by way of' another speech act (such as the assertion). However, the position to be argued for here is that acceding to this claim is not tantamount to accepting the further claim that the refusal is arrived at through a process of indirect inference. Instead, if it is accepted that the sequential positioning of the HAFTA statement following both an action request and an explicit refusal marker functions as 'an interpretive resource of first resort' for the children (Heritage & Atkinson 1984:19), it follows that the reason interpretation will be processed as a direct inference rather than as an indirect inference.

The point is that given a discourse context which provides a structural frame for interpreting the HAFTA statement as a reason, it is not necessary to assume that the reason interpretation is indirect (i.e. processed after the proposition level meaning) just because it is not coded in the sentence level syntax. Rather, the reason interpretation emerges due to the configuration of cues established within the discourse. These cues, referred to as 'creative indices' by Silverstein (1976) or 'contextualization cues' by Gumperz (1982), reflexively serve to establish a frame in terms of which the statement of constraint will be interpreted as a reason. The nested levels of meaning which accrue to the HAFTA utterance should come as no surprise given the assumption that discourse is organized to convey multiple levels of meaning simultaneously (Stubbs 1983:5).

At this point, the question which arises is whether the analysis generalizes to utterances which begin with a marker other than the explicit refusal marker 'No!' (exs. #1-4). That is, when the child says 'Well' or 'But' and then a first person HAFTA statement as a means of realizing the turn of non-compliance, do these other markers work as effectively as 'No' does as signals for the Non-Compliance Frame? Although this question cannot be answered definitively without an in-depth examination of the markers themselves, in that the children never attempt to comply with the prior action request after using any of the markers (unless further prodded), what the data suggest is that each of the different markers functions as a means of indicating the speaker's non-compliant response. It was for this reason (plus the semantic affinity of the markers and their overlap in distributional privileges) that the entire set of markers were interpreted as non-alignment markers which vary with respect to degree but not kind. Thus, even if the non-categorical markers only function as probabilistic cues to the Non-Compliance Frame, the point is that they still do function as cues, and thus they still can be used to guide the interpretation of the HAFTA statement toward the reason component of the frame.

Now, even though it occurs only once (by E in the last session), there is a particular use of HAFTA which has been categorized as DEFENSIVE though the utterance is part of a negative response to a seemingly more descriptive statement made by the other party. Observe the following example:

- (6) A's mom (K) reminds A about their upcoming vacation
 K: Tell Elizabeth about your vacation
 A: I'm gonna go to the snow/I'm gonna go on skates/I'm gonna go on skates
 E: Well, I HAFTA get - I HAFTA get a little bit older to skate
 A: But, I'm gonna skate when I'm a big sister

In this example, E seems to be abiding by some type of conversational demand that she relate A's plan to herself. As such, the utterance 'Well, I HAFTA get a little bit older to skate' no longer functions as a refusal of a request but it functions as a more general type of negative response. 'Well' still signals the speaker's non-alignment, but this time the non-alignment refers to an expectation which derives from the first party's expression of her future plans, i.e. the expectation that if a future plan is expressed,

the addressee should either comment on the plan or relate it to her own experience (see options illustrated in Fig. 'II). Given this expectation, the HAFTA statement functions as a reason for the speaker's non-aligned reply. Thus, even though 'Well + I HAFTA VP' is still being used DEFENSIVELY, this time it is being used to convey a contrast in plans rather than a refusal to act. Based on this example, it is proposed that a relatively more assertive **Projection of Plans Frame** develops out of the directive **Action Request Frame**. Figure III presents this more general type of negotiatory frame which is still considered part of the DEFENSIVE use-type.

Figure III: Projection of Plans Frame¹²

Turn 1: [Occurs] Speaker 1 Projects Plans
 Turn 2: [Projected] Speaker 2 is to Respond Positively (preferred)
 (i.e. a 'me too' sort of response or a 'good for you' sort of response)
 or Speaker 2 is to Respond Negatively (dispreferred)
 (i.e. a 'not me' sort of response or a 'you can't' sort of response)
 [Occurs] Speaker 2 Responds Negatively (dispreferred)
 (i.e. a 'not me' sort of response: Speaker 2 projects plans for self which diverge from and therefore challenge plans of Speaker 1)
 by-means-of

Non-Alignment Frame

[Projected]	Non-Alignment Part	+	Reason Part
	by-means-of		by-means-of
[Occurs]	Perseverative Marker		HAFTA statement of constraint

Compared to Figure II, Figure III is intended to capture a more abstract type of discourse frame which is based on certain expectations engendered by the speaker's projection of her future plans. Although there is no developmental data to support this claim, it is hypothesized that the child first uses the Non-Alignment Frame for the action-based context of non-compliance with requests. Eventually she learns to generalize this response frame to more abstract contexts such as the speech act territory of assertives, i.e. to disagreements with plans. If this hypothesis is correct, it suggests that the Request/Non-Compliance Frame provides a developmental anchor for a more abstract set of assertively grounded discourse functions to emerge: i.e., statement of plans/disagreement with plans.

While the nature of the DEFENSIVE use-type would seem to favor first person singular subjects, it is possible for the HAFTA statement to have a third person or first person plural subject and still accomplish the same DEFENSIVE discourse purpose. In fact, the distribution of the DEFENSIVE uses of HAFTA with respect to grammatical person is as follows: I=12; Third=6; WE=3. A quick perusal of the next set of examples indicates that they function identically to the first person singular cases.

(7) J: Hey, I think it's getting time for the Christmas Party on the

- white rug/Ok!/Let's have the Christmas Party!
- E: But the mother HASTA get there/And she HASTA put on her dress and her underpants
E continues to dress her doll as she has been, undisturbed
- (8) A: Want some tea?
A begins to act as if she will pour tea in E's dolls' cups
- E: Wait a minute! Wait a minute! They HAFTA get theirs
E continues to dress dolls; refusing to play tea-party w. A
- A: Do you want some tea?
A tries again
- E: Wait a minute! Amy! They HAFTA get theirs yet!
E continues to dress her dolls
- (9) J: This is a beautiful party! Have fun!
J intervenes in children's play; tries to get kids to move onto tea-party phase of play, rather than preparations phase
- E: But, we HAFTA have these things!
E worries that J will take away some of the cooking implements in an attempt to coerce them to have tea-party
- (10) A: I'm not gonna play anymore!
A walks away from E clutching her dolls
- A: OK/I'll play grandpa/Here grandpa
A returns and encroaches onto E's play territory threatening to disrupt it by offering to play with E
- E: Wait a minute! We HAFTA go there and then they - they HAFTA go there
E continues to prepare her dolls for the party, rebuffing A

Though the speaker no longer represents herself in the role of 'I', the purpose of the HAFTA statement is identical to the first person singular uses: i.e., the HAFTA statement functions to defend a predilected activity that the speaker is engaged in once it is threatened with change or disruption. This time, however, rather than project her own persona as subject of the constraint, the speaker projects her identity onto the collectivity, and expresses that WE or THEY (the dolls) are constrained to do what WE/THEY are doing. Moreover, since the statement of constraint occurs after a non-alignment marker, the reason interpretation is still an effect of the discourse pragmatics established by the relevant discourse frames, i.e. the Action Request Frame plus the Non-Compliance Frame.

The last issue to be considered in the analysis of the DEFENSIVE use-type is whether the HAFTA statement is actually successful as a means of non-compliance with the requestor's previous request. As it turns out, there are four types of uptake to the DEFENSIVE uses of HAFTA viewed as a negative response to the initial speaker's request: (i) the requestor desists from any further attempt to make the request [N=10]; (ii) the requestor makes a second try request which remains unsuccessful [N=9]; (iii) the requestor makes a second try request which is successful [N=11]; and, (iv) the response is unclear [N=1]. According to these figures, the HAFTA statement serves as a very successful means of protecting the requestee's activity from the requestor's attempted disruption: the requestor may try to impose on the

recipient a second time but usually even the second try is not successful. However, this finding cannot be taken at face value as too many factors are confounded. First, it is not clear whether the impregnability of the HAFTA governed activity is due to the use of HAFTA to defend it, or to the nature of the activity itself, or to the type of activity requested, or to the status of the party who requests the activity. Without an independent measure of the cost of each of these factors (Ervin-Tripp, Strage, Lampert & Bell 1987 provides a nice illustration of this point), the extent to which the HAFTA statement is itself successful as a DEFENSIVE strategy to ward off the intruder cannot be determined. Second, these results are, surely, very context dependent: i.e. non-compliance in a peer-play context may indeed be acceptable where it would not be acceptable in other types of activity contexts. Nevertheless, as a first pass in examining the efficacy of the child's DEFENSIVE use of this particular modal form, the result is suggestive: in the context of peer-play, the HAFTA statement functions as a reasonably successful means of maintaining the child's activity once that activity has been threatened with change or disruption.

2.2 The OFFENSIVE Uses of HAFTA Statements

Reciprocal to the DEFENSIVE use-type is the OFFENSIVE use-type [N=22]: while in the former, the HAFTA statement is deployed as part of the speaker's attempt to protect her ongoing activity given the threat of change, in the latter, the HAFTA statement is deployed as part of the speaker's attempt to alter the activity trajectory of the other party. Moreover, whereas the DEFENSIVE uses of HAFTA are all instances of a single discourse frame (i.e. the Action Request Frame) or a variant thereof (i.e. the Projection of Plans Frame), the OFFENSIVE uses of HAFTA occur in four different discourse frames. Nevertheless, the point to be argued for here is that the primary function of the HAFTA statement remains the same across the different discourse frames.

Though the uses of HAFTA which have been coded as OFFENSIVE are not restricted to the second person, since the nature of this use-type is most clearly manifest in second person uses, we begin our discussion with them.

