THE USES AND UTILITY OF IDEOLOGY: SOME REFLECTIONS

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Quelque grands que soient les avantages
des signes, il faut convenir qu'ils ont des
inconvéniens; et si nous leur devons
presque tous les progrès de notre intelli-
gence, je les crois aussi la cause de pres-
que tous ses écarts.

A. Destutt de Tracy (1827[1801]: 267)

Without wishing to commit the etymological fallacy in the understanding of a word's meaning, I would like first to comment on the traditions of usage of the term ideology, a theme elegantly announced in Woolard's introductory discussion of "issues and approaches."

As is well known, it was Antoine Louis Claude Comte Destutt de Tracy (1754-1836) who invented the term, in that naturalizing move of the French Enlightenment rendition of Locke (or, to be sure, Condillocke) that sought to understand human "nature." Ideology was proposed as that special branch of zoölogy that recognizes the condition of humans, we animals who have ideas as the content of what we should call our minds. Central here is the fact that any ideas more developed than physiological sensations are dependent on such ideas' being clothed in signs, the organization of which by some systematic grammar allows the discursive expression of a logical faculty of mind. Hence, for Destutt de Tracy, there is the general scientific field of ideology proper, the science of ideas, of which the subfield of grammar studies the signifying externalizations, as it were, in structured systems of articulated signs, and the subfield of logic the modes of rationality oriented to truth and certitude of inferential states of mind (i.e., formation and combinatorics of ideas). Such a science would, for its propounder, also allow us to diagnose and understand "the causes of incertitude and [logical] error," thus presumably leading to an amelioration of the human condition vis-à-vis its natural mental faculties.

It is particularly interesting, therefore, to see the fate of this term, proposed as a formation parallel to any of the other "-ologies" of a systematic scientific outlook. It has obviously become a word that now denotes a part or aspect of Destutt de Tracy's very object of investigation, and in many appearances has the specifically "pejorative" use - to pick up on Jane Hill's invocation of Raymond Geuss (1981: 12-22) - that presupposes we know certain ideas to be dubious, in error, and

therefore suspect or at least suspicious, in the manner of "mere" ideas as opposed to material, historical, indeed factual "realities."¹

For those of us who have no connotational - i.e., ideological! - problems with considering mental phenomena as historical and factual, if not directly material realities, the concept of ideology in our contemporaneous usage can embrace the terminological transition to a notion of a concrete object of possible study, while making no judgment - at least in scientific and scholarly usage - about some independent and absolute universe of Truth (with its capital T) and Validity (positivistically, not positively, speaking) against which ideologies are measured. (In this usage, it is no cause for concern that scientific and scholarly discourse, too, is "ideological," not escaping from the universe of human mental activities as these arise in conditions of sociality.) It is thus with the sociological and anthropological (or more generally "descriptive" [Geuss 1981: 4-12] and social scientific) concepts of ideology that I should like to see us continue to be concerned, and certainly this cluster of concepts - to re-term Woolard's differentiation of 'features' of the term ideology - is central to all of the papers in the accompanying section, to which my remarks are directed.

These different emphases of social scientific users of the concept-cluster - whether by name or equivalent - form a kind of palimpsest or geological stratification of connotations taken from canonical nineteenth- and twentieth-century texts. Ideology is an intensional characteristic, predicable of a society, of a group or other social formation abstracted from society, or even of individuals within some defined population, and can be understood as "mental," therefore, with the same problems

