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Volume 13
Language, Culture, and Identity – Signs of Life
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Language, Culture, and Identity – Signs of Life

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Foreword

Chris Sinha

The publication of this volume in the series *Cognitive Linguistic Studies in Cultural Contexts* marks the breaking of new ground in culturally oriented cognitive studies of language. The chapters here collected include original contributions in the now well-established field of cultural linguistics, exploring cultural conceptualizations in a variety of domains. Central in many authors’ contributions, however, is a concept, and a domain of thought and argumentation, that has hitherto been marginal to the concerns of cognitive linguists, although it figures prominently both in many academic disciplines and in contemporary political discourses. *Identity* is not only a complex concept, it is an *essentially contested* one (Gallie 1955). Whether identities are essential or relational; whether they are electively adopted, discursively imposed or asserted through language; whether they are unchanging or contingent: these are questions that have preoccupied thinkers down the ages, and we know, too, that different cultural traditions have different answers to them. Not only that, what we call “identity politics” is the eye of the gathering storm in this era of culture wars and the clash of fundamentalisms. When we study language and identity, we step into a field of forces and vectors that is multiperspectival, rich in interdisciplinary insights, but is also contested, sometimes brutally, in the street, in the media, on political platforms, in the laboratory and in “the field”. Here, in the hurly-burly of voices, powers and identities, there is no “innocent eye” (however cultivated it might be) on which reality simply imprints itself. There is no privileged place outside the fray to which the scholar can retreat. And yet, though we are, like it or not, protagonists, we must also know how to be analysts, how to deploy the tools of diverse academic trades. The editors of this volume have brought together authors with backgrounds in anthropology, critical theory and psychology, as well as linguistics. The result is novel, challenging and in places provocative. *Signs of Life* testifies, beyond doubt, to the vitality of its own

1. I would like to thank here my late friend and mentor, John Shotter, who introduced me to the notion of “essentially contested concept”. 
endeavor, and I hope that it will encourage a growing engagement by scholars around the world, from different disciplinary traditions, with the dynamics of language, culture and identity.

Reference

INTRODUCTION

Language, culture and identity

Signs of life

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The interrelationships between language, culture and identity are a major focus for many linguists, cognitive and cultural researchers. Language has an inextricable connection with cultural identity and cultural practices, which in turn shapes personal identity. The nexus of language, culture and identity is explored in this book from diverse disciplinary and theoretical perspectives, offering a wealth of insights to a wide range of readers.

Background to this volume

This book consists of selected peer-reviewed papers based upon presentations at the 7th International Conference on Language, Culture and Mind, held at Hunan University in June 2016. The conference enhanced mutual understanding among researchers from different disciplines and yielded fruitful results in exploring the relationship between language and cultural conceptualisations. In this book, we have aimed to record the creativity, explanatory strength and depth of insights that were demonstrated by the studies presented at the conference. The chapters were selected for this volume because they are based on case studies that reflect the development of interdisciplinary studies in exploring the relations among language, culture and identity. The ultimate goal of Language, Culture and Identity – Signs of Life is to contribute to fostering a dialogue between different disciplines focused on the interaction of language and culture in individual and cultural identity construction. Additionally, it also provides the opportunity for both senior and early career international researchers to work together in a common platform, in order to disseminate high-quality research work and to establish effective and long-lasting interdisciplinary relationships.
“Signs of Life” is an expression that is often used in the medical context, either in relation to the body or to an individual. It typically relates to purely biological signs that act as evidence of an organism being alive. However, our bodies are not “pure biology”; they are also social and cultural. It is through learning and using language that human beings become cultural as well as animate beings. Language is the cord that ties the individual to their community, and it is by means of language that human beings become fully immersed into their culture and active participants and constructors of its subsequent development. Language is the lifeblood of any community, and if a language dies, the cultural identity of the community and the individuals that compose it may be also threatened with extinction.

Linguistic signs contribute to mediating human cognition, and it is through language that cultural conceptualisations are brought to life and kept alive. Language is also a product of a shared cultural reality, in which each sign is not only a reflection of this reality, but also a resource for making meaning and creating the reality. For this reason, the present volume brings together contributions from different disciplines and perspectives that enhance our understanding of language, through its interaction with culture and identity in a diverse range of contexts and realities from around the globe.

Since language is always used in social and cultural context, it reflects people’s socio-political values and world views. In Chapter 1, Linda Martín-Alcoff offers a philosophical account of how a Eurocentrist approach limits and biases the Western scholars’ judgements and analyses of work in other traditions. The author points out that “Westerners are judging whether other traditions are worthy, but not putting themselves in the position to be taught” (p. 15). The author reflects on the pathological tendencies in Western understanding, that she calls the transcendentalist delusion. She argues that persisting in this ethnocentric way to explain the world means that scholars remain in an “ignorance that perpetuates the sort of epistemic injustices that came to be consolidated in many European intellectual trends during its extended efforts to colonise the globe” (p. 36).

These aspects of Western colonisation of the world are portrayed in narratives which emerge from different ways of identifying the context of postcolonial literature. Chapter 2 by Prem Poddar explores how Ghorka writing crystallises and problematizes postcolonial identities in India. The narrative is always loaded with content or a sense of experience, and in this sense it is inseparable from its ideological content relative to lived experience. The author analyses Ghorka narratives with a particular focus on cultural aspects, pointing out that the process of writing and translation are productive and transformative, rather than merely reflective, of culturally positioned subjectivity.”
Colette Grinevald and Chris Sinha also explore in Chapter 3 how Eurocentrism is imported by researchers and scholars into their discussions and research practices. More precisely, the chapter exemplifies how the colonial Eurocentric bias is manifested in the research field of linguistics. The authors expose several examples of how this bias is inherent in the influential concept of the methods of endangered language documentation, addressing the unequal exchange that frequently characterises the relationship between researchers from the Global North, local researchers from the Global South and members of the language communities studied. According to the authors, such relations are on occasions abusive, involving dominating North-South power relations in which linguists consider local, and especially native, researchers as mere “data collectors”, that is, they are thought to only engage in a mechanical activity, for which they do not need experience or knowledge.

Chapter 4, by Wary Kamaiurá Sabino, offers a first-person narrative of his journey as an indigenous student from a non-written culture to obtaining his PhD and now being a researcher of his own language and culture. In his text, the author documents his personal experiences while an indigenous student and researcher of their own language and culture. In his words: “Non-Indian people sometimes took advantage of me financially because I am an Indian, as they believe I was unable or unaware to keep track of their calculations” (p. 126). This narrative demonstrates that Grinevald and Sinha are not wrong in stating that the rules between researcher and researched need to be changed and, in particular, that “data collection” is a complex activity involving “knowledge as practice/practice as knowledge” (p. 84). The author affirms that it was from his experience as a native speaker, allied to the studies, that he obtained recognition and empowerment, becoming a recognised researcher of his culture and traditions. Aiming for a better knowledge of indigenous reality, this chapter reflects the richness within his society’s culture, also posing a reflexive discourse about his educational process and how intersecting cultural traditions influenced his viewpoint about the world.

Since language is always loaded with cultural signs, its practical use is inseparable from its meaning related to life. Exploring this idea, Chapter 5 by Stef Spronck brings up a discussion on the assumption that “if we conceive of linguistic signs as inherently social signs, we should be able to capture social meaning at the grammatical level of the linguistic sign itself, not only in its use” (p. 128). Based on the analysis of Ungarinyin language from Australia, the author proposes a grammatical approach by analysing differing semiotic modes, iconic, lexical and symbolic.

This discussion is complemented by Chapter 6, in which Yuanyuan He suggests that the development of critical cultural awareness (CCA) involves a robust and dynamic assortment of framing-based cognitive processes. The author investigated these processes and stages in the development of critical cultural awareness.
on the basis of frame semantics and conceptual blending theory and proposes a model for CCA development to represent the different levels of our awareness of the impact of framing on our sociocultural understanding, as well as their relations. The study’s findings suggest that more evidence-based research is needed to explore further effective prompts for these cognitive processes, and to investigate individuals’ CCA development in actual social settings.

Chapter 7 and 8 both exemplify the potential of integrating a cognitive linguistic analysis for investigating metaphors used by Mandarin speakers from differing and interesting perspectives. Chapter 7 by Wei-lun Lu analyses various signs of life in Taiwanese political eulogies at the linguistic, conceptual and social level. The author proposes that, in addition to conceptual metaphor and metonymy, cognitive grammar is also a useful theoretical construct in analysing political eulogies. Lu compared as well the eulogistic idioms that are displayed at Taiwanese politician’s public funerals with Western eulogies, evidencing the variety of cultural conceptualizations and allusions that are involved and that the particular social role played by the deceased and the mourner also acts as an important sign in cultural-historical knowledge for the understanding of the political genre.

Similarly, in Chapter 8, Yanying Lu examines the inner self metaphors used by Chinese speakers during conversations. The author argues that “speakers perceive and respond through performing various aspects of the self, literally and metaphorically” (p. 285) when participating in socio-culturally oriented practices. Thus, a socio-cognitive analytical approach would capture social meanings of inner self metaphors, as well as the interrelatedness of cognitive centrality and plurality of discursive performances. The author brings up insight in using a socio-cognitive approach to capture the socio-culturally embedded meanings of inner self metaphors in discursive acts.

Metaphors acquire a fundamental role in the daily use of all languages. For instance, in indigenous cosmogonies, the conceptualisation of human as the primordial form of the being generates several instances of personification and embodiment. Based on conceptual metaphor theory, Chapter 9 by Wany Sampaio, Vera da Silva Sinha and Chris Sinha focuses on metaphors of personification and body part constructions in Amondawa, a Tupian language of Brazil. The authors provide and analyse examples of the retelling of mythic narrative texts. These both reflect the cultural identity and cultural conceptualisations and illuminate cognitive processes. The authors relate their findings to the anthropological theory of Perspectivism and examine the relations between the speakers’ experience of the physical and mythical domains and their linguistic conceptualisations.

Chapter 10 by Penelope Scott demonstrates that not all metaphors grounded in sensory-motor experience will take similar forms cross-culturally. She proposes a semasiological approach for the analysis of *hefig ‘heavy’* in Old English, situating
the burden metaphor within a network of cultural metaphors and culturally-specific proposition-schemas. It is argued that although the conceptual metaphor difficulties are burdens might be grounded in sensory-motor experience, the various weight-related metaphors arising in certain domains – such as discipline or religion – cannot be explained without accounting for their cultural conceptualizations.

Chapter 11 by Ming-Ming Pu and Qinghong Pu investigates constraints and motivations underlying the narrative process by analysing narratives elicited from the same stimulus material by native speakers of American English and Mandarin Chinese. It is demonstrated that “narrative as a complex process is motivated and governed by the cognition-culture-language interaction” (p. 363). The authors’ analysis evaluates narrative styles with native English speakers and native Chinese speakers, highlighting the objectivity of English narrative in contrast with more evaluative narratives produced by Chinese speakers that make more use of emotional and personal involvement when narrating an event.

Narratives fall into various types and serve different functions. Narrative in rhetorical discourse is a special type in that it renders analytical and evaluative readings of narratives and narrative elements in situated discourse. Its aim is usually to persuade or convince people towards specific ends. In Chapter 12, Mingjian Xiang and Bosen Ma explore the cognitive underpinnings of rhetoric by presenting a case study of the rhetorical use of fictive questions in the Zhuangzi text. The analysis employs a framework featuring a combination of the theory of conceptual integration or ‘blending’ and the theory of fictive interaction. The authors’ argued that the ubiquitous use of conversational structures as rhetorical strategies in ancient texts across languages and cultures emerge from our intrinsically conversational mind as interacting social beings.

Zooming out from the narrative itself, we could find that tracing specific notions in public discourse is conducive to a deeper understanding of political practices from a cultural perspective. Chapter 13 by Xuefei Ma takes her data from the use in the People’s Daily of the two contrasting terms nüxing and funü in conceptualisations of women in the discourse of “keeping up with the times”. Although these are often considered synonymous words for “woman”, the analysis reveals that nüxing is primarily used in representations of modernity, while funü is associated with notions of the lesser, the lacking and the inferior in the contemporary context. The different conceptions of these two terms demonstrate on the one hand how women are categorised as part of the nation, and on the other hand the structure of power within China’s political system.

Approaching relations among language, culture and cognition from another angle, Chapter 14 by Yahong Xue investigates the representation, cognitive motivation and cultural connotation of Chinese non-basic colour terms and
demonstrates that they are intimately related to both language associations and perceptual learning specific to Chinese culture. It is found that metaphor, metonymy and conceptual integration are the major cognitive motivations and the use of cultural-specific terms to capture fine distinctions of colour reveals the unique thinking mode of the Chinese. The chapter lends important cross-cultural support to contemporary neo-Whorfian research.

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CHAPTER 1

Philosophy and philosophical practice
Eurocentrism as an epistemology of ignorance

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City University of New York

In this paper I argue that avoiding and denying the contextual influences on philosophical systems and trends is the work of an epistemology of ignorance. Further, transcending illusions about the creation of philosophical ideas and the progression of philosophical debates must be consciously cultivated and protected in order to justify restricted curricular requirements. Given the intellectual wealth of the world, an exclusive focus on the European tradition requires an intentionality and some manner of justification. Primarily, Eurocentrism is justified on the basis of what I call the transcendentalist delusion: a belief that thought can be separated from its specific, embodied, and geo-historical source.

Keywords: Eurocentrism, epistemology, philosophy, ignorance, contextualism

Introduction

...even philosophical systems are facts of history.
Kwame Nkrumah (Consciencism: 3)

Signs of life, language, create the conditions for human existence. Yet, while languages are constitutive of meanings, knowledges, and forms of subjectivity, they can also block, constrain, and exclude some contrasting forms of life, misperceiving and misrecognizing the signs of life, of creative thought, and of intelligence that are deemed “other.” As flexible and fluid as languages are, there can be subtle mechanisms that maintain blockage, justify exclusions, and thus stultify the potential dynamism in all cultures. This paper will take up the topic of Eurocentrism as a particularly pernicious impediment to the life of language.

As Nkrumah notes, philosophical systems are products of history, that is, historically embedded. What this implies is that the work of philosophers, far from being transcendent of their context of origin, is affected by cultural, historical and national genealogies. Most obviously, questions of meaning, and hence
intelligibility, are dependent on contextual conditions, but the assessment of truth cannot be pursued without a prior understanding of the meaning of a claim. Here I will argue that avoiding and denying the contextual influences that bear on our ability to assess and create philosophical systems and trends is the work of an epistemology of ignorance. That is, transcendental illusions about the creation of philosophical ideas and the progression of philosophical debates must be cultivated and protected. Such illusions have been and continue to be functional for certain groups of philosophers, not to mention the empires that house them.

Perhaps the most important way in which western philosophy protects and maintains its ignorance about the effects, and limitations, of its geographical location is through the perpetuation and defence of Eurocentric practices and curricula. We should understand Eurocentrism in philosophy as the exclusive or nearly exclusive attention to a European canon of philosophical writing. Given the intellectual wealth of the world, an exclusive focus on the European tradition requires an intentionality and some manner of justification. Oftentimes justifications are quite explicit, as Amy Olberding has recently argued (2015). Non-western philosophies have to merit inclusion by presenting distinct lines of argumentation one cannot find in the Western canon, yet they must also pass a test of intelligibility, not being so distinct that they are beyond comprehension. These demands have an air of methodological common sense about them (e.g. ‘we cannot know what we cannot make sense of, nor do we need to know from new sources what we already know’). Yet they remain forms of Eurocentrism by assuming the non-negotiable legitimacy of a Western measuring stick, holding Western judgments, sensibilities, assumptions, norms, and conventions in place as the gatekeepers for philosophical inclusion. The capacity to judge whether an idea is distinct from Western traditions is itself a philosophical task that should not be left to one side of the dialogue. Indeed, such approaches brook no dialogue: Westerners are judging whether other traditions are worthy, but not putting themselves in the position to be taught.

I want to suggest that such forms of Eurocentrism indicate that it is a species of an even larger pathology I will call the *transcendentalist delusion*: a belief that thought can be separated from its specific, embodied, and geo-historical source. Philosophical ideas and arguments, on this approach, can be discerned and assessed without attending to the location of their genesis. The genealogy of an idea is a concern of intellectual historians, perhaps sociologists, but neither appropriate nor germane to philosophy. Within the subfield of philosophy of language, the concepts of meaning and reference have been used at times to sidestep the pragmatic dimensions of language: the idea is that while a word may be arbitrary, what it refers to, and thus what it means, is not. Below or beyond the surface particularities of communicative acts, then, language conveys, once again, transcendental truths.
The transcendentalist delusion is both a cause and a symptom of Eurocentrism. It has legimated the long persistence of exclusionary intellectual practices that were initiated in the midst of the first era of European empire building. Starting with the empires of Spain and Portugal during the Renaissance, new discursive formations had to be spawned in order to manage, explain, and justify these ambitious, and violent, projects. Conquerers such as Cortes reported in their journals of finding marvelous cities equal or greater than any in Europe, and the subsequent mandate from Christian monarchs and Church officials to kill elites, enslave populations, and build bonfires out of their intellectual and cultural products required some subterfuge. Enrique Dussel has suggested that what the Europeans did in the Americas was less of a discovery than a covering over or encubrimiento (Dussel 1995). Eventually, new theories developed about the existence of natural geographical hierarchies and typologies of peoples, cultures, and religions that claimed to justify and explain Europe’s domination of the world (see Eze 1997).

Central to the discursive formation emerging around the formation of European colonial empires was the idea that Europe was at the vanguard of human culture, achieving the highest successes in every domain of human inquiry and endeavor, but especially the domain of knowledge. Colonialism required such beliefs. As Ghanaian philosopher Kwame Nkrumah explains, “To say that each man was able to contribute to the truth would require at the social level that each man should have political rights. To say that each man was equally capable of contributing to the truth would require that each man should have equal political rights.” (1964: 44) Ramon Grosfoguel has named this a form of epistemicide, explaining that it was a necessary aspect of conquest (Grosfoguel 2013). The knowledges of the people’s subject to colonization had to be rendered harmless to the colonial project. This could occur in multiple ways: by denying that these were true knowledges, or by claiming that they were epistemically inferior to European knowledges, or by outright theft of a knowledge and then repackaging it as a European invention. Destroying and deriding the intellectual traditions of a people altered the sense of self for both colonizer and colonized, enabling hubris for the one and inhibiting resistance for the other. And as Nkrumah notes, thwarting demands for political democracy required incapacitating the idea of epistemic democracy, or the ability of all to contribute equally to human knowledge. Projects of conquest could then justifiably pursue non-dialogic processes of engagement, epistemic and otherwise.

In the beginning of Europe’s rise, domination was given a decidedly Christian cast. A major example of this was in the Spanish monarchy’s doctrine of ‘Requerimiento.’ This doctrine required that the indigenous peoples of the Americas submit to religious conversion, and further declared that upon conversion they immediately became subjects of the (divinely sanctioned) crown. By such
means Christianity provided not only a cover for colonialism but a bureaucracy for surveilling and managing populations. The interpretation of Christian doctrine such practices relied on was contested from within the Church, most effectively by Bartolome de las Casas. As strong secular tendencies emerged across northern Europe in the 17th century, the legitimation of colonial practices was again put to the test, and yet, interestingly, the rise of secularism did not lead to a general repudiation of empire building except among a small minority (most notably, Diderot). Instead, followers of Enlightenment ideas began to develop putatively scientific and philosophical forms of argumentation that would legitimate colonial rule on the basis of rational superiority rather than religion. Theories began to proliferate about the intellectual and moral effects of climates and the subsequent hierarchies of cultures and peoples. Yet the political utility of these new theories was just as useful: just as before, when a refusal of Christian conversion justified force, so the rejection of European governance proved one’s backwardness and resistance to progress (McCarthy 2009).

In an impressive sleight-of-hand, these new philosophical justifications established Europe as both the vanguard of the human race and as achieving a universal form of thought. The values, epistemology, and scientific methodology that could only emerge from the cooler latitudes of the conquering societies were universally true, and applicable to all (Zea 1988–89; Dussel 1995; Wynter 2003). Melville sets up a character in his slyly seditious 1850 novel, *White Jacket*, to explain that “We are the pioneers of the world, the advance-guard…the political Messiah has come in us, if we would but give utterance to his promptings. And let us always remember that with ourselves, almost for the first time in the history of the earth, national selfishness is unbounded philanthropy; for we cannot do a good to America but we give alms to the world.” (Chap, 36) Ingeniously, the origin of an idea in ‘America’, or Europe, established its ability to achieve universal scope.

What also follows from this idea is that the cultural achievements of the advance-guard reflects on the outermost capacities of the human race. Hence, what other cultures do reflects their current developmental state, while the achievements (or missteps) of the United States and Europe showcases the fundamental capacities of the human species.

With this orientation in place, modern European epistemologies had no need to consider the limited applicability of their justificatory norms or the advisability of enlarging the dialogic space of philosophical debate. Though they recognized the geographical specificity of their endeavour, they believed it to have a global reach, without need for contextual reflection. Quite obviously, such delusions emerged out of an experience of empire, which spawned several important philosophical trends and, in fact, philosophical errors. These errors included the inattention to philosophical genealogy or the relationship between ideas and their
cultural contexts, as well as idealist and non-dialogic conceptions of justification and truth. A whole edifice of framing assumptions such as nature/culture, mind/body, civilized/savage, and public/private served to sequester particularist, embodied, and material issues away from the sight, and sites, of philosophers. These framing assumptions also helped to conceal the particularity, embodiment, and materiality of philosophical projects.

The transcendental delusion, then, was born out of a very specific European experience that it then had no tools to analyze, reflect upon, or correct. Women's studies scholars discovered more than a generation ago that one cannot simply add women and stir as a way to introduce scholarship and research on women into the academy, given the dominance of such framing assumptions and concepts as I’ve discussed, as well as naturalized ideas about families and gender that render women’s (or any non-male) experience outside of the sphere of analysis. Just so, one cannot simply add non-Western philosophy or topics such as race and colonialism to the existing field of philosophy, its canon and curriculum, without subverting the mainstream periodization, the existing canon, even questioning what is meant by ‘philosophy.’

In some respects, the challenges posed by race and colonialism are even more intransigent than those posed by gender and sexuality. As Genevieve Lloyd wrote in 1984, feminism has required (and still requires) attending to the Other of reason, that is, to the abjected realm of bodies, desires, and particularities of affective commitments that have been positioned as outside of, and obstacles to, the rational faculties of judgment. Feminism cannot simply be included alongside without refiguring some of the central features of the existing discipline and its ideas about its best practices. Both feminism and decolonial theory call out for dismantling such basic terms of identity as “man” or “human.” Yet some have imagined feminist philosophy itself as transcendent of its own time and place, able to stay within the domain of Eurocentric theoretical resources without attending to their geographical genealogies. On such a view, only part of the transcendental delusion would require reform for such feminist philosophy to carry on. Such a partial reform is not possible for the work of decolonial and critical race philosophy, since it would not mandate an expansion of the geographical boundaries. Eurocentric theory is going to be called out, and worse, put in context as a limited, partial, often delusional perspective, and not in any sense the underlying key to the riddle or the mainspring of critical and liberatory philosophy.

Critical race and decolonial theory forces us to attend to the colonial context in which the European canon of rational thought has been and continues to be produced. This project involves uncovering the Eurocentrism embedded in the way in which philosophy is defined, conceptualized, and taught, and this requires placing Western philosophy, most of which occurred in what the discipline defines
as the modern period beginning in the late Renaissance, squarely within its context of the long *duree* of European and U.S. global empire building. The societies that spawned our modern philosophers were not inessential backdrop but constitutive of the available meanings and conceptual repertoires, the reaches of intelligibility, and the central problematics of this tradition. Examples include debates over freedom and individual sovereignty, the sphere of legal rights and property rights, and the nature of human understanding (Bernasconi 2003; Mehta 1999). And this is just as true for the liberatory and radical tracks of European modern philosophy, such as Rousseau, Hume, Kant, Marx, Mill and others, as it was for the more conservative thinkers. Both groups had intra-European debates and social struggles in mind but these were themselves formulated against a contrast class drawn from “new world” indigenous cultures, Asian cultures, African cultures, and non-Christian societies, all of which were constructs sometimes fashioned by little more than travelogues (Mignolo 2011; Coronil 1996).

Modern European philosophy emerged from a context of epistemic injustice toward non-European societies, and this injustice is perpetuated by legitimating ideas about intellectual superiority of European-American philosophy. To correct this injustice, and avoid its repetition, philosophy must develop, as Zea, Dussel, Nkrumah, and so many others have argued for more than half a century, greater reflexive capacities as a part of its normal work. It must come to be understood as deeply connected to its context, and this requires working from and within the decolonial studies now emerging in geography, history, anthropology, sociology, and so on (i.e. the assortment of derided social sciences that too many philosophers, from all persuasions, have summarily ignored) that explore the intellectual contours and effects of the context of European colonization (e.g. Gordon 1995, Maldonado-Torres 2006). Perspectivism, as I will argue, will prove insufficient if it implies a setting of philosophies alongside one another, as if Anglo-European philosophy must simply begin to make way for others, or make a space for other philosophical traditions alongside itself, to the side, if not to the back. Rather, instead of a pluralist perspectivism, what is required is a decolonizing of the way in which we interpret, and teach, Western philosophy and, indeed, every form of philosophical thought.

In what follows I will focus on the need to think through the geography of epistemology, or what some have called shifting the geography of reason.

**The geography of epistemology**

The idea of geography here involves the practice or orientation of *spatialization*. What geographers study is not simply the coordinates of entities in a domain, but the constitution of the domain itself, including its borders and its internal and
external relations. In order to observe the workings of European meaning systems, we must rethink the imagined ground upon which Western philosophy locates itself. Here is how Walter Mignolo puts this point:

The important observation to make here is not simply whether there are other perspectives about the ‘same event’ but that another paradigm emerges across the epistemic colonial difference. The dominant theo- and ego-politics is being contested by the emerging shift to the geo-politics and body politics of knowledge: knowledge produced from the geo-historical and bio-historical perspective of racialized locations and people. (Mignolo 2005, p. 48)

What Mignolo makes clear is that the solution cannot be an “add alongside” or happy multiculturalism. Perspectivism may imply contrasting points of view and the capacity to access different sorts of empirical evidence, lending support for aggregation models of knowledge that would build from the acknowledgement of multiplicity and difference to a more expansive, comprehensive account. Yet Mignolo and others have argued that the overarching frames of Eurocentrism are intrinsically imperialist and insusceptible to compatibilism or an adequate inclusivity. This does not entail or imply that every single claim or theory in the traditional European canon of philosophy is untrue and unusable, but that the overarching framework constitutes its domain via a paradigm that cannot play well with others.

Mignolo’s reference to ‘theo-politics’ has to do with the way in which, as I described earlier, 15th and 16th century Christianity began to systematically destroy all of its competing sign-systems, expelling peoples, committing genocide, burning temples and books en masse, and redrawing universal maps of location, history, and value in its own terms. The people of Africa came to be viewed as the descendants of Ham, the disobedient son in the Bible who, by his disobedience, deserved his fate of being made a servant to his brothers. And so all peoples who remain ignorant of the word of God became classified as heretics and, for that reason, barbarians (a word continually in use in public discourses today). For the Greeks the term barbaros was used to designate non-Hellenophones, though in the Christian era the contrast class came to be predictably defined as one who is heathen, meaning non-Christian. In both cases the concept designates by negation without identifying any substantive alterity. Thomas Aquinas defined the barbarian as one whose manner of life defies common sense (what later came to be called natural law), and, as such, their lives do not accord with human nature (Las Casas quoted in Mignolo: 18) But this again works via negation, denying the Other a substantive difference. One needs to know nothing about them, their beliefs or practices, except what they are not. Hence, the contrast class for establishing the boundaries of civility or humanity is defined in terms not of self/Other, but in
terms of self/not-self.¹ Difference is reduced to a question of one’s relation to the norms and belief systems of the dominant Christian European society. Barbarians are those who have repudiated Christianity, and their own belief systems and ways of life have no bearing on this judgment. Unlike the Inca and followers of Islam, for example, who recognized an overlap between their own belief systems and those of other theists, the Christian Church could tolerate no commonality.

