AN INDECENT CALL FROM A MAN: NARRATIVE AS REVELATION OF FRAMEWORK

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The self neither preexists all conversation, as in the old monological view; nor does it arise from an introjection of the interlocutor; but it arises within conversation, because this kind of dialogical action by its very nature marks a place for the new locutor who is being inducted into it.

Charles Taylor, "The dialogical self"

0. Introduction

"[S]peaking a language is engaging in a rule-governed form of behavior. To put it more briskly, talking is performing acts according to rules." (Searle 1969: 22) Speech Act theory has demonstrated that people perform such varied actions as ordering, requesting, apologizing, and promising by uttering sentences (e.g. *Come here!*, *Can you pass me the salt?*, *I apologize*, etc.) (Searle 1969, 1979). Recognition of such varied actions is made possible through consideration of 'rules' involved in these actions. However, what one does with words is not necessarily restricted to the activities that Searle identifies. What is overlooked in Speech Act theory can be clarified by consideration of such larger units of discourse as narratives.

The Labovian approach to narratives argues that narratives, the forms recapitulating the speaker's past experience, have their own structures: Abstract, orientation, complicating action, evaluation, and coda (Labov and Waletzky 1967; Labov 1972). Regarding the two functions of narratives, i.e. referential (to the outside world) and social/expressive, Schiffrin (1994b) argues that "telling a story is a form through which we display our identity". What is unique in her discussion is that this approach enables one to analyze narratives not only at the structure level (as Labovian analysis), but also at the level at which the narrator's self is defined "both by the individual and by the culture in which he or she participates" (Bruner 1990: 116). Identity, in Schiffrin's discussion, concerns two kinds of selves associated with the narrator, agentive self and epistemic self, which contribute to the construct of the speaker's psychological self.¹

¹ The discussion on self has received attention from various fields including anthropology (e.g. Geertz 1973), philosophy, psychology (e.g. Mischel ed. 1977), psychotherapy (e.g. Schafer 1992; Spence 1982), and social psychology. Social psychologists such as Bruner (1986, 1990), Harré (1984,

While this line of argument is useful, the goal of this paper is consideration of how the narrators locate themselves in their surroundings. The key question is, therefore, how do narratives contribute to display speakers' orientations? The utility of this type of approach becomes clear when compared with other approaches. The type of approach taken by Conversation Analysis, for example, assumes social interaction to be structurally organized:

"all aspects of social action and interaction can be examined in terms of conventionalised or institutionalised structural organisations which analysably inform their production. ... These organisations are to be related as structures in their own right which ... stand independently of the psychological or other characteristics of particular participants."

(Heritage 1989: 22)

In such a view, the speaker's self is not given importance. CA analysts' focus has been on conversation as the manifestation of social order (Heritage 1984; Lee 1987; Sacks 1984).

On the other hand, as Schifffrin (1994b) points out, the Labovian approach to narratives, although considering them as transformation of the speaker's personal experience, misses the dynamic view of self. Sociolinguistics has been assuming that most members of a community have fixed identities represented by such labels as Asian, Japanese, male, graduate student, etc. and investigates the variations found within a group.² Such categorizations can be significant when studying traits of people from a macro-point of view, namely "what the speaker is," but they do not contribute to knowing "who the speaker is". What this paper will suggest is a micro-point of view focusing on a community member's self, "who the speaker is," by

1993), and Potter and Wetherell (1987) provide discussions on self with reference to discourse and narratives. In his overview of the development of the notion of self in Western culture, Johnson (1985) summarizes a view of self as an interpersonal or intersubjective unit that can be extracted from various theorists and disciplines:

"Since the self is intersubjective and is seen in the phenomenological contexts of actual encounters, its manifestations take the form of communication and are empirically present in the gestural, semantic, and contextual features of encounters occurring within or between one or more selves." (130)

In a recent study in linguistics, Senko K. Maynard (1993) discusses the importance of the interactional aspect of the self with reference to L.S. Vygotsky and Japanese philosopher, Tetsuro Watsuji. Watsuji defines the Japanese word *ningen* 'human beings' in terms of both *hito* 'person' and *yo no naka* 'world', and clearly distinguishes it from such other words as *anthropos*, *homo*, *man*, *Mensch*, etc. (Watsuji 1934/1963). He "emphasizes that 'self' cannot be defined without sufficiently considering the social relationship between the self and others, which in fact are definable only in their 'betweenness'" (Maynard 1993: 10). A similar view of Watsuji's 'betweenness' can be found in Arendt (1958).

² It is significant here, especially in the case of Japanese identity, that Japanese themselves promote such a view, leading eventually to the assumption that the "Japanese (language, people, society) are very unique" (see for example, Maynard 1993 for criticism). Clancy (1986) argues from a macro point of view that culture-specific patterns of communication reflect fundamental cultural beliefs. In this sense, to ask where the speaker's orientation is provides another viewpoint for sociolinguistics and sociology of language.

investigating how he or she locates self in a society by means of narratives.

In order to approach narratives as revelations of a speaker's orientation, the work of philosopher Charles Taylor (1985, 1989, 1991) will serve as a conceptual background of the study. He considers such notions as self, identity, and morality, and is essentially interested in one's self and the interactional situation. He argues that in order for one to have an identity, it is necessary to recognize what kind of "framework" s/he relies on to make moral judgment:

"... when we try to spell out what it is that we presuppose when we judge that a certain form of life is truly worthwhile, or place our dignity in a certain achievement or status, or define our moral obligations in a certain manner, we find ourselves articulating *inter alia* what I have been calling here 'frameworks'." (1989: 26)

Each of us uses a framework to know where to be oriented "in moral space, a space in which questions arise about what is good or bad, what is worth doing and what not, what has meaning and importance" (Taylor 1989: 28). For example, those who make a moral or spiritual commitment to something may want to identify themselves as, say, anarchists Catholics, Japanese, anarchists, etc.. Taylor points out that they are not simply attached to a certain spiritual view or background. As a source of moral judgment, he says, it is impossible for us to live without frameworks. In this view, the Cartesian pure rational agent that is free of frameworks is rejected.

However, one's self is not captured as a fixed one (cf. Schiffrin 1994b). Taylor views the self as dynamic³; here the existence of the other interlocutor comes into the picture:

"I am a self only in relation to certain interlocutors: In one way in relation to those conversation partners who were essential to my achieving self-definition; in another in relation to those who are now crucial to my continuing grasp of language of self-understanding - and, of course, these classes may overlap. A self exists only within what I call 'webs of interlocation'." (1989: 36)

The self, unlike inanimate objects which exist statically in the world, lives in relation to its surroundings. Surroundings should be construed to range from the location in which self is embedded to the interaction which it has with other selves.⁴ It is

³ Anthony P. Kerby (1991) also discusses the speaker's self with regard to narratives. He argues against the position that the self is a given entity (i.e. Cartesian agent) with priority over everything else and functioning as an automation:

"On a narrative account, the self is to be construed not as a prelinguistic given that merely employs language, much as we might employ a tool, but rather as a product of language... The self, or subject, then becomes a result of discursive praxis rather than either a substantial entity having ontological priority over praxis or a self with epistemological priority, an originator of meaning" (1991: 4)

⁴ I would like to thank one of the *Pragmatics* judges for calling my attention to the relationship between Goffman's Frame Analysis (1974) and Taylor's ideas. These two scholars do not mention each other in their own works, but Goffman's notion of "frame" can be the basis where the speaker's self is revealed. In other words, to keep applying adjustments for frame could be the source of

inappropriate, if not impossible, to study the self as one studies objects in natural scientific studies. The self must be captured in terms of *jissenteki kooiteki renkan*, the 'practical relationship based on actions' (Watsuji 1934/1963).