- (11) [A & E have been playing a game with Izzy where they build with blocks as he pretends to sleep on the stairs; then they wake him and knock over their blocks for him; game has now ended; Izzy & J (the researchers) are packing to leave; E & A are distraught!]
- E: Go to sleep!
- A: Go to sleep!
- E: Go to sleep again!
- A: You HAFTA go to sleep on the stairs - so we will mess it up
- I: But I HAFTA help Julie now
-[Omit 8 lines].....
- E: Go to sleep!
- J: I will in a minute
- A: But you HAFTA right now
-[Omit 6 lines].....
- E: Both of you HAFTA go to sleep now on the steps! Come on! Go

- to sleep! Quickly! Quickly! Go to sleep!
- J: I will/OK
- (12) [A begins to build a triangle in her own way]
 E: You can't make a triangle this way
 I'll show you how to make a triangle
 You HAFTA get red, red triangles and that's enough
- (13) [E eats cookie rather than cooking her play-food as instructed]
 A: Mother!
 E: What?
 A: You can't do that
 You HAFTA cook
 E: I know
- (14) [E takes one of the dolls brought by the investigator's which is in A's territory]
 A: No! No doll! No!
 E: Amy! (shouts) You HAFTA share things!
 J: Amy, you HAFTA share things
 A: Don't lose that one
- (15) [A eats cookie out of bag instead of using tea-party plates]
 E: But first! (shouts) You HAFTA put them on a plate!
- (16) [E holds baby doll up to A's daddy doll]
 E: I WANNA go to the Christmas party //baby-talk register//
 A: No //gruff//
 E: Why?
 A: Cause you didn't WANNU
 E: Yes I do
 A: [Negative head shake]/You HAFTA stay home //gruff//
 E: I WANNA go to a movie

As the examples illustrate, the HAFTA statement functions as part of the speaker's attempt to alter the recipient's ongoing behavior or projected behavior. Indeed, the reason for characterizing this use-type as OFFENSIVE is to capture the speaker's intrusive, non-cooperative intent. However, the HAFTA statement also functions as part of a negative response to something the other party is doing, has done, or wants to do. Thus, even though the OFFENSIVE use-type functions to convey directive intent, it is not spontaneously initiated. Rather, it consistently occurs as a type of response to something in the situation which mobilizes the speaker's resistance.

For example, in #11, the HAFTA statements serve as part of the response to the fact that Izzy & J. are preparing to leave: the HAFTA statements are used to persuade them to stay and continue to play a particular game (a 'You HAFTA Do X' type of meaning). In examples #12-15, the HAFTA statements are used as part of an attempt to prohibit the recipient's ongoing activity in favor of some other activity. More specifically, each of these examples begins with a phrase which functions as a prohibition and as such expresses the speaker's disapproval of the recipient's ongoing act (i.e., 'You can't!', 'Amy!' 'But first!'). The prohibition is then followed by a HAFTA statement which requires the recipient to carry out an activity which is

different than the one she is currently engaged in (a 'Don't Do X/You HAFTA Do Y' type of meaning). In #16, the HAFTA statement is used as part of the attempt to alter the requestor's plans. That is, E requests permission to carry out one act, but is told that she HASTA do what in essence is the inverse act (a 'You can't do X; You HAFTA Do Y' type of meaning). In each case, whatever the nature of the provoking event, the HAFTA statement functions as part of the attempt to encroach on and alter the activity trajectory of the other party. Moreover, in 11 of the 12 cases where HAFTA occurs in a second person sentence frame, the choice of HAFTA is warranted, i.e. the token use of HAFTA is associated with a pre-existent norm which provides a legitimate basis for the HAFTA-speaker's request (see Note 10). A schematic representation of the different values on the basic dimensions which comprise the OFFENSIVE use-type is presented in Figure IV.

Figure IV: THE OFFENSIVE USE-TYPE

1. Response: HAFTA-statement is part of a negative response to (i) the non-occurrence of an expected/desired activity, (ii) the occurrence of an activity which is considered inappropriate and/or undesired; (iii) a request; (iv) a refusal of a prior request
2. What IS NOT to change: HAFTA-speaker's belief that the other party should be doing something other than what she is doing plus HAFTA-speaker's intent to change the other party's behavior in the appropriate way is to be preserved
3. What IS to Change: Other party's behavior/projected behavior is to change. (The HAFTA-speaker is warranted in what she says the other party HASTA do in 91% of the OFFENSIVE uses; see Note 10)
4. Desire: HAFTA-speaker desires HAFTA-governed activity to come about
5. Temporal Reference: HAFTA-speaker wants a particular activity carried out in the immediate future
6. Functions As: HAFTA-statement functions as part of an attempt to alter the play partner's behavior so that a particular activity is carried out in the appropriate fashion

According to Figure IV, the OFFENSIVE uses of HAFTA can be represented by a different set of values on the same set of dimensions which define the DEFENSIVE use-type. Once again, dimensions 2 & 3 represent the core force-dynamic conflict and constitute the essence of the OFFENSIVE use-type: the HAFTA speaker attempts to alter the other party's behavior (dimension #3), based on her belief that the other party should be acting in a particular manner and her intention to change the other party's behavior to conform with her belief (dimension #2). Though the values on each of the different dimensions will change over time, it is expected that the core force-dynamic conflict which characterizes the OFFENSIVE use-type remains the same.

As stated above, not all instances of the OFFENSIVE use-type occur in the second person. Of the 22 HAFTA statements which have been coded as OFFENSIVE, their distribution with respect to grammatical person goes as follows: YOU=12; I=7; Third=1; WE=1; 0=1. Examples of non-second person uses are presented below.

(17) [E pours rice in A's pan]

- A: Oh Mother! Don't do that!
 I HAFTA stir it up when you're gonna do that
 as A grabs spoon and stirs rice in her pan
- (18) A: I need a apple juice/I need some tea!
 as A is about to drink apple-juice from bottle
 E: No! No! Don't drink it from there!
 Now I HAFTA do something with these
 as E grabs bottle from A, begins to fill tea-cups with juice
- (19) [A lifts pitcher lid of juice pitcher, looks inside, it's empty]
 E: Wait! Wait! Wait! That's empty!/I HAFTA put some more in
 as E grabs pitcher from A and then fills it with juice
- (20) [E wants to play with her doll and the ambulance by herself;
 A and A's doll have been trying to join E, they go over to E]
 E: I'm not going with you and I not WANT you
 A: I WANT TO come/I'm sick mama
 E: I'm sorry
 A: I'm sick mama
 E: I'm sorry
 A: I HAFTA go to the doctor mama/I don't WANNU walk
 E: No! No! Not you!
- (21) [A begins to play with E's brother's toy castle]
 E: Don't Amy! Don't Amy! That's Andrew's! He's gonna be mad
 J: No, he said you could play with it
 E: Well, my brother said - he HASTA play with it
 because it's Andrew's - my brother

Even though the HAFTA statements are no longer realized as second person directives, the claim is that they are still considered part of the OFFENSIVE use-type since they function as part of an attempt to alter the addressee's activity trajectory. This time, however, the focus of the HAFTA statement is on what someone other than the addressee is required to do as a consequence of what the addressee has done or may do. Indeed, the consequence relation is made explicit in #17 and #18: i.e. the occurrence of 'when' (in a conditional) in #17 and 'Now' (meaning 'now that you have done something wrong') in #18 are both used to indicate that the speaker's required act is a consequence of what the other party has done or is about to do. The fact that a requirement is ascribed to the speaker does not necessarily entail that the statement functions DEFENSIVELY. Rather, since the requirement is expressed as part of the attempt to alter the behavior of the addressee, the examples qualify as instances of the OFFENSIVE use-type.

However, in order to understand the full range of functions of the OFFENSIVE uses of HAFTA, it will be necessary to examine the discourse sequences in which they occur. Accordingly, the first interesting finding is that the uses characterized as OFFENSIVE never occur on their own. That is, there are no instances of 'You HAFTA DO X' which are made as independent directives. Instead, each of the HAFTA statements follows a prior statement which appears to establish a particular relation with respect to the HAFTA statement. This finding parallels that for the DEFENSIVE uses of HAFTA which also occur in second position in pairs of sequenced utterances.

Nevertheless, as noted above, what characterizes the DEFENSIVE use-type is that each member of the pair of sequenced utterances is spoken by a different speaker and, as such, reflects an adjacency pair organization.

In contrast, the majority (N=20) of sequenced utterances which characterize the OFFENSIVE use-type are spoken by the same speaker - and as such, do not qualify as instances of adjacency pairs. Nevertheless, the sequenced utterances are tied to one another in such a way so that a structurally defined relation emerges between them. Indeed, in each case, the first utterance - or head speech act - sets up what Garvey (1975) calls 'a domain of relevance' which determines the appropriateness of other speech acts which are inherent to the functioning of the head act. This suggests that the HAFTA statement occurs in a particular slot whose relevance is established by the meaning of the head act. In order to determine the particular meaning which the HAFTA statements accrue in virtue of their position following the head act, the construct of a discourse frame will again be invoked. In fact, four different discourse frames will be proposed to account for the relations between the OFFENSIVE uses of HAFTA and the head acts which they follow. Figure V presents a schematic illustration of these frames in terms of the head acts which organize them. (Each of the four frames will be fleshed out in greater detail below.)

Figure V: The four discourse frames
which the OFFENSIVELY structured HAFTA statements occur in

- 1) N=6 Directive Frame: Do X
You HAFTA do X
- 2) N=12 Prohibition Frame: (There are 4 sub-types)
 - 2a) N=5 Don't do X or You Can't do X
First you HAFTA do Y
'Instead' you HAFTA do Y
 - 2b) N=5 Don't Do X
First I HAFTA do Y or
'Otherwise' I HAFTA do Y
 - 2c) N=1 Don't Do X
'Instead' He HASTA do X
 - 2d) N=1 Don't Do X:
'Instead' We HAFTA do Y
- 3) N=2 Permission Request Frame: Across Speakers: Refusal:

Speaker 1 (subordinate): I WANNHA do X
(as a permission request)

Speaker 2 (dominant): [Neg marker]
You HAFTA do Y

4) N=2 Permission Request Frame: Same Speaker: Second Try:¹⁴

Speaker 1 (subordinate): I WANNA do X
[as a permission request]

Speaker 2 (dominant): No

Speaker 1 (subordinate): I HAFTA do X

Though the OFFENSIVELY structured discourse frames turn out to be more numerous than the DEFENSIVELY structured discourse frames, it is striking to note that both the DEFENSIVE and OFFENSIVE uses of HAFTA consistently occur in some type of discourse frame and never as isolated utterances. Furthermore, in each case, the HAFTA statement never occurs as the head act of the frame but always as a secondary or more subordinate act.

Given these findings, what can be inferred about the function of the HAFTA statements in the children's speech? In short, just as the DEFENSIVE uses of HAFTA function as reasons for the speaker's move of non-compliance, so the OFFENSIVE uses of HAFTA also function as reasons but this time for the various OFFENSIVELY structured head acts represented in Figure V. Since the basic communicative purpose of each of the head acts in all four frames is to alter the other party's behavior, reasons fit right in as they provide a rationale for the speaker's OFFENSIVE intent. Indeed, according to Garvey (1975), reasons are inherent to the domain of a request as they offer material which supports the speaker's intervention. Generalizing Garvey's claim, reasons can be viewed as being systemically inherent to each of the OFFENSIVELY structured head acts, as in each case the speaker is intruding into the conduct of another party by prescribing that she alter her behavior. Therefore, when a statement of requirement occurs following one of these head acts, the statement will be co-opted by the requirements of the discourse to serve this particular discourse function.