The division of the Iberian peninsular and subsequently the entirety of the Americas into binary maps of Christian/Heathen or Christian/not-Christian produced this binary of Self/not-Self in which the other is reduced to a negative, comparative feature. This is what spurred debates about whether the indigenous were human beings, capable of personhood, endowed with even a modicum of rationality or even self-regard. Such a construction constitutes a radical form of epistemic injustice, as it follows from one’s very identity or being. This is what Medina has called “epistemic death”: when one experiences both testimonial and hermeneutic exclusion and thus shut out completely from contributing to the production of meaning and knowledge. In reality, of course, productions of meaning and knowledge never stop occurring, even among the most abject conditions, yet will be unacknowledged by the Masters, or appropriated without attribution.

Such a construction of barbarian identity removes any motivation to learn other ways or creeds. The claim that those designated are inferior and inadequate thinkers is not justified by a study and evaluation of different practices, customs, forms of religiosity, institutions, beliefs, and the like, but simply on the observation that a group is not-Christian or not-rational or not-self. This is an epistemology of ignorance born of imperial and colonial projects of plunder that legitimates a lack of investigation and study beyond one’s own domain. Hence Eurocentrism has no need to apologize much less correct itself. On the contrary, Eurocentrism has a need not to know, a motivation not to learn, in the service of its material and discursive conquests.

The language of “human nature” has an implicit normativity and capacity for comparison built into it, since if there is a human nature, then there is at least the possibility of an inhuman nature. Such inhuman natures are continually attributed to differently abled bodies as well as different cultures and practices. If we want to ward off the possibility of this kind of conclusion, or, in other words, if we wish to maintain a normative idea about human nature without thereby producing a class of sub-humans, we will need to develop a capacity for the sort of reflexive analysis that decontextualizing philosophical thought makes all but impossible.

¹ We could understand the self/Other distinction as inclusive of, or even identical with a self/not-self distinction, but Mignolo’s point is that there is a conceptual distinction between being an Other, and being simply defined in terms of a negation.
Decolonial theory by figures such as Mignolo, Dussel, Wynter, Grosfoguel, Coronil and Nkrumah provide the tools to begin such philosophical reflection on Western philosophy and in particular Western epistemologies, although they are almost completely absent from required curricula, and even optional curricula. An important piece of this reflection must be the way in which the domain of the ‘secular’ is understood, in order to draw the links between the foundations of European colonialism, the Enlightenment, and conceptions of modernity. This is the point of Mignolo’s concept of “theo-politics”: that the teleological and exclusivist conceptions of intellectual, cultural and scientific development that are used to rank varied global achievements and contributions are still operating within a political world view with significant elements of theology. Thus, the transition from Spanish-Christian discourses of colonialism to Enlightenment secular ones, referenced earlier, should be understood to be at least in some important respects superficial, since the overarching framing assumptions and teleology remained operational. Whether it has an associated God or not, there is a theological resonance in a teleological frame that moves from a state of grace (or state of nature), a fall (into mob democracy, for example, or authoritarian scholasticism, or submission to tyranny), a developmental trajectory of salvific, philosophical enlightenment (or scientific progress alongside industrialization), and a period of divine or transcendental punishment and judgment (which could become the task, of course, of the philosophers). Western philosophy is imagined always as a light or gift brought to the hoi polloi by a talented and profound individual or small group, never as something emerging from the mass. If the mass rejects the gift of philosophy, or doesn’t value its contributions, this act alone is often sufficient to define them as barbarians. Hence, there are those who can cohabit the garden of ethical life, if they willingly follow the Teacher, and those who must be shunted out. For those inside the garden walls, there is a set of political protocols for the protection of rights, and altogether different treatment for those outside the walls.2

Mignolo’s point is that secularism simply adopted and adapted a prior Christian theological mapping with all of its trappings of a universal system of

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2. This intellectual and secular bifurcation maps onto older Christian ones, but it’s characteristic megalomonia is not found everywhere. The ancient Chinese under the long Zhou dynasty defined themselves as the Middle Kingdom, a form of jurisdiction that acknowledges boundaries and neighbors. Islam understands itself to have a constitutive relationship with Jews and Christians, distinct religions practiced by ‘the people of the book,’ whose teachings Muslims must respect. Numerous indigenous groups describe their genealogy as place-based rather than as deriving from a source or value that transcends place (which is why their displacement can destroy identity). Group names (e.g. Murrawarri people of what is today called Australia) are often identical to place names. It is a mistake to jump to the conclusion that Eurocentrism is a universal problem or innate human tendency.
truth that judged resisters blameworthy for their exile and suffering. If Christianity organized the peoples of the world fundamentally into those who see the light and are saved and those who are unwilling or incapable of salvation, current ideas about modernity continue this schema. What is new in the modern period is that the categories of demarcation between the self and the not-self become racialized and associated with land mass.

There is a wonderful geographical doublespeak in the philosophy profession, where the salience of location is both avowed and denied. On the one hand, it is bad form to locate a philosophical idea as having a national lineage. We don’t speak in polite society of French ideas or German theories: this would sound too much like Nazism’s idea of Jewish science and art. Yet the principle reason given for rejecting the relevance of lineage is methodological: because this would obviate the distinction between philosophy and intellectual history and reduce ideas to arbitrary features of their formation that cannot sustain causal claims. Even if it can be established that an origin of an idea played a causal role in its formation, philosophers are said to be interested in reasons, not causes. Neither the meaning nor the validity of an idea is determined by its genealogy.

On the other hand, our curricula continue to operate with implicitly colonial historiographies that organize the canonical periodizations of western philosophy and its geographical borders. The canon periodization we use misnames particulars as universals. Still today the history of philosophy is grouped within the following categories: Ancient (meaning fourth century Greece), Early Modern (meaning 17th century northwestern Europe, excluding Spain and Portugal), Modern (meaning the same area in the 18th century), and Nineteenth and Twentieth Century (including here England, Scotland, Germany, Austria, France, and the U.S. and Canada). These time-maps represent modernist frames about the progression of reason. If anything, the last few decades have witnessed a further narrowing of the field, cutting out Chinese and Indian philosophy from so-called top departments. The history of philosophy is itself on the ropes in many analytic departments, losing its market share of courses and faculty lines, so one may imagine that this solves the problem of the colonial narrative but in reality it only further ensures a decontextualization of thought. The canon at least gives us a historical trajectory for current debates and preoccupations.

The idea here is not that philosophies are reducible to their context, and dismissible on those grounds, but that without understanding philosophical systems and trends in their context we cannot hope to adequately interpret or assess them. It is not that the origin of an idea is all-determinative, but that we should stop assuming it has no effect without exploration. Context can explain why a weak argument gained favor and came to be representational of a sub-field, but it also can explain why the question was formulated just so, even if the answer given
was rather brilliant. Thankfully, the situation is beginning to improve in the history of philosophy, where a larger range of contemporary interlocutors are taken up alongside canonical figures, as well as historical, social, and political events (good examples: Solomon, Beiser, O’Neill, Potter). And such work is helping to reshape periodization and geographical boundaries, as we come to understand, for example, the influence of the learned Arab world on early Modern philosophers. It is not simply that they helpfully kept Aristotle in their libraries for us, but that their disputation on numerous topics set the terms of discussion. I’ll shortly give an example related to this point.

Yet in other sub-fields of philosophy, there has not been as much methodological progress, and questions continue to be portrayed as timeless and transcendent of their context. Such approaches leave intact and unchallenged the geographic imaginary that privileges the West as the origin and principal location of Philosophy. In this imaginary, which is regularly reinforced, if not policed, by our departmental curricular requirements, philosophy is a practice invented by the ancient Greeks, re-emerging (as if from a dream) in modern Europe, and primarily flourishing in those countries influenced by the West. This is a time-map, and it allows those of us who locate ourselves in the western tradition to rest assured that those behind us, even if they start on the path we have charted, will never catch up.

Thus, the idea of ‘theo-politics’ helps name the teleological framing of philosophical history that legitimates geographical narrowness. Just as once the world was divided between Christians and non-Christians, today there are those who do philosophy (or who do philosophy properly), and those who don’t, and these divisions correspond to geographical locations. Next I want to turn to the other term Mignolo refers to in the passage above, which is the idea of ‘ego-politics’. This is a reference to Descartes, and in particular, to Enrique Dussel’s analysis of the role Descartes played in the formation of western epistemology’s colonial narrative about its own emergence as an uncaused cause (Alcoff 2013). The philosophical scholarship on Descartes has taken some very productive turns of late, benefitting from the newly expansive contextual trends in the history of philosophy, as I noted. This has helped to place Descartes’s work in relation to earlier periods, and there have also been multi-layered readings of his nightmarish meditations (see e.g. Bordo, Scheman, Brown, Lee). But what remains too often neglected is the link between Descartes and the Jesuitical tradition in which he was educated. Understanding this link challenges received ideas not only about the development of early modern European epistemology but also about how modernity is continuously defined today.

The Jesuit order, or Society of Jesus, was founded only in 1536, 60 years before Descartes’ birth. The order was quickly distinguished by its willingness to proselytize under difficult conditions, including as one of its four vows the promise
of engaging in missionary work, and they soon became some of the most active missionaries in the New World. In some cases Jesuits sought to protect indigenous populations from abuse, but they also operated as overseers of indigenous labor in the mines and plantations and owned significant numbers of African slaves.

As early as 1549 Jesuits began missionary work in the wide expanses of the New World. Thus the evolution of the order tracked their colonizing projects in the service of Spain and France as they began to develop the institutions and practices that would help them manage the populations under their patronage throughout the Americas, including the job of efficiently extracting labor. The innovation of the Jesuits was to proselytize not primarily by forced memorizing of the catechism but, rather, by inviting others to join in their personal relationships with Christ by performing self-examination as individuals and developing a capacity for reflection on their beliefs, meanings, values and the relation of these with the divine purpose.

From the age of ten until he graduated at 17 Descartes was enrolled in the Jesuit Collège Royal Henry-Le-Grand at La Flèche. He then went onto the University of Poitiers where he earned a degree in Canon Law, or the body of Christian laws. His subsequent quite numerous travels took him to the papal nuncio in Italy, where it was Cardinal Berulle who first urged Descartes to write philosophy.

Descartes' association with the Jesuits links him securely to Spain (whose philosophy in this period is too often ignored) but also to the New World. The flow of people and of intellectual influences across the Atlantic was intense starting in the 16th century, and so it was not at all odd that Descartes studied logic from a work written by the well known Mexican philosopher of that period, Antonio Rubio.

The Jesuit belief in a thorough and sustained 'examination of conscience' maps easily onto the Meditations on First Philosophy, first published in 1641, in which Descartes (1993) provides an uncanny reportage of his innermost doubts and debates. Such self-examination is also clearly evident in his Passions of the Soul, published in 1646 (1990). Dussel and other historians of philosophy have traced Descartes' formative influences also back to Fonseca, the Portuguese philosopher who influenced a generation of Jesuits known as the Coimbran school. Here the principal topic of discussion was the concept of method, identified as “the art of reasoning about whatever probable question”. Another Portuguese influence on Descartes that Dussel tracks is Francisco Sanchez who proposed a means to arrive at certainty through a process of doubt.

In standard intellectual histories Descartes’ influences are listed as the late works of Aristotle, the Stoic school of Greek philosophy, and St. Augustine. Augustine’s influences on Descartes are thought to be less theological than involving his self-examining, reflexive practice and his logical approach to questions of time and reality. Hence all of Descartes influences are taken to be secular. One of the interesting implications of this new contextualization of Descartes’ ideas is
that the move from religious to secular philosophy is not as sharp a break as it is often made out to be. Nor is secularism a necessary component of the self-critical reflections associated with rational modernity.

Dussel suggests, in fact, that we should locate the emergence of modern thought with Las Casas rather than with Descartes. In this shift, modernity is the emergence of a critical reflection on difference and material conditions rather than a conquering and isolated ego. It is a reflection directed toward the ideas and practices that inhabit one’s social and historical context, and not simply directed at one’s self or one’s own personal beliefs. As Mignolo suggests, the differences between such definitions of modernity are not compatible: we cannot place such perspectives alongside one another but must shift registers. Descartes’s aim is for each individual to achieve absolute or indubitable certainty, just as the Jesuits aimed for. Hence, he finds the route of perceptual sensation too defeasible for this purpose, nor can it disprove his eventual conclusions. By contrast, Las Casas works through a direct perception of his material surroundings, the real world conditions of the Indians and their cultural achievements, using this to test dogmatisms of Church interpreters and their use of syllogistic reasoning. But unlike traditional empiricists, Las Casas recognizes the particularism and thus perspectivism of his own location – a perspective that provides the criteria necessary to identify the strange and barbarous. Because he recognizes it as a perspective, he is able to see the Other as having a substantive difference, and not simply as a “not-self.” Las Casas then goes on to engage in reflective social critique of his own society’s doxastic conventions.

Descartes’ habitus was very much unreflectively informed by the theo-politics of Christian conquest, producing an ego-politics with the imperialist mind-set that rejected all external influences out of hand. The progress of Western philosophy continues to be hobbled by this approach, insistently ignorant of potential interlocutors. Las Casas, by contrast, is visibly groping toward a different self-understanding, in which one’s own inclinations are analyzed in relation to their social context. With this approach, dialogic models of philosophical thought, especially those that can span cultures and belief-systems, are non-negotiable necessities for the achievement of understanding.

What theo- and ego-politics have in common is an imperial design on time and space. Where theo-politics proposes a singular historical developmental trajectory of progress and redemption, ego-politics proposes a spatial mastery from a singular nodal point. Descartes’ procedure requires no dialogic interlocutors, no collective process, and yet can achieve a truth for all. Without speaking to all, it is a truth that speaks for all. Against these Mignolo proposes “a geo-politics and

3. Descartes engaged in vigorous dialogues with others, as we know, and yet the ‘Method’ he propounds requires no such dialogues nor does it even encourage them.
body politics of knowledge: knowledge produced from the geo-historical and bio-historical perspective of racialized locations and people.” This is not a reversal but a decentralization: in place of a singular trajectory of successive events in which every culture can be located as either ‘ahead’ or ‘behind,’ he and others propose a pluriversality of heterogeneous historico-structural nodes. Las Casas moves us closer to this ideal by deflating the concepts that would legitimize hermeneutic closure, turning away from dialogue.

Conclusion

My argument has been that Eurocentrism is more than simply a preference for a particular tradition of philosophical thought, but a practice of ensuring ignorance that perpetuates the sort of epistemic injustices that came to be consolidated in many European intellectual trends during its extended efforts to colonize the globe. Continuing to separate philosophical practice from its context obscures this fact, disabling critical reflexivity, justifying exclusivity, indeed, justifying a rather appalling ignorance about others and other intellectual traditions.

There has always been a resistance both within and outside the philosophical traditions emerging from Europe. Within the West, feminist and post-colonial and critical race and decolonial philosophies have recently increased in scope and vigor but they are not entirely new. Outside of the West, the critique has been persistent. Decolonial thought emerged to contest European intellectual mono-lingualism as soon as the Conquest began; its just that this rich tradition of counterpoint has been all but excluded from the Western curriculum. Western philosophy’s long overdue engagement with its non-Western critics is the only solution to the epistemology of ignorance.

In his essay “What is Enlightenment?” Michel Foucault makes an interesting observation about Kant’s own writings on the French Enlightenment. He looks at two of Kant’s essays, the 1798 essay on the French Revolution, ‘Contest of the Faculties,’ and his 1784 essay whose title Foucault unabashedly stole.

Rather than considering Kant’s characterization of the content of the Enlightenment, Foucault notes another interesting feature of these texts. He points out that Kant is venturing to make a commentary on his own present moment, a rare move for a philosopher. This has the effect of positioning philosophical reflection in a specific temporality, as emerging in a here and now, in relationship to the present.

Both the French revolution and the Enlightenment were events in space and time, often given starting dates and geographical locations. Thus, Foucault suggests, in commenting on such events “the philosopher presenting his philosophical
discourse cannot avoid the question of him being part of this present...about his membership of a particular ‘we,’ if you like, which is linked to a greater or lesser extent to a cultural ensemble characteristic of his contemporary reality. This ‘we’ has to become, or is in the process of becoming, the object of the philosopher’s own reflection.” (2003: 13). I suspect that for Foucault, the “cultural ensemble characteristic of his contemporary reality” is a reference to the particularity of a group identity, as German or European, for example.

Kant’s commentary, and Foucault’s perception of it, is a small opening to contextual self-reflection, and, as Foucault points out, for Kant it is an opening as yet unfulfilled. Contrast this with Dussel’s reading of Las Casas as a better candidate for the paradigm shift of European modernity in philosophy. Las Casas is also taking note of his surroundings, his present, the “we” of which he is a part, but he is also attentive to his material surroundings in the context of peoples and labor and the uses to which these are put, and thus he is not only cognizant of the elite ‘we’ at the upper strata. Las Casas is mostly considering the philosophical justifications (what Foucault might call the matrix of rationality) that operate in regard to this organization of the material field. Against this Las Casas offers assessments and criticisms, considering the ‘we’ and ‘them’ of Europeans and Indians (or indigenous) in relation to the concept of barbarism. For this reason Dussel suggests retaining ‘modernity’ as a normative ideal in the sense of reflective critical engagement with the material context of thought, despite the fact that he vigorously contests the usual teleology of modernity. For Dussel, this is the sort of philosophical practice that might resuscitate the moribund philosophical traditions that remain wilfully ignorant of their transcendentalist delusions.

Acknowledgements


References


CHAPTER 2

Translation and transnationality in the Himalaya

Writing Gorkha language and culture

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Focusing on migration, translation and diaspora-formation, my chapter explores how Gorkha writing both crystallizes and problematizes postcolonial identities. Gorkhaness hinges on a fulcrum of ambivalence as it seeks to articulate a separate cultural identity away from Nepal and relocate itself within the citizenry and national culture of India. The iconic Darjeeling writer Indra Bahadur Rai narrates Gorkha subjectivity as it attempts to recast itself within the Indian matrix, riddled as it is by ethno-nationalist demands, including the cry for a Gorkhaland. Questions of translation in a transnational context in the Himalayas, I argue, has become the central concern in the writers I discuss. These writings enact a process of ‘alienation and of secondariness in relation to itself’. Rai comes across as a Gorkha nationalist/ethnicist, but the necessary ambivalence of his text ends up imagining and rewriting a more inclusive community.

Keywords: translationality, transnationality, Himalayas, Gorkhas, postcolonial identities, ethnonationalism, borders

Introduction

The Gurkhas in Malaya cut the tongues of mules
so they were silent beasts of burden
in enemy territories
after such cruelty what could they speak of anyway. –(Ondaatje 1979: 66)

In this chapter, I approach the themes of this volume through the lens of writing, translation, diaspora, and migration. My aim is to explore the way in which
writing both crystallizes and problematizes postcolonial identities, with particular reference to Gorkha language, culture, and literature. My focus is on literary texts, and my perspective is more cultural than cognitive. It is consistent with cognitive linguistics as well as the cultural-linguistic proposition that cultural conceptualisations “may be instantiated in various cultural artefacts such as painting, rituals and narratives” (Sharifian 2011: 3); however, my starting point is that the processes of writing and of translation are productive and transformative, rather than merely reflective, of culturally positioned subjectivity. The structural types of visual metaphor, described by Phillips and McQuarrie (2004) as juxtaposition, fusion, and replacement refers to the visual relationship between source and target which can also be read where translation is involved.

Vibrant signs of life in Gorkha thought, language and identity are evident in even a cursory reading of the literature. Gorkha identity in India hinges on a fulcrum of ambivalence as it seeks to articulate a separate cultural identity and relocate itself within the citizenry and national culture of India. The terminological difficulties in forging this identity are evident in the production of rather unwieldy devices indicative of some distance from the historical homeland of Nepal, in the form of lexicalizations such as Indian-Nepali, Nepamu Bharatiya, Bharatiya-Gorkhali or Bhargoli. The terms ‘Gorkha’ and ‘Nepali’ have been used interchangeably in India and it is now increasingly the case that ‘Gorkha’ is preferred politically over Nepali1 citizens of Nepal are referred to as ‘Nepalese’, and the Nepali speaking Indians as ‘Nepalis’ (see Subba 1992: 67–74). ‘Gorkhaness’ then becomes synonymous with Indian Nepaliness but invests only degrees of differential commonalities with Nepaleseness and diasporic Nepaleseness. While these counters the irredentism of a Greater Nepal thesis, it cannot completely exorcise the spectres or temptations of an ethnic absolutism for diasporic subjects. This chapter looks at the work of the iconic Darjeeling writer Indra Bahadur Rai (1928b); particularly his shorter fiction and two essays which narrate Gorkha subjectivity as it attempts to relocate itself within the matrix of the Indian nation, riddled as it is by ethno-nationalist demands, including the cry for a Gorkhaland.

1. Geolinguistically speaking, the difference in language is mainly regarding accent and vocabulary usage; grammar has remained constant. Originally termed Khas kurā, an Indic language, it came to be known as Gorkhali later following the expansion of the Gorkha empire (between 1559 and 1768). The term Nepali, interestingly, was adopted only in the 1930s. In terms of linguistic differentiation, dhungo in some parts of Nepal, for example, transfers to dhunga in Darjeeling and Sikkim. Words such as hyaa or khaate would be considered absurd amongst Indian speakers. Words like dhoka or pasal used in Nepal are believed to have Tibeto-Burmese roots.
I use English translations of Rai’s work in my analysis while making references to the original at times. I also pose questions relating to the linguistic and cultural translation of postcolonial texts, while making a modest contribution towards a shift from the monolingual scope of postcolonial Indian literature to the recognition of the diversity and polyglossia of literary production in South Asia. Questions of translation in a transnational context in the Himalayas, I argue here, have particularly become the central concern in the writers I discuss.

Colonial and national Darjeeling

The emergence of a Gorkha identity in late nineteenth century India, even though this happens much later historically, is nevertheless inseparable from colonial discourse, especially as it appears in ethnographies on martial theories of race (Streets 2004). The British in India “formulated and codified the principle...into a dogma” (Mason 1974: 349). Where Lieutenant-General Sir George MacMunn in his *The Armies of India* (1911) speaks of the genetic valour and able-bodiedness of the European man, he declares: “[s]ome of the most manly looking people in India are in this respect the most despicable” (George MacMunn cited in Caplan 1991: 580). Biologically predisposed to the arts of war, Victorians held, the martiality of the ‘Gurkhas’ lay in their geographically hilly and cooler origins; as opposed to the effeminacy of the Bengalis who inhabited hot and flat regions. The historian Ludwig Stiller describes as ‘sheer nonsense’ the conviction that Nepal was a ‘nation of soldiers’; and not predominantly farmers (Stiller 1973).

The Anglo-Nepal war of 1814–16 is a critical reference point as it is during this war that the British officially ‘discover’ the Gorkhas. The history of their recruitment to serve in British armed forces goes back to this period, when three battalions of Gorkha regiments were raised (Mozumdar 1963). Among the Indian soldiers who helped crush the 1857 Mutiny (also referred to as the first Indian War of Independence), Gorkhas, along with Sikhs and Kumaoni, proved their loyalty to the Raj. Following this, recruiting depots were established along the expanse of the border with Nepal. By 1864, the British government had a charter grant for the Gorkha Regiment to acquire land for settlement stations at Almora, Dehradun, Dharmasala, Gorakhpur, Shillong, and other places. In 1890, the
The Gorkha Recruitment Depot was opened in Darjeeling; to this day it continues to attract recruits from the Darjeeling region as well as neighbouring Nepal.

The swathe of territory dividing eastern Nepal from British India, Sikkim and Bhutan can be conceptualised as having largely indeterminate and fuzzy boundaries. Boundary lines “waxed or waned according to the military strength and vigour of the ruling dynasty … [and] followed from the history of western diplomacy and drew their meaning from maps and lines drawn on maps” (Stiller 1973: 220–1). The history of migration in this region—though questioned by those who subscribe to the thesis that Gorkhas are autochthonous—cannot, however, be denied. It is difficult to assess the validity of the report by Dr. Campbell, Superintendent of Darjeeling, who raises “not more than hundred souls in 1839 to about 10,000 in 1849, chiefly by immigration from the neighbouring states of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan” (in O’Malley 1989: 22). (Campbell is of course the man who brought China tea seeds from Kumaun and pioneered the growing of tea in Darjeeling). The setting up of hill stations and tea plantations is the other colonial vector central to the formation of a Gorkha community in the Darjeeling area (for hill stations, see Hopkirk 1990). The immigration of Nepalese was encouraged by the colonial state, which required labour for infrastructure-building in its hill stations as well as its economy of tea gardens and cinchona plantations in Darjeeling, Kalimpong and Kurseong. Though nothing like the moment of classic capitalism produced by the movement of Indian indentured labour to the Caribbean during this time (Mishra 1996), an old diaspora of plantation labour does take form.

The production of colonial knowledge about Darjeeling was inevitably followed by the reconstitution of fuzzy identities into an enumerated community (Kaviraj 1997: 156–7). The 1860s are marked by an upsurge in the production and circulation of gazetteers, manuals, and ethnographies. Subjecthood was conferred as the colonial state sought legitimation by creating a public sphere, though the notion of a civil society was rather limited (Chatterjee 1995: 237). By the middle of the second decade of the twentieth century there had emerged a sizeable middle class in Darjeeling (Chalmers 2003).

The two specific sectors that are stressed by the reform movements of this time are general education and the improvement of Nepali language and literature (Onta 1996). In consonance with other movements in colonial India, civil society
was uneven, monopolised by elites, and paternalistic in its pedagogical objective. Civil society organisations in the region contributed actively to the forging of a new self-identity that relied on notions of kinship (or *jati*); a standardised Nepali language as a vehicle for uniting different groups seen as constituting the Gorkha: *jati* becomes key. The term is often rendered as ‘race’ and its sub-category *janajati* as ‘sub-race’ even when it is *ethnic* or nation that is being referred to. The transnational “nascent Nepali public sphere…decidedly apolitical” (Chalmers 2003: 204), to begin within the early 1910–20s India, quickly turns politically aspirational under the pressures of social reform, especially when the All India Gorkha League takes off in 1923. The production of Nepali language resources under its aegis sets up a relationship with the Indian freedom struggle. Rai’s continuing fear about possible divisions is well brought out in the ‘Hills and Streams’ article I discuss below. Not unsurprisingly, a deterritorialised Gorkha subjectivity ambivalently flitting between the two poles of ‘homeland’ and ‘hostland’ – constituting a diasporic public sphere – becomes the *topos* of literature produced in the Darjeeling hills.5

In multi-ethnic postcolonial India, Gorkha identity is best seen as articulated in terms of an ethno-symbolic matrix of nationalism that underlines pre-modern ethnic identity and community in reading the ‘modernity’ of its nation (Smith 1986).6 Gorkhas are paradoxically Janus-faced in looking atavistically at the primordial past of the *jati*, while at the same time desiring progressively to fulfill the requirements of modern citizenship and nationhood.7 This dialectic unfolds as the subject attempts to shed her ambivalence towards colonialism and its promised, but unfulfilled, modernity; nationalism offers a similar liberation, and subsequent discontentment. Before I go on to discuss the work of I. B. Rai, it is important to mention another pioneering Darjeeling writer, Agam Singh Giri (1928-71), who anticipates many of Rai’s concerns and is subject to a similar vacillation in terms of a politics of belonging and belonging to land and hill, nation and community. It comes as no surprise that, in a seminal story of his, ‘Maina’s Mother is Just Like Us’, Rai tellingly deploys a folk song by Giri about the Gorkhas of Darjeeling:

Her eyes watch a leaf wafting down, making her wait for her own existence. She goes far across the brown ridges of the fields. On a piece of rising ground, luxuriant grass is growing. From the end of a garden she walks steeply uphill, moving from terrace to terrace…

5. Migration is thus a central concern from Lain Singh Bangdel’s novel *Muluk Dekhi Bahira* (1947) to Asit Rai’s *Naya Chhitiiko Khoj* (1981).