¹ The historical linguist in me wishes to note that there is an interesting problem here in the shift of meaning from the abstract field-of-scientific-study sense to the concrete sense of (in the singular) one of the objects-of-scientific-study. It would seem likely that the actual mechanism involved a derived, adjectival usage, viz., idéologique, ideological, which would construe the objects-of-study by characterizing them as such objects, namely, those studied by the field of ideology. Thence it is easy to see the back-formation that reidentifies the base as the object-of-study, since the -ique, -al formations of adjectives have moved decisively in the direction of characterizing objects on the basis of their own denoting terms, especially as these share formally identical stems. It is clear that contemporaneously with Destutt de Tracy's introduction of the term idéologie in Paris, there was stimulated translation coinage of an equivalent in English, attestations from 1796 and 1797 appearing (reporting on the French discussion) with the authorially-stipulated senses for ideology and ideological (see *O.E.D.*, s.vv.). Apparently through a kind of delocutionary quotation-translation of (pro-)Napoleonic usage ca. 1813-1815, the derivational set ideology, ideologue, ideologist, ideological emerges with a fiercely negative and mocking connotation, leading to a sense of unpractical, speculative, idealist social philosophical thoughts and thinkers, whence by the 1830s and 1840s, the opposition of (negatively valued) ideas vs. historical and material facts is established in English, especially ideas associable - according to one 1827 citation of ideology - "with hot-brained boys and crazed enthusiasts," that is, the negatively-valued (mere) social-theoretic ideas of a group clearly indexed as not that of the speaker or writer. Thus any *ideologist*, i.e., proponent of the intendedly scientific field of *ideology*, has merely *ideological* beliefs, as opposed to ideas that correspond to material, historical, and factual realities. A possible parallel shift in the noun-adjective derivational structure may be observable in very contemporary times, in English close to home, where we can note the shift of the erstwhile paradigms (noun) language - (adj.) linguistic [= 'of language'] vs. (noun) linguistics - (adj. phr.) of linguistics, as in the noun phrase linguistic theory, so that now the last phrase seems to speakers (linguists themselves!) to mean 'theory (as opposed to descriptive or other practice) of linguistics', not '...of language', and hence winds up being an "ideological" term - in the newer sense - of its disciplinary social organization.

as the concepts of 'culture' or 'language' when these are considered as "mental" characteristics. Thus note that the sharedness of ideology, like that of culture or language, and the relationship of ideology to consciousness, are properties that survive from Destutt de Tracy's usage, which focused upon the human condition as ideational. Certainly, the culture concept and the concept of language central to several traditions of anthropology and of linguistics have entailed their wrestling with the nature of such sharedness, and the degrees of consciousness involved in such cultural and linguistic phenomena, in many different ways. These constitute both ontological and epistemological problems for validity claims in the scientific manner for our statements about "the" culture or "the" language we purport to describe, as every aware practitioner knows, and they will not disappear, as is increasingly being recognized (sometimes more forcefully by external critics than by practitioners, who then look like "ideological" apologists) by appeals to Cartesian certitude of self-examining "intuition." Having such intuitions, and being able consciously to formulate and communicate ("share" in an active, agentive sense) them, may thus be "ideological" to a degree greater than, and in ways more diverse than, many students of culture and language in one scientific mode or another would find tractable. Indeed, if all cultural and linguistic phenomena are essentially ideological "all the way down," this calls for a re-evaluation of how we might creep up on such "material" or "objective" factuality as presents itself in them.

Observe how this leads into the second aspect of the concept-cluster, the social-situatedness of ideology. For if we are dealing with some ideational phenomenon particular to or predicable of societies, groups, etc., like the classic Romantic notion of the world-view of "a people," "a nation," etc. that constitutes their uniqueness, then insofar as ideology is characteristic of any sociocultural phenomenon, it must inhere in what makes any social entity of whatever scope cohere as that social entity. We have only to be able to locate such a social entity, to find the potential for a unique mental or ideological aspect associable with its members or participants. Once we yield to the distrust of the socially-locatable (as opposed to the material and factual of early nineteenth-century pejorative usage) as somehow less factual than real facts, we see that the locatedness of ideology takes on a kind of negative connotation as opposed to the locatedness of "culture," in both its technical and its lay usages. Rather than seeing that there is no such thing as a social fact without its ideological aspect or component, many users of the concept have simply yielded to the negative connotations of a kind of charged political rhetoric when it comes to analyzing the ideational aspect of social formations. But the long-standing textual basis for this bias is not hard to find, revealed as it is even in the historical organization of dictionary attestations in the *OED*.

Thus, the locatedness appears to those viewing ideology from across a divide: whether on the perceivedly opposite side of the scientific stance at or in objective "Truth" vs. the distortions or mystifications in ideology (this is Woolard's third member of the cluster of notions in the word), or on the perceivedly opposite side of the de-mystifying, de-bunking, committed championship of the victims of dominant, powerful, or oppressive groups or institutions, on whose behalf the self-legitimization of the latter is declared to be ideological; these are the initial intellectual salvos of de-legitimation (Woolard's fourth feature of the concept). We can see that features three and four share the stance of otherness, the one being

epistemological, the other rather frankly political. These two stances can, of course, be combined, as in traditions of a politically-committed scientific analysis of "ideological" formations that some versions of political economy declare themselves to be.