Another way of viewing the appropriateness of reasons in the OFFENSIVELY structured discourse frames is in terms of Brown and Levinson's (1978/1987) discussion of face. Each of the head acts listed in Figure V can be viewed as act-types which inherently transgress the other party's face, i.e. telling the other party what to do or requesting permission constitutes a transgression of negative face while denying permission constitutes a transgression of positive face. To the extent that these acts of transgression are supported by reasons, the damage to the other party's face is potentially offset - especially since the use of HAFTA conveys that the speaker herself is not the source of the constraint and hence is not directly responsible for the speech act. Thus it appears that the reason function itself has more than a single motivation, i.e. it functions as a support which justifies the head act, and/or as a redress of face.

However, just as the reason interpretation does not exhaust the full range of functions of the DEFENSIVE uses of HAFTA, it does not exhaust the functional potential of the OFFENSIVE uses either. Indeed, one of the most interesting findings which emerges from the data is the extent to which the different uses of HAFTA are consistently deployed to convey more than a single function on a single occasion of use. In order to pin down the

different levels of functioning that each type of HAFTA statement participates in, the four types of OFFENSIVELY structured uses will be examined more fully. In the upcoming discussion, an attempt will be made to justify the different levels of meaning attributed to the child's use of HAFTA.

The criterion for classifying a HAFTA statement as part of a Directive Frame (N=6; e.g. #11) was that it had to follow an imperative utterance. Assuming that the imperative explicitly conveys directive intent (Searle 1979), it is proposed that the expression of a requirement following an explicit directive will be interpreted as a reason for the directive. In accordance with this interpretation, note the greater elaborateness of the first HAFTA statement in contrast to the imperative statements in #11. A. elaborates on the details of the game procedure when using the HAFTA statement. The greater elaborateness accords with the interpretation that the HAFTA statement functions as a reason to provide supporting material.

However, since the HAFTA statement also functions as an assertion about the subject being required to act, identifying it as a reason does not vitiate its status as an assertive statement which is evaluable with respect to its truth, i.e. whether the subject is required to act in the said way or not. (see Note 10). Thus when used as part of the Directive Frame, the HAFTA statement not only functions as a reason, but it also functions as an assertion about the sentence subject being compelled to act in a particular way. In addition, the expression of a requirement packaged in a second person sentence frame accrues a directive potential all of its own. Indeed the HAFTA statements in example #11 are produced with directive-like intonation and thus appear to be escalations of the directive intent expressed by the imperatives: i.e. from straightforward orders to the expression of a requirement to act. Therefore, the third function which the HAFTA statement serves is that of an escalated directive.

In order to illustrate the interrelation between these three different levels of functioning achieved by the HAFTA statement occurring in a Directive Frame, the schema in Figure VI is proposed. It will be noted that two of the functions have a hierarchic mode of organization while the third function results from the second person sentence frame.

Figure VI: Directive Frame: Same Speaker

Turn 1: [Occurs]	Directive-qua-Imperative
Turn 2: [Projected as Possible]	Reason for Directive
[Occurs]	Reason
	by-means-of
	HAFTA statement of constraint;
	Plus, in a 2nd person sentence frame
	the HAFTA statement functions as an
	escalated directive to act

The criterion for classifying a HAFTA statement as part of a Prohibition Frame (N=12; e.g. #12-15, 17-19, 21) was that it had to follow some type of prohibition. According to Garvey (1975), prohibitions are similar to

requests in that they constitute an imposition on the interlocutor. Hence, the occurrence of a prohibition establishes an expectation that some type of reason is relevant. Given this, a statement of requirement following a prohibition will function as just such a reason. For example, the CAN'T/HAF TA pairings in #12 & 13 convey a prohibition through CAN'T, the reason through HAF TA; the DON'T/HAF TA pairings in #17, 18, & 21 function analogously. A similar procedure is effected in #14, 15 & 19 only this time the prohibition marker is less explicit. That is, when E screams *Amy!* in #14, *But first!* in #15 and *Wait!* in #19, these expressions function as attention-getters which are intended as prohibitions: they are intended to halt the recipient's ongoing activity. Therefore, the occurrence of these markers creates an expectation that some type of reason may follow to mitigate the speaker's intrusiveness.

Yet once again, the HAF TA statements do more than just give reasons for the prohibited action. They also function as assertions which express the proposition that the sentence subject is constrained to act in a particular way. In accordance with this interpretation, note the response to the HAF TA statement in #13 where E says 'I know' rather than 'I will'. By saying 'I know', E responds to the truth-value of the HAF TA statement rather than to its directive intent. Indeed, each of the HAF TA statements which occurs in a Prohibition Frame is warranted; that is, the HAF TA statement refers to an activity which the speaker can legitimately expect the recipient to carry out (see Note 10). In addition, another purpose of the YOU HAF TA statement when it follows a prohibition is to tell the recipient what she is required to do after telling her what not to do. That the directive intent is understood by the child is indicated by the finding that the addressee typically complies with the request (see discussion below). Thus, our claim is that the HAF TA statements which occur in the second slot of a Prohibition Frame also embody at least three different functions for the child. To illustrate the interrelations between these functions, note the schema in Figure VII:

Figure VII: Prohibition Frame: Same Speaker

Turn 1: {Occurs}	Prohibition
Turn 2: {Projected as Possible}	Reason for Prohibition
{Occurs}	Reason
	by-means-of
	HAF TA statement of constraint;
	Plus, in a 2nd person sentence frame
	the HAF TA statement functions as a
	directive to act

The criterion for classifying a HAF TA statement as part of a Permission Request Frame: Across Speakers: Refusal (N=2; e.g. #16) was that the HAF TA statement had to follow the requestee's refusal of the other party's request. For example, in #16, E adopts the role of baby and requests permission of A in the role of daddy to go to a party. In this context, A's negative head-shake functions as a refusal marker. The expression of refusal as a form of non-compliance sets up the expectation that some type of reason

may follow. Hence, a statement of constraint following a refusal will be interpreted as a reason for the speaker's negative reply.

However, analogous to the other uses of HAFTA, the HAFTA statement in example #16 functions at the level of the proposition as a descriptive statement about the recipient being constrained to act in a particular way. Indeed, this particular use of HAFTA is warranted since A is playing the role of daddy which, in this culture, gives her the right to tell the baby-doll what she should do. In addition, the statement of a requirement in a second person sentence frame functions as a directive. The fact that E complies with what is asked of her suggests that the directive potential of the HAFTA statement is understood by the child. Hence, in order to account for the different functions of the HAFTA statements which occur following a refusal of a request, Figure VIII is proposed.

Figure VIII: Permission Request Frame: Different Speakers: Refusal

Turn 1: [Occurs]	Permission Request
Turn 2: [Projected for Recipient]	Permission vs. Refusal
[Occurs]	Refusal
	by-means-of
<u>Refusal Frame</u>	
[Projected]	Refusal Part + Reason Part
	by-means-of by-means-of
[Occurs]	Neg. head shake + HAFTA statement of constraint; Plus, in a 2nd person sentence frame, the HAFTA statement functions as a directive to act

The criterion for classifying a HAFTA statement as part of a Permission Request Frame: Same Speaker: 2nd Try (N=2; e.g. #20) was that the HAFTA statement had to follow a previous request by the same speaker which had already been denied. For example, in #20, A, who is the relatively more subordinate child, has been following E around attempting to join in E's game of taking the dolls to the doctor in an ambulance. In the above sequence, A states 'I WANT TO come' which, given E's dominant status, functions as a permission request. This request is followed by a reason ('I'm sick') which gets repeated after E's rebuff ('I'm sorry'). Finally, after a second rebuff, A states that she HASTA go to the doctor. Because going to the doctor accords with E's game-plan, the HAFTA statement can be viewed as another type of reason to persuade E to include A in her play. (In fact, A advances three different types of reasons: i.e. 'I'm sick mama', 'I HASTA go to the doctor mama', and 'I don't WANNU walk').

Analogous to the other uses of HAFTA, the HAFTA statements which occur as reasons in the Permission Request Frame also function as assertions about the speaker being constrained to act in a particular way. In #20, since going to the doctor is conventionally associated with being sick, A provides a warrant for saying that she HASTA go to the doctor and in this sense, her assertion can be considered true. In addition, the HAFTA statement functions as a second try of the request. That is, once a request which is formulated

in terms of the speaker's desire has been refused, to then reformulate it under the aspect of constraint suggests that the speaker intends the utterance as an escalated second try. Hence, the HAFTA statements which occur as second tries following a permission request embody another set of complex functions for the child as illustrated in Figure IX.

Figure IX: Permission Request Frame: Same Speaker: 2nd Try

Turn 1:	[Occurs]	Request for Permission to Act
Turn 2:	[Projected for Requestee]	Permission vs. Rejection
	[Occurs]	Rejection
Turn N:	[Projected for Requestor]	Reason for Permission Request
	[Occurs]	Reason
		by-means-of
		HAFTA statement of constraint;
		Plus in a 1st person sentence frame
		the HAFTA statement functions as a
		second try of the request

In summary, what the analysis of the OFFENSIVE uses of HAFTA suggests is that different levels of functioning are integrated into each use-type of HAFTA classified as OFFENSIVE in the children's speech. Furthermore, two of the functions are hierarchically organized such that the discourse function appears to be primary. This means that even before the HAFTA statement is spoken, the 'reason interpretation' is represented as a possibility due to its role in satisfying the expectations created by the discourse frame.

The plurifunctional status of the OFFENSIVE uses of HAFTA notwithstanding, it is nevertheless the case that the various functions are each associated with slightly different, yet overlapping, formal means of expression: (i) The 'reason interpretation' derives from the sequential location of the HAFTA statement following an explicit directive; thus, this level of meaning can be thought of as being configurally conveyed in terms of the discourse frame; (ii) The 'assertion interpretation' is based on the occurrence of HAFTA in an declarative sentence frame; (iii) The 'directive interpretation' is based on the second person sentence frame plus the meaning of HAFTA as a requirement to act.