6. A book that grapples with the problematic of dislocated memory is: Kumar Pradhan’s *Pahilo Pahar* (1982).

Prem Poddar

Why then did you come here?
Why then did you come here?
Why then did you come here?
Why then did you come here? (Rai quoted in Hutt 1991: 263–4)

Postcoloniality and translation

The various aspects of translation, especially in relation to colonial India, can be described “as ‘metaphor’ of the colony, as a mode of transaction, as a ‘supplementary’ site of culture, and as ‘epistemic violence’” (Postcolonial Translation, n.d.). A colony, in this sense, begins as a translation, a copy of the original located elsewhere on the map. The metaphor of the colony as a translation can thus be cognized as a copy of an original located in the contact zone of a place where cultures met on unequal terms. Translation – linguistic and cultural – is intimately tied up with more general questions of nation and narration. It foregrounds the processes of transmission, the contortions and distortions undergone by articulations of multiple voices as they are carried across borders and between and within communities, thus rejecting a view of cultures as unified, organic wholes (Poddar 2000). In the context of the colony, critics have noted how as a result of the colonialist enterprise certain Western translations of Eastern texts came to be regarded as ‘canonical’: this appropriation, as it were, advanced the linguistic as well as the political subjectification of the conquered (Niranjana 1992). Such latter-day Orientalism, some argue, can be found even in Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses, which portrays “Oriental people, their ‘customs, mind, destiny and so on’ from the “positional superiority” of a “successful mainstream Westernized immigrant” writer (Jussawalla 1989: 113–4).8 This critique resonates powerfully with the spillage of fury in the Darjeeling hills and beyond into the Nepali diaspora at what was perceived as the negative depiction of Gorkhas, a sort of home-grown Orientalism,9 in Kiran Desai’s Booker Prize-winning novel The Inheritance of Loss.

It is through translation, as Walter Benjamin maintains, that the ‘afterlife’ of “the life of the originals attains its latest, continually renewed, and most complete unfolding” (Benjamin 2000: 255). Benjamin’s own writing, much of it in frag-

8. More extreme views found expression not only in the Iranian fatwa on Rushdie. His Japanese translator Hitoshi Igarashi was stabbed to death and left in the hallway outside his office at Tsukuba University. Ettore Capriolo, the Italian translator of the novel, was stabbed in his apartment in Milan. He survived.

9. For a mode of argument along these lines, see Prem Poddar and Tanka Subba (1992).
ments, attests to the impossibility of closure. His contention that translation is a writerly practice, that translations can be bastardizations or transformations of the original with an existence apart from the author’s intentions (ibid. 2000), is anathema to many translators. One of the three translators, Dorjee T. Lepcha, whose work I comment on here, holds Rai in such elevated esteem that he is often frustrated as he experiences what we might call, drawing from Blanchot, “a constant and dangerous intimacy with something he [could] never possess” (Blanchot 1982: 20). For him the aim of the ‘minor art’ of translation is not ‘free’ interpretation but to produce a seamless text while faithfully conveying the complexity of the writer’s world.

I. B. Rai’s own complex world, predominantly peopled by Gorkha/Nepali characters, raises fascinating and sometimes contentious issues. His much celebrated, and sometimes reviled, work includes essays and fiction produced over a span of more than forty years. The mixing and merging of ambivalent ethnological narratives is central to his articulations; the two essays (one of which was originally authored in English) and seven stories which I examine here provide an insightful, albeit not definitive, sense of his preoccupations that resonate well with our translational times; I argue that the *récit* (story) does not exist in the time of the narrator but instead in the time of the translator, reader and interpreter. My deployment here of the critical theorist Benjamin here is then not so much an ‘unworking’ of Rai’s work as a gesturing to the life that someone gives to the work through translation.

Etymologically speaking, the word translation comes from the Latin *translat-us*, ‘carried over,’ serving as past participle of *transférre*, ‘to bring over, carry over’ (cf. transfer), from trans- + latus, ‘borne, carried’. Benjamin’s notion of ‘afterlife’, found in the transformation that takes place via translation, throws light on this. Salvaging is at the core of the process of translation. This is no nostalgia for a lost original but a gesture towards an afterlife; it is an attempt to salvage, to reclaim a future from the ruins of the past. Translation emerges from the life of the original; not from its own life, as it were, but from its afterlife. Having been borne across

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10. In his comments on Benjamin’s essay, Derrida – the much-translated polyglot – posits that the story of Babel relates “among other things, the origin of the confusion of tongues, the irreducible multiplicity of idioms, the necessary and impossible task of translation, its necessity as impossibility” (Derrida 1985)

11. Personal communication with Lepcha.

12. The aura of the ‘original’ is demystified by tearing away the work from the “fabric of tradition” of which it was a part; “mechanical reproduction emancipates the work of art from its parasitical dependence on ritual”. Benjamin makes this argument in the seminal essay: “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” (1969a: 211, 224).
the world, not only linguistically but culturally and socially, not a few of us can lay
claim to being ourselves translated men and women, even though not all forms of
migrancy and dislocation are equal.

With the words, “I too am a translated man”, the Indo-British writer Salman
Rushdie intrudes into the narrative of his novel _Shame_. He reflects: I think I’ve
been fortunate, in a way, because of the accidents of my life, to have insider access
to a number of worlds. But something happens to individuals who move across
the planet: out of language, out of culture, out of place… Something is lost in
translation. However, you can also add to whatever it is you think of as yourself, as
a result of such a journey, such a translation (Rushdie 1984: 29).13

In the work I discuss here of the other two translators of Rai, Anmole Prasad’s
and Michael Hutt’s stories carry some of that sense of journeying. Hutt explains
in the preface to his translation project _Himalayan Voices_: It is part of a transla-
tor’s duty to explain and interpret, and I have tried to do this as unobtrusively as
possible with a fairly brief introduction to the genre and its themes and with an
explanation of Nepali terms and cultural references in brief footnotes to the texts.
A number of Nepali words have been retained in these translations because no
single English word could adequately translate them (1991: xii).

Thus, in the social realist story reminiscent of the iconic Hindi writer
Premchand, ‘The Storm Raged all Night Long’, _sayapatri_ is not rendered as ’marigold’
nor in its botanical name _Tagetes erecta_. ‘Sayapatri’ is a shrub that is central to
Hindu worship; no Nepali yard is complete without this flowering plant. One might
read this, then, not so much as an issue of maintaining authenticity in translation,
as a question of the untranslatability of certain cultural terms. The story itself con-
cerns the issue of specific locations, of home and belonging. Through the polarities
etched between land and landslide, storm and lull, town and country, house and
home, the narrative is invigorated by the leitmotif of _building_ – of rebuilding a
life – a familiar theme in Rai’s fiction. After resisting the temptation of moving
back and “enjoying living in a proper _building_ in the middle of town”, a mental shift
is focalized through the female protagonist back to the storm-ravaged hearth and
land: It’s true, the storm did do some damage. But we’ll put it right now. It’s not an
impossible task, I have my house, my cowshed, my cows in the shed. And there’s
the land, with thirty or forty bamboo trees, and fig trees and fruit trees too. The
rows of cucumbers stretch up to the sky… How much damage can a storm really
do, after all? I must go now and get started (Poddar and Prasad 2009: 83).

Another of Rai’s translators, Anmole Prasad, describes the task of translating
the ‘slice-of-life’ depicted in the story ‘The Ordinariness of a Day’, as a tightrope

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13. One cannot not note, at the same time, his striking dismissal of non-Anglophone Indian
literatures.
walk (ibid: 55–62): between the contending poles of verisimilitude and interpretation, likewise tangible in the substitution of some of the botanical names and the retention of other ‘native’ ones. One is allowed to wonder whether the cataloguing of species in the story was not the result of the author’s prior encounter with landscapes in the target language itself (Insert reference page number).14

The story unfolds in a garden where a couple talk ordinarily as they walk around, and nothing really happens. As the story’s narrative hovers over the horti-agriscape to capture the tug and oscillation of a couple’s heartstrings, closing open-endedly with a hop across a hopscotch, what becomes evident are the translational border crossings between more than one discursive territory, adding a sense of completion in enlarging the original.

The act of translation in this sense can be likened to Indra Bahadur Rai’s derived idea of Leela Lekhan (or literally, playful writing). This refers to a kind of interpretation where the vantage point (however changing) of the observer/translator allows a freer reading than the original may seem to demand. Though likened to Reader-response theory or Reception theory, Leela writing is probably best seen as a loose translation of Jacques Derrida’s conception of free play (1986). Although likened to Reader-response theory or Reception theory, Leela writing is probably best seen as a loose translation of Jacques Derrida’s conception of free play (1986). For instance, Rai’s Arthharuko Pachhilitira (or Behind the Meanings 1994), has a multiplicity of authors whose authority is always placed in doubt. Derrida’s Glas has an excess of boundaries which divide up the text inside itself in order to deliberately subvert the unified text. Wholeness or textual unity is conspicuously absent; fragments offer multiple beginnings and endings. Glas can be said to be almost a text and yet more than a text. By juxtaposing two columns of text Derrida compels the reader to engage in the ‘air battle’ between pure philosophical ‘truth’ and perverse literary ‘free play’. Such highlighting of the connection between thought and language, and the playful questioning of the borders between philosophical and literary writing, is a hallmark of Derrida’s work.

Rai does not display this kind of virtuosity, though he struggles with similar ideas. Rai has attracted his fair share of criticism for borrowing from trendy western theory. Apart from being called a fascist by leftist writers like Parijat,15 he is also seen by some as an elitist trying to impress: this from an entry in Gorkhapedia:

Indra Bahadur Rai’s prose is notoriously dense, packed with idiosyncratic expressions and jarring turn of phrases [sic]. When a simple word can do IB will extract the most obscure synonym. In short IB’s project is to infect Nepali literature

14. Personal communication with the translator. Having been a lecturer in English literature, it comes as no surprise that Rai’s syntax sometimes echoes that of English.

15. The Kathmandu-based writer and critic Manjushree Thapa also sees Parijat and Rai as having ‘politically divergent’ views.
with the ‘intellectual’ incomprehensibility of his mentors such as Derrida, Lacan and Baudrillard and put Nepali literature out of reach of ordinary readers. (Gorkhapedia n.d.)

The translated stories and essays discussed here nevertheless display none of this; clarity characterises almost all of them. Rai, although he has not been dislocated like the refugees, asylum seekers and migrants of some his fiction, is able to communicate the trauma of their precarious lives. In his fiction/writings, what is sometimes, (though not always) ‘carried over’ in the liminal space between here and there, now and then, is really the texture and the tone of such traumatic life. Caught in the spaces between Nepal, Darjeeling, Sikkim, Bhutan, North-Eastern India, Burma, and the various theatres of war around the world, Rai’s characters dramatise the in-betweenness of longing and belonging. (One might imagine a future story from him or from another writer in Nepali, where the ‘postcolonial’ or decolonised space of the imperial metropolis throws up a similar predicament: a retired Gorkha soldier in Alperton in London, for example, wondering how he got there, how he was sent to Afghanistan like many of his forebears, why he puts up with the BNP fascist taunts).16 There is then a profound complexity to Rai characters seen as diasporic subjects – in India and around the world.

As some Gorkhas demand group rights in the form of Gorkhland, the pitfalls of ethno-nationalism cannot simply be wished away. Critical intellectual sympathy for minorities designated inferior in the lens of modernity and sometimes postmodernity (outsiders, migrants, women, indigenous ‘tribes’, the insane and so on) alerts the contemporary Indian to the need for attending to those same categories of people in India. In terms borrowed from Foucault – who stressed that the Enlightenment brought by the modern institution was always accompanied by dark shadows – any regime of normalcy engenders exclusion. In similar fashion, the category ‘Indian citizen’ presupposes the category ‘non-Indian citizen’, and in the discourses of modernity the former is assigned a positive connotation at the expense of the latter. The same is true of a discursive opposition that sets up terms such as ‘non-Bengali’ or ‘non-domicile’, even ‘non-Gorkha’, ‘non-Nepali’. The intellectual challenge is to interrogate how the oppositional term has been produced historically, and further to explain how power is distributed in constituting and reproducing the opposition. The matrix of the ‘national’ here is overdetermined, as the ‘Nepali’ or ‘Gorkha’ seeks to locate and relocate. How can the vernacular jati (regardless of its usage in Nepali or Hindi or any other language) contain the national and/or ethnic imaginary of the Nepali/Gorkha heartland? The all-too-easy assumption of unruffled translatability of terms such as jati into ‘nation’ has

16. Fighting foreign wars is not an exercise that elicits much applause in Nepali verse, though in prose the predicament of soldier-characters receives sympathetic treatment.
to be brought into question by suggesting the myriad uses of local vocabulary, and the play of metonymic gaps.\(^{17}\)

**Short story and subalternity**

The transmission or translation of a story necessarily involves reshaping. In that it is like inheritance, a re-membered tradition. But it also motions toward the future and a community’s desire to live on, to undertake new journeys. In a sense, one might consider the afterlife of the story not only in terms of figurative translation but the literal mode of travel. The potentiality, the possible futuricity in the afterlife of the story is the repository of a community’s liberatory hopes and desires. In a Chekhovian vein, the Nepali poet Lakshmiprasad Devkota uses the term *jhyalbata* to observe that the short story is like a glimpse of life seen through a window (see Hutt 1991: 188). Debts to Hindi and western literatures in the development of the form are quite clear even though Nepali scholars disagree.\(^{18}\) There are times when writers are able to convey a novelistic depth and span of emotions within the limited confines of the short story genre.\(^{19}\) It is not necessarily the scope of the novella

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17. The metonym creates its own cultural space or gap between the English/European language and the postcolonial context. The ‘metonymic gap’, is further explained by Ashcroft as, “[…] that cultural gap formed when appropriations of a colonial language insert unglossed words, phrases or passages from a first language, or concepts, allusions or references that may be unknown to the reader. Such words become synecdochic of the writer’s culture – the part that stands for the whole – rather than representations of the world…its very resistance to interpretation constructs a ‘gap’ between the writer’s culture and the colonial culture. (Ashcroft 2007: 134).

Metonymic gaps can be a way into an intercultural site: “literature, and particularly narrative, has the capacity to domesticate even the most alien experience” (Ashcroft 1995: 302). Metonymic gaps, therefore, impede the reader from relating back to existing schemata and consequently to ethnocentrism.


19. In the essay ‘The Storyteller’ Benjamin views the novel, which is a printed form, as a solitary experience, while its predecessor, the story, belongs to “the realms of living speech” ([year missing] 87). Following this it is worth noting that the modern short story is of course part of the same development as the novel’s rise in print capitalism. Interestingly, in 1934, in an address delivered to the Institute for the Study of Fascism in Paris, Benjamin declared, “We are in the midst of a vast process in which literary forms are being melted down, a process in which many of the contrasts in terms of which we have been accustomed to think may lose their meaning” ([year missing]89). On incorporating his idea of *Leela Lekhan* in his short story, ‘Jhyal’, Rai declares ahistorically: “Nothing has a fixed form so why should a story have a fixed form?” (NOW 2002: 7).
or the short long story or the long short story that makes this possible; it is the masterful practitioner of the short fiction form who sometimes packs an almost historical sweep of events circumscribing the lives of characters caught in a momentous upheaval. Rai’s ‘Jaimaya Alone Arrived at Likhapani’ is able to convey the scope as well as scope of this (Poddar and Prasad 2009: 147–167). The backdrop of socio-political turmoil in Burma, the modes of belonging and alienation – a staple of postcolonial literatures of dislocation – that the soldier protagonist (Jaimaya’s father) and his fellow Nepalese experience as fleeing refugees, are all brought out vividly and economically in this piece. As the British retreat from Burma under the onslaught of the Japanese, the Subedar contemplates the 224-mile road to Sumprabung while a compatriot puts on a brave front: Those in Rangoon and Akyab left last year; our brothers-in-law from Mandalay are already in Manipur. Only we have lagged behind. Who would have believed that those midgets could have advanced so far? But no matter, Subedar sa’ab: we’ll be there too. Once we cross the Takab River, we’re home (2009: 151).

‘Home’ here is not Nepal from where the Subedar’s father came, on the heels of the third Burmese war, when he joined the Burmese military police. Home is British India, somewhere in the north-eastern part of the country. An imaginatively invested reportage-like quality also characterises ‘Jarr: A Story that Happened’, which retells a tale of the flight of a lover from the wrath of a cuckolded husband, across the geography of a porous border that separates and yet joins Nepal and India (Poddar and Prasad 2009: 27–51). Nepali valour and honour are powerfully conveyed. Hints of reflexivity in the narrative, however, about the colonial construction and subsequent internalisation of martial discourse in the community which renders the Gorkha as *bir* or brave, are difficult to find.

The short story as a genre, it has been argued, is specially suited to the representation of unsettled identities. That is why writing in postcolonial societies from Australia to Zimbabwe has tended to claim the form as distinctly befitting their needs. The particular appeal of the form in subaltern populations (among readers as well as writers) seems to answer to a sense of nation, state, region, or even self, that is not all that secure. Though we might ask whether Rai’s (or for that matter, any Nepali writer’s) stories attest to the subaltern sense of Nepali culture and Gorkha society in ways more significant, subtle, or precise than his novels. A blur in the boundaries between genres can anyway be seen in the experimental

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20. Among the other reasons cited for the short story’s inordinate representation in literatures of the emerging or postcolonial world include economic considerations. Where only small publishing houses exist, low-capital magazines often constitute the main outlet for new writing. Inevitably the short story and poetry finds favour in such a context: although the latter is probably better developed in Nepali.
writing that *Ayamik Lekhan* (the Dimensionist Movement of which Rai was a leading light) advocated.\(^{21}\) ‘Maina’s Mother is Just Like Us’ abstracts chunks of time so that we see the mother’s contemporaneous selling of vegetables in the market square juxtaposed cubistically (in one of the languages of early twentieth century painting) with her appearance in another time, pre- or, perhaps, post-market square, in a nomadic universe (Hutt 1991: 182). According to Hutt, who translated the story, it expresses the historical and cultural consciousness of the poorer sections of Darjeeling’s émigré Nepali community: farmers and workers driven out of eastern Nepal during the past few centuries by landlessness, poverty, and unemployment (Hutt 1991: 182).

Compressing these hundred-and-fifty odd years into the span of a partially pictured life, changes are suggested in the historical settlement of Darjeeling, but in terms of the relations of production, nothing seems to have altered for Maina’s mother (who is ‘just like us’ – all Gorkhas) as the narrative arrives at a close: “The whole bazaar left its work and came toward her. A thousand faces surrounded her, asking, ‘Why did you come here?’” Another of Rai’s stories adopts a different perspective. Not without irony, the Maughamesque ‘Ghosh Babu’ is an empathetic representation of a Bengali dry-cleaner resident in Darjeeling.

‘My wife washes the world’s dirty clothes as well, what work that is!’ I looked towards the town. Under the Himalaya, Darjeeling was in bright sunshine, and its tumult of voices could be heard: it was as if they were laughing at what Ghosh Babu had said (Poddar and Prasad 2009: 25).

Rai’s Darjeeling is not by any stretch of the imagination James Joyce’s Dublin, but there is an attempt all the same to capture the multiplicity and synchronicity of a town/city as it unfolds in narrative. In retrospect it is difficult not to see Joyce’s *Ulysses* as a precursor to the portrayal of Irishness in *Dubliners*, his celebrated collection of stories. Another Irishman, Frank O’Connor (known famously as the ‘Irish Chekhov’), in his manifesto on the short story, found in it always “this sense of outlawed figures wandering about the fringes of society”, giving it “its most characteristic something we do not often find in the novel – an intense awareness of human loneliness” (O’Connor 1963: 19). Joyce’s portraits of Dubliners live up to this, and we see this sometimes in Rai’s Darjeeling. Rai’s Gorkhaness, however, is in no ways comparable to Joyce’s culturally hybrid Irishness (a cosmopolitanism for which he has been attacked by nationalist critics). Although it is not easy to

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\(^{21}\) *Sampurnata* or ‘totality’ was Ayam’s clarion call. Georg Lukács (see Löwy 1979) had insisted that only by portraying the totality of the societal process could art (especially the novel) reflect the progressive tendencies of history. Benjamin, the anti-historicist, as I discuss later, proceeded differently: it is the sharp fleeting insight of the fragment, the present historical instant in the fragmentary that has transformative potential.
establish the general applicability of the short story form itself to real or imagined subalternity, we can still consider the kind of cultural work it can do, as evidenced in Rai’s imagining, in a context of marginalisation.

Marginality and linguistic minority

Nepali is one of the 22 officially recognised languages in India, as well as a major Indian literary language approved by the Sahitya Akademi. It is the majority language in Nepal but a minority one in India. Rai has, quite problematically, spoken of a language barrier between the two traditions of writing in these terms: The Nepali written in Nepal leans heavily on its Bhramanical [sic] side, whereas majority of the Indian Nepalese are Mongoloids and this has given rise to certain differences in the usage (NOW! 2002: 6).

There are, however, different ways of thinking about the ‘minor’. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari have deployed the term ‘minor’ to explain how Franz Kafka exploits the situation of German language in Prague (where it was ‘corrupted’ by the presence of Yiddish and Czech) by deploying “its syntactic and stylistic ‘poverty’” in aid of “a new sobriety, a new expressivity, a new flexibility” (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 23). ‘Minor’, here, is not to be confused with regionalism; for Deleuze and Guattari, regional writing, which gravitates towards cultural nationalism, is “nostalgic and essentialist”, full of “archaisms that [it is] trying to impart a contemporary sense to (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 24).” Apart from the purely geographical reasons of residency in two territorially separate nation-states, this is why critics in Nepal cannot frame writing from Darjeeling, Dooars, Sikkim, and Assam as being ‘regional’ (kshetriya) though some may indeed express ethno-nationalist sympathies.22 The potential of a ‘minor’ literature lies rather in its marginal location, its fragile border position that pushes it “to express another possible community and to forge the means for another consciousness and another sensibility” (ibid. 1986: 17). The ‘major’ tradition in this sense can never be revolutionary. For the ‘minor’ literature, on the other hand, as Abdul JanMohammed and David Lloyd argue: “symptoms of inadequacy can be read transformatively as indications and figurations of values radically opposed to those of the dominant culture” (1990: 8). In their concern about the role of the academic and the ‘objective alienation’ of the minority intellectual, they come close to linking the notion of ‘minority’ to the political resistance and irreducible difference that the subaltern has come to

22. Relations are of course intimate: the established writer and critic Balkrishna Sama is reported as having declared: “What Darjeeling thinks today, Nepal thinks tomorrow” (Giri and Pariyar 1977: 5).
represent. The ‘inadequate’ or the ‘minor’ in this sense signifies the possibilities of empowerment. Extrapolating from this mode, one could view the positionality of the interrogating Gorkha writer/intellectual as emerging from a space that ruptures the confines of a nation from which they sometimes feel excluded.

There is a danger here. There is always a desire for the ‘minor’ to become ‘major’. To retain its political and subversive edge, Deleuze and Guattari suggest opposing “the oppressed quality of this language to its oppressive quality” and finding “points of nonculture or underdevelopment (1986: 26–27).” The short story knows how to remain minor: Henry James (1934: 117–231) emphasises that the short story must be seen not as limitation or deficit or lacking in the full frequency of the novel but as a form that produces its own unique effects of ‘multiplicity’; Elizabeth Bowen sees the shortness of the short story as ‘positive’(Bowen 1950: 39); Samuel Beckett envisions the radical potentiality of the art form where we read not a ‘partial object’ but a “total object, complete with missing parts” (Beckett 1965: 101). The short story’s unfinished economy links it to the ‘inadequate’ or ‘minor’ in a literature – away from the power and institution that is associated with ‘major’ literature. It would be a tall claim to make that the short story is unique in fulfilling this minority function, but writers can indeed use its interrogative features to mount a creative resistance. I do not claim that Rai’s stories necessarily attain this mode all the time, but ‘Maina’s Mother is Just Like Us’ definitely comes close to being radical.

Interspersed with passages that read like elements of a short story, Rai’s essay ‘Hills and Streams’ provides a narrative reminiscent of the approach found in the Smithian ethno-symbolic account of nationalism I mentioned above. (One of the problems in the translated essay is the rendering of the term *jati* as ‘race’ and *jana-jati* as ‘sub-race’ even if, one could argue, that is the original intent of the author.) The Nepali *ethnie* (or nation) thus comes to be considered as a community of genealogical descent, with its own native history, vernacular language and culture, and popular mobilization: “golden sayapatri”, “gundruk”, “timur”, “chimphing”, “Dasain”, “Tihar”, “a racehood that has lasted 3000 years”.23

One cannot fail to read the ‘origin house’ (*moolghar*) that stands on the ridge in ‘Hills and Streams’ as an emblem or metaphor for nation. Its residents are a unified people, a *jati* (translated here as ‘race’) whose origins are lost in the primordial past, held together by what Benedict Anderson calls ‘a deep horizontal comradeship’24 even as it is riven by the inequities of caste. The government official

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23. For Rai, the rejection of the ‘Aryan’-Hindu festivals ‘Tihar’ and ‘Dasain’ by the ‘Mongoloid’ *janajati* (or sub-ethnie) constitutes a fissure in the ethnic/national imaginary.

24. For Anderson the nation is an ‘imagined political community’. Nationalism is a product of the rise of reading publics engendered by the spread of ‘print capitalism’ (Anderson 1983).
in the essay, who has benefited from reservation policies and lives somewhere in
the plains of India, wants to visit the origin house to see whether it is still stand-
ing and what its condition might be. “The next day, he arrives at the border in a
government vehicle. At dusk he enters the Nepali district. He had already entered
a hired vehicle and a discussion with a fellow traveller” about “political unification
and racial unification”. He discovers that the origin house, standing in for the na-
tion, “is a strong, bright, cheerful, able, confident house… which stands wide and
tall before him… ‘It won’t fall down, this house!’”. Even as the hills may be denuded
by change, [t]he rivers are always going somewhere, they always remain. There is a
sense here in terms of a visual metaphor that swims into the eye of the politically
‘imagined community’ flowing across the border as a diasporic consciousness: “In
some part of him he feels that although they have gone their separate ways they
have still not become separate (Poddar and Prasad: 181–190).

Although the essay could be read as raising the highly charged issue of a
“Greater Nepal”, at least in terms of a cultural project, it is probably better seen
as an articulation of pan-Gorkha ‘racial’ cohesion, while bemoaning the propaga-
tion of a division based on ‘sub-racial’ or ‘tribal’ (Tamang, Limbu, etc.) lines in
the Darjeeling region. The authorial voice is clearly disapproving of this divisory
stance: When will the Nepali race ever get anywhere when it has to walk the main
street taking everything along with it? The path of the sub-race is our only short
one, a way of quick progress. For how long will we wait together, with the future of
the race our only aim? (Poddar and Prasad 2009: 94–103).

The narrator in ‘Ghosh Babu’ is similarly self-critical of Gorkha impatience:
“We prefer short paths, that’s our custom, and we’re not patient enough to see
another’s point of view. We’re quick to blame others, I went on” (Ibid.: 25).