Observe how the specialized senses Woolard points out are on the order of Putnamian stereotypes locatable in specific groups of users in historically located traditions of the division of linguistic labor of the very term *ideology* and its derivatives. These all seem to have emerged out of the very same, ideologically informed processes of linguistic change that start in the indexical penumbra of denotational usage of linguistic forms-in-context, is re-valORIZED in the realm of ideologically-grounded apprehension, and returns to usage in terms of transformed indexical value. Such explains also the charming sociolinguistic fact that Woolard brought up in oral presentation that there are two phonological forms, [ay]*ideology* and [i]*ideology*, probably indexically locating a speaker in different communities of discourse and probably emphasizing different stereotype aspects of the concept-cluster in actual usage, e.g., cultural anthropologese vs. social anthropologese or sociologese, among others. Like the classic Labovian example of the woman who infused the stratification indexical value of the alternative pronunciation of *v[ey]es* vs. *v[ahz]es* with denotational content (the first denoting less valuable objects than the second), those of us who pronounce and listen to these alternatives probably do behave like native speakers ought to in respect of the term *ideology* and its derivatives, in which the role of authorizing, canonical texts read and re-read over two centuries infuses even our phonetic usage with now one, now another dominant conceptual strand, despite ourselves.

Turning to the other papers in my assigned task, I want to emphasize two general themes concerning the ideological aspect of the cases discussed, and then comment upon the utility of the concept of ideology - as opposed to the concepts of culture and language themselves - when dealing with the facts of language. These two themes comprise first, the mediating position of ideology in what can only be called a dialectic process at many planes of abstraction and many distinct orders of sociality and of social process. The second theme is how, exactly, to understand the "sitedness" of ideology in a number of frameworks relevant to the analysis of language: where - to spatialize metaphorically at least - to look for ideology's many manifestations in social life, and the implications of the answers to this for social scientific practices. The papers here have rich material relevant to these concerns.

The necessity of ideology in the dialectic of indexicality

Once we recognize that the "realities" of meaningful social practices emerge from the experience of indexical semiotic processes, we should resign ourselves to enjoying the fact that it's indexicality all the way down. That being the case, we should see that meaningfulness is a dialectic property of social semiotics (other than such aspects of denotational language as are justifiably referred to systems of Saussurean-Bloomfieldian-Chomskian 'sense'-generating morphosyntax). And the rub is, the only way to break into such dialectical systems is with the inherently ironic concept of ideology. Ideology, in other words, is defined only within a discourse of interpretation or construal of inherently dialectic indexical processes, as for example

the processes of making or achieving text (entextualization) by using language and other sign modalities whether at the denotational plane or the plane of interactional textuality (though of course, for language in particular, both planes of textuality are always in play).²

Now any indexical process, wherein signs point to a presupposed context in which they occur (i.e., have occurred) or to an entailed potential context in which they occur (i.e., will have occurred), depends on some metapragmatic function to achieve a measure of determinacy. It turns out that the crucial position of *ideologies* of semiosis is in constituting such a mediating metapragmatics, giving parties an idea of determinate contextualization for indexicals, presupposable as shared according to interested positions or perspectives that follow upon some social fact like group membership, condition in society, achieved commonality of interests, etc. Ideology construes indexicality. In so doing ideology inevitably biases its metapragmatic "take" so as to create another potential order of effective indexicality that bears what we can appreciate sometimes as a truly ironic relation to the first. Let us term these, as it were, hypothetically *pre-ideological* and decidedly *post-ideological* indexicalities respectively the first-order and second-order aspects of indexicality.³ (Of course, given the dialectic nature of the semiotic process, we should understand these relative orders to be generalizable to nth and n+1st.) One kind of approach to invoking ideology in the analysis of social signs is to start with the observation that every system or modality of social signs is infused with indexicality, that therefore such indexicality is caught up in a dialectic process mediated by ideological formations, and that therefore there is no possible *absolutely* pre-ideological, i.e., zero-order, social semiotic - neither a purely 'sense'-driven denotational system for