It is interesting to consider the related possibilities in adult speech. For an adult, the statement 'You HAFTA go visit your mother' can be used on its own to accomplish both a head act (i.e. a directive) plus a subsidiary act (i.e. a reason) in virtue of using a modal of obligation in a second person sentence frame (Searle 1979). As such, the modalized statement accomplishes two hierarchically organized speech acts at once: a directive by-means-of a reason for the directive. In contrast, the 3-year-olds are apparently not able to use a single utterance to accomplish both acts at once: as noted above, there are no instances of 'You HAFTA do X' which occur as independent statements. Indeed, it is the very occurrence of the HAFTA statement in a second position slot which provides the clue to its primary function - i.e. as a reason which supports the head act which it follows.

The last point to be considered concerns the success of the HAFTA statement viewed as an attempt to alter the play partner's behavior. As it turns out, four different types of uptake occur to the OFFENSIVE uses of HAFTA: (i) the recipient complies with the required act [13]; (ii) the recipient does not comply but offers a plausible reason [5]; (iii) the recipient does not comply and offers no reason [3]; (iv) can't tell [1]. According to these figures, in 81% of the cases when HAFTA is used as part of the attempt to alter the recipient's activity, the recipient indeed attempts to comply - or at least she feels obliged to give a reason for her non-compliant behavior¹⁶. Hence, the OFFENSIVE uses of HAFTA constitute an effective means of eliciting at least some type of response from the other party. However, the caution which was urged in interpreting the success of the DEFENSIVE uses of HAFTA must be extended to interpreting the success of the OFFENSIVE uses as well. Without an independent measure of the cost of censoring or requesting the target activities, the extent to which the results are due to the particular activities which are requested or whether they are due to the use of HAFTA in the directive cannot be determined.

Now, in order to give an account of the different patterns of use of the total set of HAFTA statements in the children's corpus, another type of HAFTA statement will be briefly considered which consists of a blend of the DEFENSIVE and OFFENSIVE use-types already presented.

2.3 The DEFENSIVE/OFFENSIVE Uses of HAFTA Statements and The OFFENSIVE/DEFENSIVE Uses of HAFTA Statements

Certain uses of HAFTA [N=9] combine both a DEFENSIVE and an OFFENSIVE discourse stance. These combinations exclusively occur when WE is used as sentence subject. While in certain instances, the DEFENSIVE stance is dominant [N=4], in other instances, the OFFENSIVE stance is dominant [N=5]. In the former case, the DEFENSIVE/OFFENSIVE use-type, the HAFTA statement is used in a particular context to convey a message which can be glossed in the following way: 'We HAFTA do what I am already doing. I don't wanna follow your request. You do what I am doing'. In the latter case, the OFFENSIVE/DEFENSIVE use-type, the HAFTA statement is used in a different context to convey a slightly different message: 'Let's do what we have been told we HAFTA do. Don't do what you are doing. I ask you for the second time'. What both types of blends have in common is that the speaker asserts that she and the addressee should together carry out a particular task-related activity. Observe the following examples:

DEFENSIVE/OFFENSIVE USES

- (22) A: Here [hands E a block while E is building]
E: No! I - We HAFTA make windows! Make windows!
as E continues to make windows in her castle; glances at A
- (23) A: Let's set it up! [A walks over where E is preparing for tea-party and begins to set up table; A gets very involved]
E: But first! - We HAFTA make it (invitingly)
E is on the floor, gathering utensils & food for party; she seems to hear A's comment as a threat to preparing for party continues to do exactly what she was doing; glances at A

- (24) A: But we HAFTA set it up!
 A continues to set up table; looks expectantly at E to join
 E: Yeah! [E continues prior activity of gathering utensils]

OFFENSIVE/DEFENSIVE USES

- (25) [E has been trying to get A to go to the party with her; A has been refusing]
 E: Come to the party! Come to the party!
 I want you to come to the party!
 A: OK! I'm coming! I'm gonna come down! OK? I'll be right down
 I'm gonna fix dinner
 as A marches her doll down steps of castle away from E
 E: But! We HAFTA go to the tea-party! //E screams at A//
 as E waits for A and her doll to join her
 A: But - but I'll be right back
 E: OK
[Omit @ 6 lines].....
 (26) A: Oh! I found something and I will HAFTA go to sleep here
 as A marches doll to turret of castle and lays her down
 E: But we HAFTA go to the tea-party! //E screams at A//
 as E waits for A and her doll to join her
 A: I will

The HAFTA statements in examples #22-24 are considered instances of the DEFENSIVE/OFFENSIVE use-type. As the examples illustrate, one child is in the midst of a particular activity which is suddenly disrupted by the other child's request. The first child then responds by asserting that both parties HAFTA do what the speaker is doing. As such, the HAFTA statement functions as a means of defending the speaker's ongoing activity while inviting the other party to join in. In contrast, what characterizes the OFFENSIVE/DEFENSIVE use-type, as examples #25-26 illustrate, is that the speaker has not yet begun the required activity. Rather, the HAFTA statement is used to solicit the participation of the other party in order that both parties carry out a particular play-task together. Moreover, since in each case the request has been issued before, the HAFTA statement also functions to defend the speaker's plan.

To render this analysis commensurate with the other analyses, the different levels of functioning of the two mixture use-types will be presented by building on the analyses of the DEFENSIVE and OFFENSIVE use-types already given. For example, all four of the DEFENSIVE/OFFENSIVE uses of HAFTA occur in the second slot of an Action Request Frame and follow a non-alignment marker. Hence, their primary function appears to be analogous to the function of the purely DEFENSIVE uses: the HAFTA statement serves as a reason for the speaker's non-compliant reply. However, given the first person plural sentence-frame, the HAFTA statement also functions as a directive to persuade the addressee to join in the speaker's activities. In order to conceptualize the set of functions attributed to the DEFENSIVE/OFFENSIVE use-type in the children's speech, the schema in Figure X is proposed.

Figure X: Action Request Frame: DEFENSIVE/OFFENSIVE USES

Turn 1: [Occurs] Action Request
 Turn 2: [Projected] Compliance vs. Non-Compliance
 [Occurs] Non-Compliance
 by-means-of

Non-Compliance Frame

[Projected] Non-Alignment Part + Reason Part
 by-means-of by-means-of
 [Occurs] Refusal Marker + HAFTA statement
 Contrastive Marker of constraint
 Plus, in a first person plural
 sentence-frame, the HAFTA statement
 functions as a directive to H to act
 as S does

All five of the OFFENSIVE/DEFENSIVE uses of HAFTA follow a straightforward imperative - either in immediate succession or after a few turns (e.g. exs. #25 & 26). Based on the argument made for the occurrence of a HAFTA statement following an imperative in the purely OFFENSIVE use-type, it is again claimed that the primary function of the HAFTA statement in the mixture use-type is to serve as a reason to support the speaker's prior directive. What the OFFENSIVE/DEFENSIVE uses add is that the occurrence of HAFTA in a first person plural sentence frame functions as a directive for joint action: i.e. both children are required to participate in the activity together. Moreover, since the HAFTA request has been made before, it also functions as a means of defending the speaker's plan in the face of non-compliance. To illustrate the set of functions associated with the OFFENSIVE/DEFENSIVE use-type, Figure XI is proposed.

Figure XI: Directive Frame: Same Speaker: OFFENSIVE/DEFENSIVE USES

Turn 1: [Occurs] Directive-qua-Imperative
 (Directive has been given a few times before)
 Turn 2: [Projected as Possible] Reason for Directive
 [Occurs] Reason
 by-means-of
 HAFTA statement of constraint;
 Plus, in a 1st person plural sentence
 frame, the HAFTA statement functions
 as a directive for the speaker and
 addressee to act together; plus, the
 repetition and discourse marker indi-
 cate a defense of the speaker's plan

It might be mentioned that during the coding phase of this research, before the blends were recognized as such, this particular subset of statements [N=9] were the most difficult to code as they seemed to flip back and forth between the DEFENSIVE and OFFENSIVE categories. In contrast, the remaining first person plural statements [N=9] were more easily coded as straightforward instances of one of the other use-types. The difference between the

two sets of first person plural utterances turned out to correlate with the different possible referents of the pronoun WE. When WE was used as an impersonal subject marker ('one'), the HAFTA statement was coded as one of the primary use-types (DEFENSIVE, OFFENSIVE or SELF-REGULATIVE). In contrast, when WE was used as a marker of the participants' joint agency, then the HAFTA statement was coded as one of the blend use-types.

Finally, we turn to the last two types of HAFTA statements in the children's corpus: namely, the IMPLICIT DEFENSIVE use-type and the SELF-REGULATIVE use-type. The primary characteristic of both of these use-types is that the HAFTA statement occurs outside of a conversational context: that is, the target statement is not directed to a specific addressee. Thus, at first blush, the absence of surrounding discourse might suggest that in such instances the children will employ a sentence based/bottom-up method of utterance interpretation - as speech act theory would have it. However, the point to be argued for here is that the absence of a discourse context is not equivalent to the absence of an activity context conceived as the set of shared background assumptions about the nature of the activity being engaged in. Indeed, what the following analysis suggests is that the occurrence of a HAFTA statement uttered on its own presupposes a highly structured context in terms of which it counts as a meaningful contribution.

2.4 The IMPLICIT DEFENSIVE Uses of HAFTA Statements

The first type of HAFTA statement to be discussed which occurs as an independent utterance in the child's speech will be referred to as the IMPLICIT DEFENSIVE use-type. Whereas the pure DEFENSIVE use-type serves as a non-compliant response to a verbal request for change, the IMPLICIT DEFENSIVE use-type serves as a non-compliant response to the rules governing the activity context. It will be recalled that the children were given specific instructions for conducting themselves during the play: i.e. that they had to share the research toys, that they could not leave the filming area, that they could not take each other's toys, etc. These instructions provide a set of norms which determine the appropriate behavior during the course of the play. Therefore, the existence of these norms creates a problem if the child decides to execute an act which has been prohibited. One solution to this problem appears to be that the child can use a HAFTA statement to assert that the prohibited act is now required - whether or not it really is. Though only a few instances of this use-type obtain (N=5), they merit discussion as they raise an interesting problem for the analysis. Observe the following examples:

- (27) A: I HAFTA go and get something //pre-emptory intonation//
A glances at E then J as she acts; said as A gets up to leave the filming area; a prohibited move
- (28) A: This doll HAFTA get some more //pre-emptory intonation//
said as A gathers more small miniature spoons for her doll; these are highly desired items, hence a risky move; A glances at E; E watches A closely
- (29) A: I HAFTA stir these //pre-emptory intonation//
said as A grabs E's spoon; E has been very ungenerous/bossy

during play. A's move is risky; A glances at E as she talks

In the absence of surrounding discourse, it is tempting to assume that the HAFTA statements uttered by A function as spontaneous announcements in which A makes explicit her intent to act. As announcements, these statements would be viewed as cooperative moves in terms of the task of negotiating emergent activity-goals. The problem with this characterization, however, is that it cannot account for the total range of behaviors which occur: in particular, the speaker's pre-emptory intonation, plus the furtive glances which are exchanged. Instead, if it is assumed that these paralinguistic phenomena serve as 'contextualization cues' (Gumperz 1982; 1989) which provide a means for interpreting the speaker's intent, what these particular cues suggest is that the HAFTA statements are used to convey some kind of negative intent on the speaker's part. More specifically, since the HAFTA statement asserts that a particular activity which was once prohibited is now required, it generates the inference that the statement is being used to countermand the previously stated rules of the game.