In Rai’s later essay entitled ‘Indian Nepali Nationalism and Nepali Poetry’
(1994), which appeared originally in English, he subscribes to the idea of India as
a multi-ethnic nation. Here, Rai speaks of a nation-building process that stresses
the need to understand the different stages in which different regions (and ethno-
nationalisms) may find themselves: As a result of uneven development in the
country, some units of the Indian nation have fallen behind the others, and these
facts, together with the attendant feelings, have to be reflected in their literatures
(Ibid.: 87).

His view draws from the standard historicist, developmentalist vision which
measures progress universally and incrementally. On the other hand, the rather
short short story, ‘Light’ (‘Ujyalo’), is almost anti-developmental, nostalgic in
its celebration of a world without electric light. Light’s banishment of shadows is
equated with vulgarity, while narrative becomes the illuminant in an almost O.
Henry ending: “But now our home is a cage for civilisation. Today I achieved a
small triumph over civilisation. I switched off the light, lit the lamp, and wrote this.”
All of Rai’s narratives somehow end up illuminating the parameters of (dis)location, subalternity and resistance as Gorkhas become historical subjects.

**Awakening historical memory: Diaspora and danger**

Writing in his ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’, Benjamin famously states “there is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism. And just as such a document is not free of barbarism, barbarism taints also the manner in which it was transmitted from one owner to another” (1969b: 256–257). The task of the historian, he writes, is not to relive the past by empathy, not to set the present aside in order to recover (in a raw sense) ‘the way it really was’, and certainly not to locate and portray, as was the wont of the colonial enterprise, different peoples on a civilisational scale of progress in linear ‘homogeneous empty time’, as if that is what made up human history. Benjamin’s famous image of the Angel of History illustrates the logic by which a confused and tumultuous nation-state moves towards a catastrophic future on a path laid down by a distorted account of the past. With his back turned to the future, “[w]here we see the appearance of a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe, which unceasingly piles rubble on top of rubble and hurls it before his feet […] That which we call progress, is this storm” (1969: 249).

The historian or the intellectual, in Benjamin’s vision, would be one who “seize[s] hold of a memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger” and be “man enough to blast open the continuum of history” (Benjamin 1969a: 252–63).

Rejecting a form of linear history cast in terms of progress, and the historicist attempt to recover ‘the way it really was’, Benjamin similarly de-privileges notions of the organic and original in relation to literature, preferring to see the ‘life and afterlife’ of literary works as they appear in translation. The history that translation reveals (as it continues to develop its life in coming generations), is not one of closure but becoming. The original is opened up to the extremes and apparent excesses of historical possibility to be found in language: not what a work is, but what it might be.

As I see it, Rai’s reflections on the Nepali language, the Gorkha/Nepali community, and his own writing practice can be read in two ways. The first is in terms of telos: that writing will strengthen the nation or ethnie. The second is the more troubled interrogative reading that questions cultural identity, *inter alia* through textual elisions and ambivalences, about writing and the Gorkha/Nepali community. I raise the possibility of, and vacillate between, both kinds of reading in this essay, but the very act of vacillating veers me towards the latter. The trope of ‘building’ that runs through Rai’s novel *Aaja Ramita Chha* (1964) must be seen...
not simply as materialistically aspirational, as a derivative symbol of arrival for the protagonist, but as a measure of dwelling that is at home in history. We await the arrival of such a translation, such a liberating history, a futuricity, a place where the received and assertive vocabulary of cultural community is recast.

Writers like Rai are interesting precisely because of the paradox that they embody. The subjectivity of such a diasporic writer hovers as a translated body imagining displacement as well as emplacement – enacting iteratively the translational process in the manufacture of a hybrid self. Such a diasporic hybrid ontology transgresses national borders and begins to recast symbolic territories that define and mark nations. Translation, thus enacts “a process of alienation and of second-ariness in relation to itself” (Bhabha 1990: 210). Rai at one level comes across as a Gorkha nationalist/ethnicist, but at another level, the necessary ambivalence of his text ends up imagining and rewriting a more inclusive community and nation: how else could one possibly read ‘Ghosh Babu’?

I began with an epigraph from Ondaatje who writes, as a variation on Adorno’s ‘No poetry after Auschwitz’, about poetic risks in dredging up explosive historical memory. I want to end with lines in the final stanza of ‘Sadhain-Sadhain Mero Sapanama’ (1959) from the Nepali poet Bhupi Sherchan (1936: 89); his critique of wars in which his Nepali countrymen were fighting on the side of imperialism is a way of rejecting the disavowal of mercenary violence. Without such an acknowledgment the spectres of a traumatic past cannot be exorcised; the poem itself then articulates the silence encrypted around that matrix of events:

So always always in my dream
a great ocean forms:
the tears of the men in Malaya; a corpse rises up and a corpse sinks down
in every ocean wave,
regarding me with hatred.
Ah in my dreams I am loathed
by the history of my awakening.

(Sherchan quoted in Hutt 1991: 123)

References


CHAPTER 3

North-South relations in linguistic science
Collaboration or colonialism?

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In this chapter, we attempt to unmask the ideological bias inherent in influential conceptions of the methods, motivations and practices of endangered language documentation research (ELDR). We highlight the extent to which common justifications for ELDR suppress the sociocultural and historical relations within which its practices are situated. We review the historical evolution of language documentation research, and its relationship to language preservation and revitalization. We ask what it is that makes ELDR scientific, critically analysing the models of “language” and of “science” that are frequently deployed in arguments for its importance, and question the value-neutrality of the notion “scientific community” in this context. We suggest that the conjunction of dominant concepts of “language” and “data” generates an ideological construction of unequal competence that operates to justify unequal North-South exchange relations.

We document this claim of unequal and at times abusive North-South exchange with brief, anonymized case studies. We conclude by noting that, in comparison with other social science disciplines, linguistics seems resistant to reflexive and self-critical analysis of its ideological dimension; and suggesting possible ways of raising awareness and generalizing models of good practice.

Keywords: endangered languages, ideology of linguistics, language documentation, language preservation, language revitalization

Introduction: Why document endangered languages?

To most linguists, and many non-linguists perhaps, the answer to this question is self-evident. Both existing, and documented but extinct, languages are vital resources for scientists to study the nature of, and the constraints on, language variation; and thus, indirectly, the human language faculty and the human mind more generally. The languages and language varieties of interest to Endangered Language Documentation researchers will not be, or may not be, there to study in...
vivo in the future, and if they are not documented now they will not be available for future generations of scholars. This is the argument most frequently advanced by linguists to convince governments, inter- and non-governmental agencies and other funding bodies that this research field matters and requires funding. Sometimes, the argument is also put forward that language diversity is a value in itself, analogously with biodiversity, in that languages are the most important bearers of the cultural heritage of the communities that speak them. These two arguments are not, however, always seen as necessarily complementary, and when the latter is advanced it is frequently couched in terms of an immaterial heritage whose value (analogously, in this context, with material heritage artworks and artefacts) is frequently conceptualized in terms of larger groups – nation states and their citizens, humanity as a whole – rather than for the still-existing speech communities.

We do not challenge the force or validity of either of these arguments in themselves. But we do question the bypassing of unarticulated critical questions – “whose heritage?” and “heritage or contemporary life resource?” – that the focus on scientific, national and human heritage tends to push to the background. When endangered languages are viewed primarily through the lens of heritage, and the everyday language practices of the communities that speak (or used to speak) them are neglected, these communities themselves are de-privileged in the discourse of Endangered Language Documentation Research (henceforth ELDR). In this case, we can speak of a “heritage ideology” which is reinforced by influential (and often uncritically accepted) conceptions of linguistic science and scientific method. The conception of language that informs and sustains the heritage ideology is that of “language as an object”, viewed from outside by an (ideally disinterested) scientific observer who is equipped, by both training and material resources, to analyse the language and disseminate the results of her/his analysis to other members of the scientific community.

Again, we do not challenge these conceptions in themselves. ELD researchers are subject to the same professional imperative to communicate research findings to the scientific community as researchers in other fields – even more so, perhaps, in the recent past, when ELDR faced the task of legitimizing itself as a recognized field of scientific activity. Furthermore, the mainstream traditions of linguistic science have long viewed language as a synchronic system, taking a 3rd person perspective, and the working assumptions of many subfields of linguistics, including most approaches to typological linguistics, reflect this conceptualization. However, both theoretically and in relation to ELDR practices, the language-as-object view is constricting and incomplete. Although it may represent the historically dominant paradigms of linguistics, it does not represent the whole of language science; in particular it does not represent those research enterprises
that are primarily interested in languages as communicative tools, and in speech/language as a social practice.

The “language-as-object” view meshes with the heritage ideology because it views a language as a kind of symbolic package handed down from generation to generation, whose transmission is ideally both whole and accurate, with deviations from these normative ideals (such as those arising from language contact or intergenerational differences in contexts of acquisition and use) being viewed as unfortunate noise in the data. The language-as-object view thus also reinforces the choices of data that are privileged in ELDR, that is, monologic speech genres (such as narratives) produced by older speakers, who are viewed as (and often are) more knowledgeable about both language and cultural heritage (Austin 2016). Again, we do not dispute the importance of such data, but we do emphasize that this focus is informed by the heritage ideology, in which the data archive is a museum of a past and more “pure” era, rather than a record of contemporary appropriation strategies towards the endangered language employed by speakers with varying degrees of knowledge, occupying diverse positions in the society.

The language-as-object view may serve, then, as an ideological support for the conceptual separation of the endangered language from the community that speaks (or is ceasing to speak) it. Just as Richard Dawkins (1976) argued that organisms are merely vehicles for the replication of genes, so communities may be viewed as merely vehicles for the transmission of a language; language variation and language relationships being viewed from an internalist and autonomous perspective, divorced from both communities and cultures. This is not a caricature, as witness the controversy generated by recent defences of the argument (which is itself not new: Sharifian 2015) that grammar is significantly culturally motivated (Everett 2005, 2009; Nevins, Pesetsky and Rodrigues 2009). We acknowledge, of course, that the language-as-object view does not entail that language be viewed as autonomous from culture and community. Rather, we are suggesting that it may reinforce a background presupposition of such autonomy. The consequence is that not only do ELDR practices privilege certain data choices over others, but also the language itself is viewed as free-floating data, ownership of which and access to which communities neither have nor should have special rights over. Endangered language data are, in this view, primarily scientific heritage data, in whose use and preservation the main stakeholders are the scientific community.

The countries containing “sites of interest” for ELDR are often in the non-Anglophone global “South”. The ELD researchers, and the agencies funding the research, are often from the global “North”.¹ The relationship between researcher

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¹. The terms “North” and “South”, like “Western” and “non-Western”, are not strictly geographical in this context. They are metonyms for conceptual complexes that differentiate global
and researched is, therefore, frequently a *North-South relationship*, with all the socio-political complexities that this carries with it. It is also, of course, the case that linguists who are nationals of countries of the “South” also conduct ELDR, sometimes in conjunction with language revitalization programmes, and sometimes in collaboration with researchers from the “North”. We address the North-South dimension of researcher-community relations in more detail in the third section of this chapter; and North-South ELDR research collaborations in the fourth section. Here, we wish to stress that the language-as-object view also operates as an ideological support for unequal power relations (and *unequal exchange*) not only *between* the academe and the communities, but also *within* the academe, because of the way in which it valorizes certain kinds of skills over others. In the academic world of linguistic science, “theory” and “pure research” have traditionally been more highly valued than “applied” research; “data collection” is seen as a purely mechanical, cognitively “light” activity; and local and contextual knowledge gained through personal experience of field work is devalued in comparison with theoretical knowledge. All of this amounts to the devaluation, familiar to many experienced field workers, of *knowledge as practice* and *practice as knowledge*.

Knowledge as practice/practice as knowledge can be thought of as encompassing both the “know-how” that underpins field research, and the reflexive stance that is *theoretically* enjoined upon researchers in all disciplines that employ qualitative research methods. It includes, but is not reducible to, knowledge of how to use technical equipment and software tools. Unfortunately, just such a reduction, that bypasses the difficult and complex questions of the theory and practice of ethnographic research, intercultural communication, field research ethics, indigenous rights and intellectual property, is all too common in the education and training of ELD researchers. We return to these issues in our concluding reflections. In the next section, we examine in greater depth, on the basis of the previous work of the first author, the development over the past twenty years of changing conceptions of ELDR, of the relationships between documentation, description, archiving and revitalization, and of the differing spheres of ideology within which ELDR exists and which impinge upon its theory and practice.

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populations on geo-political and economic grounds, with a component of differential valorization. For example, the so-called “Fourth World” indigenous minorities of North America may be considered to be part of the global “South”, while the non-indigenous majority of, say, Australia, may be considered to be part of the global “North”. We therefore use scare quote marks for these terms (but not for the phrase North-South relations, which should be understood as denoting relations between the global “North” and the global “South”).
ELDR: Evolving paradigms

At this juncture we would like to propose a set of constructs to clarify the evolving paradigms of the still developing field of ELDR, which should be understood as having contributed to the ongoing collective debates and publications of the last decade (such as the collections in Brenzinger 2006; and Austin and Sallabank 2010). This set of constructs, which encapsulate changing ELDR paradigms, will serve as a backdrop for our later discussion of North-South relations in endangered language research.²

The formula that we propose in order to capture the evolution of the new sub-discipline of ELDR is ‘D-D.A+R′, in which the linear order – Description, then Documentation and Archiving, then Revitalization – reflects the chronological order of elaboration of these sub-fields; and the symbols used to link them are meant to match familiar linguistic glossing conventions marking different types of relations between elements. The symbol ‘−‘ in ‘D-D′ is meant to resemble a morphemic segmentation, meaning ‘description and documentation’; ‘·‘ in ‘D.A′ to show the unit formed by ‘archiving of documentation’; and ‘+‘ in ‘D.A+R′ to mark the addition over time of revitalization as an activity systematically incorporated in the complex of practices constituting ELDR. This last link of ‘D-D.A plus revitalization’ can also be formulated more explicitly as D-D.A ‘FOR’ revitalization.

Within modern linguistics, the activity of description was long regarded as something of a poor cousin to “theory”, but it has in recent years regained value both for its essential empirical role in work on yet un(der)-described endangered languages, and as a key methodological aspect of new developments in the subfield of linguistic typology. Documentation has entered linguistics under guise of a specific subfield of “documentary linguistics” whose development and standardization has largely been driven by the accelerated development of new technologies. New technologies have also allowed the development of standards for archiving of this documentation. We can note here the essential role played by major funding programmes (notably VW DOBES and ELDP-SOAS) in the last 20 years in setting documentation and archiving norms (Gippert, Himmelman and Mosel 2006).³ As for

². The constructs to be presented here have been amply discussed in recent years within a network of researchers including the University of Lyon research team LED TDR (Langues En Danger: Terrain Documentation and description, Revitalization); its associates in the 3L Consortium (Lyon, London-ELDP SOAS, Leiden); and participants in the 3L series of international summer schools.

³. Several programmes were established around the turn of the century to foster work on endangered languages. The Dokumentation Bedrohter Sprachen (DoBeS) programme, funded by the Volkswagen foundation of Germany, was based at the Max-Planck Institute for
the revitalization link which has been added to the chain (see Grenoble and Whaley 2006), its status remains better recognized in sociolinguistics and anthropological linguistics than in purely linguistic academic circles, where it may sometimes not even be acknowledged, or, when it is, may be consigned to a lesser-valued realm of “applied linguistics” or “social service”, as we examine in more detail below.4

The second element of clarification we will propose considers the relation of linguists to the speakers of the endangered languages with whom they work, and to the linguistic communities to which those speakers belong. This particular topic still finds limited space in discussions of ethics in the field of endangered languages, where discussions are more oriented to legal aspects of intellectual property rights and formal definitions of informed consent, than to the nature of the human interactions in the process of collecting data; reflecting the legalistic approach typical of literate societies. Here again, a formula will be proposed to capture succinctly the evolution, over the second half of the 20th century, of a line of thinking preoccupied with the issue of power relations between researchers (from the academic sphere in general) and researched in the field.

The proposed formula is the simple schema of ‘fieldwork ON, FOR, WITH and BY’ as ‘fieldwork ON (a language), FOR (a community), WITH and BY (speakers)’. This formula is actually an adaptation and extension of a proposition originally made by Cameron et al. (1992) from the field of sociolinguistics, imported into the field of endangered languages in Craig (1993). It spells a progression from fieldwork ON a language (the ideological schema of the 1950s, of field research using native ‘informants’) to fieldwork FOR the linguistic community (the ideological schema of the time of civil rights movements, of the engaged linguist in defence of linguistic rights of minorities, taking an advocacy role in “speaking for” the speakers and the communities); to fieldwork WITH the speakers (the ideological schema that emerged in the 1990s, of empowerment, collaborative research and action research as exemplified in Craig 1992); to which was added, more recently, the final step of the ideal of fieldwork BY speakers trained to be the linguists of their own languages for and within their communities (Grinevald 1998, 2000, 2002, 2006; England 2003; Woodbury and England 2004; Cabral et al. 2016).

Psycholinguistics, Nijmegen; the Hans Rausing Endangered Language Project (HRELP) was established at SOAS, University of London, in 2002; and the Documentation of Endangered Languages (DEL) program was funded by a consortium of US foundations (the National Science Foundation, the National Endowment for the Humanities and the Smithsonian Institute). It was on this funding base that a new subfield of linguistics named “documentary linguistics” (Himmelman 1998, 2006) took shape.

4. We stress that we do not endorse the positioning of applied research as lower in a hierarchy of status and value; rather, we are critically drawing attention to a common (mis-)conception.
Placing native speaker researchers at centre stage in endangered language research brings with it a radical rethinking of the role of linguists in the field, with both synergies and contradictions in terms of expectations in and by the academic sphere, and expectations of the concerned communities of endangered language speakers. It also brings with it the obligation to understand the complex processes of transformation of the personal and cultural identities of the native speaker researchers themselves, as is documented by the native speaker linguist Wary Kamaiurá Sabino in Chapter 4 of this volume. Wary Kamaiurá Sabino describes in vivid detail his trajectory through an educational system, rooted in a society that does not recognize the value of the indigenous person and the indigenous culture. His testimony is vital in understanding how native speaker researchers have to negotiate the contradictions of belonging and not-belonging. As suggested by Costa (p.c.) this is rich material for the further exploration of the links between linguistic rights, diversity, grassroots self-organization, language policy and educational policy and practice (see also Pütz and Filipovic 2016).

Finally, we would like to offer as a last element of clarification a visualization of what Grinevald and Bert (2014) have called the Spheres of Ideologies (see Figure 1) within which the different aspects of ELDR practices operate, are conceptualized and are evaluated. For the purpose at hand here, the academic sphere is represented as standing “autonomously”, next to and outside the “real world”, as represented in the common expression “the ivory tower”, or presupposed in the injunction often addressed to the present authors to “not mix science/academia and politics”. At the core of the prevailing ideology of the academic sphere is its own sense of its research (and teaching) mission, traditionally articulated as a notion of “pure science” demanding a distancing from what is perceived as the messiness of the “real world.” We argue below that this ideological stance is not neutral, as it holds itself to be, but in fact validates relations of unequal exchange, as a consequence of which it is increasingly challenged in many parts of the developing world.

The world “out there” is represented in Figure 1 as a nested arrangement of four stacked spheres of international, national, regional and local scope, from a world-encompassing domain to the very local sphere within which fieldwork takes place on the ground. The local sphere where fieldwork takes place is the sphere where linguists encounter the languages they describe, document, and, in some circumstances, help revitalize. It is the sphere of contact with a linguistic community, and of face-to-face interactions with speakers and all other actors involved in some way with the fate of the endangered languages.

A major issue for ELD researchers is how to deal with the great variety of speakers that one is most likely to encounter in endangered language situations, who not only vary in their levels of pragmatic and grammatical competence as well as lexical knowledge, but also in their attitudes toward the language, as well as their
interest in sharing their knowledge. These are some of the basic ingredients that are being considered for the elaboration of a typology of speakers of endangered languages, as proposed in Grinevald and Bert (2010a, 2010b), following up on pioneering work by Dorian (1982). This variety of speakers places on researchers complex demands for interpersonal skills in developing field methods appropriate for local circumstances, a key ingredient of knowledge as practice/practice as knowledge. Finally, one major issue field linguists must reckon with in the field is the level of consciousness and politicization of the community at large surrounding language issues, including loss of vitality of the language and concern about it.

The national and regional spheres are delimited by constitutions, laws and decrees, and their linked ideologies as expressed in language planning and educational policies, with possible contradictions or even conflicts between national and regional levels. The international and global spheres are the spheres both of forces of globalization that contribute to the loss of language diversity, and of well-established organizations – NGOs or other bodies with diverse philosophies that support or run specific development programs – engaging in the promotion of local endangered languages, as part of larger concerns, such as human rights, indigenous rights, or protection of the environment. This is the case for various branches of the United Nations, such as UNESCO (Minasyan 2014) and its efforts in the past decade on behalf of the protection of intangible world heritages of the world, including languages. What is striking, seen from the field, at least in many places in Latin America, is the rapidly increasing awareness on the ground, in the local sphere, of the declarations of such international entities.
Our attempt to visually represent spheres and loci of different ideologies regarding endangered languages makes for a rather flat two-dimensional schema. The reality in the field, however, is that endangered languages and their communities can either become focal points of attention or lose that attention, accounting for great variations in the ease or difficulty encountered while carrying out a project, eventuating in changes of circumstances very difficult to read and interpret on the spot, even if they can be elucidated later, with hindsight. This instability of “the field” constitutes one of the major elements of risk in such projects for academics who must plan their field trips well in advance and generally from a distance, in order to satisfy the demands of funding agencies and to meet other work commitments. The requirements of funding agencies and universities for rigorous and exhaustive planning, and efficiency demonstrated by quantified results and scientific outputs, often clash dramatically with the realities of the field, creating a gap of divergent interests and ideological views. This gap, which is a source of constant tension for any project of (sustainable) development, is another issue to be cast below in the North-South perspective already mentioned. Doing fieldwork, in our view, in essence consists in a constant back-and-forth between the academic sphere and the local sphere with its diverse links to the other spheres. It is this dialogic and dynamic relational activity, mixing collaboration, contradiction and, sometimes, conflict that we call *knowledge as practice/practice as knowledge*.

We have emphasized in our presentation of the issues so far the multiple scientific and non-scientific contexts that inform the practice and the theory of ELDR. We have also stressed changing conceptions of the roles of ELDR researcher and researched. In the following section, we extend the conceptual map of ELDR to encompass its situatedness in global inequalities of wealth and power, both between academe and community, and between different sub-groups of the academe.

**North-South relations: Unequal exchange between academics and communities**

In this section we focus on relationships between researchers and language communities, framing this in terms of an assumption that the former are from the “North”, and the latter from the “South”. An important effect of the ideology in which languages are viewed as databanks floating free of the communities that speak them is to validate the notion that language documentation and language revitalization can and should be regarded as entirely separate enterprises, the former being a dispassionate and value-free scientific activity, and the latter a form of non-scientific “linguistic social work” (Newman 2003: 8). Indeed, major funding programmes for ELDR have explicitly excluded language revitalization from
documentation research support. In this view, the relationship between the vitality vs. mortality of (respectively) languages, communities and individuals is a monocular one-way street, in which communities and individual speakers are merely vehicles for language survival or language death. A language is usually considered dead when the last individual speaker from the original language community passes away. At this point, from the 3rd person perspective of language-as-object, the individual and the community cease to be matters of interest.

In the complex real world, in which there is a dynamic interplay of social, cultural and linguistic processes and practices, this simplistic assumption is contradicted by evidence that language survival can be critical to the life chances of individual members of minority communities, and hence to the viability of the community over time. As the late Michael Chandler and his colleagues have demonstrated, there is a non-figurative life and death quality to language preservation and revitalization, in relation to individual and community health and wellbeing. Chandler and his colleagues investigated adolescent suicide rates in Canadian First Nations communities, finding that the variable with the single strongest predictive value of low rates of suicide, when comparing different bands, was language vitality (Chandler et al. 2003; Hallett, Chandler and Lalonde 2007). These authors’ use of the trope of individual, cultural and community death by language is a useful corrective to the reifying metaphor of language death, the latter being cast as an event that can be conceptually corralled as being of concern principally to the scientific community.

The closely inter-related language-as-object and language-as-databank conceptualizations are constructed from the specific perspective of the scientific community. These conceptualizations not only reify language and divorce language practices from the community, they also alienate the language from the community as a form of symbolic and cultural capital (Bourdieu 2010). For the communities and their members, the loss of this symbolic cultural capital usually has mainly negative material consequences, such as those documented by Chandler and his colleagues. For the scientist, however, language-as-databank is a form of capital that, once “put to work”, can yield symbolic and material benefits in terms of continuing success in grant applications, citations and promotions. Analyzed in this fashion, while the combination of language documentation with language maintenance and revitalization can result in a “win-win” situation, in which there is mutual benefit to both researcher and community, language documentation in the absence of language maintenance and revitalization is an unequal exchange (Emmanuel et al. 1972) in which the benefit to the researcher is not accompanied by an equivalent benefit to the community, and may in fact result in disbenefits.
North-South relations: Unequal exchange inside the academe

Unequal exchange is not confined to the symbolic economic relations between endangered language communities and researchers; it can also be seen in the relations between different groups in the scientific community. Like its geo-political twin the “international community”, the term “scientific community” serves to mask dramatic inequalities of power and resource between different members of this *imagined community* (Anderson 2006), and to confer an aura of beneficent disinterest on relations between them. “Northern” linguists receive disproportionately greater funding than “Southern” linguists; they generally enjoy better research infrastructures; have networks that help them update their theoretical, methodological and technical knowledge and skills; and are more likely to have publications in international (Anglophone) journals. These facts generate an ideological construction of *unequal competence*, to the further disbenefit of researchers from the “South”. The beneficiaries, linguists from the “North”, too frequently seek to maximize their material advantage by laying claim to the intellectual territory of ELDR and its technical wherewithal; by acting as gatekeepers to funding; and by asserting the principle that “data are for everyone”, which sometimes boils down to “let me have your data”.

We recognize that many linguists feel deeply affronted by suggestions that their discipline is complicit in the reproduction of unequal relations of power and resources. We suggest that that this is because the objectivist view of science, one manifestation of which is the conceptualization of language-as-object, encourages the elevation of “value neutrality” into a value itself. In our view, on the contrary, the ideology of detached and objective science is best viewed as a cultural model widely adhered to by linguists (amongst others) as a professional body. It underpins the notion of a disinterested scientific community, whose only goal is the pursuit of knowledge, and elides real differences in power, influence and resources between different sub-groups of the imagined scientific community. From such a perspective, even to discuss the politics of linguistic research amounts to a violation of professional norms. We consider, on the contrary, that airing of these issues will both increase awareness of issues of ethics and social responsibility, and contribute to transparency in research practice. Lest it be thought that our critical remarks are fantasies spun out of the web of our own ideological perspective, we buttress them by providing three brief, anonymized case studies, based on events attested by the authors and personally known colleagues.
Case study 1: Does “data collection” count as research?

A faculty member in linguistics at a well-known and reputable North European university, with no personal ELDR experience, sought data on an Amazonian language. He agreed to fund from his research grant a field trip by two Latin American researchers, one based at the same university, and one based in Latin America, on a topic of mutual interest. The Latin American researchers were an anthropologist and a full professor in linguistics, who between them had more than 25 years field work experience with the community. The Latin American researchers were also familiar with, and experienced in using, the kinds of elicitation tools that the Northern researcher asked them to employ.