² It is, of course, essential to keep these planes of textuality distinct one from another, since the first answers the question, "What has been/will have been said in-and-by some use of signs?" and the second "What has been/will have been done in-and-by some use of signs?" The first is a model of denotational (referential and modalized predicational) coherence over some span of event-duration, frequently expressed in terms of propositional or "informational" content; the second is a model of social-actional coherence, frequently expressed in terms of social acts in some framework for description. It must be seen, however, that both of these kinds of text are models of gradient, interpersonal, indexically-consummated achievements in the processual realtime of using signs, the decontextualizable, genred appearance of which to the user is an important, ideologically-informed perspectival reality that makes indexical presupposition seem to gel as structure autonomous of realtime contextualization (available, for example, for armchair microsociologizing of linguistic pragmatists and philosophers). And note how such structure becomes vivid when concretized in a text-artifact that can perpetually be reanimated - e.g., by reading a printed array as a text - in a new entextualizing event.

³ In my 1979 piece on "Language structure and linguistic ideology" I reference Robert K. Merton's differentiation of manifest and latent functions of social practices (see Silverstein 1979: 204), especially as this aligns ideologically-informed metapragmatic "takes" (there called function,) on indexical function (there called function,) with Merton's manifest dimension, and much of actual indexical effectiveness - especially in the way of entailments of indexical occurrence - with Merton's latent dimension. Given the dialectic of ideological engagement with indexicality, however, the concept of orders of indexicality mediated by ideologically-informed metapragmatics is a much more useful formulation, since in certain respects ideological formations depend on facts of signs functioning indexically (at whatever order) just as a higher order of indexical functioning depends on the presupposition of ideological formations functioning metapragmatically.

the referential-and-predicational expressions of any language, nor a totalizing system of purely "symbolic" values for any culture. Certainly the confluence of deconstructive and Marxist political-economic approaches, insofar as coherent, amount to an argument to this effect. But it is not my purpose here to elaborate on these.

Rather, I want to point out that ideologies as invokable schemata of explanation/ interpretation of the meaningful flow of indexicals gelled into text-like chunks, are generally thought of as relatively perduring with respect to the indexicals-in-context that they construe. And we recognize such schemata characteristically by the way that they constitute rationalizing, systematizing, indeed most importantly naturalizing schemata that "explain" the indexical value of signs in terms of some order(s) of phenomena stipulatively presupposable by - hence, in context, autonomous of - the indexical phenomena to be understood. Such naturalizing schemata, in the way of "Just So Stories" about the direct, transparent, indeed sometimes *iconic* indexicality of the phenomena at issue, in their most elaborated forms, go to the very heart of issues of what human nature is all about in a universe that has certain absolute characteristics with respect to the field of indexical semiosis at issue.

We can think of any of the demographic dimensions of identity summoned up indexically in the use of language: men vs. women, generation n vs. generation m within a kinship or even age-system order, ethnicities A, B, or C, various class-orientations or -identities within a structure of stratification, etc. Any reasoning that interprets a presuppositional relationship - "Such-and-suches use form '...', while so-and-sos..." - is potentially an ideological one rationalizing the indexical value of the forms in terms of schemata of social differentiation and classification that are independent of the usages at issue. And we should note how systematic and elaborated such rationalizations in pre- or non-semiotic frameworks can be, ultimately grounded in a cosmologically or cosmogonically totalizing vision. At their most elaborate, ideological construals/constructions of indexicality - the ultimate extensional facts, note - turn the indexicals into seemingly natural indexical icons - emblems with consubstantial *intensional* content or stuff with respect to their original contextual surround, little detachable design elements that are like ready-made texts deployable for social-interactive effect and which preserve their intensional characteristics as a seemingly autonomous "code" of meanings.⁴ (We have only to think of the almost literal evaluation of words - such as v[ahz]es - as \$10-items, compared with their \$.10 denotational equivalents in other socio-economic class registers.)