Such a dynamically-captured self still lacks its temporality. Taylor further suggests that in order to have a sense of who we are, "we have to have a notion of how we have become, and of where we are going" (47). Narratives as transformation of the speaker's past experience serve to locate the self in the speaker's life time span. They structure the speaker's present, and they become the indicators of future directions:

"But narrative must play a bigger role than merely structuring my present. What I am has to be understood as what I have become. This is normally so even for such everyday matters as knowing where I am. I usually know this partly through my sense of how I have come there. But it is inescapably so for the issue of where I am in moral space. I can't know in a flash that I have attained perfection, or am halfway there."

(Taylor 1989: 47-48)

This brief summary of how self is captured in Taylor's moral philosophy has three parts. First, one has his/her own moral framework(s), the lack of which can lead to an identity crisis. Second, because we are human beings interacting with people around us, to describe one's self requires attention to the relationship one's self has with others. Third, one's self should be captured in terms of not only its location in moral space but also of time span. This enables one to speak about the self within historical perspective.

However, Taylor's arguments remain abstract. This paper attempts to apply his ideas to narrative analysis. Narratives as the manifestation of the speaker's framework and as the location of the speaker's present will be discussed utilizing a Japanese narrative in which the female agent (= the narrator) receives a so-called indecent phone call from a stranger. The analysis proceeds from how the speaker's self as an agent is portrayed in the narrative (Bruner 1990; Kerby 1991; Taylor 1985) (section 1) to how the narrator makes the point of the story (section 2). It will be seen that the narrator uses a certain framework in which her self is located; how such an event is evaluated with reference to that framework will also become evident. This narrative point leads to another - the narrator's framework differs from that of other women, who, in her ambience, are easily seduced (section 3). It can be concluded that the narrator's self is basically a "dialogical self" (Taylor 1991). Definition of such self requires dialogical interaction with other people. At the same time, one's background of the self is known from the maintenance of framework between the story world (i.e. past) and the time of the interaction (i.e. present).

1. Emergence of the narrator's self

In order to learn how our narrator identifies herself through narrative, two points

emergence of different dialogical selves. For instance, the stranger's way of answering her questions were the "keys" for her reorganize what was going on between them. To change one's "footing" (another Goffman's notion, cf. Goffman (1981)) is related to the readjustment to different frames.

will be considered: Construction of the figure of the caller, and how the narrator portrays herself in the narrative. These are actually interrelated; it will be seen that the narrator's self is shaped through the interaction with the caller. The significance of these two points is also discussed in section 2 in connection with the point of the story.

1.1. Constructing the antagonist's figure

The participants in the conversation, K (Japanese male) and S (Japanese female), have been talking about S's boyfriend. The excerpt begins with K's evaluation of the boyfriend *shinshi da ne* 'He is a gentleman' (1). S agrees by using the same evaluative word *shinshi* 'gentleman'.

- K: (1) *shinshi da ne.*
 S: (2) *shinshi yo.*
 K: (3) *ii hito ja*
 S: (4) Σ *honde sa, sono shinshi to wakarete kimochiyoku*
 nattotta no.
 (5) *n de ne, tsun tsun tsun tte hoteru no heya kaetta no.*
 (6) *soshitara sa, shinshi janai yatsu kara denwa ga atta no yo. ..*

English gloss:

- K: (1) He [her boyfriend] is a gentleman.
 S: (2) He is.
 K: (3) Good person ...
 S: (4) And I was happy after I said good-night to him.
 (5) And I went back to my hotel room.
 (6) Then I got an indecent phone call from a man. (lit. "I got a call from a non-gentleman-like guy.")

S's narration begins with an abstract (what happened to her, i.e. she received a call from a stranger) contrasting her boyfriend (= gentleman) with a stranger who had called her, *shinshi janai yatsu* 'a non-gentleman-like guy'. Her characterization of the caller contributes to locating her moral orientation, namely which kinds of men's attitudes she judges good and bad. This particular narrative in the conversation between S and K should be understood in terms of the preceding linguistic context, namely, the narratives on S's boyfriend, which will be discussed further in section 2.

The content of the indecent call is vividly captured through S's "constructed dialogue" (Tannen 1989) between herself and the stranger. It is important to see how this man is portrayed by her in her narrative. It enables us to recognize (i) what kind of moral framework she has (i.e. those things which she judges bad, undesirable, weird, etc.), and (ii) how she presents her agentive self in the story (Schiffrin 1994b), who decides what to do, what to say and what to think in such a situation.

- S: (16) "hai" tte,

- (17) "S-san desu ka?"
 (18) "ee soo desu kedo"
 (19) "anoo ima nani shiterassharu n desu ka?" tte yuu wake yo.
 K: (20) ee? nanoranai de?
 S: (21) un.
 K: (22) @ nani sore?

English gloss:

- S: (16) I said, "Yes."
 (17) "Is this Miss S?"
 (18) "Yes, speaking."
 (19) And he said, "What are you doing now?"
 K: (20) What? Without identifying himself?
 S: (21) Yes.
 K: (22) What's that?

After she answers the summoning call (16), the man asks an information question, whether this is the person with whom he wants to speak (17). So far, it can be said that the conversation has followed an ordinary script (ringing (=summon)-answer, Q-A).

K's amazement (20) indicates that something is wrong with the stranger's question *ima nani shiterassharu n desu ka* 'What are you doing?' (19). If the analysis proceeds strictly as structural organization of talk, which is the chief concern of CA, why K interrupts the narration to comment on what is (believed to be) said by the man is difficult to explain. As far as the structure of conversation between S and the man is concerned, no marked utterance is observable. Both participants obey Q-A format. The markedness of the man's question stems from the fact that normally a caller self-identifies after (18), or even before. And although he is using the respectful form of the verb *suru* 'to do,' i.e. *shiteirassharu* to refer to S's action, the question content counters this politeness. Such a personal question from an unknown person communicates something wrong with this interaction (see below). K's point is, therefore, why the stranger asks her such a thing. His concern is for the content of this particular information request; it is not an answerable question (Lakoff 1973). Because this particular question is embedded in a constructed dialogue and presented as the utterance of the man, it contributes to construction of the image of the man in this narrative.