Thus, our claim is that even though the IMPLICIT DEFENSIVE statement is not elicited by the sequential constraints of an immediately prior utterance, it still functions as a type of response since it presupposes the prior instructions which it challenges. As such, it exhibits what Goffman (1981) calls a 'backwards reach'. The different values on the basic dimensions which comprise the IMPLICIT DEFENSIVE use-type are presented schematically in Figure XII.

Figure XII: THE IMPLICIT DEFENSIVE USE-TYPE

1. Response: HAFTA-statement serves as a negative response to one of the prior instructions governing the activity context
2. What is NOT to Change: HAFTA-speaker's activity which has just been initiated is to be preserved. (The HAFTA-speaker is warranted in what she says she has to do in 20% of the IMPLICIT DEFENSIVE uses; see Note 10)
3. What IS to Change: The other party's anticipated resistance to the HAFTA-speaker's activity is to be thwarted
4. Desire: HAFTA-speaker desires to carry out HAFTA-governed activity
5. Temporal Reference: HAFTA-speaker refers to an immediately subsequent activity
6. Functions As: HAFTA-statement functions as an attempt at self-assertion on the speaker's part

The IMPLICIT DEFENSIVE use-type can be represented in terms of the same set of dimensions which represent the other use-types. This implies that the IMPLICIT DEFENSIVE uses also revolve around the force dynamic conflict of change and resistance to change. More specifically, the other party's anticipated resistance to the speaker is to be thwarted (dimension #3), while the speaker attempts to protect her own immediate activity plans (dimension #2). According to Figure XII, what distinguishes the IMPLICIT DEFENSIVE use-type from the pure DEFENSIVE use-type is that the HAFTA

utterance is directed to an anticipated response by the other party rather than to an actual verbal request for change.

The importance of recognizing that the IMPLICIT DEFENSIVE uses serve as a negative response to the norms governing the activity-context rather than as a spontaneous announcement of speaker intent is that the former interpretation provides a basis for conceptualizing the full range of functions exhibited by this class of uses. That is, similar to the other uses of HAFTA, the IMPLICIT DEFENSIVE uses are also selected so as to accomplish more than a single function on a single occasion of use. (The IMPLICIT DEFENSIVE uses are all spoken by A; see below for a possible explanation). In order to understand the different levels of functioning associated with this use-type, its occurrence with respect to the surrounding context will be examined.

First, as stated above, in the context of joint play where certain activities have been prohibited, for A to assert that she is required to carry out one of the prohibited acts - as she initiates that act - constitutes a non-cooperative response to the rules of the game. Indeed, the fact that these utterances are spoken in such a pre-emptory manner supports the claim that their use serves a defiant purpose for A. Moreover, by stating an alleged requirement, A can also be viewed as giving a reason for her non-compliant behavior. The reason interpretation gains support if we consider the power differential between the two children. Though A and E were both instructed to share toys and not to move about, E, the more imperious child, left the filming area quite frequently and hoarded most of the toys for herself. Hence, a situation seems to have developed in which A felt one-down to E and thus required a justification for transgressing certain rules which E would transgress without a justification. Therefore, the finding that the IMPLICIT DEFENSIVE uses were all spoken by A supports the claim that the HAFTA statements were issued as reasons to justify the subordinate child's transgressions to the more dominant child. In addition, the use of the HAFTA statement as an expression of non-compliance serves as a vehicle of self-assertion on A's part. Since the very use of the HAFTA statement presupposes the rule that it challenges, it functions as a means whereby A can assert her own preferences despite the rules of the game.

Lastly, given their packaging as declaratives, the HAFTA statements also function as assertions which are evaluable with respect to whether they are 'true' or not. With this in mind, it is interesting to note that according to Figure XII, the IMPLICIT DEFENSIVE uses are warranted only 20% of the time (see Note 10). This means that only one of the five instances of this particular use-type corresponds to a pre-existent norm which would render the use of HAFTA 'true'. According to these findings, the IMPLICIT DEFENSIVE use-type contains the greatest proportion of non-warranted uses. For example, A's three statements, that she has to 'go and get something' (#27), that she has to 'get some more' (#28) and that she has to 'stir these' (#29), are not backed by any known convention or rule which would render the HAFTA statements 'true'. In a previous paper (Gerhardt, in

press), such uses were designated as 'Constituting Uses' as they function as attempts to constitute a mutual belief in the very requirements they express. The finding that the IMPLICIT DEFENSIVE use-type has the highest proportion of Constituting Uses (non-warranted uses) is interesting in light of the fact that these uses most closely approximate initiatory statements and, as such, seem to have more degrees of freedom than those uses which are embedded in a more tightly structured discourse frame. Perhaps the speaker's greater sense of choice allows her to employ the HAFTA utterance for purposes of self-assertion whether or not the use of HAFTA is literally 'true'.

The point of this discussion is to suggest that in the absence of a discourse context, the activity context (or what Hymes [1972] refers to as the speech event context) serves as another type of framework which provides an inferential basis for interpreting the HAFTA statements. We will refer to this activity framework as an 'activity frame' by analogy with the discourse frames discussed above. The construct of an activity frame is intended as a way of systematizing some of the assumptions about the nature of the activity context which provide a basis for interpreting the utterances which occur therein. (Also see Levinson 1983:281 on contextual frames.)

To summarize, it is proposed that the IMPLICIT DEFENSIVE uses are similar to the other uses in that they serve to convey a complex set of functions in the child's speech as illustrated in Figure XIII.

Figure XIII: Peer Play with Toys Frame

Backdrop 1a:	{Once stated rules of the game}	Background assumptions about particular activity norms
Backdrop 1b:	{Projected}	Compliance vs. Non-Compliance
Turn 1:	{Occurs}	Non-Compliance by-means-of HAFTA statement that speaker is required to engage in a prohibited act; in context, HAFTA statement functions as a reason for non-compliance as well as a means of self-assertion

According to Figure XIII, Turn 1 presents the first real-time statement which is made against the backdrop of this activity framework. According to this schema, though the HAFTA statement is spoken as an independent utterance, it is intended as a comment on the rules governing the activity context. The more general point is that when interpreted with respect to the context, the HAFTA statement accrues various functions which go beyond its semantically-syntactically encoded functions.

However, though this analysis provides some support for the claim that the IMPLICIT uses of HAFTA exhibit the functions specified above, in the absence of surrounding discourse the cues for determining the situated meaning of the HAFTA statements are less determinate - at least from the perspective of the investigator. This problem is compounded by the fact that E does not respond to A's statements and hence there is no basis from which to infer

participant interpretation. Nevertheless, since previous research has shown that children as young as 3 do use the activity context as a basis for utterance interpretation (Ervin-Tripp 1977; Shatz 1978; Garvey 1975; Gee & Savasir 1985; McTear 1985; Ervin-Tripp, Strage, Lampert and Bell 1985), it is proposed that E is able to mobilize the relevant framework in order to recover the situated meaning(s) of the IMPLICIT uses of HAFTA intended by A.

However, if this is wrong, if the child does not use the activity context as a framework for interpreting the HAFTA statements, and consequently if the 'non-compliance', 'reason' and/or 'self-assertion' interpretations are not recovered, then presumably the IMPLICIT DEFENSIVE uses are interpreted solo as literal statements that the speaker is required to act in particular ways. In other words, in the absence of surrounding context, the bottom-up method of utterance interpretation is the most likely strategy adopted (see Gibbs 1979 for empirical support of this claim with adults).

2.5 The SELF-REGULATIVE Uses of HAFTA Statements

So far we have seen that the children's HAFTA statements occur in episodes of incipient arguments: i.e. in episodes where the speaker's agenda is to oppose something the other party has done or may do. Whereas the DEFENSIVE and OFFENSIVE statements are used to confront the addressee directly, the IMPLICIT DEFENSIVE statements are used indirectly as delayed responses to anyone who may be invested in the continued operation of the play rules. What each of these use-types share is that the HAFTA statement serves as part of the speaker's response to another party's utterance or action. In contrast, what characterizes the SELF-REGULATIVE use-type (N=16) is that the HAFTA statement is not said as part of a response - nor is it said as part of an interactive maneuver. Indeed, there is no evidence that the speaker intends that it have a direct impact on anyone. Rather, the SELF-REGULATIVE statement is said for the self as a way of regulating the speaker's activity in the context of joint play when the speaker is off on her own acting independently. Observe the following examples:

- (30) [E spills some dried food on the rug]
E: Uh-oh! It spilled! I HAFTA clean this mess up
as E begins to clean up the spilled food
- (31) [A is distressed; notices there are 3 dolls but only 2 children;
so she places teddy-doll in corner of room away from play scene]
A: Daddy's at work. Now Daddy HAS TO NOT come home
as A returns to play area from displacing teddy
- (32) [E looks inside ambulance; notices doll is off ambulance bed]
E: Uh-oh! Someping's wrong with the baby! She's off! She HASTA
get in it again!
as E opens door and puts doll back on ambulance bed
- (33) [A walks in room, tries to turn light on, it doesn't work]
A: We can't put this on. We HAFTA put this on
as A turns on a different light
- (34) [E wants to stick a miniature flag in a block so that it flies]
E: There's not a hole. HAFTA make a hole
as E tries to poke stick into block to make the needed hole

- (35) [A gathers large spoons, puts them away; small spoons remain]
 A: I put these things away because they're bigger. The others are little. HAFTA take these away because they're little - bigger
- (36) [A picks up miniature box of play cereal; shakes it and smiles with surprise that there is something in the box moving around]
 A: We HAFTA make breakfast
 as she opens box & pours out cereal
- (37) [A notices spilled food on her carpet and looks dismayed]
 A: I HAFTA clean that mess up
 as she begins to clean it up

These examples provide clear illustrations of the phenomenon of SELF-REGULATIVE speech. There are two characteristics which stand out and which have been used to identify this use-type. First, the target statements do not occur as part of an ongoing dynamic of face-to-face interaction, i.e. the child does not look at anyone as she speaks and her intonation has a self-directed rather than other-directed quality. Moreover, since the activities referred to are not prohibited, there is no reason to assume that the HAFTA statements serve as IMPLICIT challenges to the status quo. Indeed, there is no evidence that the SELF-REGULATIVE statements are used to control the other party at all.