After the return of the Europe-based Latin American researcher, during a discussion of publication, the European researcher claimed that the Latin American researchers were working for him, as “assistant” and “facilitator”, even though neither was paid a salary by him. He asserted that they had no authorship rights because they had merely “collected data” to which he (because he was funding the field travel costs) had exclusive rights. When challenged, he also claimed that the Latin American researchers lacked adequate linguistic knowledge to plan the research (although they had published internationally on the topic). The European researcher also made derogatory and sexist personal comments. The Latin American researchers refused to hand over the data, and rejected payment of their field travel costs.

We submit that this case study exemplifies a number of the points we have made above. In particular, the notion that “data collection” is not research, but a merely mechanical activity that requires no particular knowledge or experience, betrays a failure to comprehend the complex activity that we have dubbed “knowledge as practice/practice as knowledge”. This failure can be (and in this case, was, institutional) as well as individual: the university, although made aware of the dispute, declined to take any position. We note, further, that the attempted appropriation of the right unilaterally to determine rights of authorship is contrary to internationally accepted ethical norms, as laid down in for example International Committee of Medical Journal Editors (2014).

Case study 2: Are field sites “open territory”?

A faculty member in linguistics at a well-known and reputable North American university, with significant field ELDR experience, planned and initiated a large-scale typological project, for which graduate students were to be dispatched to various communities in a Latin American country to collect data. One of the graduate students was sent to a community with no prior contact with a linguist
who is a national of the Latin American country (known to the “Northern” faculty member), who had been working in and with that community for many years. The Latin American linguist had already collected data on the particular topic under research, but this fact was not made known to the graduate student. When the Latin American linguist next made a field work visit to the community, community members expressed their unhappiness and displeasure at the North American graduate student’s visit, demanding to know what the Latin American linguist’s role was in that field trip. The reason for the community members’ negative reaction was that the graduate student had received, from their home institution, insufficient background information and had not been adequately briefed in issues of sensitivity and ethics.

We submit that this case study exemplifies a framing of the relationship between researchers and community in which “the field” is viewed exclusively as a “data source”, rather than a site of engagement between researchers from different teams and members of the community. It is common, to the point of being almost unavoidable, that long-term engagement with a community not only enables the development of a relationship of trust, but also brings with it vulnerabilities in which perceived violations of trust can have enduring negative consequences for the researcher who is in it for the long haul. The immediate cause for the problems in this case was a failure of communication, but the background to this failure was a lack of recognition by the “Northern” researcher both of the vulnerabilities of the “Southern” researcher and of the importance of establishing exactly what the Southern researcher already knew about the topic under investigation; the latter perhaps symptomatic of a widespread attitude that linguistic data are independent of social relationships. Our argument is that communities as “field sites”, while not being the “property” of any individual or team, cannot be separated from communities as societies in relationship to researchers, in which some relationships are more enduring and vulnerable than others.

Case study 3: To what extent, and when, should data be in the public domain?

A faculty member in linguistics at a well-known and reputable North European university, with no personal ELDR experience, initiated a large-scale, collaborative typological project on a theme overlapping with that of a previous project based in a different country of the North. The funding for the new project, which was conceived together with a linguist in the second country of the North, was acquired on the assumption that data collected for the previous project on indigenous languages of South America, mostly by PhD students and postdoctoral researchers, would be made freely available for the new project, with a view to the leaders of the new project publishing the analyses. The North European linguist, who had not
discussed this assumption with the data collection team of the first project, asked at an initial project meeting (for the new project) for the already existing data from the previous project to be put at his disposal for him to analyze and publish. He was surprised and annoyed when the researchers who had carried out and supervised the prior field work (who, unlike the North European linguist, specialized in the regional languages under investigation) were not willing to agree to this.

This case study does not, perhaps, so directly implicate North-South relations as the previous two, although some of the field researchers were “Southern”. It does, however, exemplify the major and contentious issue of open access to, and open archiving of, data. The “piggy-backing” of new projects on previous projects, with cumulative re-analyses of data, is a frequent and often productive research strategy. Open archiving is also increasingly mandated by research funding agencies. It would seem at first sight that this can bring only benefits to the scientific community, and we do not wish to downplay these benefits. However, there are also potential disbenefits to researchers, particularly those from the “South” who have less experience of international (Anglophone) publication than “Northern” researchers and who are less likely to be the leaders of international consortia. We would also draw attention to the potential disbenefits for communities of “absolutist” interpretations of open data archiving and open data access. There are genuine reasons why communities, as well as primary field researchers, may wish to restrict access to certain genres of linguistic data, including those that are restricted within the community itself. This issue becomes even more salient in the case where the primary field researcher is also a native speaker. Researchers from the “North” should be aware of these issues from the start when planning new projects, and be sensitive and flexible enough to negotiate mutually beneficial agreements with communities and with “Southern” colleagues.

General discussion

The three case studies that we have briefly presented here are attested by our own experience, together with that of trusted colleagues. They are representative of a number of other cases that have come to our attention, and that are also reliably attested. They should therefore not be dismissed as exceptional outliers. Rather, such cases are best understood as manifestations of a systemic problem that is tightly bound up with particular notions of what is, and is not, science; of who is to be considered a qualified scientist; and of who has intellectual property rights over data. This systemic problem is deeply rooted in the objectivist view of science as an activity that is not only value-free, but essentially context-free.
We referred to and analyzed the devalorization of local knowledge in the first section of this chapter. Here we emphasize that this devalorization is all too often mapped onto North-South relations, in cases where the work of researchers from the “South” may be dismissed as old-fashioned or lacking in technical sophistication, without a complementary and reflexive understanding of the lack of local knowledge on the part of the researcher from the “North”. Capacity building is all too often viewed as a one-way North-to-South transfer of knowledge, with data and intellectual capital accruing unequally to the “North.” The presupposition of unequal distribution of knowledge and expertise, conceptualized in terms of a hierarchy of skills and knowledge, forms a seamless ideological join with real world inequalities of power and resources, in which those with access to large scale funding and experience of international publication take it as their right to determine the conditions of “collaboration.” It is appropriate to characterize such attitudes and assumptions as neo-colonialist (we do not claim these to be universal, but simply assert that they exist, as we have documented in the first two case studies).

Concluding reflections on theory, methodology, goals and values

ELDR is not, and should not be seen as, a world unto itself. It takes place within a complex array of contexts, including relations of global socio-economic inequality, North-South relations within the academe, and the existential predicaments of indigenous minority communities. These communities face multiple threats to their traditional ways of life, including loss of environment, depletion of resources and the hostility of neighboring communities, as well as the increasing penetration of the dominant language and culture. Rather than viewing them as solely as “vanishing cultures” to be archived and memorialized, it is more useful and more ethical to view them as communities challenged by complex cultural dynamics, and to assist them in the formation of strategies that will secure their future as equal co-participants in national development. ELDR should be situated in the realities of dynamic cultural change, the adaptation of tradition to new circumstances and the renewal of culture as a mode of participation in a changing world. It is, on this view, an integral part of an overall strategy encompassing community wellbeing in health, education, economy and environment. Implementing such a strategy requires the participation of scientists and professional practitioners from many different disciplines, and the search for effective ways of complementing scientifically useful knowledge with practically useful, community guided interventions.

Unlike many social sciences (including anthropology and cultural psychology), linguistics does not traditionally value reflexivity as an inherent part of the
research process. Indeed, many linguists would deny that linguistics is a social science, preferring to emulate the supposedly objective (and objectifying), disengaged stance of the natural sciences. In relation to ELDR, this leads to a view in which socio-political questions relating to revitalization, community engagement and empowerment are compartmentalized as questions of “mere application”, or of individual opinion and responsibility. We maintain, on the contrary, that linguistics is a social science, and its practice in ELDR is not of one neutral inquiry by a disinterested observer, but a social practice with social consequences.

We have criticized the view that languages are primarily “science heritage” resources, and only secondarily vital to the survival of indigenous communities. We have also argued that the cultural model of objectivist and “value-free” science encourages the self-distancing of linguistic ELD researchers both from issues of the distribution of knowledge and power, and from engagement in practices of language revitalization. It also, at least in part, underpins unequal exchange relations between linguistics researchers from the global “North” and the global “South”. We would advocate a different model in which research is a collaborative learning enterprise, involving mutual knowledge transfer to mutual benefit, analogously with the WITH and BY paradigms we discussed above in relation to researchers’ relations with endangered language communities. Collaborative relations can and should involve two-way capacity building and scientific empowerment (including empowerment OF, WITH and BY native speakers: Cabral, Sampaio and Silva Sinha 2016; Woodbury and England 2004).

Although we do consider the dissemination throughout the research community (including indigenous researchers) of knowledge and skill in using up-to-date technology for recording, annotation, description and archiving of data to be of great importance, we would also argue that this should be complemented by the dissemination of an understanding of the relevant methodological and ethical principles of qualitative research and of research in indigenous cultures. We would therefore advocate that just as much attention is paid, in ELDR education and training, to the socio-cultural context and dimensions of ELDR as to its linguistic-theoretical and technical aspects. ELDR is, or should be, an interdisciplinary activity, and its theory, education and practice should reflect this. The theory, methodology and practice of ELDR needs to be informed as much by the

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5. Disciplinary self-reflection in anthropology (e.g. Clifford and Marcus 1986) and cultural psychology (e.g. Gergen et al. 1996) has long included discussions of power inequalities in both researcher-researched and North-South collaboration relations, in a global context; and has been contextualized too by reflexive debate on the cross-cultural appropriateness of methods and theories (Cole et al. 1971). Such reflection was for a long time virtually absent in linguistics, although it is now becoming part of ELDR debates (Austin and Sallabank 2014). We can hope that this attention to reflexivity will take hold in the wider discipline of linguistics.
reflexive and qualitative stance of disciplines such as anthropology, as by the experimentalist and quantitative stance of disciplines such as cognitive psychology or corpus linguistics. ELDR education and training should reflect the dynamics and complexities of knowledge as practice/practice as knowledge, only part of which is knowledge of how to use technical equipment and software tools.

We would advocate, too, that university ethics courses and ethics committees should adopt and enforce principles and criteria relating to community rights, community engagement, community intellectual property and principles of collaborative research, in addition to the usual focus on individual informed consent. Novice ELDR researchers should be presented with examples of best practice in combining documentation and archiving with language preservation and revitalization. Above all, our message is that the critical discussion of the issues we have raised should not be seen as a distraction from “business as usual”, but as an integral part of the endangered languages research landscape.

Acknowledgements


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CHAPTER 4

My journey as an indigenous Xinguan teacher and researcher
A personal account

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The present work aims to document my personal trajectory and experience as an indigenous student and researcher of my own language and culture. This has been an experience during a period of my life in which I lived outside my village while seeking the enhancement of my knowledge, capacities and skills. I consider this as a tool that enabled my education and knowledge about my own history and that of my native fellows. This tool allows for the better knowledge of people about their reality and it reflects that there is great richness within their society’s culture. I present as well a reflexive discourse about the educational process from a non-written culture to another culture that privileges the written materiality, and about how I processed this particular aspect while meeting both cultural forms that are structurally and conceptually different by nature.

Keywords: indigenous language, culture, Kamaiurá, Awetý

Introduction

This chapter is a record of a reflection on how my multicultural experience has influenced and still influences my viewpoint about the world. Prior to this my perspective was restricted, it did not appreciate the importance of the traditional wisdom and I was not aware that it was in danger, at risk of perishing or disappearing at any time. That wisdom requires protection and we must get rid of the virus that attacks the heart of the identity of our people and land, as if it were a huge cobra swallowing half of a human body, causing the disappearance of the native society that also entangles the social organization of the culture in which we were born. Thus, this text is solely based on my own personal narrative, and is focused on my way of life, to witness, and to be Kamaiurá, Awetý and Brazilian.
Linguistic classification

According to Rodrigues (1985), the Kamaiurá language belongs to the Tupi-Guarani linguistic family. It is spoken in the region of Alto Xingu, at Mato Grosso state in Brazil. The Awetý language belongs to the Awetý family, an independent family that comes from the Tupi linguistic trunk.

Societal and political organisation

Every society is constituted according to a specific organization, as well as every society’s community is characterised by its own rules in terms of responsibilities and functions. For instance, in my culture we have a cacique (chief, leader), a spokesperson, a traditional songster, a traditional healer (male or female), a medicinal herbalist (male or female), a worshipper, sorcerers, and a shaman among others.

In our Kamaiurá culture, the traditional cacique could be a male or female leader (Morerekwat). The function of the Morerekwat is very important for the community, as they require self-confidence and the capacity to respond for the whole community. The cacique has to be especially polite, attentive, affectionate, smiling, cheerful and full of joy, and their attitude has to be always positive. A cacique cannot mistreat someone, have prejudices or be a racist person, and can neither show their sadness nor wish wrong for other people. Their speech has to be smooth and always delicate, instead of rough. Every time someone passes by their house, they should wait for that person to stop by and come in. Several people request the Morerekwat to come into their own houses to converse, generally while eating or drinking together. The cacique’s family, their spouse, sons and daughters, as well as their brothers and sisters are expected to have a good attitude too. More precisely, they are expected to show the same behaviour that the cacique themselves demonstrates for their community.

The community highly respects the cacique, and the cacique also holds the community in high regard. The community always follows the Morerekwat’s instructions, who decides what the community wants to do, because the community always ask for their cacique’s permission. For that reason, the cacique decides whether or not an event may take place in the village. But, generally, the cacique’s response is never negative if the event fits with their cultural values. Every member of the community depends on the Morerekwat. This dependence relationship could be represented organically, as it was a dependence that is graven in the skeleton of the Morerekwat. The Morerekwat is the heart of the stability of our community. In order to assist the Morerekwat we have also subchiefs which are also known as
Jeneywypy (leader or leadership). They can substitute the Morerekwat at any time he might be sick, travelling or away from the village.

In the Awetý culture, the cacique (Morekwat katu) has the same functions and responsibilities. The subchiefs are the Morekwat/Iti’ingku to’otat (communicators, those that talk in the meetings and welcome the visitors) and the Tazungku tat (who directly assist the Morekwat, accompanying him to the meetings, and organizing the festivities and dances). The latter has the function of supporting the Awetý Morekwat, but both of them are able to make decisions. Should there be divergence in their decision, they will not do anything as they must reach full consensus. These leadership roles could be exercised by women or men as long as they have a Morekwat lineage, and they could be designated by the Morekwat or by the community.

Nowadays, we have had to introduce other forms of leadership in order to cope with political and social issues of our people. The Tawa jat (landowner) is the leader who takes care of the land and ensures that the village lands are not occupied or inhabited by another people or a person from a different ethnic group, by a foreigner, for example to bury a deceased family member. Because of this the Tawa jat will always be consulted about any circumstances that occurred in the village. He never ceases to be consulted, and his opinion is always sought about situations such as another ethnic group’s festivities to be celebrated in our village, or about the visits of foreigners and other outsiders. The Je’eng ijat or ojareko ma’e (spokesperson or caregiver) is the leader who welcomes foreign visitors, articulating both politics and the community. He is the spokesperson of the community, a traveller who understands every word of his people and is able to convey his community’s decisions, and those of their Morerekwat and their Tawa jat. He is one of the main leaders, who receives all the information, news and other details from the people. He has the obligation to inform the community about any new event or visitor that will happen in the village: where they come from, who are the individuals, the reason and/or purpose of their visit, or any request of support he may need from them.

Among the people that live in our village there are also specialised roles to be performed, such as the ones listed below:

- Traditional architect: who knows how to build useful and durable houses. He also knows well the procedures and feedstock to be used during the construction process.
- Traditional fisherman: who knows not only how to fish, but also all the places where fish can be found. He is able to select the appropriate baits to use in their arrowhead for a successful fishing.
- Hunter: who knows the forest well and is able to find locations where there are plenty of animals to feed the community.
- **Ipeju tat**: is a male or female worshipper who serves by saving human lives, and providing either good or bad luck to people.
- Shaman: who gets rid of the indigenous disease from the patient. He saves human but also spiritual lives.
- **Ihwanungat**: who treats people for wounds and weakness using traditional medicine, such as medicinal herbs.
- **Ywapoa jat**: who knows well the medicinal roots, including the root types, and which medicinal herbs cure each disease, both of the Indian and white-skin people.
- **Moang ijat**: is considered a magical human, who does evil to people or kills. This is an extremely dangerous function within the Kamaiurá and Awetý cultures. The **Moang ijat** uses spells and manipulates the culture for his own purpose and advantage. Those spells are considered as a weapon that is used to harm other people.
- Midwives: in our village, only women could perform this labour. There are always three or four women who are specialised in helping a mother to give birth. Among them, there is a woman (*kunu’um apuru’a kytsi*) who is in charge of cutting the baby’s umbilical cord and to clean the baby after birth. After bathing the baby, she checks the baby’s condition and certifies whether or not he or she was born as a healthy infant.

**Onomastic designation**

In our culture, naming a person constitutes an important social process for the whole community. Children do not receive their names right after birth, but they are named after losing their navel (if the baby is female) or once they have their ear pierced (for male babies). Their proper names are given from those of their paternal or maternal grandparents, according to whether they were boys or girls (see Tables 1 and 2). Male babies’ names are thus given from those of both male grandparents (the father of his father and the father of his mother), just as female babies receive their names from those of both female grandparents (the mother of her father and the mother of her mother). Although everyone will have two proper names, prior to their adulthood children typically use the name that was given from their closest family branch (paternal or maternal).
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### Table 1. Onomastic designation rule: Example for a female baby

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paternal grandmother</th>
<th>Maternal grandmother</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kamiru</td>
<td>Kanualu</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this case, the baby girl will be named *Kamiru Kanualu*, as she will receive her paternal grandmother’s name in first place (*Kamiru*), as a representation of her paternal family, and her maternal grandmother’s name in second place (*Kanualu*) representing her maternal family.

### Table 2. Onomastic designation rule: Example for a male baby

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paternal grandfather</th>
<th>Maternal grandfather</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pira</td>
<td>Johet</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this case, the baby boy will be named *Pira Johet*, as he will adopt his paternal grandfather’s name (*Pira*) as a representation of his paternal family, and her maternal grandfather’s name (*Johet*) which represents his maternal family.

The process of reclusion marks an important milestone in the lives of children: Their step to adulthood. From that time, the proper names of all Awetý and Kamaiurá people will slightly increase according to the same onomastic designation rules, adopting four names (instead of two) by the end of the process. Boys start their process of reclusion as soon as their voice changes. For girls, this process will take place once they have their first menstruation, which is considered as a sign of a child becoming a young adult. The process of reclusion is decided by the family. For boys, it is considered as a means to become handsome and strong young men, while reclusion allows girls to be trained in women-related activities, as well as becoming beautiful and strong young women.

Both the Kamaiurá and Awetý people share this mandated tradition of being confined as part of the ritual of entering into their adulthood. The confined person must also participate in several cultural activities such as singing or crafting, since they have to be prepared to live in society when they come out from the reclusion, leaving as a new and independent individual. These are the principal jobs that are performed within the village and the community.

In our culture, the age of people is irrelevant, we value instead their social roles and biological changes, such as boys’ voices breaking, or the first menstruation for girls. As this indicates that a child becomes an adult, it involves a point in time after which they are expected to assume other social roles such as getting married and having children. Similarly, having grandchildren indicates that an adult enters into the life stage of being an elder.
Indigenous schooling

We have a different education in the Xingu National Park from the public educational system in Brazil. Our school is based on documenting our language and culture, which allows for a very different perspective about our children’s reality and a greater value of our way of life. We preserve our pure experience of everyday life, strengthening the traditional culture that is progressively disappearing from the indigenous world. We value our roots, our lifestyle, our history and our origins. We have designed a Political and Pedagogical Project (Projeto Político Pedagógico – PPP) in order to record every reality of each ethnic group while paying respect to other peoples. We teach mathematics, Portuguese language, science, natural science, geography, history and culture, dance and music. In addition, teachers in our school use a teaching method based on Ethno-Mathematics, in which children learn numerical concepts through play, or hands-on activities such as building a bow, an arrow or any other toy. The artefacts made during handicrafts education in school are not produced for sale. On contrary, what children manufacture in school (e.g. an axe handle, a bow and its arrow, a mortar and a pestle, a clamp, or a headgear) is used for everyday life in the village. Thus, everyday experiences and what children learn in school are closely linked.

The Elementary and Middle School grades are taught in the school in the indigenous languages. Because there are several marriages between people from different ethnicities, we encourage parents to learn the language of their spouses, so families can speak both of their languages with confidence and allow children to develop with pride of being learning two languages simultaneously. However, our school is bilingual. We conducted a sociolinguistic evaluation which showed that 50% of the community uses the indigenous language, and the other 50% speaks Portuguese. This led to the decision to use both languages at school, working in parallel, although our aim prioritises literacy in the children’s mother tongue. The Portuguese language is typically used to communicate with members and leaders of other communities, and to draw up official documents, commercial agreements, memos, radiograms, and writing documents to different authorities and so on.

Traditional roles of our village, such as the shaman, the healer, the medicinal herbalist, the songster also share their knowledge according to their specialization. For example, they teach children to sing traditional songs, to compete in the traditional wrestling called huka huka, and to manufacture artefacts and handicrafts, such as bows and arrows, armbands, or headdresses amongst others. In addition, students learn from them about social organizations and the three types of caciques that are responsible of our village (the cacique of the village, who takes care of the community; the spokesperson cacique, who welcomes foreign visitors; and the landowner cacique, who takes care of our land). Everyday practices and habits are
taught through daily and collective activities, related to music, dance, harvesting or house constructions.

**Diet**

The Alto Xingu diet is based on traditional food that grows free of pesticides and without industrialized intervention. Our diet is largely based on fish and *beju*, which is made of manioc, herbs and manioc flour. This is the main dish that we eat every day. All these ingredients are indispensable for every household. Although each family home is responsible for their own food, there is reciprocity because families help other community members, both from their own family and other close relatives.

Friends exchange goods as gifts. These are acts of giving in which there has to be necessarily a reciprocation. People from Alto Xingu practice *jomo’itara* (*moitará*), that is to exchange goods between houses and between villages. It is an exchange of an object for another. In such cases, a group of men or women, but never of mixed gender, visit the house where the exchange will take place.

**Reflection on my experience**

In the past, I was a layman who knew nothing and had little idea about what was going on around me. I did not think of anything, let alone studying the non-Indian culture, so I did not understand anything about the world outside our village, and I did not have a broad perspective about our world. My perspective on this world was very limited because there was no school in my community and indigenous culture. Our knowledge was transmitted through oral teaching, passed from father to child, from grandparents to grandchildren. The idea of studying came first from my family. For example, my mother noticed that several FUNAI employees were working and buying goods for their families, although they were not educated and did not attend the school. I thought that I was going to continue living this life the way I did forever but, as time went by, I realized something very different, that it was not what I initially thought. Thus, I decided to ask myself three questions: What should I study? Which direction will my life take if I study? And what field of study may be good for me?

Then, I started to approach people who spoke Portuguese so that I could accompany them and learn from what they were saying. So, my path continued non-stop. But I had no idea that I would learn Portuguese myself, I could not imagine that one day I would understand that non-Indian language.
After a long time, I was selected by my community as the village’s spokesperson, so I had to understand Portuguese to speak with non-indigenous people that visit our village, and guide them. All this happened between 1988 and 1993. In 1994, the Training Course for Indigenous Teachers was created within the Indigenous Territory of Xingu-Mato Grosso. I attended that course to obtain some fluency in Portuguese.

That is why I started to love studying, and I encouraged myself on this task until I was chosen again by the community, this time to be the village teacher. I progressively gained the trust of my community. I worked very hard during my studies, I tried hard to understand and later speak Portuguese, I worked hard to write and read fluently, to get rid of my shyness and open myself to dialogue with anyone. But my pace also rapidly increased, I developed so fast that I also learned very quickly. Thus, I did not give up studying.

But during that period, we lost a family from the village, and I personally lost a male and a female leader that supported my studies and always gave me the strength to continue pursuing my studies until I graduated. But I also lost my grandfather, who passed away, and who was one of the principal persons that wanted to see me finalizing my education. In addition, during my graduate studies in Literature and Linguistics my wife left me because I dedicated too much time to my studies. At that time, I lost my cousin as well, who always cheered for me and who was also one of my former students in the village’s school. During my Postgraduate studies, I had to face a series of health problems from family members that lived in the village, while I was away from my family pursuing my dream. Studying for a Master’s Degree and obtaining a PhD was a great challenge in my life and in this personal journey: my family was sick, my mother, my sister and my son became ill, and my head and soul did not work properly. I was extremely sad and all this moved into my psychological and emotional systems. This could have led me to abandon my studies because of health condition of the family. Thus, I cried a lot, and I did not feed myself properly, but I always walked holding my head high, I always had faith, believing in my God Mavutsini, who could give me the strength to keep pushing forward. This has been the way in which I entered into the world of studies in the non-indigenous culture, and all the obstacles I have encountered during this journey.

I am extremely proud to be an Indian, and to speak my mother tongue. Although I have had to study outside my village, and away from my territory, I have never stopped being an indigenous person, I have never lost my identity, the way I was born, the way I am. I still struggle for a differentiated education for all indigenous people, for their autonomy, their self-determination and their professionalization. I am very proud to be a teacher, to be an Indian, proud of the teachers who have been my students, as well as those who were my students in
college. Today, we are colleagues, we fight for the same cause, we value the same matters, we discuss the same issues. The sacrifice that I have suffered to be who I am today, today has paid off, I am collecting its fruit when I see my students – who I call my teachers – who are the teachers of the school where I work. I feel proud of all the Xingu teachers, as well as I am very proud of all those that will be teachers in the future.

My experience has been enhanced with respect to the recognition of the indigenous culture and the empowerment that exists in the world, both in Brazil and abroad. It is with a wide and extremely comprehensive perspective that I value today the importance of each society's culture, its origins and its native shelter. The beautiful and wonderful traditional practices are thus witnessed within daily activities, especially those related to the social organizations of each group. So, keep your tradition alive!

**Culture and identity**

During the period that I spent in the non-indigenous world, I lived in a different culture, with different traditions, a whole different environment and even I lived in a different place that was built with hard walls. All these changes seemed really strange to me, and it was difficult to get used to it and adjust to it to that extent. I turned to live according to a different identity, and I even had fun in a totally different way from that of my former identity and habits. While living in the city, some of the non-indigenous people I met initially thought I was Peruvian, Bolivian, and even Korean, Japanese or Chinese. I now acknowledge that there are similarities in our facial features, so it now makes sense why they greeted me in Spanish, Chinese and other languages. However, most of the non-Indian people recognized me as an indigenous individual, and soon they came to talk with me and ask me questions, led by their curiosity about the indigenous culture but generally with respect. There were people who thought I was Bolivian because I have straight hair, black hair and my skin color is light brown. They used to ask me about the exportation of crack and marijuana, and whether I was able to bring some to the university, and sell it to them. My answer was always the same: I do not mess with these matters because I am an Indian, from the Indigenous Territory of Xingu-Mato Grosso, a place that does not get involved in these issues, which are not part at all of our culture.

Generally, most non-indigenous people have always found my culture beautiful and so I was encouraged to preserve my origins and do not let our rich and beautiful culture disappear. But some others found me to be a peculiar individual because I did not keep all my original culture’s signs, since I dressed in
non-indigenous clothes, while we used to be naked in the village. I did not paint my body and I changed my traditional haircut. They typically asked me whether I was an Indian or an acculturated Indian. They believed that I had inherited money for free and without working (so I wish!), and considered me a rich Indian or a millionaire because of my clean clothes or the sunglasses that I wore. Others were afraid of me because I belong to an indigenous community, following old misconceptions such as that all Indians practice cannibalism, which hindered my opportunities of making new friends. There were people that would not talk to me, that looked sideways at me, or would not sit next to me. But I never let myself be overwhelmed by these circumstances, and I was neither depressed nor sad.