It is useful to consider here the pragmatic/discourse function of questions before proceeding to observe other parts of the constructed dialogue which constitute the narrative itself. Athanasiadou (1991) in her discussing the discourse functions of questions, and says that not all information questions are "free questions" (Lakoff 1973); whether or not the question is answerable depends on its contents and the relationship between questioner and subject. Commonly observed questions in conversations, i.e. information questions, are deeply related to the status of the questioner and the subject. It is particularly important in discourse to consider questions with regard to the questioner's intention and what motivates him/her to ask such a question. Concerning the relationship between the questioner and the subject, Athanasiadou points out that "people ask information questions most readily of those in a similar status. Information questions carry the least power

when they are addressed to status equals" (1991: 118). S has not been provided with appropriate and sufficient information by the caller to respond to a personal question because he has not revealed his identity.⁵

In passing, with regard to the interaction between K and S, it is worth mentioning K's involvement in the narrative. K's comment (20) on the man's information question shows that he is involved and cooperating in creating the figure of the caller as the type of person who asks a personal question without identifying himself.

Against the man's information question, S asks a clarification question (23). However, she soon recognizes that they are not on the same ground. So she changes her mind and asks an information question to learn who he is rather than answer his question. It is notable that the caller provides information about his location when she checked in at the front desk, but without providing his name:

- S: (23) "a, ima desu ka? dochira desu ka? dochira-sama desu ka?" tte yuttara ne,
 (24) "ano, boku ne, chekkuin no toki ni anata no ushiro ni ita n desu" tte yuu wake yo.
 (25) dakara chekkuin no toki kagi toru janai,
 (26) de heya no bangoo yuu desho? 2222 ne?
 (27) "/???/ shita n desu" tte yuu wake yo.
 (28) honde "he: soo desu ka," tte yutta no.

English gloss:

⁵ Searle's Speech Act Theory (SAT), as quoted in the beginning of this paper, is a knowledge-based approach to language use. Its application to a real utterance, for example (19), misses the point of why the caller is considered rude at the outset of the interaction. One's utterance is counted as a question when the following conditions are fulfilled appropriately:

Propositional content:	Any proposition or propositional function
Preparatory:	(a) S does not know "the answer," i.e. does not know if the proposition is true, or, in the case of the propositional function, does not know the information needed to complete the proposition truly (b) It is not obvious to both S and H that H will provide the information at that time without being asked
Sincerity:	S wants this information
Essential:	Counts as an attempt to elicit this information from H

The caller's (constructed) utterance, *anoo ima nani shiterassharu n desu ka?* "What are you doing now?" is construed as a gap-type question, which lacks certain information to complete the proposition, say, *S wa ima ___ o shiteiru* "S is doing ___ now." The caller does not know what S is doing, and without being asked, it is unlikely that S will provide such information. Following SAT, we can identify the man's utterance as a question. However, SAT's analysis does not go beyond this point. It does not account for why this particular utterance is construed rude because neither the context of the utterance (i.e. in the beginning of the interaction, without identifying himself) nor what kind of question it is (i.e. personal) is considered. If any, the caller's self revealed from such an utterance is a figure lacking certain information, and he tries to find the answer. We cannot be satisfied with this type of approach that conceals what we want to know, namely, who the man is.

- S: (23) "Well, now? To whom am I talking? Who is this?", I asked.
 (24) "I was behind you when you checked in", he said.
 (25) You receive a key at the desk.
 (26) And you say your room number, right? 2222.
 (27) "I did [unintelligible part], he said.
 (28) And "Oh, really.", I said.

In Goffman's terms (1974), S is an animator, author and principal who produces, creates, and is responsible for portraying the figure (the man). The figure of the caller is presented in this dialogue as the type of person who wishes to maintain his anonymity. Provision of the location at the time S checked in is not a normal way of identifying oneself. One might argue that he tries to provide a visual image of what he looks like to remind her of a person behind her. Nonetheless, people normally provide their name when asked to identify themselves and frequently do so even earlier. Intruding into her territory, this man demands that she answer his question, without identifying himself first.⁶

Notice that the caller accomplishes two things by uttering (24). He fulfills the participant role in an interaction by providing S with required information, which contributes to the maintenance of Q-A structure. And he creates a power relationship by maintaining his secure anonymity - he knows her name, appearance, location, and phone number, but she does not know him (no information whatsoever has been provided by him). He is a manipulator with power over her, and he exploits his anonymity. On the other hand, facing such a manipulator, the narrator seems to be attempting to structure a detached role in the story. Her answer *hee soo desu ka* 'Oh, really' in a disinterested tone suggests that she is not totally surprised by his way of revealing his identity, and she tries to distance herself from interaction with the man. Although S's self does not know who he is, his assumptive manner culminating in the imposition of power makes her decide how to cope with him.

So far, the man has been portrayed as an intruder, violator of telephone etiquette, and imposer of power. On recognizing him as such, she enters into an observer mode; she shows no interest and changes her attitude in order to investigate what he has on his mind. Wearing the mask of indifference, the narrator's self forces him to clarify his motives in calling her.

- S: (29) *de "sore de nan desu ka?" tte yuttara ne,*
 (30) *"iyaa ano desu ne, anoo tookyoo no kata desu ka?" tte yuu no yo.*
 (31) *"iie watashi amerika no kata desu" tte yutta no.*
 K: (32) *@@@*

English gloss:

- S: (29) "So, what do you want?", I said.
 (30) "Un... Are you from Tokyo?", he asked.

⁶ I would like to thank Robin Tolmach Lakoff for calling my attention to the point that the caller's utterance is virtually a threat (i.e. "I know where you are"), and it indicates his greater power (i.e. "I know more about you than you do about me.").

- (31) "No, I'm from the United States", I replied.
 K: (32) [laughing]

This part is one of the climaxes within the account: She demands the man answer her question as to what he has in mind. The hearer's (K) focus is now on whether the man tells her why he has called. Such direct questioning of the other interlocutor's intention, especially when a man attempts to impose his power on the interaction, challenges him. Thus far, the narrator has portrayed herself as a passive victim exposed to a caller's indecent question. (29) is a counterattack against him. His perplexity is well captured in the constructed dialogue in which he supposedly said *iyaa ano desu* ne 'well' (30), a formulaic phrase used when a speaker brings a difficult subject into a conversation. Instead of answering her question, he responds again with a question. Such a question can be construed in this interaction as (i) avoiding an undesirable (unsuccessful) situation which might be caused by revealing his real intention, while (ii) maintaining the conversation by manipulating S into Q-A interaction. Another aspect of the stranger's character is revealed as he avoids her question, and does not articulate his ulterior motive.