Thus also note that many of our theorized sociolinguistic constructs are inherently suffused with the ideological dimension of the semiotic processes that realize them. For example, the concept of register, as a minimally binary paradigm of "saying the same thing" indexically appropriate to two distinct contexts of usage,

⁴ Is this not the essence of totemism that has been completely missed by structural-functionalists and structuralists alike? Here note the similarity to phenomena of fetishization, of reification, and of commodification, as they have been termed in their respective literatures informed by Marx, Durkheim, Lukács, *et al.* I sketch this generalization of the phenomena to the wider semiotic realm, fully in keeping with and developed from scattered insights of the late Roland Barthes (see especially 1968; 1983), as I have detailed in two as yet unpublished papers at other AAA meetings in 1984 and 1988, on "The 'value' of objectual language" and "De-voice of authority."

however defined. Note that the "sameness" of denotational value, built into this concept, is an ideologically-driven mirage from the structural linguistic point of view; that there are indexically-inflected paradigms of "equivalence," from the perspective of users of the denotational forms, is what makes this denotational "equivalence" factual within some sociolinguistic order. No examples of literally equivalent registers have, to my knowledge, appeared in the literature, yet it is a construct that nicely captures an important way that native speakers of languages comprehend variation and variability in their linguistic forms, one that allows us to capture something of what it means to have a linguistic community whose ideology of "speaking the same language" must obtain in spite of obvious processes that dialectically balance dialectal and superposed variability in usage (the terms are Gumperz's 1968: 383-4) in their constant reciprocal interconvertibility in different orders of indexicality.⁵ Yet the imagination of indexically-functioning variability as organized by registers - seeing indexicality through the lens of alternatives of denotational usage - presents the social context that metaphorically surrounds language through the idiom of discussing the appropriateness of alternatives of formulating one's denotational message in this or that way. As Don Kulick observes in his paper, "language ideologies seem never to be about language so much as they are about other things, such as gender and expression and being civilized," all, we might add, features of language's context of occurrence.

So that people have ideologies of language is a necessary entailment of the fact that language, like any social semiotic, is indexical in its most essential modality. And that irony is the essential trope lurking always in ideologically informed contemplation of language, whether by "them" or by "us," is a consequence of the actual dialectic manner in which ideology engages with pragmatic fact through metapragmatic function, in a kind of spiral figurement up the orders of indexicality. All of our accompanying papers demonstrate this.

Irvine's paper takes up the distinction between deference-and-demeanor indexicals and honorific registers. The latter always involves a strong ideological component expressed in a metapragmatics of appropriateness to addressee-focused context (presupposition) at the first order of indexicality that ironically operates rather differently, generally speaker-focused, at the second.⁶ Moreover, as Irvine

⁵ Note that the intuition of "saying the same thing" in the ideologically-informed capacity of native speaker contemplating dialectal/superposed indexical variation is a very different one from anything a structural linguist might want to happen upon for purposes of setting up morphosyntactic and hence 'sense' equivalences in the realm of morphosyntactic paraphrase relationships. A paraphrase in this conceptualization has nothing to do with an indexical paradigm of equivalence-in-context, of course, contextualization and entextualization being, the theory goes, entirely independent "performance" characteristics distinct from characteristics - like paraphrase relationships - giving evidence for the structure of linguistic (sc., grammatical) "competence." (Small child watching the Emperor parade by: "Or *are* they?")

⁶ Thus, note the case of Javanese deference honorification laid out in Silverstein 1979: 216-27, and in greater detail in Errington 1988. The multiple dimensions of indexicality involved, speaker-to-addressee, speaker-to-referent, speaker estimation of Agent-to-Dative NP-denotatum deference, contrast with the linguistic ideology of addressee-focused unidimensional, linear "finesness" of language as part of the appropriate behavioral envelope or ego-centered, addressee-focused bath in which one should strive to immerse one's interlocutor, the more "fine" the interlocutor (in a

points out, in some languages these honorific registers organize the lexicon of nominal-heading grammatical forms insofar as the categories of honorific/neutral/pejorative are expressed systematically through the normal paradigms of inflection and agreement. In this sense they are "grammaticalized" in some languages to a very great degree, as in Yao and ChiBemba, while in others there are simply paradigms of lexical register-alternants in sometimes one-to-one (Zulu), sometimes many-to-one denotational "equivalence" (Javanese).