Second, the HAFTA statements are spoken as the child enacts the HAFTA-governed activity. For example, in #30, E begins to clean up her mess as she directs herself by means of the HAFTA statement; in #31, A places the daddy doll out of bounds as she enunciates the play rules by means of the HAFTA statement; in #32, E puts the baby doll back on the ambulance bed as she guides herself using the HAFTA statement. The remaining examples follow suit: namely, the child dictates a course of action for herself by means of the HAFTA statement as she begins to carry it out. This overlap between word and deed is important since it suggests that the HAFTA statement not only functions descriptively to state a requirement but it also functions prescriptively as a way of regulating the speaker's activity with respect to the content of the requirement.

Based on these two characteristics, this mode of self-directed speech will be considered to be a manifestation of what Vygotsky (1962) has called 'egocentric speech', i.e. speech which is used to plan and/or regulate the speaker's own activities in situations of joint play. To emphasize the prescriptive nature of this use-type, it will be referred to as 'SELF-REGULATIVE speech' (the term is from Wertsch [1985]).

In order to appreciate the relevance of egocentric speech for understanding the children's SELF-REGULATIVE uses of HAFTA, a brief description of Vygotsky's formulation follows. Central to Vygotsky's account of language acquisition is the idea that development consists of the emergence of different functions as well as the acquisition of different forms. Whereas language is initially organized with respect to the function of communication and social control, eventually, it comes to serve as the primary

expression of rational thought. Crucial to Vygotsky's formulation is the claim that this developmental passage is marked by an intermediary phase - the phase of egocentric speech - whose basic characteristic is that the child begins to use her repertoire of external speech forms for planning and regulating her ongoing activities. This transition begins around age three and is manifest when the child speaks outloud as a way of formulating and executing a plan of action rather than as a means of direct communication with another party. The importance of egocentric speech is that it reflects the child's nascent ability to master 'semiotically mediated processes and categories' (Wertsch 1985:166) which will ultimately transform the child's behavior and cognition.

A further characteristic of egocentric speech - which Vygotsky was not able to account for sufficiently - is that it tends to occur in a social context rather than a solitary context. The finding that this mode of self-directed speech presupposes some form of social conditioning suggests that it must serve some type of socially useful purpose. Thus, having originally stated that SELF-REGULATIVE speech is a type of speech which is said for the self, this claim must now be dialectically refashioned to include its social conditioning. That is, the idea that SELF-REGULATIVE speech functions solely for the self - like the type of 'self-talk' described by Goffman [1978] - is untenable in light of the finding that it is restricted in its occurrence to a social context. In fact, what seems to be critical for the occurrence of this type of speech is that others be present who are capable of understanding (Vygotsky 1962). Therefore, in order to get a handle on the possible communicative value of this mode of self-directed speech, the following hypothesis is put forward: the communicative function of SELF-REGULATIVE speech is that it serves as a means of giving an account of the speaker's ongoing activity agenda when she is engaged on her own in the context of joint play. As a consequence, the speaker is able to sustain her involvement in the joint play scenario - even when she is off on her own acting independently (see below for an explication of this claim).

The parameters which have been used to define the other use-types can also be used to define the SELF-REGULATIVE use-type. Figure XIV presents the different values on the six parameters which characterize the SELF-REGULATIVE uses.

Figure XIV: THE SELF-REGULATIVE USE-TYPE

1. Response: HAFTA-statement is part of a negative response to something in the environment which is not in a canonical state but should be
2. What is NOT to Change: HAFTA-speaker's belief about how something should be is to be preserved
3. What IS to Change: An object in the environment is to change state (The HAFTA-speaker is warranted in what she says has to be done in 69% of the SELF-REGULATIVE uses; see Note 10)
4. Desire: Not clear whether HAFTA-speaker desires the HAFTA-governed activity to come about or not; this does not appear to be relevant

5. Temporal Reference: HAFTA-statement refers to an ongoing activity, or to an activity just about to be initiated
6. Functions As: HAFTA-statement functions as a means of self-regulation for the speaker; plus, it serves to give an account of the speaker's ongoing activities which contributes to the maintenance of the activity context as one of joint play

The most unique feature of the SELF-REGULATIVE use-type is indicated by the value on parameter #3: for the first time, the locus of change is the state of an object - rather than the activity (or anticipated activity) of the play partner. In other words, the SELF-REGULATIVE uses of HAFTA are not precipitated by an action of the other party which provokes the speaker's opposition. Instead, what precedes and motivates this use-type is an oddly disposed state of affairs which conflicts with the child's knowledge regarding how that state of affairs should be.

This absence of interpersonal opposition has implications for interpreting the functioning of the HAFTA statements. In short, there is no longer any rationale for viewing the target statements as reasons. Hence, the SELF-REGULATIVE use-type contrasts with the other use-types which have been interpreted as reasons. Indeed, since the DEFENSIVE and OFFENSIVE uses are organized with respect to the parameters of compliance and control (parameters which structure argumentative discourse), reasons fit right in as inherent constituents of this discourse genre. In contrast, since the SELF-REGULATIVE uses are said for the self - or at most can be viewed as serving to broadcast the speaker's agenda to others - reasons per se are not required as the speaker is not in a situation of trying to coerce or manipulate the other party. In other words, without an addressee to whom the reason would be given, there is nothing in the discourse which would recruit the HAFTA statement to serve in this role. Hence, the statement of constraint will not take on this functional value.

Instead, given a context where the children have been instructed to create and maintain a temporarily shared activity, the problem which arises is that of sustaining a shared context when divergent activity-goals are pursued: i.e. how can the child maintain some semblance of intersubjective consensus about the nature of the joint play when her activities are not coordinated with the other child's activities? Our claim is that the child's SELF-REGULATIVE speech is intended as a solution to precisely this problem: in short, the use of the SELF-REGULATIVE statement functions as a way of giving an account of the speaker's ongoing activity in order that her solitary performance be transformed into an intersubjectively penetrable event. According to this hypothesis, the very act of narrating one's ongoing activity in a social context functions as a public account of that activity, the consequence of which is that the play scenario is potentially maintained as one of joint play. The usefulness of this claim is that it provides an explanation for the occurrence of non-directed speech in the presence of others who are not directly addressed.

At this point, in order to explicate the particular type of SELF-REGULATION which the child imposes on her actions when using a HAFTA statement - as opposed to some other type of statement - we will examine the examples in more detail. First, it will be recalled that the HAFTA statements were classified as SELF-REGULATIVE on the basis of two criteria: the absence of a dialogic format and temporal overlap between utterance and action such that the speaker's activity appeared to be guided by her speech. However, taken together, these two criteria identify two structurally different patterns of use (i.e. exs. #30-35 vs. #36-37). To justify the decision to treat these different patterns as equivalent expressions of the same underlying use-type, the examples require some elucidation.

In examples #30-35, the HAFTA statement occurs as part of the representation of an episodically structured sequence of events. Indeed, the HAFTA statement is positioned so that it generates the inference that the HAFTA-governed activity is required due to the circumstances represented in the preceding utterance. That is, the examples either begin with some type of contingent physical problem state (i.e. 'It spilled'; 'Something's wrong with the baby/She's off'; 'We can't put this on'; 'There's not a hole'), or with an undesired circumstance which is based on convention and has conventional implications ('Daddy's at work'; 'because they're bigger'). In each case, the problem state or undesired circumstance represents a disparity from a normal state of affairs. The HAFTA statement is then used to represent a conventionally based solution to the problem (See Mann & Thompson [1986] for a discussion of 'solutionhood' based inferences in a sequence of same-speaker propositions). For example, if something has spilled, according to convention it should be cleaned up; if the doll falls off the ambulance bed, according to convention she should be put back on; if a pillar does not have a hole to carry a flag, the convention is to make one; if Daddy's at work, according to convention, he will not be coming home, etc. In fact, eight of the 16 SELF-REGULATIVE uses occur in the following format: the statement of a problem is followed by the statement of the conventional solution to that problem.

The other type of HAFTA statement classified as SELF-REGULATIVE is illustrated in examples #36 & #37. In these examples, the statement of constraint occurs on its own. Nevertheless, it turns out that in all eight occurrences, the speaker first alights on something in the context which captures her imagination due to its anomalous status. For example, in #36, by shaking the cereal box, A discovers that the usually empty box contains something inside; she smiles with excitement. In #37, A notices food all over her rug and is very displeased. In both cases, A becomes aware of something which is discrepant from the way things normally are and should be. This prompts the statement that she has to act in such a way so as to correct the discrepancy (i.e. cook the food in the box, clean up the rug, etc.). In light of this finding, it is proposed that even when the HAFTA statement occurs as an independent utterance, its function is the same as in the examples above: namely, the HAFTA statement functions to express a conventional solution to an anomalously disposed state of affairs.

Summarizing across these two sets of examples, what the data suggest is that the HAFIA statements are used for a very particular type of SELF-REGULATION by the child: namely, an attempt is made to correct some type of situational anomaly by providing the conventional solution to that anomaly. Given that HAFIA is associated with a requirement to act based on the existence of social convention (see Note 6), the very act of enunciating a HAFIA statement for purposes of SELF-REGULATION makes explicit that the speaker's activities are being carried out in conformance with social convention - rather than her own personal desires. The inference which this gives rise to is that the speaker's activities are still part of the joint play scenario despite their appearance as solo performances (i.e. as parallel play). In other words, SELF-REGULATION carried out by means of a HAFIA statement - as opposed to some other type of statement - serves to highlight that the speaker is abiding by social norms rather than personal preferences whether or not her play is overtly collaborative.

In fact, there is another level of meaning which pertains to some of the HAFIA statements which works in tandem with the semantics of HAFIA to downplay the speaker's personal agency. As noted above, the SELF-REGULATIVE statements are positioned so as to convey the inference that they are intended as a solution to a particular problem. To the extent that these problems are presented as pressing (e.g. 'Uh-oh! Something's wrong with the baby!', etc.), they give rise to the further inference that the required activity is one which is externally caused. That is, when the HAFIA statement is presented as a solution to an extremely urgent problem, the message which is conveyed is that the invocation of the required activity is not freely chosen. The effect of such a message is, once again, to downplay the speaker's personal volition.