It is interesting to observe how she deals with such a situation. The portrayed self is not afraid of the man. The agent self (Schiffrin 1994b), which is in observer mode, has strength to deal with this unknown man by distancing herself from the current interaction. Her strength is apparent in her reply to the question regarding where she is from (31), which evolves into a humorous interaction.⁷ It is amusing for two reasons. She literally came from the United States to visit her family at the time of the interaction, so that she was telling the truth. *X no kata* (*no* 'possessive marker' and *kata* 'honorific form) person' literally means 'a person of X' (i.e. a person from X), and *kata* 'person (honorific)' supposedly does not appear in an answer to this type of question. The use of *kata* to refer to the speaker herself violates the rules of Japanese honorification, resulting in elevating the speaker's self. She ridicules the man, whose false politeness (his use of *kata* 'person (polite)') loses its effect, and his hidden intention.

S's constructed dialogue reveals another aspect of the man as he confesses that he is drunk:

- S: (33) ne, mendokusai kara ne.
 (34) "amerika no kata desu" tte yutta no.
 (35) soshitara ne, "amerika niwa oshigoto de" toka yuu kara ne,
 (36) "ee soo desu kedo: ano: dochira no kata desu ka?" tte kiitara ne,
 (37) "anoo boku wa: xyz [=prefecture name] desu yo"

⁷ Deborah Schiffrin pointed out to me that it seems that S keeps attending to the caller's agenda on a referential, informational level, thus saving face for him. For example, in line (31), she answers the question rather than repeating her question in (29). When I later asked why she simply did not hang up, she responded that she thought that the man might just want to report something which she had lost. Even if this were the case, it might be reasonable to expect business-like talk to elicit necessary information from the caller. The extent to which interlocutors in various societies engage in face saving in behalf of themselves and others (assuming that her engagement in referential level interaction is related to such politeness strategy), is however, beyond the scope of this paper.

- (38) "aa ja kyoo wa shucchoo ka nanka de" tte hantai ni kiita no.
 (39) "iya ano ne chotto yopparacchatte mendookusaku natta mon de
 kocchi tomatteru n desu" tte yuu wake yo.
 (40) "he:"

English gloss:

- S: (33) You know, it's too much trouble [to explain why she is in the U.S.].
 (34) "I'm from the United States", I said.
 (35) Then, he said, "Do you live in the United States for a job?"
 (36) "Yes, but how about you? Where are you from?", I asked.
 (37) "I'm from xyz prefecture", he said.
 (38) "Then, are you here [in Tokyo] for a business trip?", I asked.
 (39) "I'm a little drunk. I'm so lazy that I decided to stay here", he said.
 (40) "Really."

Until (35), the role of interviewee has been imposed on her: The man has asked four questions ((17), (19), (30), and (35)) but refused to provide appropriate answers for S's questions ((23) and (29)).⁸ After these unproductive Q-A interactions, she plays the active role of inquirer who unmasks him. Because he is from xyz prefecture requiring three hours by train, he must have a reason for staying in the hotel. He (un)intentionally tells her that he is drunk! (39) would serve as a hint to be developed later in the story.

It has been observed that the constructed dialogue plays an important role in depicting the narrator's self and the antagonist, the stranger. His behavior - intruding into her territory, asking various questions, violating telephone etiquette, insisting on maintaining his anonymity, and refusing to reveal his intentions - all contribute to establishing the kind of person he is.⁹ Also observed was how the narrator's self was shaped through interaction with the caller and enabled to change from the role of passive subject to active inquirer.

But the encounter continues. After (40), K is interested in which hotel she stayed, and S and K chat about the hotel for a while ((41)-(75) see Appendix). The next section will discuss the latter part of the incident in which the stranger reveals

⁸ Asymmetrical interaction is typically observed in what Robin T. Lakoff calls therapeutic discourse (TD) (Lakoff 1989, 1990). It is common in our data and TD for (i) the person with power to control such local initiatives as questions, orders, and proposals, and (ii) the motivation of the questioner (doctor/the caller) is not provided, and (iii) topic changes are not marked as such (cf. ten Have 1991).

⁹ At least, concerning the latter two characteristics of the man, namely, maintaining his anonymity and refusing to reveal his intention, Gricean maxim violations are observable. For the constructed utterance (24), the only way to construe his answer as relevant to the question is to assume that he is cooperative. If he were genuinely cooperative, and he appears so at least at the surface level analysis of the Q-A format (i.e. he does not ignore the question, but supplies something of a response to the inquiry), his desire for maintenance of his anonymity is very likely motivation for not providing his name. On the other hand, in the case of (30), when he is asked what he wants, he does not answer the question, but poses another question to S. Thus, (30) violates the maxim of relevance and it seems that what motivates and is eventually implicated is that he does not want to talk about his real purpose in calling her.

his actual intention.

1.2. *Construction of the narrator's self*

As the hearer of S's narrative, K interrupts the story but also initiates reentrance into the narrative world. Upon receiving K's invitation, S summarizes the previously established points that the caller was behind her in line (anonymity) and that he was staying at the hotel because he was drunk (irresponsible state):

- K: (76) a soide soide?
 (77) sono otoko ga nan da tte?
 S: (78) de ne, "ushiro ni ita n desu" tte yuu wake.
 (79) n de "kyoo wa mendokusakatta mon de, koko ni tomatteru n desu" tte yuu wake yo.
 (80) de "he:" toka tte yuttara,

English gloss:

- K: (76) And?
 (77) What did this guy say?
 S: (78) So, "I was behind you", he said.
 (79) "I'm so lazy that I decided to stay here", he said.
 (80) "Really", I said.

After this short reintroduction to the story, the narration moves on to another scene. The man, as a next step, tries to ask her out.

- S: (81) "ano: isshyo ni sake demo nomimasen ka?" tte yutta wake.
 (82) de "osake? doko de nomu n desu ka?" tte yutta no.
 (83) "ano ima nani shiteru n desu ka?"¹⁰
 (84) "terebi miteru n desu kedo" tte yuttara,
 (85) anoo raunji ka nanka dattara ne, betsuni zenzen kankei nai janai.
 (86) betsuni ne, neru mae no jikan ne,
 (87) ni-sanbai aotte "soreja" tte kaereru kara, ne?
 (88) "raunji de, raunji nanka areba,
 (89) sore wa raunji de oai shite nondemo betsuni neru mae ni ne,
 (90) kankei nai desu yo ne:" tte yuttara ne,

English gloss:

- S: (81) "Are you interested in having a drink with me?", he asked.
 (82) "Liquor? Where are you planning to drink at?", I said.

¹⁰ Note that virtually the same request for information about what S is doing has already been made in (19), whose inappropriateness is considered in section 1. In the case of (19), it was not obvious what motivated him to ask such a question; however, utterance (83 = pre-invitation) is accompanied by (81 = invitation) which provides a context for why he asks what S is doing. Note the order of the preinvitation and the invitation is reversed in this interaction.

- (83) "What are you doing now?" (he said)
 (84) "I'm watching T.V.", I said.
 (85) I think it is okay if it is a lounge or some other similar place.
 (86) Before I go to bed,
 (87) I can drink a couple of shots and come back saying "Good-night".
 (88) "If there is a place like a lounge,
 (89) I can meet you at a lounge, before I go to bed;
 (90) it is not a problem for me", I said.