By contrast, Irvine notes that the Wolof linguistic ideology, centers on the binary contrast of articulate *griots* and inarticulate nobles (the latter forming a kind of verbal *Lumpenkönigtum*, one can imagine) as **speakers** with immanent social characteristics indexically presented. As Irvine has discussed in an earlier paper on greetings (Irvine 1974), the ideological alignment of these social identities relative to discursive interaction looks something like the following: Griot : Noble :: active, moving : inert, stationary :: low status : high status :: speaker : addressee :: fluent, loud, rapid, intoned speech : dysfluent, soft, slow, monotone speech :: first pair-part role (soliciter) : second pair-part role (responder). Doing something to index a shift in these expected alignments is the obviously speaker-centered possibility for effectively troping, but not trampling upon these expectations. Thus, speaking more elegantly in the griot manner will not a nobler person make, obviating a higher-order indexical effect. Irvine's paper thus nicely problematizes the contrasts between ideologically-supported indexical systems of honorification or of avoidance-respect (Zulu *hlonipha*), with their addressee focus, their degrees of enregisterment and even grammaticalization, and the characteristics of various kinds of text-bound, discursive indexicals the ideologies engaging which seem to operate distinctly. Highly-ideologized, enregistered, grammaticalized (or at least lexicalized) honorific and avoidance-respect indexicals are imperialistic; they underlie an expansive tropic potential in what seems to be a great deal of strategic "metaphorical switching" (Blom & Gumperz (1972: 425) with effective second-order indexicality.

In Hill's discussion of the reflective discourse of nostalgia among Mexicano (Nahuatl) speakers in the Malinche area, we see the topic of ideological concern, not unexpectedly, in the addressee-focused honorification indexes, prototypically conjured up in images of set interpersonal routines like greetings. One of the most interesting facts here is the irony of ideologically-informed usage, located as it is with respect to a past viewed with highly-developed longing for days of mutual "respect," and positionally-defined self-certitude in discursive interaction. (It is an irony so palpable that at least one commentator, Doña Fidencia, catches all of this in her own counter-nostalgic wit.) Indeed, the very irony pointed up by Hill (citing

metric ultimately cosmologically centered through the King or Sultan in social structure). Ironically, the more "finely" one can speak, the more one shows self - at a second order of indexicality informed by, and depending on, the ideological understanding of the practice - to be deserving of ideologically-informed "finesse" of speech and behavior from others! Janet Morford, of The University of Chicago (p.c.) reports various speakers of French observing that their families of orientation were so cultured and polite, they would not use reciprocal T (of the famous Brown & Gilman [1960] set, T/V) under any circumstances, even in the domestic group. Note here again the second-order indexical value, focused on "culturedness" of *speaker*, in what has been obviously emerging in certain circles as a register of honorification bespeaking positional identity of speakers, not necessarily addressees.

several exemplary works by Kenneth Hill and herself, q.v.) is like that of Labov's (1972) now famous "lower middle class" speakers of New York City English showing maximal "linguistic insecurity" before, i.e., ideological allegiance to, the standard register they seem basically (or basilectally) not to use. Around the Malinche the ideological discourse of nostalgia for the pure, unadulterated Mexicano of mutual respect seems to peak among those whose verbal protocols show maximal mixing, i.e., interference/code-switching, between Castellano (Spanish) and Mexicano. As Hill notes, "the discourse of 'nostalgia' [being] in fact a pragmatic claim about the present, using 'pastness' as a naturalizing ideological strategy," there is room even within the community for seeing the incoherence of the first-order and second-order indexical effects so generated, the first aligned with the valued "pure" formulaics of honorification, *compadrazgo*, in a seeming memorializations of a time when everyone knew his or her proper place (and hence the other person's too), the second with contemporaneous social stratification and ego-focused mobility, people construing their local, traditionally Nahuatl-speaking community within a nation-state order dominated by Spanish. And we can see that the speech community exists in the intersection of different sociopolitical interests around the far-from-neutral ideological portrait of the old days as a canonical ethical-moral text and enregistered model for current behavior. Yet such interests articulate, debate, and contest the images in terms seemingly understandable one to another.