For all the circumstances that I experienced during this period of my life, I fully focused myself on the achievement of my main target: to concentrate on my studies so I could graduate and come back to my community holding my title, because they were who trust in me. I had to repay my community for their support, and I know they were waiting with their arms wide open for me to return in victory and to execute what I learned studying at the University. I also became a leading researcher of my own culture and the traditions of my community and village in the Indigenous Territory of Xingu-Mato Grosso.

At times, I felt insecure and alone in the midst of the non-indigenous society, I felt that I had no support and that I was strong enough to get over the difficulties when I was in need or in a precarious situation. I felt isolated, without any family or somewhere to go and seek support to ease this journey and new life. Non-Indian people sometimes took advantage of me financially because I am an Indian, as they believed I was unable or unaware to keep track of their calculations. For instance, when in the supermarket or going out for a coffee, I was many times unfairly charged with a higher price. The cashier usually gave me the wrong change, believing that I had no financial knowledge at all. They were always surprised and embarrassed when I proved them wrong. I had to develop my own strategies then, such as asking the price or researching on it prior to going shopping. But this is part of my life in the non-indigenous world, in the city. A totally different environment from the world I knew, from my culture and my identity as a Kamaiurá and Awetý community member.

Acknowledgements

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References


CHAPTER 5

The representation-cohesion-stance hypothesis

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This chapter argues that if we conceive of linguistic signs as inherently social signs, we should be able to capture social meaning at the grammatical level of the linguistic sign itself, not only in its use. It proposes that a way to do so is through analysing the linguistic sign as consisting of three semiotic modes, a symbolic, an iconic and an indexical mode. Using a descriptive grammatical approach, it illustrates these modes on the basis of a discourse structuring marker in the Australian Aboriginal language Ungarinyin and describes a linguistic methodology that applies separate analytical tools to each of the linguistic semiotic modes in order to capture interactions between these modes. This approach is referred to as the representation-cohesion-stance hypothesis. It is argued that only by accounting for non-symbolic meaning in a similar way that linguistics has traditionally accounted for symbolic meaning, we can develop a rounded view of socio-culturally conventionalised meaning.

Keywords: semiotic, cohesion, stance, sociality and grammar, Ungarinyin (Worrorran), Peirce

Introduction

The limits of grammar

If we are serious in our conviction that language is a social construct with a social purpose, a sign of human cultural life in its truest sense, we should not only be able to observe the sociality of grammar through usage, but within the conventionality of the linguistic sign itself. Although on the face of it, this claim may seem relatively uncontroversial, and arguably motivates much of the research programmes in functional and cognitive linguistics, syntactic theories are remarkably ill-equipped to deal with it.

This becomes especially clear when we consider linguistic phenomena that defy clear-cut morphosyntactic classifications, such as the expression of speaker
perspective, or information structure. Language is riddled with, for example, implicit attitudinal biases and perspective-taking, and these affect sentence patterns as much as verbal inflection (through, e.g., mood and tense), lexical choice, prosody, and even extra-linguistic signals such as eye-gaze or posture (Dancygier 2016). Information structure, signalling what is prominent and what is backgrounded in a discourse, is equally associated with a broad array of structural expression types.

For theories of linguistic signs that state that language structure is inherently shaped by the cognitive properties of speakers and addressees (cognitive grammar) or the use of language in conversation (functional grammar) pervasiveness of a feature combined with scattered structural expression is inherently problematic. The claim that sociality crucially shapes language, therefore, leads to an analytical paradox: exactly the inherent embeddedness of language in social interaction is the reason why sociality is represented throughout the linguistic system. The ubiquitousness of sociality at multiple levels of grammar is what makes it so difficult to identify within an individual linguistic sign. Sociality may be the most fundamental feature of language as a cultural phenomenon, yet one of the hardest to characterise in basic grammatical terms.

In this paper I argue that this analytical paradox is by no means unavoidable, but derives from a foundational inconsistency in the treatment of sociality in contemporary (cognitive-)functional linguistics: on the one hand usage is seen as fundamental to language, yet the linguistic sign itself is not fundamentally defined by it. Illustrating the proposal with an analysis of a grammatical marker in the Australian Aboriginal language Ungarinyin, I suggest an alternative theoretical account of the relation between social meaning and grammatical convention.

I begin by laying out a descriptive challenge associated with socially entangled grammar on the basis of a specific grammatical morpheme in the Australian Aboriginal language Ungarinyin, the so-called definite subject marker. The regular, conventional meaning of this morpheme is introduced in our second section on “A descriptive challenge: The Ungarinyin definite subject marker”, which illustrates some exceptions to this use in discourse.

These observations lead to several fundamental questions about the status of grammatical morphemes in Ungarinyin and beyond, more particularly, they raise the question what, exactly, we mean with a grammatical sign? In order to address this issue I will take a step back in the third section and examine Jakobson’s (1980) reading of Peirce’s semiotics, deconstructing the linguistic sign into three semiotic modes which, crucially, are complementary rather than mutually exclusive. After outlining this semiotic background, I embed the Peircian semiotic triangle within a view of grammar as a social technology, as recently proposed by Dor (2015). I submit that grammar is a tool for social instruction consisting of three relatively isolated but complementary modes, one dealing with how linguistic signs relate to
extra-linguistic experience (representation), one with how linguistic signs relate to each other (cohesion), and one with how linguistic signs relate to the social entities involved in the speech situation (stance). The claim is that the three proposed semiotic modes of grammar build three systems, viz. that of representation, cohesion and stance, which are each associated with specific, often multi-functional linguistic structures. I call this the representation-cohesion-stance hypothesis.

The next section places the Ungarinyin observations in the context of the representation-cohesion-stance hypothesis. First, this section reformulates the core meaning of the definite subject marker in terms of the grammatical modes introduced in the previous section, and then relates the observation to the grammatical domain I claim the definite subject marker typically forms part of, the domain of cohesion. Later, it discusses the apparently atypical interpretations of the marker as transgressions of the border area between cohesion and stance. The analysis proposed here attempts to explain the apparent multi-functionality and semantic changes observed for the Ungarinyin definite subject marker within a unified account, based on the assumption that any conventional grammatical meaning is part of an inherently social linguistic sign.

The pre-final section returns to the analytical paradox surrounding sociality in cognitive-functional linguistics with which I began this introduction. It discusses some of the implications of the proposal in this chapter for cognitive-functional syntactic theory and for the treatment of sociality in grammar more broadly and then I summarise the representation-cohesion-stance hypothesis.

The concluding section briefly explores some implications of the proposed analysis in the context of current developments in linguistics and linguistic anthropology more widely.

A descriptive challenge: The Ungarinyin definite subject marker

Ungarinyin is a language of North-Western Australia, belonging to the Worrorn family (McGregor and Rumsey 2009). It is agglutinating and headmarking (Nichols 1986), and most of its verbal clauses contain complex verbal constructions consisting of a so-called coverb and an inflecting verb (McGregor 2002). Transitivity in the language is obligatorily signalled by a pronominal prefix complex, expressing a grammatical subject in intransitive clauses, and an object and subject (in this order) in transitive constructions.1 Immediately following (and partially fusing) with the pronominal prefix, Ungarinyin inflecting verbs may display a morpheme

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1. For a fuller description of Ungarinyin grammar, see Rumsey (1982) and Spronck (2015: Chapter 2).
that Rumsey (1982) has termed the ‘definite subject’ marker. Characterising the meaning of this marker poses several descriptive problems, which I will address in this section. Next sections describe the regular form and interpretation of the definite subject marker, as well as several exceptional uses.

Conventional meaning of the Ungarinyin definite subject

Rumsey (1982: 105) defines the Ungarinyin subject marker as ‘signal[ling] that the subject of the verb so marked is an NP which is coreferential to one which has occurred in previous discourse (usually in the immediately preceding clause or sentence) and whose reference has been definitely established’. Although Rumsey (1982) introduces this definition as a first approximation of the meaning of the marker that requires further investigation, it seems to cover the main uses of the prefix. Such a typical use is illustrated in (1), which has been taken from a narrative about a mother-in-law and a son-in-law (referred to here as ‘she’ and ‘he’). The definite subject marker -irra₂- appears on the verb wurrumarn ‘she takes it’ in line (1b) and indicates that the third person subject ‘she’ in (1a) is coreferential with the subject in line (1b).²

(1) a. umburunyine di yidminjär ngurrba
   umburu-nyine di yidminjär ngurr-ba
   what.cha.ma.callit-INS N₃W_ANAPH bushes hit-ASP
   amundan di
   a₁-a-minda-n di
   3MSG.O-3SG.S-take-PRS N₃W_ANAPH
   ‘With, what’s it, bushes she hits him then’

b. wurrumarn ay nyumanangka
   wu-irra₂-ma-rn ay nγa₁-ma-nangka
   3N₃W.O:3SG.S-DEFS-take-PRS INTER 3SG-do-3SG.IO
   ‘With, what’s it, bushes she hits him then. She takes it (the bushes). She says “Ay” to him’
   (Spronck 2015: 361)

In the sequence in (1), marking the coreferential relation between the subjects of (1a) and (1b) serves a clear functional purpose. The pronominal third person

². Subscript numbers in the interlinear glosses of Ungarinyin examples refer to morphophonemic processes detailed by Rumsey (1982) and have no semantic significance. Glosses are in accordance with the Leipzig Glossing Rules, with the addition of the following: AMBIPH ambiphoric pronoun, ANAPH anaphoric pronoun, ASP aspectual marker (completice/iterative), CONT contiuative aspect, DEFS definite subject, INTER interjection, IO indirect object affix, LAT lative case, nw w-class neuter, O object affix, S subject affix, SS same subject marker, SUB subordinate clause marker.
prefix in (1b) is underspecified for the gender of the subject, which gives rise to potential ambiguity: it may either refer to the son-in-law, the third person object of the preceding clause, or the mother-in-law, the subject of the preceding clause. The definite subject marker -irra₂ in (1b) signals that the second interpretation is intended, and that wurrumarn is to be translated as ‘she takes it’.

This use of the marker in Ungarinyin is reminiscent of what Stirling (1993: 17–18) calls a ‘recapitulation clause’ in languages that morphologically mark ‘same subject’ versus ‘different subject’ (for a detailed recent overview of systems and languages marking ‘same’ versus ‘different subject’, see van Gijn 2016).

\[(2) \text{Sain leih dana age jo eundec ben ca cehe-gi-na.}\]
\[\text{time some man 3PL house that_kind big with build}-3\text{PL-PRS}\]
\[\text{Od-i-me-ig cuamu ijed o wal oso eu odi qahe-gi-na.}\]
\[\text{do-pred-ss-3PL room three or four INDF that like break-3PL-PRS}\]

‘Sometimes the men make one of those houses bigger. They divide it into three or four rooms.’ (Amele, cited from Roberts (1987) in Stirling (1993: 18)

Amele requires its users to make a paradigmatic choice between signalling that the subject of a verb is coreferential (in which case it is marked with a ‘same subject’ suffix) or non-coreferential (in which case it is marked with a ‘different subject’ suffix). Without either of the two suffixes an Amele verb is ungrammatical.

While marking subject coreferentiality in Ungarinyin is not obligatory as it is in Amele,³ (1) and (2) share clear functional parallels. In both instances, the highlighted markers indicate that the subject of the verb in the second clause refers to the same entity as that in the preceding clause.

In Ungarinyin, signalling such coreferentiality through the use of the definite subject marker can be surprisingly consistent, in that, e.g., an entity can be marked as coreferential even though it may undergo a dramatic metamorphosis in a particular story. In (3), for example, two speakers (labelled A and B) co-narrate a creation story in which an ancestral being transforms into a mountain stream.⁴ Despite the lexical changes accompanying this transformation (which also involve a change in grammatical gender), the definite subject marker signals coreferentiality throughout.

³. Note that this means that the absence of the definite subject marker in Ungarinyin is not a priori interpretable, i.e. it does not necessarily indicate that the clause has a different subject to that in the preceding clause.

⁴. Ancestors transforming into parts of the landscape are a common trope in Australian Aboriginal creation stories in Ungarinyin and beyond.
(3) a. B: \textit{di ngawa jinda ongarri waj}
\textit{di ngawa jinda a_{i}-w_{u}-ni-ngarri waj}
\textit{n_{w}.ANAPH rain M.PROX 3MSG.O-3SG.S-ACT.ON-PST-SUB throw.away wurrebini}
\textit{wu-o-irra_{2}-y_{1},ibi-ni}
\textit{3N_{w}.O-3SG.S-DEFS-throw-PST}
‘Then, when the rain hit him he cast them [the bushes] away’
b. \textit{ngabunju wondij wurruwangka ngulangula marda}
\textit{ngabun-ju wondij wa_{2}-irra_{2}-w_{1}-y_{1},ngka ngulangula marda}
\textit{water-LAT create 3N_{w}.DEFS-act.on-REFL-PST ¿splash? go}
\textit{wurrumarerri walangkalu Yilurrun}
\textit{wu-irra_{2}-ma-ra-y_{1},irri walangkalu Yilurrun}
\textit{3N_{w}.DEFS-do-PST-CONT ¿sideways? Yilurrun}
‘He/it made him/itself into water and near there did he ripple the water there, Yilurrun’
c. A: \textit{dulkoka kanda}
\textit{dulko=ka kanda}
\textit{corner=Q N_{w}.PROX}
‘Is there a cliff [here]?’
d. B: \textit{dulk kanda wanangkalu}
\textit{dulko kanda wa_{2}-a-nangka-lu}
\textit{corner N_{m}.PROX 3N_{w}.S-GO-3SG.IO-PROX}
‘A cliff runs from here in this direction’
e. A: \textit{wo wurrwan}
\textit{wo wu-irra_{2}-w_{1},a-n}
\textit{flow 3N_{w}.DEFS-fall-PRS}
‘It flows’
f. B: \textit{wo wurrwan}
\textit{wo wu-irra_{2}-w_{1},a-n}
\textit{flow 3N_{w}.DEFS-fall-PRS}
‘It flows’

All instances marked with the definite subject marker -irra_{2}- in (3) refer to the ancestral being referred to as the subject of waj wurrebini ‘he cast [the bushes] away’. Even though in (3b) the entity fundamentally changes his appearance (he turns himself into water), the definite subject marker identifies him as the same subject referent already introduced. In the intransitive phrases marda wurrumarerri ‘it [the water] went’ (3b) and wo wurrwan ‘it [the water] flows’ (3ef), the continuity of reference to the ancestral being through both his waterlike and previous non-waterlike state is indicated by the use of -irra_{2}-. Despite the similarities with recapitulation clauses as in (2), and with some other phenomena found in languages marking same subject/different subject, in
this chapter I will adhere to the original, tentative terminology of Rumsey (1982) and refer to the marker -\textit{irra}_2 as definite subject marker.\textsuperscript{5} Before addressing the main theoretical implications posed by the Ungarinyin definite subject marker I will briefly illustrate a feature that does not seem to be directly connected with the core meaning of reference maintenance described in this section: clustering in discourse, particularly around ‘narrative peaks’. 

\textit{Definite subject clustering in discourse}

In the earliest description of the Ungarinyin definite subject marker, Coate and Oates (1970) fail to ascribe any particular meaning to the form, which they call the ‘long form’, but observe that its distribution is more dominant in specific genres. According to Coate and Oates (1970: 54) the long forms ‘are far more widely used in narrative than are the short [i.e. forms without the definite subject marker, SS], though both occur together in the text. In conversational speech usually only the shorter forms occur, so the longer forms may be those of the literary or narrative language.’

While the definite subject marker is noticeably more prevalent in narrative discourse, its distribution is far from random. This may be illustrated on the basis of the co-constructed narrative from which the passage in (3) has been taken. The story, continued in (4) belongs to the main type of mythological story told among Ungarinyin speakers, recounting the travels of mythological ancestors across the land, while creating landmarks, sacred sites and other places of cultural significance. In the fragment shown in (3) the narrators discussed the creation of a river and rock lake called Yilurrun, about which they continue to talk in (4). After completing their travels, ancestors would ‘become a painting’ in a cave at the spot marking the end of their journey. Ungarinyin uses the verb, -\textit{ode-REFL-} ‘paint oneself’ to describe this event of an ancestor appearing as a rock painting by her/his own volition, and Elders have been repainting these images for centuries preserving them to the present day. For our analysis, the relevant aspect of this narrative structure of Ngarinyin\textsuperscript{6} creation stories is that the painting event represents the culmination of the story, its narrative peak.

\textsuperscript{5.} Given the theoretical focus of the present chapter on characterising grammatical markers such as the Ungarinyin definite subject marker as \textit{social signs} the space for describing its various uses is kept to a minimum here, but for a fuller description and contextualisation of the use of -\textit{irra}_2 see Spronck (2020).

\textsuperscript{6.} The label ‘Ngarinyin’ is used here as an ethnonym for the Ngarinyin people, whose traditional language is referred to here as ‘Ungarinyin’.
The lines in (4) represent the almost immediate continuation of the fragment in (3). Note that nearly every turn in both exchanges contains one or more definite subject markers, although the markers are infrequent both in the lead-up prior to line (3a) and all but disappear from the discourse after line (4j).

(4) a. A: yow dali murrumanga munda dambun?
yow dali ma₂-o-irra₂-ma-nga munda dambun
yes name 3N₉₋₀-3SG.S-DEFS-take-PST N₉₋₁.PROX place
‘Oh yes, did he name that place?’

b. B: munda Yilurrun kudma, irrumara
munda Yilurrun kurr-ma a₁-irra₂-ma-ra
N₉₋₁.PROX Yilurrun 2PL-do 3MSG-DEFS-do-PST
‘He said: “You call this place Yilurrun”’

c. A: kajingarringa wurreyirri?
kajingarri-nga wu-irra₂-y₂i-yirri
permanently-EMPH 3N₉₋₁-DEFS-be-CONT
‘Does it go on eternally?’

d. B: kajingarringa wurreyirri
kajingarri-nga wu-irra₂-y₂i-yirri
permanently-EMPH 3N₉₋₁-DEFS-be-CONT
‘It goes on eternally’

e. A: dali wirriwelannyirri?
dali wa₂-rr-iwa₂-ʔ y₁ila-n-yirri
name 3N₉₋₁-O-3PL.S-DEFS-hold-PRS-DU
‘Do those two [i.e. the mythological ancestor and the rock lake] still keep that name?’

f. B: dali wirriwelannyirri
dali wa₂-rr-iwa₂-y₁ila-n-nyirri
name 3N₉₋₁-O-3PL.S-DEFS-hold-PRS-DU
‘They two will keep that name’

g. A: andu kunya ada irruma di?
andu kunya ada a₁-irra₂-ma-ø di
M.AMBIPH where sit 3MSG-DEFS-do-PRS N₉₋₁.ANAPH
‘And where does he stay then?’

h. B: arriyu wandimi?
arri-yu w-andimi
about-LAT N₉₋₁-whatchamacallit
‘And he, eh, what’s his name…’

7. If the pronominal prefix includes a rhotic -irra₂- is realised as -iwa₂- (Rumsey 1982: 106).
i. A: \textit{Yilkiyangan}  
\textit{Yilkiyangan}  
‘Yilkiyangan’

j. \textit{wijika irroden} \textit{di?}  
\textit{wijiji=ka a}_{1-}\textit{irra}_{2-}\textit{oda-y}_{1i-n} \textit{di}  
truly=Q 3MSG-DEFS-paint-refl-PRS N_{w-ANAPH}  
‘It is his painting, right?’

k. B: \textit{aw, burray wa angkode runga mardumardu}  
\textit{aw burray wa a}_{1-}\textit{w}_{2a_{2}-\textit{oda-y}_{1}i} \textit{ru-nga mardu-mardu}  
oh no NEG 3MSG-IRR-paint-refl just-ONLY walk-REDUP  
\textit{angkerri mangurre}  
\textit{a}_{1-}\textit{a-ngka-yirri mangurre}  
3MSG-GO-PST-CONT half.way  
‘No, this is not [the place of] his painting, he had only just come halfway’

l. A: \textit{a!}  
\textit{a}  
\textit{ah}  
‘Ah!’

What explains the clustering of definite subject markers in (3) and (4) in contrast to the rest of the narrative dialogue? For the occurrences in (3) we could find a functional pressure to disambiguate reference through the use of \textit{-irra}_{2-}: in line (3a), the marker is used by speaker B, the principal narrator of the story, in a way that is quite similar to the use illustrated in (1). Here, there are multiple third person referents available in the discourse context and therefore the definite subject marker helps to disambiguate the identity of the subject. Given the unusual transformation of the ancestor being into a mountain creek in line (3b), the references to the water in (3b) and (3ef) could simply be interpreted as underlining the referential continuity of the subsequent subjects.

In (4a), the turn \textit{dali murrumanga munda dambun} ‘did he (definite subject) name that place?’ again includes an \textit{-irra}_{2-} marked subject referring to the mythological ancestor. While the ancestor/water referent is again the subject, at this stage the use of the definite subject marker seems functionally redundant at best: the subject is unambiguously established, as is clear from A’s responses to B. Nevertheless, throughout (4), both speakers continue to use the marker.

I would suggest that the explanation for this use lies in A’s question in line (4j), \textit{wijika irroden di?} ‘Is he really painted here?’: A assumes that this passage is

\footnote{The use of the present tense here represents the painting event as eternally ongoing, a phenomenon commonly referred to in anthropological descriptions of Australian Aboriginal
a narrative peak, a description of the place where the ancestor ‘paints himself’, in
other words, speaker A, who initiates most of the turns with the definite subject
marker assumes that this fragment represents the culmination of the story.

In this sense, the ‘overuse’ of the marker is not dissimilar from the phenomenon found in the last lines of (5).

(5) ‘Susan herself was amazed at the effect and stepped into the amphitheater, watching D’Ambrosio’s fall. She stood there for an instant, thinking that D’Ambrosio must be unconscious. But the man drew his knees up and pulled himself into a kneeling position. He looked up at Susan and managed a smile despite the intense pain of his broken rib. “I like ‘em… when they fight back,” he grunted between clenched teeth.

Susan picked up the fire extinguisher and threw it as hard as she could at the kneeling figure. D’Ambrosio tried to move...’

As Fox (1987: 167) points out on the basis of the novel fragment in (5), the full realisation of the names ‘Susan’ and ‘D’Ambrosio’ in the final paragraph is redundant, since there can be no confusion about the referents intended. As established referents, it should be sufficient to refer to these entities with the pronouns ‘she’ and ‘he’, but the referential form of the final paragraph contributes to creating the tension appropriate for the action scene in (5), a final confrontation between two protagonists. Across languages as diverse as English and Ungarinyin, redundant specification of referents appears to contribute to signalling a narrative peak.

As with same/different subject marking before, I do not claim that the Ungarinyin observation and the English referential patterns in (5) are equivalent. However, the similarities between the two phenomena need to be explained.

Grammar as a social instructive tool and a semiotic hybrid

How do we apply the goal stated in the first section, to analyse grammar as social signs, to a morpheme such as the Ungarinyin definite subject marker? Answering this question first requires us to address a more basic problem: What actually makes the marker a grammatical sign?

A traditional definition could be formulated along these lines: a grammatical sign consists of an identifiable, conventional morpho-synactic form and a conventional semantic meaning. But however seemingly innocuous such a definition may be, none of its components are uncontroversial. For example, a growing number of linguists associated with interactional linguistics would deny any special cosmologies as the ‘evernow’.
privileges to morpho-syntactic form. As Fox (2007: 281) writes: ‘grammar is […] a physically embodied, publicly available display’. This suggests that every aspect of interaction, including gesture, voicing, eye gaze etc. would have to be considered part of grammar.

Without qualifying the broader merits of such a research programme (but see discussion section), this conceptualisation of grammar does not help us in characterising grammar as social signs. I would like to repeat my point from the beginning of this chapter: without denying the necessity of studying all aspects of interaction, studying more forms does not equal a more social grammatical analysis. If language is fundamentally shaped by sociality there is all reason to expect that its most conventionalised, repeatable forms are steeped in social meaning. Since these conventional forms necessarily have to be learned across a speech community, and are therefore intrinsically connected with culture, I believe it is warranted to assign them a privileged status in our analysis, but at the very least they are of particular interest.

A second potential controversial aspect of the ‘traditional’ definition of a grammatical sign introduced above concerns its focus on conventional semantic meaning. Proponents of Cognitive Grammar, for example, would reject a special role of semantics in such a definition, since they would object that ‘any strict line of demarcation [between semantics and pragmatics] is arbitrary’ (Langacker 2009: 93). Authors ascribing to this view would suggest that, for example, the semantics of the definite subject marker may well lie in subject reference maintenance, but that prominence signalling in narrative peaks (arguably a pragmatic effect) is no less part of the meaning of the marker as a grammatical sign. I agree that such meanings have to be accounted for at the level of the grammatical sign (rather than only as emergent meanings in use), but I do believe a principled distinction can and should be made between semantics and pragmatics, as I will argue in the sub-section on “Grammatical signs as instruction”.

Syntactic theories would further have differing opinions about two additional aspects of the above definition of grammatical signs as conventional forms with conventional meanings: first they could be differentiated on the basis of their interpretation of the relation between form and meaning in the definition of a grammatical sign. Second, they would diverge over the nature of conventional linguistic meaning and its relation to any extra-linguistic meaning, if they would assume this division can be made at all.

With respect to the relation between meaning and form, syntactic theories may be separated into constructionist approaches, which assume that the two are intrinsically linked (cf. Goldberg 1995, 2006; Croft 2001; Hoffmann and Trousdale 2013) and non-constructionist, which propose various ways in which an ‘underlying structure’ (cf. Chomsky 2005) or, e.g., a set of functional features
Stef Spronck (cf. Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2008) gives rise to a form. On this issue I will side with constructionist approaches: I will assume that it is equally nonsensical to talk about a linguistic form without a meaning as it is to talk about a linguistic meaning without a dedicated form: if one occurs without the other, it is not a grammatical sign.

The second and final issue concerns the distinction between grammatical signs and other types of linguistic and extra-linguistic signs, such as lexical signs or a slap on the wrist. For our discussion, the question here is whether a definite subject marker is a different type of linguistic sign from, e.g., a lexeme such as 'book' and if so, how.

These are the issues I aim to address in the present section, by means of background starting with a brief discussion of the foundational Peircian trichotomy of signs, the distinction between symbols, icons and indices, and its relation to grammar.

Grammar is multimodal, in a Peircian sense

Any semiotic analysis at some point has to address the classic trichotomy of signs proposed by Charles S. Peirce (as part of a broader classificatory system): the distinction between icons, indices and symbols. I trust the reader will be familiar with this trichotomy, but as a reminder Table 1, reproduced from Merrell (2001: 37), summarises the standard interpretation of this three-way opposition with examples of each sign category.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sign type:</th>
<th>Icon</th>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Symbol</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Semiotic mode:</td>
<td>Similarity</td>
<td>Causal or natural relation</td>
<td>Convention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practical examples:</td>
<td>Photograph, painting, diagram, touch of silk, musical note, sweet smell</td>
<td>Smoke for fire, thermometer for heat, symptom for disease, crash for falling log, feel of fur for cat tail</td>
<td>Word, insignia, Morse code, logical sign, algebraic sign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How to make and take them:</td>
<td>Feeling, sensation</td>
<td>Perception, inference, action-reaction</td>
<td>Learning by instruction and by doing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Applications of the trichotomy to linguistic signs would naturally focus on symbols. Linguistic signs necessarily carry a conventional meaning (whether we attribute this to a cultural or an innate cognitive basis) and need to be taught by (in
Chapter 5. The representation-cohesion-stance hypothesis

Unsurprisingly, Table 1 shows ‘word’ as the first practical example of a symbol.