He suggests drinking together. Note that it is S's agentive self who first tries to specify the place at which to drink. Her cautious and sober mind contrasts with that of the devious and drunk man. Stepping out of the story world, she confirms that her self was playing an aloof/observer role in the narrative world. She comments that she does not care to drink with the man ((85)-(87)), which in turn reveals an aspect of her moral self, namely, the type of activity in which she can and will engage. However, this should not be construed that she is obedient, but that rather, she could at this point read his mind. She chooses a lounge as a neutral and safe place (85). She suggests that drinking in a public lounge, even with this man who has imposed his power and guards his anonymity, would not lead to a deeper relationship.

Negotiations between S and the man begin. Contrary to S's suggestion of a lounge as a meeting place, he argues against a lounge, countering that he does not know whether the hotel has one!

- S: (91) "raunji aru ka doo ka wakarimasen yo" tte yuu wake yo.
 (92) raunji aru no yo. aru. atashi shitteru no.
 (93) "a soo desu ka. ja doko de nomu n desu ka?" tte yuttara ne,
 (94) "ano heya de ikaga deshoo ka" Z_{na::} Z_{tte yuu kara ne,}
 K: (95)
 S: (96)
 (97) "a heya wa chotto" tte yutta no yo.
 (98) "raunji ka nanka de onomininaru tte yuu n deshitaru,
 (99) maa ichijikan gurai otsukiai shimasu kedo?" tte yutta no.

English gloss:

- S: (91) "I'm not sure whether or not this hotel has a lounge", he said.
 (92) There is a lounge. I know that.
 (93) "I see. Then, where do you prefer?", I said.
 (94) "How about my room?" Z_{No!} Z_{he said.}
 K: (95)
 S: (96)
 (97) "I don't think it's a good idea", I said.
 (98) "If you are planning to drink at a lounge,
 (99) I can drink with you for an hour or so", I said.

S knows (and knew in the story world) that his reasoning is false simply because she is aware that there *is* a lounge in the hotel. In any event, the proposal that she meet and drink with him in a private room is excessive. Note that S's portrayal of this

man has progressed from mere intruder to manipulative power imposer, which now allows the hearer to label him a disreputable person.

The constructed utterance, *heya de ikaga deshoo ka?* '(lit.) How about a room' (94) is not ambiguous because it indicates his room. A lounge can be considered a neutral place, in that it does not pertain to either of the participants. It is a public space, and there may be other customers present. On the other hand, drinking in either his room or hers would significantly affect the relationship between them. Going to a man's room can indicate a woman's willingness to enter his territory on his terms. The eyes of the public may restrict people's behavior in a locale such as a lounge. His entering her room, on the other hand, implies that she welcomes the man; she is the occupant of the room and responsible for what happens in it. It is also still commonly assumed in many locations that women are invited, and ladies do not invite (These are variations on the double standard). Ultimately, his refusal to meet at a lounge clearly communicates that he wants to be alone with her in a private space.

S declares that she would not think of drinking with him in his room. Both know what it means for a woman to come to a man's room especially at night. The man imposes his power over her further when he demands to know why she refuses to come to his room (102), and she responds with alacrity:

- S: (100) *soshitara "iya: raunji wa wakaranai kara heya wa doo deshoo ka" tte kiku wake yo.*
 (101) *de "heya, heya desu ka? heya wa chotto komarimasu ne:" tte yuttara*
 (102) *"dooshite desu ka?" tte yuu kara*
 (103) *"dooshite tte ne:, chotto maa raunji no hoo ga ii desu yo" tte yuttara*
 (104) *soshitara ammari nando mo yuttemo sa,*
 (105) *"ano raunji nara otsukiai shimasu kedo moo sore de nakereba otsukiai itashimasen" tte yuttara sa,*
 (106) *"aa soo desu ka, ja raunji ga aru ka doo ka shirabetemimasu.*
 (107) *ato de kakenaoshimasu" tte gachan tte kitta no.*

English gloss:

- S: (100) Then, he said, "I don't know about a lounge. Why not my room?"
 (101) "I don't like that idea", I said.
 (102) "Why?", he asked.
 (103) "Why? I prefer a lounge", I said.
 (104) I didn't want to repeat my words, so
 (105) "Lounge is okay, but otherwise, I cannot drink with you", I said.
 (106) "I see. I'll check whether there is a lounge in this hotel or not.
 (107) I'll call you later", and he hung up.

The man appears to assume that S must come to his room unless she provides an acceptable reason for not doing so. S could say that she knows that there is a lounge in the hotel. However, if she says so, it would be interpreted as an insult to him. Or, she could say that she knows what he has on his mind - asking a woman to his room for a drink at night. Because in this constructed dialogue he implies, but does not explicitly say, something sexual, he might have denied such an accusation, making her the guilty party because she assumed!

Such an exchange - S's insistence on a lounge, and his demanding a reason for rejecting his room - is unlikely to terminate as long as they are engaged in this adult game. S is the one who concludes it with her explicit statement that she cannot be his companion because he insists on his hotel room as the place for them to meet and drink (105). The story ends here, implying that he did not call her again as he said he would. He was not interested in merely drinking with her; what he had on his mind was, of course, something sexual.

How constructed dialogue contributes to portrayal of the figures of S's self and the man has been observed. The summary line of the story *soshitara sa, shinshi janai yatsu kara denwa ga atta no yo...* 'I got an indecent call from a man' (6) forecasts the contents of the narrative. Construction of the figure of the caller has been provided through the narrator's reporting what he said in the telephone interaction. He is captured as one who disturbs her peace (4), one who asks a personal question without establishing equal status with S (19), one who manipulates the power structure by refusing to reveal his identity (24), an inebriate (39-40), dishonest person (91). The overwhelming evidence leads to the conclusion that he is not a gentleman (*shinshi janai*).

The narrator's self also emerges/is shaped through the interaction with the caller. In accordance with his increasingly anomalous behavior, S's self takes the shape of an autonomous observer/analyzer who attempts to distance herself from the interaction in which her self is engaged, and as an active agent who resists the man's attempts to cast the net of the power structure. She changes her footing (Goffman 1981) according to the way the man responds (i.e. keying) and to reframing of the situation (Goffman 1974); the initial encounter with a stranger, in which the participants might get involved in interaction, makes S change her footing not do so. Her control enables her self to reject him when attacked by his several questions. For example, she employs the formula he uses for an information question on where she is from (31). The active agent was brave enough to say no to him when he pressed her to come to his room.

2. Making a point of the narrative

Thus far, close examination of S's narrative has been provided. The aim in this paper is to view the narrator's portrayal of herself in it with regard to her own framework. The point of the story and the portrait of one's self, although interrelated, require different levels of analysis. That is, as the introduction of S's narrative (*soshitara sa, shinshi janai yatsu kara denwa ga atta no yo* 'Then I got an indecent call from a man' (6)) suggests, 'why this narrative at this point of conversation?' should be studied with reference to S and K's conversation; our goal of seeking the narrator's use of her own framework is not (at least initially) the main focus of the narrative.