Contestation is, indeed, the theme of Kulick's paper on Gapun (Papua New Guinea) speech genres of *kros*-making vs. oratory. The first, invective- and obscenity-filled dialogic outbursts hurled between two houses, are negatively valued and rationalized as the product of essentially immature personalities who do not keep their *heds*, their autonomous selves, while the second, well-turned monologic thoughts shared at a public meeting, are positively valued and rationalized as the products of persons who have achieved *save*, i.e., "savvy" and exemplary Christian and civic ideals oriented to the common weal.⁷ At the ironic, second-order of indexicality, this becomes an indirect index of being an adult female, prone to burning *kroses*, so it is thought, or being an adult male, able to burnish oratory in orderly interaction through serial monologue, as in the ritual politics of the men's house. And yet, exactly parallel to the real irony of male sociopolitical life among the Merina long ago pointed out by Ochs (Keenan 1974), men can strategically orchestrate or authorize a *kros* in which their wives or other female relatives are the talking *heds*, thus playing a potentially important role in issues of contested interests.

Kroskirty's discussion of Arizona Tewa shows that that ideology of language use centers on *te'e hi:li* 'kiva speech', which seems to be conceptualized both as a genre and as a register with respect to serving as the informing centerpiece of what outsiders see as "linguistic conservatism" or "purism" more etically. Thus, insofar as identity is manifested through modalities of using language, all of the demographic and attitudinal characteristics of people are potentially aligned as metaphors one of

⁷ It would seem from Kulick's paper that the people of Gapun consider the *kros* to be a monologic genre, in a way, and the oratorical speech to be a dialogic one, in terms of their ideology of grounding the value of these genres as functional events indexing something of the personality characteristics of the speakers. This provides another, subtle form of irony especially in the characteristically female genre, the *kros*.

another by the conceptualized proximity to the the kiva, in practice or in entitlement, they can summon up in linguistic usage. Functionally similar to the hegemony of standard register in linguistic communities like those of modern nation-states, that is, dominating at the top-and-center of the conceptual array of "enregistered" indexical forms, the forms of kiva register become potential superposed variables in the repertoire as a function of position and strategy of users. And we see thereby the interesting irony that a woman announcing a yard sale in the manner of the traditional male public crier, using enregistered forms close to, though not at, kiva-"standard," is nevertheless commended for the effort.

Keeping the sites of ideology in sight

I want very briefly to point to the differences in explicitness of the ideological as such phenomena mediate social life, and also to the special position of certain institutional sites of social practice as both object and modality of ideologization. Again, the papers here demonstrate something of the commonalty as well as diversity of ideological manifestations.

A first important distinction is the degree to which, and the textualized manner in which, ideologies manifest themselves in and as phenomenal discourses *about* social practices such as using language itself. Such metadiscourses, even in the partial, though mutually-reinforcing form that any of Hill's Mexicano consultants articulated, frequently present themselves as nomically-calibrated metapragmatics - a metapragmatics stipulating law-like regularities, independent of epistemological concern with time, place, or other eventive contingencies of the pragmatic practice that is its object of discursive focus. (This nomic calibration can be contrasted with metapragmatic calibrations of a reportive or reflexive type [see Silverstein 1992: 48-53], which roughly deal with the realms, respectively, of "those" and "these" pragmatic phenomena. Myth, liturgy, and generalized historical or etiological explanation of social phenomena tend to be in nomic calibration with their denotational objects-of-exposition.)

Such a metadiscourse is semiotically situated to advantage in being a mode of rationalizing explanation, representing de-contextualizable characteristics as the basis of how indexical signs instance types of meaningfulness. Thus, any accounts of how characteristics of individuals recruited to the roles in semiotic events are indexed by certain linguistic forms, have this characteristic: women vs. men engage in, or are skilled at, distinct genres of discourse - extensional observation - because, women are such-and-such and men are so-and-so--intensionalization in another etiological schema giving the "essence" of the social category; these are the valued vs. devalued forms of language because they are in keeping with tradition or the way of the ancestors or not - the Malinowskian "charter myth" about indexically-pregnant forms; etc. When people have elaborate metalinguistic ideologies of this metadiscursively-evidenced sort, this is one place for the social scientist to start in figuring out the nature of the indexical dialectic that is the sociocultural object of investigation.

Sometimes, the metadiscourse emerges in descriptive images of linguistic and other semiotic usage in particular contexts, genred, eventively-situated stereotypes of usage that form a kind of canon of ideological values. Hence Kroskrity's kiva-style, the contextualized use of which links this context, through an ideological

imaging of it, to any other context in a kind of effectively intertextual - really, interdiscursive - ideology that measures any contextualized use of language by the degree to which the kiva-talk can be seen as immanent in it. The Mexicano scenes animated by speakers as typical of days gone by, also seem to have some of this canonical character as textualized Gestalten that are not so much constructed ideologically by a discours of intensional rules or principles, as exhibited - "meta"-animated - by a trope of re-presentation that functions as characterizing representation. Note in many of the papers how such textualized images combine with rationalizing metadiscourses of principle in a complex narrated and expository genre.