Therefore, what this analysis suggests is that by viewing the HAFIA statements in context - even in the absence of a dialogically structured discourse context - the children's SELF-REGULATIVE uses can be viewed as accomplishing several different functions on a single occasion of use. To be sure, this claim assumes that the children do in fact orient to the context as a framework for employing and interpreting the HAFIA statements. The above analysis should be read as an attempt to support this claim. In order to illustrate the complex set of functions associated with the SELF-REGULATIVE use-type, the schema in Figure IV is proposed.

Figure IV: Peer Play with Toys Frame
& Self-Regulative Discourse Frame

Backdrop 1a	{Children instructed to play together}	Joint play is ongoing
Turn	1b {Occurs}	Speaker regulates and plans her own independent activity by-means-of HAFIA-statement of constraint
Backdrop 2a	{Once stated rules of the game}	Existence of rules to create and maintain a shared play situation

Backdrop 2b [Projected]
Turn 1 [Occurs]

Compliance vs. Non-Compliance
Quasi-Compliance
by-means-of

HAFTA statement of constraint which functions to provide an account for others of what the speaker is up to when she is acting on her own; and, that her behavior is being carried out in terms of social norms

Backdrop 3a [Occurs]

Statement that a problem exists, or speaker alights on a problem

Backdrop 3b [Projected]
Turn 1 [Occurs]

Deal with problem vs. Ignore problem
Deal with problem
by-means-of

HAFTA statement of constraint which serves to represent the solution to the problem; plus, by serving as a solution to an urgent problem, the speaker's volition is thereby downplayed

According to Figure XV, all be the SELF-REGULATIVE uses of HAFTA not dialogically situated, they nevertheless are contextualizable with respect to the flow of the speaker's own discourse and the particular play situation which the children are attempting to maintain. And, once again, the context will determine the various ways in which the HAFTA statement functions.

3. Conclusions

The above analyses have raised several larger theoretical issues which I would like to briefly highlight. First, in a previous study which investigated the meanings associated with HAFTA, NEEDTA and WANNA in the speech of the same two children (Gerhardt, in press), it was found that the children assign a meaning to HAFTA which contrasts with the meanings assigned to NEEDTA and WANNA. In short, HAFTA makes reference to some type of external constraint or social convention which dictates (i.e. requires) that a particular course of action be followed. Thus, in terms of the split between the two traditional modal values of possibility and necessity, HAFTA is a device which encodes a meaning closer to necessity. The importance of this claim is in terms of the inference which the concept of necessity gives rise to. To say that an event is necessary can explain its occurrence while to say that it is possible cannot. Indeed, according to White (1975:91), 'something can happen because it is necessary, but not because it is probable or certain' (i.e. 'John read Kant because he had to', vs. 'John read Kant because he could?'). In other words, the notion of necessity plays a central role in providing explanations of actions and events. Moreover, in that the type of necessity expressed by HAFTA is that associated with the constraint of certain pre-existent norms, HAFTA conveys what White refers to as a type of 'retrospective necessity' (i.e. something is

necessitated by something else), rather than 'prospective necessity' (i.e. something is necessary for something else.)

In light of White's description regarding the suitability of the notion of necessity as a mode of explanation, our findings come as no surprise. That is, it is little wonder that the HAFTA statements occur in discourse slots which are reserved for reasons in episodes of incipient arguments. It will be recalled that the discourse patterns which contain the HAFTA statements turn out to have a very specific shape: in both cases, some type of non-compliant or intrusive head act occurs (i.e. a refusal or a directive) which is followed by a reason as a means of support. According to the framework offered above, this pattern is not arbitrary: the occurrence of a reason following such a head act functions to explain the head act and to justify the speaker's oppositional stance - as well as to help preserve the hearer's face, though this dimension was not explored. Thus, from the perspective of the discourse, reasons can be viewed as being systemically inherent to the meaning structure generated by those speech acts which convey the speaker's oppositional or intrusive intent - whether or not the reason is realized (also see Garvey 1975 and Schiffrin 1987). As a way of capturing the relations between the HAFTA statements in their role as reasons and the various head acts which they support, several different discourse frames have been proposed (cf. Figs. II, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, XIII, and XIV). These frames are intended as mental schemas which embody the expectations established by the head act in terms of which the HAFTA statement will be interpreted as a reason. One of the most striking findings which has emerged from the analysis is that both the DEFENSIVE and OFFENSIVE uses of HAFTA consistently occur in some type of discourse frame and never as isolated utterances. Moreover, the HAFTA statements occur in a second position slot, i.e. in a slot designed for reasons, rather than as a head act of the frame. Thus, this research provides further support for the conversation-analytic claim that utterances are organized with respect to the underlying discourse structures in terms of which they count as significant contributions.

An analogous claim has been made with respect to the SELF-REGULATIVE uses of HAFTA. What distinguishes the type of speech referred to as SELF-REGULATIVE is the absence of direct verbal interaction between the participants: the speaker's utterances are said for the self for on-line planning (the speaker-based function), or, at most, they are intended to be overheard by the play partner as a means of maintaining a joint play scenario when the speaker is acting on her own (the communication-based function). In terms of the influence of the requirements of this speech-type on the interpretation of the HAFTA statements which occur therein, the absence of dialogue - and indeed the absence of any type of disputatious move which might require an explanation - renders the need for reasons superfluous. That is, since reasons have been defined as accounts given to others (see Introduction), in the absence of dialogue there is nothing in the context to impose the reason interpretation on the HAFTA statements. Hence, they do not take on this meaning. Rather, the communicative function which is imposed on the HAFTA statements by this mode of self-directed speech can be

thought of in the following terms: i.e. the HAFTA statement functions as a public account of the speaker's activity agenda such that the inter-subjective status of the ongoing play situation is maintained in the absence of direct interaction.

Therefore, the upshot of this analysis is to suggest that different speech-types impose different functional pressures on the same linguistic construction such that the situated meaning of the construction varies depending on the speech-type. With respect to the types of speech referred to as argument and self-regulative discourse, the speaker is confronted with a different task in each: in argument, the speaker is called upon to proffer an explanation to the other party for her disputatious or intrusive moves; in self-regulative discourse, the speaker is called upon to maintain the joint play scenario when she is pursuing an independent goal. The hearer has reciprocal expectations based on her knowledge of these different speech types. Therefore, the different pragmatic level inferences which the HAFTA statements give rise to - reason-giving vs. account-providing, respectively - are determined by the different functions which characterize each genre.

The second issue to be highlighted concerns the method for selecting context. Rather than make an apriori decision to view the HAFTA construction in terms of its occurrence in a discourse context or in terms of its contribution to a socially constituted activity context, it was decided to use the form as a guide and follow the form wherever it lead. As a consequence, the analysis suggests that both modes of context need to be considered when conceptualizing the relation of language to context with respect to the child's use of HAFTA. That is, both the linguistic and the non-linguistic context provide different kinds of frameworks in terms of which the statement of constraint counts as a significant contribution. Had we delimited the study in advance to a particular type of context, the complexity of the language-context relation with respect to the use of HAFTA statements would have been missed.

The last issue to be discussed concerns the relation between the children's use of HAFTA and Talmy's (1985; 1988) force-dynamic analysis of the modals in general, HAFTA in particular. According to Talmy, what lies at the core of each modal form is a particular pattern of force opposition: the subject has an inherent tendency toward one action while some external factor opposes that tendency. For example, Talmy characterizes HAFTA in terms of the semantic components illustrated in Figure XVI.

Figure XVI: The meaning of HAVE TO for adults (adapted from Talmy 1985)

1. Subject does not want to VP
2. Not VPing has consequences that the subject does not want even more (the 'or else' constituent)
3. Subject chooses to VP as the lesser displeasure
4. Subject projects choice to VP as pressure applied by outside authority to VP

According to this analysis, HAFTA has a force-dynamic conflict at its core. That is, the subject has negative desires toward a particular act; however, these desires are overridden given the imagined consequences of not acting. The decision to act is then treated as an external pressure to act. It is important to note that under this analysis, the force dynamic conflict is conceptualized as part of the semantics of HAFTA; HAFTA just means that the subject is forced to act against her wishes given the threat of negative consequences.

In light of this analysis, it is interesting to consider the children's usage. It will be recalled that each use of HAFTA in the children's speech embodies a distinct type of oppositional nexus: namely, the speaker believes that (i) something is to change, while (ii) something which is related is not to change (parameters 2 & 3 in Figures I, IV, XII and XIV). However, what the analysis of the children's corpus suggests is that the basic force opposition is initially interactive in nature⁶: the opposing forces are distributed across different participants in the speech event context. To illustrate the difference between the child's use of HAFTA vs. the adult's, we will take the most canonical use-type from the children's corpus - the OFFENSIVE use-type - and translate its features into a schema akin to Talmy's. Figure XVII presents the OFFENSIVE use-type in Talmyesque terms.

Figure XVII: OFFENSIVE USE-TYPE of HAFTA for the Children

1. Recipient is not doing anything; or, she is doing something other than what the HAFTA-speaker wants her to do
2. Recipient presumably wants to be doing what she is doing, and not what the HAFTA-speaker wants her to do
3. HAFTA-speaker wants recipient to VP
4. HAFTA-speaker feels she has the right to tell recipient to VP [the speaker is warranted 91% of the time in the OFFENSIVE uses; see Note 10]
5. HAFTA-speaker states that recipient is required to VP

According to Figure XVII, when the child states 'You HAFTA VP', we can infer that the recipient is not VPing and that she does not want to VP. Nevertheless, the speaker wants the recipient to VP and believes she has the right to tell her to VP - as VPing is, typically, the socially sanctioned act for the particular occasion. Hence, the speaker tells the recipient to VP and, typically, the recipient complies. It is important to note that the type of obligation which is encoded by HAFTA is construed differently by the different participant-roles: in short, the speaker's HAFTA-statement is backed by a sense of 'having rights', while the recipient responds due to a sense of 'having duties'. Both forms of obligation derive from an awareness of social convention. That is, the awareness that social conventions exist breeds a sense of having rights (i.e. the right to engage in those activities which are sanctioned by convention as well as the right to expect others to so comply), as well as a sense of having duties (i.e. the duty to acknowledge the force of the convention over one's own and other's activities). In the scenario illustrated in Figure XVII, the recipient of

the HAFTA statement, who typically complies with the request, does so due to her sense of duty which comes to override her own personal desire.