In order to clarify the context of the story of this indecent call, how her boyfriend (T) and the caller will be contrasted. The relaxed atmosphere/tension created by these two men and how honest and demanding they are will be compared. How she evaluates the account of the indecent call, namely, the point of the narrative will then be clarified.

The caller's figure has been established through the constructed dialogue of

what he said to her. What is communicated is someone exploiting his anonymity to impose his masculine power dishonestly. These characteristics contrast with those of T, whom S met while traveling in Poland. The portrait of T and their second date precede the story of the indecent call. These consecutive descriptions of two men enable the hearer to estimate where the narrator's self is located, what she regards as good or bad. In contrast to the chilling atmosphere which ultimately influences S's self to assume an aloof attitude, S says that she feels relaxed when she is with T:

A.

- S: (a) maa demo raku rakuna hito da na towa omotta kedo ne.
 (b) kihonteki ni ne.
 (c) ichinichi koo poorando ni itemo jama ni naranakatta shi ne. ...
 (d) dakara seiritekini uketsukenai taipu janai.
 K: (e) aru ne, soo yuu no.
 S: (f) ne, sanjuppun ijoo issho ni irarenai /???/
 K: (g) @@

English gloss:

- S: (a) Somehow, I thought that he [T] is a very easy person to be with.
 (b) Basically [I thought so].
 (c) He was not annoying at all when I was with him in Poland the whole day.
 (d) So he is not a person whose chemistry does not match mine.
 K: (e) There are some cases.
 S: (f) There are those whose presence I cannot stand more than 30 minutes.
 K: (g) [laughing]

Although the phrase *rakuna hito* 'easy person (to get along with)' does not necessarily indicate that she is relaxed, clearly he is not the kind of person who creates an atmosphere which she can tolerate only briefly.

Her relaxed attitude with T also relates to their speaking her native Hiroshima dialect. The scene in which she is located relates to the formality of speech (Brown and Fraser 1979). After their first meeting since the encounter in Poland, she asks him what it was about her that attracted him.

B.

- S: (a) "doko ga yokatta n desu ka" tte kiitara ne,
 K: (b) a, kiita no? @
 S: (c) un. "atashi burikko shitenakatta desu yo ne" tte yuttara ne,
 (d) "shitenakatta jaro?" toka tte yutte, hiroshima-ben de.
 (e) "shitenakatta yo ne?" tokatte yutte kiitara sa;
 (f) "iya moo burikko suru taipu janai kara ne,
 (g) zenzen burikko nante ima mo shitenai desho?" toka tte yutte.

English gloss:

- S: (a) "Why did you like me?" I asked.

- K: (b) Did you?
 S: (c) Yes. "I was not pretending to be a cute girl, right?" I asked.
 (d) "I wasn't, was I", I said in Hiroshima-dialect,
 (e) "I wasn't, was I", I asked.
 (f) "No, you are not that kind of person."
 (g) "You are not pretending to be cute, are you?", he said.

T is a Tokyo native who speaks standard Japanese. It is well-known that people try to suppress their rural speech patterns in formal/unfamiliar situations. Note that this is S's second encounter with T, and they do not know each other well. This code switching from standard Japanese to Hiroshima-dialect functions as a contextualization cue (Gumperz 1982), which indicates her change of footing (Goffman 1981) from formal to familiar and how she frames the situation - whether or not this social interaction is conducted in a tense or relaxed atmosphere.

The man depicted in the indecent call account intruded into her territory and assumptively asked personal questions. This contrasts with T, who carried her baggage to the hotel for her, and did not impose or attempt to intrude into her territory:

- C.
 S: (a) de moo yuugata natta kara, hoteru ni mata okuttekitekurete.
 K: (b) @ ima hoteru tte yutta kara, "ee?" @
 S: (c) hoteru no hen made, iya, ano hito sugoi shinshi yo.
 K: (d) un.
 S: (e) sonde ne, hoteru made nimotsu mottekitekureta kedo
 (f) heya made tsuitekoyoo nante zettai shinai.
 (g) "boku wa koko de mattemasu kara doozo".

English gloss:

- S: (a) And it was getting dark, and he came to see me off to my hotel.
 K: (b) I was surprised because you mentioned a hotel. [laughing]
 S: (c) To my hotel. No, he is a gentleman.
 K: (d) I see.
 S: (e) So, he carried my baggage for me.
 (f) But he never tried to come to my room.
 (g) "I'll be waiting for you here." [he said]

Note that there appears an evaluation clause when K tries to tease her *ima hoteru tte yutta kara*, "ee?" 'I was surprised because you mentioned a hotel', she says *ano hito sugoi shinshi yo* 'He is a gentleman' (c). T is considerate and understands that his coming to her hotel room could be an intrusion into her private territory.

It was noted that the caller revealed nothing about himself (hidden intention). When he asks her out for a drink, he tries to mislead her when he claims not to know whether there is a lounge in the hotel. He seems to convince her that there is no acceptable neutral place and that if she wants to drink with him, she must come to his room. However, she knows that there is a lounge; the man is captured as dishonest. Meanwhile, the excerpt below suggests that S evaluates T as an articulate and sincere person.

D.

- S: (a) demo ne:, tabun .. demo ano hito iitai koto iu n da yo ne.
 (b) honto ni, iitai koto iu tte yuu ka sa,
 (c) chanto shoojiki ni /???/
 (d) betsuni kimochiwaruku wa nakatta yo.

English gloss:

- S: (a) But, maybe, but he says what he wants to say.
 (b) Really. Well, he says what he wants to say,
 (c) he honestly does [something].
 (d) I didn't feel that he is weird.

Articulateness and sincerity correlate in her perception with his gentlemanly manner. There is no observable deviousness in the constructed image of T. A summary comparison of the two men's constructed figures follows:

Chart 1.

T (S's boyfriend)	the caller
contributes to a relaxed atmosphere	creates tension
non-intrusive	intrusive
sincere	dishonest
a gentleman	a cad

The point of the narrative, an indecent call from a man, should be understood in its context, namely how T's figure is constructed. The preceding conversation between S and K deals with how well-mannered T is. In contrast, the caller's figure in the narrative comes across the opposite. The constructed image of T, therefore, enables the hearer to compare and judge which of these two men may be honorable and attractive.

Returning to the story, it is necessary to see the evaluation clauses (Labov 1972) to know what point S aims to make by this narrative. She evaluates what happened as *kimochiwarui* 'disgusting'; it is not captured as an interesting, amusing or exciting experience, but rather, it is disgusting:

- S: (108) demo ne, kimochiwarui to omowanai?
 (109) ushiro ni ita otoko ga heya no bangoo kiite,
 (110) ano dakara bangoo dake, onna no hito ga ne,
 (111) nantoka nantoka de tokatte iroiro messeji ga arimasuka toka tte kiku
 jan,
 (112) soshitara sa, /??/ de kagi watasu toki ni sa,
 (113) "suimasen, onamae onegai shimasu" /???/
 (114) "atashi S desu kedo" tte yuttara sore kiitoite sa,
 (115) sore mo sa, dakara heya kaette, ho tto suwatte sa, ne?
 (116) puchi tto tsukete, terebi puchi tto tsukete,
 (117) hoide suwatte midashita tokoro ni biribiririn datta no yo.
 K: (118) kowa:
 S: (119) kimochiwarui to omowanai?