At least since Bühler (1934), however, linguists have recognised that symbolic meaning is not the only aspect of a linguistic sign that matters, acknowledging that linguistic signs often involve indexical or iconic properties. Bühler (1934) defined a class of elements that are now commonly referred to as ‘deictics’, i.e. words such as ‘this’, ‘that’ and ‘there’, which, following the terminology in Table 1, have a ‘natural relation’ with the speech situation. The Ungarinyin definite subject marker, as I will argue, is not exclusively, or even primarily, symbolic either. In fact, not only linguistic signs but signs in general are rarely -if ever- of one type. As Merrell (2001: 37) phrases it: ‘Putting things into neat pigeon-holes might allow us some security, but it is a tenuous game, since signs simply cannot stand still’.

This is a first important realisation when it comes to characterising linguistic signs. While some linguistic signs are best characterised in terms of their symbolic, indexical or even iconic properties (examples will follow below), these are rarely sufficient to capture the whole sign. According to Jakobson (1980), the main source of confusion about the classification of linguistic signs lies in the expectation associated with the label in the left top row of Table 1: the tendency of authors to interpret the Peircian trichotomy as semiotic types: ‘Attempts have been made to attribute to Peirce the idea of the division of all human signs into three rigorously separate classes, while the author only considers three modes’ (Jakobson 1980: 11), and in order to illustrate this point, Jakobson (1980: 11–12) cites Peirce as follows:

It is frequently desirable that a representamen should exercise one of those three functions to the exclusion of the other two, or two of them to the exclusion of the third; but the most perfect of signs are those in which the iconic, indicative, and symbolic characters are blended as equally as possible. […] It would be difficult if not impossible, to instance an absolutely pure index, or to find any sign absolutely devoid of the indexical quality. (Jakobson 1980: 11–12)

Jakobson (1980: 87) writes that ‘Peirce’s semiotic doctrine is the only sound basis for a strictly linguistic semantics’, but it can only be so if it is used to characterise aspects of signs, not full signs themselves. In other words, a linguistic unit, such as a word or phrase, cannot be labelled a symbol, index or icon, only particular qualities of it can.

This interpretation has two fundamental consequences: first, it means that (1) we cannot simply say that, e.g., a word such as ‘cow’ is a symbol, the onomatopoeic word ‘moo’ is an icon and the pronoun ‘it’ is an index since the sign is simply not the level at which these semiotic classifications can be used. Nevertheless, the traditional approach to words with a meaning that is not fully or exclusively symbolic – in the Saussurian sense of an arbitrary form associated with a conventional
meaning – has been exactly this: to isolate a class of words based on, e.g., their indexical properties (cf. Hanks 2005). Second, (2) linguistic analyses need to be able to account for the observation that language consists of multiple semiotic modes at a *lexical* and *grammatical* level.

A first step to characterising linguistic signs consists of acknowledging that they have heterogeneous semiotic properties. As I will argue, the Peircian trichotomy provides a solid foundation to characterise these ‘multimodal’ properties of grammar.

**Grammatical signs as instruction**

For the second step of the account of grammar as a social sign developed in this chapter I will mainly rely on the interpretation of grammar as ‘social-technological instruction’, recently set out by Dor (2015, 2016). In a nutshell, Dor (2015) proposes the following:

First, Dor (2015) assumes that there is a fundamental distinction between linguistic meaning and extra-linguistic meaning, resulting in the three-way relation between experience, language form (signifier) and semantic meaning (signified) represented in Figure 1.

![Figure 1](image)

**Figure 1.** The relation between experience, signifier and signified in Dor (2015: 45)

Within this model the linguistic form, the signifier, is in many ways the least problematic aspect of the linguistic sign. In Figure 1 it is equated with the ‘linguistic sound’, the sound produced by the speech channel (or the sign space, in the case of
sign languages). On the other end of the representation in Figure 1 we find ‘experience’, which Dor characterises as consisting of types of lived experiences, through which people build up ‘experience clusters’ around a certain constant experiential anchor, viz. generalisations over all previous encounters with objects, events etc. around a more or less stable average core. While such an experiential anchor may remind of prototypes within Prototype Theory, which are constructed on the basis of exemplars (Rosch 1975), there is an important difference: since lived experience is individual and unevenly shared across a community, no two experience clusters representing a similar type of experience in two people can be presumed exactly the same. Dor (2015) highlights this observation by labelling experience clusters ‘analogue’. Although experience is often mediated through language, experience clusters themselves are extra-linguistic.

Unlike experience, ‘signified’ linguistic meaning is conventional and shared within a speech community. The combined signifieds of a language form a ‘symbolic landscape, the mutually identified model of the world that allows for the instruction of imagination’ (Dor 2015: 34), through a process Dor (2015) calls ‘instructive communication’. In instructive communication, the sender communicates: “my experience is of this type–try to imagine” (Dor 2015: 25).

The linguistic sign in Dor’s (2015) model in Figure 1 is constituted by the combination of the signifier and signified, which are intrinsically paired. In my interpretation, this equals the position of construction grammar about the relation between meaning and form: a linguistic form does not exist without a specific linguistic meaning, nor a linguistic meaning without a linguistic form (see section on “Grammar as a social instructive tool and a semiotic hybrid”).

The way in which linguistic signs are used is reminiscent of the pragmatic account of communication proposed in Relevance Theory: ‘the linguistic sense of words and sentences is used not to encode what the speaker means but merely to indicate it – indicate it in a precise way but with room for interpretation’ (Mercier and Sperber 2017: 160). In Dor’s (2015) proposal, a linguistic sign has a certain semantic, conventional meaning that the addressee in the speech situation

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9. Or at least, since no one has direct access to another person’s experience clusters we can never know how similar these are. As Dor (2015) convincingly shows, this conceptualisation can account for the many inconsistencies that have emerged in Prototype Theory over the years.

10. Zlatev (2016), accepting the model Dor (2015) proposes, adds the provision that experience and linguistic meaning are still tightly interconnected since the latter is necessarily grounded in (embodied) pre-linguistic cognition and knowledge and individual cognitive capacities have a deep intersubjective basis (also cf. Spronck 2016). Crucially, however, interactions between (individual) experience and (social) linguistic conventions can only be fruitfully studied if this investigation starts from the assumption that the two levels are at least distinguishable, which, I believe, is one of the merits of Dor’s (2015) model as represented in Figure 1.
pragmatically interprets in context and in connection to other signifieds in the symbolic landscape, based on her/his individually constructed experience cluster it is associated with.

For Dor (2015), this conceptualisation of linguistic understanding goes back to the work of Gottlob Frege:

Frege is usually remembered for his distinction between the sense and the reference of the sign, but the distinction can only be properly understood against the background of his conception of the idea. It is here that Frege establishes the status of the sign as a social entity, and the experiential gap [i.e. the fact that different people have different experiences, SS] as its foundational background: “the reference and sense of a sign are to be distinguished from the associated idea. If the reference of a sign is an object perceivable by the senses, my idea of it is an internal image, arising from memories of sense impressions which I have had and acts, both internal and external, which I have performed. Such an idea is often saturated with feeling; the clarity of its separate parts varies and oscillates. The same sense is not always connected, even in the same man, with the same idea. The idea is subjective: one man’s idea is not that of another. […] A painter, a horseman, and a zoologist will probably connect different ideas with the name ‘Bucephalus.’” It is at the level of sense that different people have the same meaning associated with the sign. (Dor 2015: 222, fn. 3)

The account of linguistic signs espoused by Dor’s (2015) model in Figure 1 is inherently social: all meanings and linked forms are learned within a speech community, but, more importantly, language itself is conceived of as a social ‘technology’. Instructive communication relies on the dialogic identification of experience clusters, and a linguistic sign is most effective in allowing the addressee to imagine an experience based on the signifieds (i.e. interpret an utterance) if it is shaped in a way in which it performs its instructive role best.

However, while this brings us closer to our goal of defining linguistic signs as social signs, Dor’s (2015) theory is fundamentally an account of symbolic signs. For a linguistic sign such as the Ungarinyin definite subject marker, for example, it would seem less relevant to associate it with a cluster of experience types, in a way that would be appropriate for an object, property or event. Rather than as a relation between symbolic linguistic meaning and extra-linguistic experience, the only way in which the definite subject marker can be experienced is through language. How can the model in Figure 1 be applied to a linguistic sign that carries a meaning that is not primarily symbolic?

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11. Dor (2015, 2017) states that ‘all interpretation must eventually be pragmatic.’

12. For a fuller introduction to the theory described above, the reader is referred to Dor (2015) and Dor (2016).
The linguistic sign as instructive modes

I would like to adopt the approach described in the sub-section on “Grammatical signs as instruction” to the Peircian semiotic modes discussed in the previous sub-section, starting from the definition Jakobson (1980) gives of for indices, icons and symbols:

In conformity with [Peirce’s] trichotomy of semiotic modes […] (1) the index is a referral from the signans to the signatum by virtue of an effective contiguity; (2) the icon is a referral from the signans to the signatum by virtue of an effective similarity; (3) the symbol is a referral from the signans to the signatum by virtue of an “imputed,” conventional, habitual contiguity. (Jakobson 1980: 10–11)

Note that if we integrate these definitions into the representation in Figure 1, Jakobson’s (1980) ‘signans’ and ‘signatum’ describe a relation between a linguistic sign (as a form-meaning complex) and what it stands for in the extra-linguistic world, respectively. In the above definitions, ‘signans’, therefore, corresponds to the combination of Dor’s signifier and signified. The ‘signatum’ on the one hand corresponds both to general experience and experience clusters (and, as Dor points out, Frege’s ‘idea’, not ‘sense’), and the dynamic experience of pragmatically recovering meaning in the speech situation.

With a few slight modifications, then, we can re-define the Peircean semiotic modes as part of the linguistic sign in the following way:

- Instructive symbolic mode: a symbol is a mode through which the speaker instructs the addressee to imagine the signatum/referent as a conventional type of experience, i.e. an experience cluster;
- Instructive iconic mode: an icon is a mode through which the speaker instructs the addressee to imagine the signatum/referent as part of the linguistic signifier-signified complex, i.e. the symbolic field;
- Instructive indexical mode: an index is a mode through which the speaker instructs the addressee to imagine the signatum/referent neither as an experience cluster, nor as part of the symbolic field but as a signatum/referent that has an ‘effective contiguity’ with either or both of these, i.e. can be directly experienced in the speech situation.

These ‘instructive modes’ represent different aspects of the linguistic sign, more particularly, they constitute different types of instructions in instructive communication. The instructive symbolic mode is the dominant mode in most lexical signs and represents the default situation for the interpretation of signifieds illustrated in Figure 1. The iconic and indexical modes are more dominant in meanings that are signalled through grammatical morphemes and function words, and
relate to the way in which the sign is to be interpreted, either as part of the symbolic field,13 or by virtue of contextual (ad-hoc) proximity to the signified.

An example of a linguistic sign with a dominant indexical mode would be a deictic pronoun such as ‘this’ (not coincidentally often labelled an ‘indexical’), but as a linguistic sign ‘this’ also has a symbolic mode (e.g., the distinction between ‘this’ and ‘that’ can only be understood on the basis of an experience cluster of proximate and non-proximate objects), and has discourse referential functions, which belong to the iconic mode. While the indexical mode may be relatively well studied through analyses of deictics, the iconic mode may be less familiar. Exploring instructive iconicity may be most easily done on the basis of an analysis of a linguistic sign in which the iconic mode is dominant. I claim that the Ungarinyin definite subject marker is such a sign.

Representation, cohesion, stance

In order to demonstrate how the definition of linguistic signs as multiple instructive modes may help to analyse the Ungarinyin definite subject marker, consider the following question: If a subject is coreferential with that of a preceding clause, but the addressee has a reasonable chance of misidentifying the referent and the speaker fails to use a definite subject marker, is s/he making a grammatical error? Although a speaker obviously cannot be held accountable for an addressee’s misinterpretations, it may be useful to compare the hypothetical case of the infelicitous absence of a definite subject marker with the hypothetical use of a past tense morpheme instead of a present tense form in (4c), *kajinngarringa wurrenyerri? ‘did it go on eternally?’*.14 Are these situations fundamentally distinct, and if so, in what way?

The hypothetical past tense form of (4c) clearly reflects an entirely different question from the present tense form in (4c). The differences concern the indexical mode of the tense form (relating the construction to the speech situation as a past event) and the symbolic mode, which means a much as ‘imagine this event as an event that has already happened’. In this instance the question has practically

13. A reader may object to the use of ‘symbolic’ in the definition of the iconic mode and replace the term ‘symbolic field’ from Figure 1 with the more general ‘semiotic field’ or ‘linguistic field’, but I will adhere to the term used by Dor (2015).

14. The morphological gloss of this word would be as in (a) below:

(a) *wurrenyerri*

\[wurra_y_i-nyi-yirri\]

\[3N_w::DEFS-be-PST-CONT\]
the opposite meaning from that in (4c). We could say that this grammatical change would result in reflecting a different reality.

A slightly different case would be a version of (4c) in which the continuous aspect marker in *kajinngarringa wurreyirri* ‘does it go on eternally?’ would be absent. Unlike tense (which is a paradigmatic choice: absence of a past tense marker in (4c) *means* non-past/present), the continuous aspect marker -yirri does not have a paradigmatic opposition with, e.g., non-continuous/punctual aspect. To the best of my knowledge, the hypothetical version of (4c) without the continuous aspect marker would be allowed following to Ungarinyin grammar, but it would lack a linguistic sign with the symbolic mode ‘imagine this event as continuously ongoing’ (although this meaning would still be present in the adverb). In this case, the alternative non-continuous aspect form of (4c) could describe the same reality, but mark fewer semantic features of this reality explicitly.

The Ungarinyin definite subject marker has a highly uneven distribution in discourse: some speakers or genres even consistently leave it out completely, and, like the continuous aspect marker, the definite subject marker does not affect the expression of the reality in which the construction is involved (both are ‘optional’ elements (McGregor 2013)). Unlike the continuous aspect marker, however, the definite subject marker does not instruct the addressee with respect to any extra-linguistic experience at all. With its dominant iconic mode it signals that its interpretation is to be found within the symbolic field, but it does not fundamentally affect the symbolic field itself. Leaving out the marker where it would have helped the addressee to identify a subject referent may qualify the speaker as a less accommodating language user, or a less empathetically competent person, but the semantic instruction of the linguistic sign can remain intact. Both the indexical and iconic modes of the linguistic sign do not so much affect the what of instructive communication (which is the purview of the symbolic mode), they affect the how.

**The definition of the definite subject reformulated in semiotic terms**

The model of ‘referential choice’ proposed by Kibrik (2011) and reproduced as Figure 2 (also see van Gijn 2016) serves as a reasonably good predictor for identifying the contexts in which the Ungarinyin definite subject marker *-irra_2-* is most frequently used.
What Kibrik’s (2011) model suggests is that a referent can be activated for two reasons: because of the discourse context and because of internal properties, which include the factors of referential prominence identified by Silverstein (1976), such as animateness, first person versus second and third person, etc. These ‘activation factors’ result in the ‘referent’s aggregate activation’, i.e. its degree of activation in the discourse. The role of the definite subject marker comes in at the stage of the ‘referential conflict filter’: if there are multiple active referents in the discourse, this results in a referential conflict, i.e. potential ambiguity, which can be resolved using a definite subject marker.15 In Kibrik’s (2011) terminology, this means the Ungarinyin definite subject marker is not a reference marker itself, it is a ‘referential aid’ that guides the addressee in the identification of a referent.

We have seen how this works in Ungarinyin discourse in examples such as (1) and (3). With our semiotic qualification of the Ungarinyin definite subject marker as a sign in which the iconic mode is dominant (i.e. signalling that its meaning concerns the symbolic landscape, the collection of signifieds or signifiers) we may slightly modify Rumsey’s (1982) original definition: the definite subject marker signals that the signatum/referent of the subject of the verb so marked is a referent within the already constructed symbolic landscape. Use of the marker indicates to the addressee: ‘try to imagine the signatum of this sign as part of the linguistic signifier-signified complex, more particularly, as a referent that has previously been assigned the status of subject.16

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15. The degree of ambiguity itself is dependent on the referent’s aggregate activation: if one of the potential referents is a highly active referent ambiguity is less likely, which is the reason first person referents (which have highly prominent internal referential properties) rarely receive definite subject marking, outside reported speech contexts.

16. For a further specification of the notion of ‘subject’ from this perspective, see Dor (2015: 129–131).
Chapter 5. The representation-cohesion-stance hypothesis

Cohesion

The model in Figure 2 allows us to connect our semiotic characterisation of the definite subject marker to a broader research programme, since Kibrik (2011) dedicates most attention to an aspect of the model I did not yet address in the prior section. This concerns the question *what constitutes a discourse context in which a referent can be assumed activated?*

Kibrik’s (2011) answer to this question, based on proposals by Chafe (1974, 1994), and further elaborated by Du Bois (1987) and Kibrik (1999, 2011), attempts to relate the expression of discourse reference and information structuring to aspects of cognition:

My suggestion will be that [the distinction between 'new and old information'] is based precisely on a speaker’s assumptions as to what is in his addressee’s consciousness at the time of speech. Such well-known linguistic phenomena as intonation, pronominalization, and to a lesser extent word order, are governed in a crucial way by these assumptions. (Chafe 1974: 111)

The complex notion of ‘consciousness’ in Chafe’s (1974) original proposal above makes it difficult to base concrete predictions on this analysis, but Kibrik (2011) chooses a narrower focus by further specifying the cognitive element of ‘consciousness’ involved: (short term) memory. Within this view (already introduced from a slightly different perspective by Ariel 1988), a discourse context that serves as a positive activation factor is one in which a referent is held in short term memory. Reasons for a referent being held in short term memory may be that it was recently mentioned, is the only prominent referent in a stretch of discourse, metonymically relates to a referent mentioned etc., but for details I would refer to the authors cited. These details are tangential to the argument I would like to make here: what these accounts suggest is that discourse reference, an aspect of grammar associated with a particular class of linguistic signs, can be related to and (partially) motivated by a specific cognitive module. Both memory and discourse referential forms can be studied in their own right, but correlating these two results in a well-defined cognitive motivation for a particular linguistic form.

This brings me to my proposal alluded to in the title of this chapter: the instructive semiotic modes of linguistic signs achieve different functions in instructive communication (i.e. have different roles in the sociality of language use), are associated with, partially, distinct aspects of grammar (i.e. relate to linguistic signs in which either the symbolic, iconic or indexical mode is dominant) and are processed by, partially, separate cognitive modules. In the case of linguistic signs with a dominant iconic mode the instructive communicative function is that of signalling that the linguistic sign has to be interpreted with respect to the symbolic landscape itself. While this function involves more than just discourse reference,
in all instances it requires the addressee to reflect on and have in mind a specific chunk of the symbolic landscape. This allows us to relate linguistic signs with a dominant iconic mode in the sense introduced in the section on “Grammar as a social instructive tool and a semiotic hybrid” to aspects of memory.

The instructive, semiotic and cognitive features combine to establish three complementary grammatical domains. For signs with a dominant iconic mode I will refer to this domain as cohesion. The other two domains I will label below as representation and stance.

The Ungarinyin definite subject marker is an example of a linguistic sign that forms part of the grammatical domain of cohesion. Even though it has language-specific functions that are likely unique to Ungarinyin (most trivially its form and position in the Ungarinyin verbal morphemic template), the parallels with the other phenomena illustrated in the section “A descriptive challenge: The Ungarinyin definite subject marker”, as well as the explanatory value of the model in Figure 2, which was not intended for Ungarinyin or even phenomena like the definite subject marker, are remarkable. Positing a shared grammatical domain between the languages involved, based on language-independent social, semiotic and cognitive phenomena, gives us a cross-linguistic motivation for the observed similarities.

Furthermore, it can also help to identify regularity in uses of a linguistic sign that seemingly do not fit a function in the domain it commonly belongs to, which may be exemplified by the ‘irregular’ uses of the definite subject marker found in the sub-sections “Grammatical signs as instruction” and “The linguistic sign as instructive modes”. As we observed, linguistic signs rarely consist of one specific mode. Consequently, a linguistic sign rarely belongs to one specific grammatical domain. In the examples of the definite subject marker in which its discourse referential function seemed less relevant, as in (4), I would suggest we find instances in which the marker ‘crosses over’ into another grammatical domain, more particularly, the domain of stance.

Definite subject markers with a dominant indexical mode: cohesion-stance transgression

If we had to identify a symbolic mode and an indexical mode of the Ungarinyin definite subject marker, what would these look like? Being a linguistic sign, the marker has a conventional meaning and form, which necessarily implies a symbolic mode. As indicated earlier, however, unlike most linguistic symbols, a definite subject marker does not signal to the addressee to imagine a type of extra-linguistic experience (experience that can be had without talking about it), but an experience with language. Nevertheless, this is in fact a type of experience as well, so we may formulate the iconic mode of the definite subject marker as follows:
Instructive symbolic mode of the definite subject marker: try to imagine the signatum of this sign as a conventional type of linguistic experience, viz. an instruction to find a co-referential subject in the already constructed symbolic landscape.

The iconic mode being dominant in the marker, this symbolic mode immediately leads to its iconic instruction (such as a symbolic mode of, e.g., a deictic pronoun would directly suggest its indexical mode), but the symbolic mode is certainly not absent.

More interesting, however, is the indexical mode of the definite subject marker. Since we may assume that the indexical mode is not especially linked to instructive communication about the symbolic field or to memory, in a way in which the iconic mode is, we may begin by asking what other types of instruction and cognitive properties can be associated with the definite subject marker. Starting with the latter, it needs to be observed that much of the time the use of the definite subject marker is not simply a result of a referent being held in short term memory, but an estimate if it is being held in the short term memory of others. Specifically, this requires the speaker to make complex judgements about the memory and cognitive processes of the addressee. While coordinating attention and knowledge is rife in animal communication (De Waal 2016), human communication seems to be unique in the sense that human speakers realise that their own knowledge basis and beliefs about the world, even when given the same stimuli, can be different from that of other humans (Callaghan et al. 2011; Kaminski, Call and Tomasello 2008; Moll, Carpenter and Tomasello 2014). In addition, humans are able to reason about interaction as if they are able to overview all beliefs involved at a particular time of the conversation:

Humans, but not chimpanzees, […] seem to comprehend joint activities and their different roles from a “bird’s eye view” in which all roles are interchangeable in a single representational format (Tomasello 2014b: 189). [T]he collaborative nature of human communication means that the communicator can perceive and comprehend his own communicative acts as if he were the recipient […] [W]ith modern humans and conventional linguistic communication, some new types of thoughts could now be expressed. Moreover, now the self-monitoring process came not just from the perspective of the recipient, but from the normative perspective of all users of the conventions. (Tomasello 2014a: 104)

According to Tomasello (2014a, 2014b), humans understand the relationships between discourse participants and anything talked about within ‘a single representational format’ of interchangeable roles. This ‘bird’s eye view’ representation of shared perspectives, individual perspectives and cultural norms of
co-operativity\textsuperscript{17} implies that each interpretation of a perspective relation is relative to that of another.

Juggling these types of judgements relies on a set of cognitive capacities we may refer to with the broad label social cognition. Crucially, social cognition and short term/episodic memory represent independent sets of cognitive capacities (Rosenbaum, Stuss, Levine and Tulving 2007).

In order to use the Ungarinyin definite subject marker a speaker requires a degree of social cognition to, first, evaluate the knowledge state of the addressee (can the addressee be expected to hold the intended subject referent in short term memory?) and, second, evaluate the potential for confusion (would the addressee be able to identify the subject referent easily?). We could illustrate this process on the basis of the schematic representation of the speech situation in Figure 3.

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{triangle.png}
\caption{The ‘stance triangle’ in Du Bois (2007)}
\end{figure}

The discourse situation in Figure 3 consists of two speech participants, a ‘subject,’ and a ‘subject,’ and a discourse object (anything that can be talked about, cf. Du Bois 2007: 147–149), forming a triangle. Within this triangle the speech participants engage in three coordinated activities: evaluating what is being talked about (e.g., qualifying it as something known or not-yet-known), positioning oneself with respect to what is being talked about (e.g., acknowledging it as an entity or event they caused to exist or have special knowledge of) and to make sure that

\textsuperscript{17} The understanding of social institutional structures, according to Tomasello (2014a: 90ff), accounts for the development of contextual interpretation.
the relevant values are similar for the other speech participant (aligning). These activities fully rely on the socio-cognitive capacities to evaluate, to juxtapose and monitor the perspective of the addressee in relation to that of the speaker. The entire process described by Figure 3, Du Bois (2007) labels stance, which he defines as

a public act by a social actor, achieved dialogically through overt communicative means, of simultaneously evaluating objects, positioning subjects (self and others), and aligning with other subjects, with respect to any salient dimension of the sociocultural field. (Du Bois 2007: 163)

Du Bois (2007) emphasises that stance is not an isolated phenomenon in discourse: expressing stance is an ongoing activity in (linguistic) interaction, and ‘[i]t is the stance utterance with its dialogic context that is the relevant unit for stance interpretation’ (Du Bois 2007: 158). In other words, stance is not a feature of individual linguistic signs, but obviously there are some linguistic signs that are more appropriate for the task of evaluating (e.g., adverbs such as ‘well’ or ‘probably’), signalling speaker responsibility (e.g., irrealis marking) or aligning (e.g., particles such as ‘yes’ or ‘no’). This analysis ties in with the conceptualisation of linguistic signs as semiotic modes that are more dominant in some signs than in other, and can be brought out in a given context. For stance, the dominant mode is the indexical mode.

In its ‘common’ use in (1) and (3), the Ungarinyin definite subject marker is not a part of the stance domain, but it does have an indexical mode as well: it necessarily involves an evaluation of the knowledge background of the addressee (her/his ability to identify the subject referent), and therefore signals a context-dependent, intersubjective judgement between the discourse participants and the discourse object (i.e. the identity referred to as the subject referent). From the perspective of instructive communication we may formulate this indexical mode along the following lines:

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18. In Du Bois’ (2007) definition, evaluating is ‘the process whereby a stancetaker orients to an object of stance and characterizes it as having some specific quality or value’ (Du Bois 2007: 143), positioning is ‘the act of situating a social actor with respect to responsibility for stance and for invoking sociocultural value’ (Du Bois 2007: 143) and aligning is ‘the act of calibrating the relationship between two stances, and by implication between two stancetakers’ (Du Bois 2007: 144).

19. Also compare: ‘Displaying stances is part and parcel of the interaction between participants who respond to prior turns and design their talk for the current recipient(s)’ (Kärkäinen 2006: 703).
– Instructive indexical mode of the definite subject marker: try to imagine the signatum/referent of this sign as a context-dependent interaction between the speech situation and the symbolic field, taking into account my assumed evaluation of your knowledge of the discourse referent and my positioning towards this referent.

Note that for its regular meaning the definite subject marker remains dependent on its iconic mode, and reference to the symbolic field (discourse) is fundamental to the semantics of even its indexical mode as described above, but there are contexts in which the latter mode of the marker asserts itself particularly strongly. An example of a context in which the indexical mode can gain dominance is in narrative peaks, as in (4). The indexical meaning suggests that the speaker considers the way in which she herself relates to what-is-talked-about (the discourse object), the referential subject in relation to the discourse, and how the addressee does. If the speaker assumes that there are discrepancies in the way in which the she relates to the discourse object (for example, she notices the salience and prominence of the subject referent but the addressee may not), she may signal such ‘misalignment’ between the speaker and addressee exactly through the use of a definite subject marker. Here, the marker that is typically part of the domain of cohesion transgresses into the stance domain.