Which brings me to point out that ritual sites - Arizona Tewa kivas, Gapun meeting houses, Zulu royal courts, etc. - and sites of understood ritualization of usage - prototypic scenes of honorification of a Mexicano *compadre*, for example - are very frequently the descriptive exemplification in terms of which ideologies articulate semiotic value for indexicals and their determinate, textualizable grounding in a universe of meanings. This is not by chance, of course, since in such contexts of use, usage is in fact such that we can find tractable interactional texts. Not only social scientists, of course, but any concerned and interested parties can appreciate the value-setting nature of ritual.

Thus we see also that ritual is a site of tremendous ideological power, in that - as Durkheimian tradition stipulates - it constitutes an autonomous metatext for social practices the indexical dimensions of which are implicated in the tropic figurements of ritual. Ritual is semiotically self-grounding, in that its very enacted form, in whatever sign modalities, constitutes its own reflexively-calibrated metapragmatics, at the same time as this enacted form is constituted out of tropes - metasigns - that presuppose the existence of nontropic, i.e., literal and absolute "reality." This presupposition of the "literal" code - Barthes (1968: 89-90) calls it, generalizing, the denotational code - by an axially self-grounding entextualization may look non-"real and factual" to the outsider, but such suspicion is, of course, irrelevant in the semiotic universe of indexicality. We know of no ritual that does not get its effectiveness in this manner, from the most mundane "performative" usage of denotational language, to the most elaborate, scripturally-ordained liturgy. Ritual is self-grounding as indexical-icon within its figured universe, and as such makes a strong, though semiotically implicit case for what can only be called an ideological order within a culture. The site of institutionalized ritual and ritualization, then, provides an essential place where societies and social groups in effect articulate the ideological. To figure out how a ritual is performatively efficacious, then, in its tropic modalities, is frequently the key to being able to articulate an ideology seemingly effective in social practice. Further, as we see in the accompanying papers, such sites are the foci of metadiscursively-evidenced ideological formations about social life more generally, being powerful institutional forms in two senses, both in their ordaining/(re)vitalizing effectiveness with respect to the "denotational" codes they regiment nomically, and as genred eventive images that are close to ideological consciousness when rationality contemplates itself.⁸

⁸ I have elaborated some of the themes about the power of ritual and ritualization in Silverstein 1992:passim, and in an as yet unpublished piece, "Metaforces of power in traditional oratory," ms. 1981. See also now the important piece on "poetics and performance" by Bauman & Briggs (1990),

But the cases reported in the accompanying show the sitedness of ideology in this way very clearly, with no further comment necessary.

The utility of the ideology concept

Finally, I wish to make an observation on the very fact of existence of the accompanying papers, namely, that they all use an analytic concept of ideology in approaching their cultural data, which itself should be a sign. Perhaps merely - and unfortunately, if so - a postmodernist sign of why "culture" is becoming 'the C-word' (though its adjectival usage, in cultural, ought to be fairly neutral [cf. fn. 1]). But perhaps also because as linguistic anthropologists dealing with the semiotic complexities of language-use-in-context (thus being expansive in scholarly charge), we are faced first-off with indexical facts, facts of observed/experienced social practices, the systematicity of which is our central problem: *are* they systematic? if so, *how*? with respect to *which* institutional forms? (re)aligning *whose* values in the semiotically seamless dialectic of mind-in-history?

The total cultural fact - and I include here primordially the total linguistic fact - consists of answers to all these questions, organized in terms of a claim of how certain local practices/local knowledge is 'cultural'. As Le Maître Saussure himself observed, theoretical concepts are only of real power when they dictate their own methodology. Ideology of linguistic and cultural phenomena is such a concept, I think, epistemologically useful in making the phenomenal "realities" of both participants and observers (these are roles, not individuals, of course!) experience-near and tractable.

The splendid papers accompanying on which I have been asked to comment abundantly and richly make this clear.

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