Therefore, it might seem that the force dynamic conflict embodied in the children's OFFENSIVE uses of HAFTA can be identified in terms of the opposition between two internal forces within the recipient, i.e. the recipient's desire to engage in her own activity vs. her sense of duty to carry out the required activity - as Talmy's analysis would have it. However, this interpretation is misleading given that the recipient's sense of duty is catalyzed only after the HAFTA-speaker enunciates the HAFTA request. In other words, what actually occurs is that the HAFTA-speaker tells the recipient that she has to do something other than what she is already doing, and presumably wants to be doing, and only then the recipient responds. This suggests that the HAFTA statement embodies a conflict which is played out between the participants in the discourse: specifically, the HAFTA-speaker who believes she has the right to make the request vs. the recipient who desires to be engaged in her own activity but who capitulates to the request due to her sense of duty after the HAFTA-speaker intervenes.

Thus, the deliberate model of solitary decision making proposed by Talmy to underlie the force dynamic conflict associated with the adult's use of HAFTA may not be directly appropriate as a model to characterize the child's use of HAFTA. That is, according to Talmy, the adult uses HAFTA in a situation where a subject chooses to VP since it is calculated to be a lesser displeasure than not VPing; she then projects her choice to VP as pressure coming from an external source. However, in the child's case, the episode begins with pressure from the external source. Hence, rather than projection there is coercion. Moreover, there is no evidence that the child chooses to VP due to its being a lesser displeasure. Rather, the child chooses to VP after she is reminded of her duty to VP by the HAFTA-speaker. Lastly, while the adult makes a choice to VP only after considering the consequences of not VPing (i.e. I have to VP or else), there is no evidence that the child considers the consequences of not VPing at all.

Therefore, at this early stage in the child's language development, it appears that the force dynamic conflict posited by Talmy to lie at the core of a modal like HAFTA gets played out in terms of an external conflict between the participants in the speech event. This finding leads to the following speculation. Rather than being a direct expression of internal decision processes inside the subject's head, the force dynamic system itself may arise from various types of discourse situations where the participants in the discourse assume different force dynamic roles. In other words, the force dynamic system which has been characterized in semantic terms by Talmy may actually derive from a semanticization of various discourse patterns which at one time were played out as actual oppositions between conflicting parties in face-to-face discourse.

Footnotes

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1. Sinclair & Coulthard (1975:11) have also noted that the modals play 'a large part in producing the lack of direct correlation' between form and function in language production.

2. Concerning the spelling conventions, the form HAVE TO will be cited as HAFTA to capture the way the majority of uses are pronounced by the children. When variants occur in the actual examples (HASTA and HAVE TO), they will be spelled as such.

3. To be sure, the use of the concept of literal meaning is fraught with difficulties as it carries the connotation that the meaning of a construction can be determined independent of any context whatsoever. However, in the discussion which follows, this meaning is not intended. Rather, the term 'literal meaning' is taken from Searle (1979) as a way of referring to the semantically encoded meaning of a sentence as opposed to the contextual meanings which utterances accrue by virtue of their occurrence in a situational context. Moreover, according to Searle, the literal semantically encoded meaning of a sentence itself 'only has application relative to a set of contextual or background assumptions... about the contexts in which the sentence could be appropriately uttered' (1979:117). Thus, when the term 'literal meaning' is used in the text, the reader should assume that it refers to the semantically encoded meaning of the target statement which itself presupposes a set of background assumptions for its interpretation.

4. Another attempt to characterize different types of discourse conveyed meanings which arise from sequenced statements is found in the work of Mann and Thompson (1986). Whereas their work focuses on written discourse, the present research focuses on spoken discourse.

5. The proximal source for the construct of a 'discourse frame' is Fillmore's (1982; 1985) discussion of the role of 'cognitive frames' in semantic interpretation and his briefer discussion of 'interactional frames' for situational interpretation of the speech event. The more distal source comes from recent work in cognitive science on frames (Minsky 1975), scripts (Schank & Abelson 1977), schemas (Rumelhart 1975) and idealized cognitive models (Lakoff 1987). Also, Levinson (1983) has an interesting discussion on the necessity of frame-like constructs for pragmatics.

6. In a previous paper (Gerhardt, in press) an attempt was made to define the meanings which were associated with the modals HAFTA, NEEDTA and WANNA in the speech of the same two children. Based on a distributional analysis which examined the selective distribution of these three modal forms with different types of predicates, it was found that HAFTA tends to be used to

regulate actions which themselves were already organized with respect to a pre-existing social convention or norm. Therefore, it was claimed that the semantic meaning of HAFTA is something like 'the existence of certain social norms compels one to do X' - at least for the two 3-year-olds studied here.

7. The third person variant of HAFTA, HASTA, more commonly occurs in contexts which pull for an epistemic meaning (an inference, i.e. That HASTA be John) rather than a deontic meaning (a constraint, i.e. He HASTA be there by 4:00). Nevertheless, both forms can express both meanings and thus the discussion which follows is not necessarily restricted to the third person HASTA variant.

8. HAFTA is referred to as a 'modal-catenative' form for the following reason. The term 'catenative' comes from Twadell (1963) to designate the class of secondary auxiliaries such as HAVE TO, NEED TO, WANT TO, GOING TO, ABOUT TO, etc. Whereas the modal auxiliaries (WILL, SHALL, MAY, CAN, MUST) are defined as a class of forms which do not require DO support for standard transformations (i.e. negation, question-formation, emphasis), the catenatives do require DO-support, and hence function more like main verbs. This implies that catenatives are not as grammaticized a construction-type as the primary auxiliaries. Nevertheless, that the catenatives do function as a grammatical construction can be shown by the following test: Whereas 'I stopped to eat' can be paraphrased as 'I stopped in order to eat', 'I started to eat' cannot be paraphrased as 'I started in order to eat'. Therefore, only the latter (START TO) is a catenative (Twadell 1963). Another criterion which defines catenative constructions is that the infinitive marker TO tends to elide with the matrix verb (Plank 1985). From a semantic perspective, catenatives tend to have either have a modal meaning or an aspectual meaning. Since HAFTA has a modal meaning (i.e. external necessity), it is referred to as a modal-catenative form.

9. This statement is made on the basis of casual observation and refers to utterances like the following: 'Well, I have to go now' said to defend the speaker's already formulated plan after an invitation to stay; 'But I have to go to Finland next summer' said to defend the speaker's more distant plan after a request to spend the summer differently; 'Well, I still feel I have to give Sally support against Fred even though I don't agree with her position' said to defend the speaker's complex plan which opposes certain beliefs. The point is that the adult's DEFENSIVE uses of HAFTA are not restricted to defending the speaker's ongoing activity but can be used to defend all sorts of beliefs and plans about the future.

10. As stated in the introduction, in a previous analysis (Gerhardt, in press), an attempt was made to evaluate each use of HAFTA as to whether it could be considered 'true' or not. That is, certain occurrences of HAFTA were used in accord with certain pre-existing conventions/norms (You HAFTA eat on a plate); as such, the token use of HAFTA could be considered 'true'. Other occurrences of HAFTA were used despite the fact that there were no obvious conventions/norms which would render the use of HAFTA 'true' (I HAFTA have this block). The former uses of HAFTA were characterized as 'warranted' (the term is from Toulmin 1958) since some type of convention/norm exists which could justify their use. The latter uses of HAFTA were not characterized as 'warranted' since they were not associated with a pre-existing convention/norm which could justify their use. In the latter case,

the HAFTA form itself functions as a signal to bring about the belief that a particular convention exists even though this is not 'really' the case. Therefore, to state that a particular use-type has a certain percentage of warranted uses means that a certain percentage of the occurrences of HAFTA which have been identified as instances of that use-type are associated with pre-existing social conventions and thus can be considered 'true'. Of the 73 occurrences of HAFTA in the children's corpus, 56 (77%) of them are used in accord with some type of warrant which justifies their use.

11. In examples #1-5, the negative markers serve as part of a response to a request for action. Hence, they are used to express the speaker's non-compliance with the request. The reason for referring to this class of markers as 'non-alignment markers', rather than 'non-compliance markers', is that the markers are not restricted to Action Request Frames. In example #6, 'Well' is used to express the speaker's lack of alignment with her interlocutor's plans and as such occurs in a Projection of Plans Frame. Therefore, we have chosen the more general term 'non-alignment marker' as an inclusive term to refer to this set of markers whose function is to express the speaker's lack of alignment with the preferred option generated by the interlocutor's previous utterance.

12. In the introduction, the claim was made that the majority of the HAFTA statements occur in arguments while the remainder occur in self-regulative discourse. Therefore, the occurrence of HAFTA in ex. #6, which falls within the speech-type of planning would seem to falsify our claim. However, a closer inspection of example #6 suggests that the HAFTA statement serves as part of the speaker's attempt to oppose her interlocutor in terms of the suitability of the expressed plans for herself. As such, the example falls within the domain of argument as well as in the domain of planning.

13. The connectives which occur in single quotes refer to meanings which are inferred rather than explicitly encoded. That is, the children do not use 'instead' nor 'otherwise' in their speech. These meanings are conveyed through the juxtaposition of the HAFTA statement with the particular head acts which they follow in the context of an incipient argument.

14. The two Permission Request Frames ('Permission Request Frame: Same Speaker: Second Try' and 'Permission Request Frame: Across Speakers: Refusal') are not independent of each other conceptually. They are separated here for expository purposes in order to suggest that reasons are relevant to various roles which are inherent to the domain of a Permission Request: i.e. they are relevant to the respondent who refuses the request and who wants to justify her refusal, and, they are relevant to the speaker who makes the request after she has been refused and wants to provide a reason as part of a second try of the request.

15. The three instances of unmitigated non-compliance occur in the Permission Request Frames. Two occur in the Same Speaker: Second Try Frame and one in the Across Speakers: Refusal Frame.

16. This hypothesis is not intended to apply to the SELF-REGULATIVE uses where the basic force dynamic tension consists of the opposition between the speaker's belief about how something should be and her perception of an object in the environment which does not conform to her belief. Although this report does not present developmental data, on the basis of Vygotsky's claim that self-regulative speech is a more advanced mode of speech than

communicative speech, the children's SELF-REGULATIVE uses of HAFTA are assumed to constitute a developmentally more advanced use than the other uses. Thus, the finding that the force-dynamic conflict is not grounded in an interaction for this use-type does not falsify our hypothesis which is intended to cover the basic use-types only: i.e. the DEFENSIVE and OFFENSIVE use-types. Nevertheless, it is to be noted that even the SELF-REGULATIVE uses are triggered by an environmental anomaly and as such seem to require an externalization of the force dynamic conflict similar to the DEFENSIVE and OFFENSIVE use-types. In contrast, Talmy's analysis of HAFTA refers to decision processes 'inside' the subject's head.

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