K: (120) kimochi waru:: hee

English gloss:

- S: (108) Don't you think this is disgusting?
 (109) The guy behind me checked my room number;
 (110) when a woman checks-in,
 (111) she asks whether or not she has any messages.
 (112) And when they hand a key to me,
 (113) "May I have your name, please?", they ask.
 (114) "I'm Miss S" I said, and this guy heard what I said.
 (115) I was happy when I went back to my room.
 (116) I turned on the T.V.,
 (117) and began to watch the T.V. and I got this call.
 K: (118) Terrible.
 S: (119) Don't you think it's disgusting?
 K: (120) It is.

The repetition of a rhetorical question, *kimochiwarui to omowanai?* 'Don't you think it's disgusting?' ((108) and (119)) invites the hearer to evaluate the story in the same way as the narrator, which, in turn, shows that the hearer (K) shares the same moral framework as far as the evaluation of this story is concerned. She summarizes what causes her disgust ... the man's devious behavior (checking her name and room number) ((109)-(114)) which resulted in a call interrupting her feeling of contentment (115).

This very point reveals the speaker's framework to which she refers at the time of judgment: What is good and what is bad (i.e. intrusion, imposition, dishonesty, deviousness), which type of person makes a good impression (her boyfriend) and who does not (the caller), what brings her happiness and what effects tension, what factors evoke a certain state of mind (relaxed and being oneself, for example, not pretending cuteness (B), or aloofness as an observer and challenger). In short, by telling a story and making a point, the narrator reveals deeply held values which she assumes are sometimes shared with the hearer, and she reinforces her feeling of solidarity with him .

3. The lesson of the experience

Beyond making their points, narratives can serve to reveal a narrator's self through the way he or she portrays or constructs the image of self. This is an additional feature in Taylor's concept because the Labovian approach to narratives cannot extend the argument that the narrative in question has meaning or makes sense in a given context. Following Taylor's line of argument, self is relevant to where the narrator is located in moral space. Such a case is that of Ms. S as she constructs the caller's behavior with reference to her framework. The narrator's self changes shape depending on the kind of interaction in which she is engaged. Capturing or constructing her own self as such, then, her self establishes boundaries around it. Her self is carved out from the narrative world, and also shaped by K's responses, as a unique entity with distinguishable characteristics unobservable in others' selves.

Others' selves, too, are anchored in different frameworks which are not necessarily shared with that of the narrator.

The following exchange between S and K after the story of the indecent call shows that S acknowledges her perception that there are women whose frameworks differ from hers:

- S: (121) demo ne, atashi omou kedo ne,
 K: (122) nani sore
 S: (123) aa yuu koto yatte nottekuru onna ga iru kara da to omou.
 K: (124) inai yo.
 S: (125) iru yo, yononaka.
 (126) zettai ne, tamani ne, soo yatte nottekuru onna ga iru n da to omou yo.
 (127) sonna no ne, moo ne, hitoban ne,
 (128) moo otoko o tomo ni shite sayoonara no hanashi dakara ne,
 (129) kimochiwarui wa yo ne, byooki ni koso narisure.
 (130) demo ne, yononaka soo yuu onna ga iru kara,
 (131) ano "a koitsu mo hikkakaran kana: " nante omotte.
 (132) datte yopparatte kaeritaku nakattara tookyoo tomatte yaru wake desho?
 (133) maa kekkon ka nanka shitotte ne, yasuku uwaki shiyoo tte yuu.

English gloss:

- S: (121) But I think ...
 K: (122) I don't understand.
 S: (123) there are some women who are interested in that kind of person.
 K: (124) I don't think so.
 S: (125) There are.
 (126) There are some women who are easily tempted.
 (127) Such a thing, one night,
 (128) is a "Sleeping with a man and 'Good-bye'" -type story.
 (129) It's terribly awful. You know you may get a disease.
 (130) But because there are such women out there,
 (131) he thought "This girl may be tempted, too."
 (132) He does this if he is drunk and doesn't want to go home.
 (133) Maybe he is married and wants to have an affair with somebody.

S claims that there are some women who are interested in men like the caller (123). K disagrees. S constructs her argument by pointing out that the man's behavior itself suggests the existence of such women. She again uses a constructed dialogue in which she refers to what she imagines the caller was thinking about, *koitsu mo hikkakaran kana*: 'This girl may be tempted, too' (131). One reason that the man called her, according to her inference, is that he had had success with women by using the same strategy.

Note that with such an assumption, S gives life to the figure of the man, no longer a stranger whose orientation is unknown to the narrator, but also anchored in a certain moral world. He is now assigned a past and potential future. She logically assumes that he is a married man (133). As the center of experience of

action, one's self is captured as an entity whose present action is the function of the past experience (Laing 1967). His action is further assumed to be located in a specific framework. However, his moral framework is quite different from that of S, who differs from those women who can be victimized by such a man. Taking an observer's position and distancing her self somewhat from the caller in the telephone interaction, she ultimately draws a line between the man and her self. It is this line that differentiates the two frameworks.

The exchange between K and S ((121)-(133)) is another social interaction which should be distinguished from that of S and T, or of S and the caller. S's self in the present interaction is on the same line extending from her past to the future. Her narratives and the self depicted in them contribute to her social self at the time of the conversation with K. She does not say explicitly that she is different from those who are easily victimized, or, as she expresses it, tempted. The hearer is expected to understand her framework as revealed through the action, attitude, and stance of the self apparent in the narratives.

4. Conclusion

This paper has engaged in a study of how narratives, the reformulation of one's experience, contribute to the portrayal of the self and how the narrator's self emerges in the constructed dialogues. One's experience, Paul Ricoeur argues, cannot be the other interlocutor's experience. Still, "[t]he experience as experienced, as lived, remains private, but its sense, its meaning, becomes public" (1976: 16). Such private experience is exposed and projected in public space through narratives (Taylor 1985). One's self, portrayed in narratives, can be captured as a "dialogical self":

"Much of our understanding of self, society, and world is carried in practices that consist in dialogical action. I would like to argue, in fact, that language itself serves to set up spaces of common action, on a number of levels, intimate and public. This means that our identity is never simply defined in terms of our individual properties. It also places us in some social space. We define ourselves partly in terms of what we come to accept as our appropriate place within dialogical actions. In the case that I really identify myself with my deferential attitude toward wiser people like you, then this conversational stance becomes a constituent of my identity. This social reference figures even more clearly in the identity of the dedicated revolutionary." (Taylor 1991: 311)

Social interaction binds both the speaker and the hearer. There is binding in the sense that "the speaker shapes her discourse in response to the other, and in a similar fashion, the listener makes sense of another's discourse by taking a responsive and interactive stance toward the speaker/text" (Kent 1991: 286). On the other hand, social interaction is a negotiation of interpretation and values because each participant in an interaction has a personal experience and belongs to a different social group. This negotiation presupposes the interlocutor's background framework, to which each participant refers in order to make a moral judgment.

S's self was shaped through the interaction with the caller. Her self as an aloof observer not involved in the continuing interaction emerges through what the man says. It was his imposition, anonymity, and dishonesty which made her take

such a stance. On the other hand, the same narrator's self was portrayed as relaxed when interacting with her boyfriend. Her own framework differs from that of the caller and some women who might associate with such a man.

Constructed dialogue in narratives induces the hearer's involvement (recall K's involvement in the narrative world, e.g. (20)). It has been observed in this paper that such a narrative form serves not only this function, but also to display the narrator's self. Because self displayed in a narrative is not separate from the self in the current conversation from the past to the present, the narrator's self in the current conversation is also captured on the basis of the framework on which the self in the narrative world relies.

I have endeavored to demonstrate that a narrative is a place where the narrator's framework is revealed. It was pointed out in the introduction that the narrator's self, which utilizes certain frameworks, is not captured as a fixed entity, as Cartesian linguists presuppose. It may be the case that mainstream linguistics is suitable for a type of investigation which attempts to capture the linguistic knowledge stored in the mind. However, if Cartesian arguments are reliable, we are all rational beings with clear logical selves using various kinds of rules, we miss very important aspects of language use, and such a view is far from reality.

The underlying assumption taken in this paper has been that the Cartesian presumption/self of commensurability should be rejected. Rather, what is employed is close to hermeneutic arguments (e.g. Bernstein 1982; Geertz 1973; Packer and Addison 1989; Ricoeur 1976; Rorty 1979), which place importance on interpretation of texts. Although philosophers' arguments tend to be abstract and without real data, an attempt has been made here to demonstrate that Charles Taylor's claim that people use frameworks opens up a new way to approach discourse analysis. Such an interpretive approach should be studied further with literary criticism, philosophy, psychology, social psychology and other fields in its perspective and a better understanding of who we are as the outcome.

Transcription conventions

Capitalization is avoided except for personal names (therefore, the narrator is referred to in the script as S, but the capital of Japan is transcribed *tokyoo*, for example). Other conventions include:

- .. Two dots indicate a perceptible pause of less than 1/2 second
- /?/?/ Question marks in slashes indicate inaudible utterances
- " " Quotation marks indicate quoted speech
- :: lengthened syllable
- @ indicates laughter
- ? rising intonation
- , continuing intonation
- [overlapping
- Z** When speech from B follows speech from A without perceptible pause, then **Z** links the end of A with the beginning of B (Schiffrin 1994a: 432).

Appendix

The following is the portion of the conversation between S and K not considered in the text. Here they are talking about how S got a room in the hotel where she received the indecent call. Although analysis of how the listener (K) contributes to the flow of conversation is an interesting topic (e.g. his interjecting a question engages S in information exchange rather than the narrative world), it is outside the scope of this paper.

- K: (42) bijinesu hoteru datta no?
 S: (43) bijinesu janai. ano: purinsu.
 K: (44) e:?
 S: (45) shinagawa purinsu. yasui.
 K: (46) yasui? uso, shinagawa purinsu da yo?
 S: (47) takakunai no sorega.
 (48) ichiman ne, sen'en mo shinai no, ippaku.
 K: (49) uso.
 S: (50) honto.
 K: (51) [/??/?/
 S: (52) [/??/?/ honto honto.
 (53) atashi bikkuri shita n da mon.
 (54) shinagawa desho?
 (55) benri desho? hamamatsu-choo kara mo ne,
 K: (56) un un
 S: (57) benri desho?
 (58) dakedo ne, atashi mazu kuukoo de hoteru yoyaku shitenakatta kara,
 (59) dare no tokoro nimo tomaritakunakatta no ne.
 (60) ano yoru toka tomodachi nimo attari suru si.
 (61) de moo chotto ki: tukau kara, shawaa hitotsu abiru no mo.
 (62) soi dattara moo hoteru ni tomaroo tte tte
 (63) "suimasen, bijinesu hoteru ka nanaka benrina tokoro arimasen?" tte yuttara
 (64) doko doko ga niman /??/?/ de, doko doko ga ichiman gosen'en de toka iiyotta
 wake.
 (65) de kayaba-choo no hoteru deshitara hassen'en /??/?/
 (66) kayaba-choo huben janai.
 (67) nihonbashi no hoo ne. ne?
 (68) "a, shinagawa purinsu desu to ichiman .. nihyaku ikura" tte yutta no.
 (69) ippaku. [shinguru ne.
 K: (70) [a honto.
 S: (71) "e? shinagawa purinsu? ja soko onegai shimasu."
 (72) ippaku desho?
 (73) hetana bijinesu hoteru datte ichiman'en de aru janai.
 (74) de purinsu dakara ne.
 K: (75) hee omoshiroi.

English gloss:

- K: (42) Was that a business hotel?
 S: (43) No, it wasn't. It was the Prince.
 K: (44) Really?
 S: (45) Shinagawa Prince. It was cheap.
 K: (46) Cheap? You must be kidding.
 S: (47) It was not expensive.
 (48) Less than 11,000 yen a night per person.
 K: (49) No way!
 S: (50) Really.
 K: (51) [/??/?/
 S: (52) [/??/?/ I mean it.

- (53) I was also surprised.
 (54) It is Shinagawa, right?
 (55) It's very convenient, you know. It's close to Hamamatsu-choo.
 K: (56) Yes.
 S: (57) It's very convenient.
 (58) However, I hadn't made a reservation.
 (59) I didn't want to stay at my friend's house.
 (60) I sometimes meet friends at night.
 (61) I have to worry about things, for example, whether I can take a shower late at night or not.
 (62) So I decided to stay at a hotel.
 (63) I asked [at the counter at the airport], "Is there any convenient place like a business hotel or something?"
 (64) So the attendant said that this hotel is 20,000 yen, that hotel is 15,000 yen.
 (65) "If you want to have a room at a hotel in Kayaba-tyoo, it is 8,000 yen," he said.
 (66) Kayaba-choo is inconvenient, you know.
 (67) It is close to Nihonbashi.
 (68) And he said, "You can stay at Shinagawa Prince for about 10,200 yen a night per person."
 (69) A night's lodging. [A single room.
 K: (70) [Really.
 S: (71) "Oh, Shinagawa Prince? Would you make a reservation for me?" I said.
 (72) One night's lodging, right?
 (73) Even not so classy hotels ask 10,000 yen.
 (74) It was the Prince!
 K: (75) That's interesting.

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