At a trivial level such a transgression, or overlap, of domains already occurs in case of the definite subject marker signalling referential conflict: referential conflict indicates potential ambiguity for the addressee, not on the part of the speaker. But the regular interpretation of the marker as introduced in the section on “Conventional meaning of the Ungarinyin definite subject” is not about the degree of misalignment, it is about subject reference internal to the discourse/symbolic field. By using it outside of a context in which it potentially resolves referential conflict, however, the definite subject marker may signal a type of positioning by the speaker with respect to what-is-talked-about (the discourse object) that exceeds this trivial contribution the indexical mode regularly makes to the linguistic sign -irra₂-. In (4), the sheer repetition of the definite subject marker signals that its interpretation cannot simply be based on its regular iconic mode: even though the initial use of the marker in the preceding passage in (3) seems to be motivated by resolving referential conflict, it would be an anomaly if the speaker assumes the referential conflict to persist after repeated uses of -irra₂-. This is particularly clear, since both speakers use the marker in referring to the same subject, which, again, would be incompatible with its function of resolving referential conflict. The indexical mode that is brought out by this use positions the discourse object as prominent and continuously salient, consistent with its occurrence in a narrative peak.
Note that if we label a mode ‘dominant’ in a linguistic sign, this does not alter the linguistic sign itself. The definite subject marker is not a different linguistic sign in its reference disambiguating function or in its ‘prominence signalling’ function in narrative peaks. Interactions and overlap between grammatical domains constantly fluctuate in language use, which can be expected since they are based on the characteristically shifty semiotic modes of linguistic signs. The proposed account simply aims to provide a way to discuss such types of interactions, which, as a shorthand, we may qualify as transgressions between grammatical domains.

Impressionistically, transgressions between cohesion and stance are a particularly common phenomenon across languages and characterising them as such allows us to identify fluid connections between types of information structure marking, e.g., topic and focus (belonging to the domain of cohesion) and expressions of modality, which lie in the stance domain. For example, cross-linguistically it often seems problematic to draw precise distinctions between contrastive focus (‘this one, not that one’) and mirative reference (‘really, that one?!’). Analysing the distinction between such cases as a linguistic sign having distinct instructive modes allows us to preserve the semantic instructive function of the sign, while describing the differences when used in context in sufficient detail. With respect to language change, we may also be able to relate diachronic observations to specific fluctuations between semiotic modes (e.g., the indexical mode gaining dominance in the process of ‘subjectivisation’ in the sense of Traugott 2010). These and other topics can, I believe, be fruitfully explored within the approach described here, but lie beyond the scope of the present chapter.

Discussion

*Representation, cohesion and stance and the analytical paradox of cognitive-functional grammar*

All communicative actions are fundamentally social and dialogic. Speakers have this experience when having their words ‘stuck in their throat’ faced with a particular audience, while experiencing the feeling of understanding someone just by looking into their eyes, or by being able to come up with a string of anecdotes when talking to person A, but hardly finding any topic of conversation with person B. In this respect, however, communicative action is not much different from any other type of action: people act in response to actions that came before and in anticipation of actions to follow (Bakhtin 1993). And even our most inner thoughts are, as Mercier and Sperber (2011, 2017) argue – in the spirit of Bakhtin – rationalisations of pre-linguistic impulses and responses to stimuli, and finding arguments
through ‘inner speech’ about how to justify our actions to the world. Reasoning, doing and speaking are all dialogic activities.

For theories stating that language is inherently shaped by the way in which it is conceptualised (i.e. Cognitive Grammar and affiliated approaches) or by the communicative functions it represents (i.e. the various flavours of functionalist grammar), the dialogic nature of language poses a particular challenge. This challenge is what I called the analytical paradox of cognitive-functional grammar in the introduction: sociality, being one of the most prevalent features of language, most easily escapes low-level grammatical description, i.e. is most difficult to pinpoint within individual linguistic signs.

There are three commonly accepted theoretical solutions to this observation. The first two are polar opposites: either we can say that grammar, as the object of linguistic study is completely separate from its use, which is the traditional position of Chomskyan linguistics\(^{20}\) or we can state that all dialogic features of communication, either verbal or non-verbal are part of ‘grammar’. The latter position appears to be favoured by, e.g., proponents of interactional linguistics (Selting and Couper-Kuhlen 2001). For cognitive-functional grammars, however, neither position is consistent with their stated core believes: if language structure is just one of the features mixed in with communicative action (or completely divorced from it) there is simply no motivation for sociality or conceptualisation to act upon language structure to shape it in any particular way.\(^{21}\)

A third, and perhaps the most successful attempt at dealing with the analytical paradox, is the adoption of so called ‘layers’ in functionalist models. Within this idea, linguistic meaning can be represented as a number of parallel, co-existing functional layers, and layering has been a staple ingredient of functionalist theories of grammar ever since the introduction within the model of Systemic Functional Grammar (Halliday 1985). In this theory, and also in, e.g. Role and Reference Grammar (Van Valin and LaPolla 1997) and Functional Discourse Grammar (Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2008), authors have sought to account for linguistic functions at least at a representational level, where logical, stable semantic functions are characterised, and at an interpersonal level, where social, contextual and pragmatic functions are treated. In order to describe relations within discourse,

\(^{20}\) In the latest incarnation of Generative Grammar, the Minimalist Program, this strict division is partially abandoned in favour of an account that is closer to the functionalist models described in the next paragraph.

\(^{21}\) This is not to deny that identifying the actions performed in communication and the ways in which they are performed is not a valuable pursuit in itself, but I would argue that such a research programme does not directly contribute to a fuller analysis of the linguistic sign, or to uncovering the essence of language structure. These are simply different goals.
Halliday and Hasan (1976) explore an additional ‘textual’ level, subsequently also incorporated into the theory. Analyses within this model remain the most detailed accounts of cohesion, specifically in English.

Fundamentally, layered models are attempts to deal with the observation that the same linguistic sign can carry multiple functions. They allow the functionalist linguist the analytical fiction that a linguistic sign can be fully characterised in a hypothetical context-free world of convention as a symbol on one level, and as an intersubjective, social, indexical sign on another hypothetical level, a level that is more grounded in use. An, arguably, positive consequence of this conceptualisation is that there is no, or little, light between traditional reference-based/truth-conditional interpretations of symbolic meaning in both formal and functionalist linguistics. Yet, from a functionalist perspective, the existence of an essentially non-functionalist representational level at the heart of the semantic definition of the lexico-grammatical sign needs to be explained – or rejected. I believe that this problem of representational meaning has so far not been addressed in any meaningful way in functionalist linguistics, and this leads to a fundamental inconsistency in layered functionalist models with respect to their interpretation of the lexico-grammatical sign.

I propose that the only way in which representational meaning can be consistent with characterising the linguistic sign as a social sign (ostensibly the main motivating factor for the functionalist approach) requires meeting two theoretical conditions: first, layers should be conceived of not as describing full linguistic signs but semiotic modes within the linguistic sign, as I have argued above, and, second, the ‘representational level’, describing the semantics of symbolic modes, has to be thought of as an inherently social construct, within the process of instructive communication.22

This introduces the final and best studied grammatical domain linguistic signs engage in, alongside cohesion and stance, that of representation. As indicated in the section on “Definite subject clustering in discourse”, I consider the model in Figure 1 an illustration of how the symbolic mode is used in instructive communication, which means that the model primarily describes the domain of representation. In Dor’s (2015) account, the symbolic field carries a ‘prescriptive’ form and meaning that the addressee dynamically matches to an experience. In my

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22. I will not further explore the compatibility between the approach advocated here and functionalist models, but I do not see any a priori incompatibility between the proposal that the linguistic sign is best analysed as complementary modes with the interpretation of layers at least in some of the functionalist models cited above. The interpretation of representation as symbolic instruction is perhaps further removed from standard conceptualisations in functionalist grammars (but see Harder 2009), yet, I believe, is also not fundamentally irreconcilable.
interpretation, this corresponds to characterising the symbolic field as a complex of linguistic signs carrying conventional forms with inherently linked conventional meanings, as is customary in Construction Grammar (Croft 2001; Goldberg 2006, 2009), the tenets of which Fried and Östman (2004) summarise as follows:

The conceptual and architectural basis of Construction Grammar is framed by the following hypotheses: (i) speakers rely on relatively complex meaning-form patterns – constructions – for building linguistic expressions; (ii) linguistic expressions reflect the effects of interaction between constructions and the linguistic material, such as words, which occur in them; and (iii) constructions are organized into networks of overlapping patterns related through shared properties. (Fried and Östman 2004: 12)

A construction is a conventional form with a conventional meaning that represents some abstract generalisation over a sufficient number of occurrences of a linguistic sign (Goldberg 2009). Within this approach most linguistic expressions consist of multiple non-hierarchically combined constructions (e.g. a transitive construction, a verb construction, a nominal construction, a past tense construction, a plural construction etc.), interacting with each other and more abstract generalisations within the symbolic field. Each construction is a linguistic symbol itself.

One of the advantages of Construction Grammar is that it provides a psycholinguistic explanation for how conventional form-function pairings are used. Pattern recognition and categorical perception are common cognitive modules that allow a form to be identified as a construction C and, given the nature of categorical perception, ‘locked’ into a specific interpretation. As soon as the form is recognised a construction C, this invokes the links this construction C normally has within the symbolic field (e.g. a verb typically requires a tense form etc.). For every linguistic form this process can be repeated several times in parallel until the addressee has imagined a meaning that is supported by all symbolic forms. Approaches such as Conceptual Metaphor Theory may provide further hypotheses about links between individual symbols and cognition.

The hypothesis

After having sketched all the components of our analysis, we are now in a position to formulate a hypothesis about the role the grammatical domains of representation, cohesion and stance play in the formation and interpretation of linguistic signs, in relation to the social nature of grammar. I have suggested and hypothesise that linguistic signs consist of three modes, a symbolic, iconic and indexical one, which assume dominance to varying degrees. These semiotic modes require for their interpretation (at least) three separate cognitive modules/suites of
cognitive capacities: categorical perception, memory, and social cognition (more speculatively, these could also ontogenetically motivate the existence of these three grammatical systems). Linguistic signs are used in instructive communication, an activity that relies on socio-cognitive capacities, such as shared attention and being able to take the addressee’s perspective (Tomasello 2003), but also unfolds slightly differently depending on the dominant semiotic mode of the signs involved. A dominant symbolic mode is an instruction to imagine a meaning based on experience, a dominant iconic mode an instruction to imagine a meaning internal to the symbolic field, a dominant indexical mode an instruction to imagine a meaning based on the speech situation.

The representation-cohesion-stance hypothesis states that representation, cohesion and stance can be studied as separate grammatical domains, with their own cognitive and semiotic properties. The dominant semiotic mode of a linguistic sign requires it to be analysed with a set of assumptions specific to the grammatical domain the mode is associated with. By demonstrating where these initial assumptions fail for a specific use, the hypothesis allows us to characterise the semiotic fluidity of linguistic signs as specific transgressions between these grammatical domains.

**Conclusion: Grammatical analysis and the linguistic sign in flux**

In recent years, the traditional empirical base of linguistics has come under increased scrutiny. ‘Interactional’ approaches, rooted in ethnomethodology and/or conversation analysis reject written, monologic text as an object of linguistic study, in favour of spoken, naturalistic conversation. ‘Multimodal’ accounts point to the importance of alternative modes of communication in addition to speech, such as gesture and eye gaze. Documentary linguistics (Himmelmann 1998) theorises ways in which newly described and/or endangered languages can be captured most effectively and comprehensively, by considering vastly more features of the communicative situation than are commonly understood as ‘core grammar’. These add to more traditional criticism of a perceived narrow focus in structuralist linguistics on symbols, following Bühler’s (1934) approach to deictic meaning, and accounts of linguistic reflexes of indexicality, and to a lesser degree, iconicity in linguistic anthropology.

I would argue that these developments make it all the more important to approach grammar, as a social construct, with a more inclusive and flexible understanding of linguistic signs. Dancygier (2016) clearly illustrates the difficulty of characterising the interaction between linguistic, grammatical signs and their semiotic interpretations on the basis of linguistic forms in discussing the notion of ‘viewpoint’, which is close to the notion of ‘stance’ as defined by Du Bois (2007):
In English […] grammatical expressions such as articles, possessives, and demonstratives, typically not considered viewpoint expressions first and foremost, may also develop viewpoint functions in appropriate discourse contexts – and it is hard to claim that this is a result of grammaticalization; rather, these instances are possibly best treated in terms of polysemy triggered by features of discourse. Generally, then, we can see viewpoint marking in dedicated grammaticalized forms, but also in discourse-specific uses of other grammatical expressions. We do not mean to argue that these cases are essentially different – rather, they may exemplify various degrees of salience and discourse-reliance. (Dancygier 2016: 283)

If we regard viewpoint/stance meaning as resulting from the indexical mode inherent to every linguistic sign, the opposition between ‘grammaticalised elements’ (i.e. full linguistic forms) and ‘discourse’ becomes a false opposition: they simply represent different interpretations of the linguistic semiotic modes. In a ‘grammaticalised’ sign with an inherent stance meaning, the indexical mode is dominant, and we have to begin describing its meaning using models appropriate to stance. Where these models fail, the meaning has to be analysed using models appropriate to the relevant symbolic and iconic modes. The representation-cohesion-stance hypothesis is an attempt to methodologically and theoretically implement this approach in grammatical analysis. The models in Figures 2 and 3 certainly need to be developed further, to a similar degree that, e.g., symbolic analysis has grown in Construction Grammar, but they are the most detailed models to characterise non-representational meaning currently available.

Broadening the empirical basis of linguistics to include more aspects of communication is important (Ferrara and Hodge 2018), but it needs to be combined with a more rounded analysis of the linguistic sign itself, one that takes into account its quality as a social construct, a culturally convention-alised sign. It requires an approach that acknowledges that sociality cannot only be something done to a sign, that is, a type of action on the sign, but must be an integral part of the sign itself. Without a fuller understanding of how the iconic and indexical modes interact in linguistic meaning, and a flexible approach to the linguistic sign that not only accounts for representation, but also for cohesion and stance in a complementary fashion, we cannot fully capture conventional linguistic meaning. I hope that the approach outlined in this chapter goes some way towards achieving this goal.

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A framing-based account of critical cultural awareness

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In this chapter, I investigate cognitive processes and stages in the development of critical cultural awareness on the basis of frame semantics and conceptual blending theory. Twelve Chinese MA students from four universities in Beijing participated in an experiment. During the experiment, the participants read the English article “Body Ritual among the Esenihc”, performed tasks of Think-Aloud protocol and picture selection, and answered questions. The data were analyzed with Voyant Tools and thematic coding. The results suggest that critical cultural awareness development involves the processes of automatic framing, deframing, reframing, and blending and that it goes through the stages of framing absolutivity, framing flexibility, framing plurality, and framing relativity. I propose a model for critical cultural awareness development to represent these findings.

Keywords: critical cultural awareness, framing, frame semantics, conceptual blending theory

Introduction

Research on intercultural communication often promotes the framework of cultural awareness as an effective way to prepare people for appropriate intercultural interactions (Baker 2012; Chen 2010; Chen and Starosta 1996; Hanvey 1976; Howard-Hamilton, Richardson and Shuford 1998; Ting-Toomey and Kurogi 1998; Tomalin and Stempleski 1993). Several studies adopt the term “critical cultural awareness” to emphasize the importance of critical thinking to effective intercultural communication (Byram 1997, 2008, 2009). Some scholars also use this term to address cultural prejudice and intercultural miscommunication caused by Western-centrism (Christopher, Wendt, Marecek and Goodman 2014; Holliday 2010).
Byram (1997: 53) uses the term critical cultural awareness to refer to “an ability to evaluate critically and on the basis of explicit criteria perspectives, practices and products in one’s own and other cultures and countries”. His approach is to integrate foreign language education and cultural awareness development with education for intercultural citizenship with an aim to encourage international political activity among foreign language learners and to promote the formation of international communities of action (Byram 2008, 2009). Although Byram’s recommendation of critical evaluation allows the conscious control of biased interpretation (Guilherme 2002), Houghton (2008) finds that the critical evaluation of self and other is an area of tension between the development of critical cultural awareness and harmonious human relationship that some societies prioritize, for example, Japan.

Gao (2002: 28) defines cultural awareness as “awareness of cultural diversity, tolerance for differences, empathy with people from another culture, and consciousness of and reflection on values and practices in one’s own culture”. Gao (2008: 62) further includes self-reflection competence, awareness of cultural relativity, and “capacity to go beyond ethnocentrism and to view the world, the self, and the self-other relation from multiple perspectives” into her definition of intercultural awareness. A significant feature of Gao’s work is her suggestion of cultural awareness as a central pedagogical objective of English language teaching in China so as to cultivate learners’ capability of “going beyond” cultures, namely, to enable them to “shake off the constraints imposed by cultural differences or stereotypes”, to “conduct intercultural communication in an open, flexible, and effective way”, and to “construct self-identity productively during intercultural interaction” (Gao 2002: 29).

Other studies of critical cultural awareness development and foreign language education have focused on critical pedagogy (Dasli 2011; Freire 2005) and the design and implementation of language syllabus (Ghadiri, Tavakoli and Ketabi 2014), pedagogical tools (Moncada Linares 2016), and course activities (Agudelo 2009; Houghton, Furumura, Lebedko and Song 2013; Nugent and Catalano 2015).

There have also been a number of valuable discussions on the need for a withdrawal from imposing the assumptions, concepts, and values of an idealized Western Self on a non-Western Other. Holliday’s (2010) critical interpretivist approach to critical cultural awareness addresses cultural prejudice created by the Center-West’s ideological vision of a globalized world, in which the non-Western Other is defined, categorized, and imagined by the Western Self and is left no space to claim the world in his or her own terms. His approach recognizes the need to put aside dominant preoccupations by bracketing (Gubrium and Holstein 1997; Schutz 1970) and making the familiar strange (Schutz 1964), to see broader interconnections by thick description and sociological imagination (Mills 1970),
and to uncover and address intercultural ideology and power relations by critical reading of rich texts. Christopher, Wendt, Marecek, and Goodman (2014) discuss critical cultural awareness in the milieu of U.S. psychology. Drawing on the work of hermeneutic thinkers, they argue that “critical cultural awareness goes far beyond multicultural sensitivity” (2014: 8), rather it demands the recognition that culture shapes human experience, a serious consideration of the perspective of the other, along with truly engaging with others with a radical openness (Gadamer 1975) and cultural humility (Bullock 2011; Tervalon and Murray-Garcia 1998). They urge American psychologists whose work crosses cultural boundaries to greater critical awareness of their own cultural grounding and to restrain themselves from imposing the understandings and practices of U.S.-centered psychology on societies where they do not fit.

Although existing research has described the components and objectives of critical cultural awareness from perspectives as diverse as foreign language education, global politics, and psychology and has recommended strategies for its development, much of the literature overlooks the cognitive dimension of critical cultural awareness. Furthermore, while Chen (2010) specifically considers intercultural awareness cognitive, he fails to explain the cognitive mechanisms of this awareness, merely equating its process with the understanding of culture’s general influence or different cultural conventions. Relegating cognition to its margins has left three lacunae in the study of critical cultural awareness: First, little attention is given to the cognitive essence of critical cultural awareness. Second, a unified account of cognitive processes and stages in critical cultural awareness is still lacking. Third, few studies have inquired into the relationships among the cognitive, emotional, and cultural elements in critical cultural awareness. Inspired by cognitive linguistic views of language, mind, and culture expressed in frame semantics (Fillmore 1982, 1985) and conceptual blending theory (Fauconnier and Turner 2002), I conduct an experimental study to begin to address these gaps.

The study examines the cognitive processes and stages in the development of critical cultural awareness through an experiment. By “critical cultural awareness” (CCA) I mean a metacognitive awareness of the impact of framing on one’s construal, emotion, and communication regarding one’s own and other cultural communities and an ability to comprehend, analyze, and reflect on framings that inform one’s own and other cultures. The study seeks to address the following research questions: What cognitive processes are involved in CCA development? What stages can CCA development be divided into in light of these processes? Below, I first review frame semantics and conceptual blending theory and then present the experiment. Drawing on experimental results, I argue that CCA development involves the processes of automatic framing, deframing, reframing, and blending. I argue further that the development goes through the stages of framing
absolutivity, framing flexibility, framing plurality, and framing relativity. Finally, I conclude with a generalized model for CCA development. In keeping with the “signs of life” theme of this volume, I illustrate how cognitive linguistic theories can be used to account for consciousness and abilities that enable people to think about and reflect on varying cultural perspectives and adapt themselves with better self-other understanding in intercultural communication.

Frame semantics and conceptual blending theory

Frame semantics is an approach to natural language meaning which was developed in the 1970s and 1980s by Charles Fillmore. In frame semantics, the word “frame” is used to refer to specific unified frameworks of knowledge in one’s memory (Fillmore 1985). A frame is made up of concepts which link together as a system. Take, for instance, Fillmore’s classic example of commercial event.1 This frame has to do with one’s world knowledge about the situation of commercial transfer. It comprises the concepts of Buyer, Seller, Goods, and Money, and the relationship among them. In the process of text interpretation, a frame can be accessed through being evoked by some linguistic form or structure conventionally associated with it or through being invoked by readers from their world knowledge (Fillmore 1975, 1976, 1982, 1985). To illustrate with an example from Fillmore (1985), the word “Christmas” in the phrase “Christmas presents” evokes Christmas. Readers with certain cultural experiences would immediately invoke this same frame to make sense of the sentence “We never open our presents until the morning”, though it makes no mention of Christmas.

The term “framing” in frame semantics refers to one’s appeal to frames in perceiving, thinking, and communicating (Fillmore 1976). We have in memory a stock of frames for classifying, organizing, and interpreting experiences. A frame identifies an experience as a type and makes it meaningful and memorable by imposing structure and coherence on it (Fillmore 1975, 1976, 1982). Fillmore (1982: 386) notes that “it is frequently possible to show that the same ‘facts’ can be presented within different framings, framings which make them out as different ‘facts’”. Some of his examples include the choices of half full versus half empty to think of a glass half filled with water, fetus versus baby to identify an unborn child, and stingy versus thrifty to describe somebody who is reluctant to spend in a particular situation. The idea of framing and alternative framing has found

1. Full capitals are used to represent a frame. The conventions established by Fillmore (1982) are followed, including using words with capitalized initials to represent constituent concepts in a frame and using lower-case italics to represent words conventionally associated with a frame.
important application to the study of metaphor, ideologies in discourse, social policy, and politics (see Cienki 2007 for a comprehensive summary of related works; Lakoff 2004).

Conceptual blending theory (Fauconnier and Turner 2002) accounts for the mechanism of backstage cognition in meaning construction. According to this theory, meaning does not reside in language but is constructed in the mind of the speaker. Language prompts the speaker to construct mental spaces, set up elements within the spaces, and establish relations between the elements. Mental spaces are “small conceptual packets constructed as we think and talk, for purposes of local understanding and action” (Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 40). Mental spaces are internally structured by frames, which specify the entities and relations of particular scenarios (Coulson 2010; Fauconnier 2010). Conceptual blending is a mental operation that works over mental spaces to produce a conceptual integration network (Fauconnier and Turner 1994, 2001, 2002, 2006; Turner 2008). This network is constituted of at least two input spaces, a generic space, and a blended space. There is a cross-space mapping between the inputs. The mapping connects counterparts in the inputs. The generic space contains what the inputs have in common. It maps onto each of the inputs and defines the cross-space mapping between them. Structure from the inputs is projected, partially, to the blended space. The blend gives rise to emergent structure – structure not directly available from the inputs – through operations of composition, completion, and elaboration. Structural properties of the blend can be mapped back onto the inputs.

Conceptual blending is “a general-purpose, fundamental, indispensable cognitive operation” (Fauconnier and Turner 2001: 59), “running over many (conceivably all) cognitive phenomena” (Fauconnier and Turner 1994: 1), “pervasive in all modes of thinking and talking” (Fauconnier and Turner 1994: 7), and “commonly interactive with other cognitive operations” such as framing (Fauconnier and Turner 2001: 59). Conceptual blending is in general unconscious and detectable only on analysis. It could, however, manifest itself in many ways. Evidence for blending is from a wide range of data that includes everyday language, idioms, literary metaphor, non-verbal conceptualization of action, creative thought in mathematics, scientific inquiry, evolution of socio-cultural models, jokes, and advertising (Fauconnier and Turner 1994, 2008; Turner 1996, 2001, 2003, 2006; Turner and Fauconnier 1998; see also Fauconnier 2009 for a comprehensive summary of related works). Conceptual blending itself has become a legitimate tool of discovery and analysis (Fauconnier 2009).

The present study attempts to apply the concepts of frames, framing, and conceptual blending to the study of CCA. The frame idea has been applied in the study of culture by cognitive anthropologists, who use the term “cultural schemas” or “cultural models” to refer to culture as shared understandings based on shared
experience (D’Andrade 1989, 1995; D’Andrade and Strauss 1992; Holland and Quinn 1987; Quinn 2005). Negative stereotypes are considered as one sort of cultural schemas, which sometimes shape our memories, interpretations, and anticipations (Strauss and Quinn 1997). Stereotypical cultural schemas — or frames, in the terminology of frame semantics — can reinforce prejudices and lead to dissociative behaviors and therefore may have detrimental effects on intercultural communication. CCA helps us to understand cultural influences on the way we frame and enables us to transcend stereotypical framing. The experiment in the current study is designed in such a way as to manipulate participants’ stereotypical cultural frames about certain groups of people and prompt their CCA development by helping them sense and reflect on their habitual way of framing. Such a reflective process requires analyzing and comparing frames, drawing inferences, and generating insights. Conceptual blending helps to explain this dynamic aspect of CCA development.

Experiment

The experiment reported here was designed and conducted to stimulate participants’ CCA so as to investigate cognitive processes and stages in their CCA development. The tools I therefore selected for this experiment — Think-Aloud protocols, picture selection tasks, and verbal probing — were designed to help me collect data about cognitive processes (Denis 1989; Ericsson and Simon 1984; Thomas 2014; Willis, DeMaio and Harris-Kojetin 1999).

Participants

The selection of participants was based on English language proficiency. Twelve Chinese MA students from four universities in Beijing took part in this experiment, in exchange for payment. All had been English majors at undergraduate studies and had passed the Test for English Majors Band 8, the highest level for English major students in China.

Materials

The English text “Body Ritual among the Esenihc” — my own adaptation of Miner’s (1956) article “Body Ritual among the Nacirema” — was used in the experiment. Parodizing an anthropological study, the text was a fictitious description of magical practices of an East Asian tribe “the Esenihc”. What it was really about was some common hygiene and health practices of the modern Chinese — “Esenihc” spelled
backward. The text contained 1042 words. The main reason for an English text was that the two names of the people (i.e., “Esenihc” and “Chinese”) were key to eliciting participants’ interpretation and reinterpretation processes and associated emotional responses and that it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to achieve the same effects with the names in Mandarin Chinese.

**Tasks and procedure**

To restrict the effect of language switching on cognitive processes, the tasks and prompts used in the experiment were written in English. Participants were instructed to perform all the tasks in English as much as they could. Only at moments when they found it hard to express themselves adequately in English, were they allowed to switch to Chinese. The experiment consisted of three parts. The first part tested participants’ initial interpretation of the people and practices in “Body Ritual among the Esenihc” and their emotions about them. This part included Think-Aloud protocols, picture selection tasks, and two verbal probing tasks. Think-Aloud protocols had participants read the text and produce verbal reports of any thought, image, or feeling which came to them. The reports were used as data about processes in which participants interpreted, evaluated, and felt about the people and practices as they read the text. The picture selection tasks and verbal probing task 1 focused on four practices in the text. These practices were described as a shrine rite (Practice 1), a private mouth-rite (Practice 2), a holy mouth-rite (Practice 3), and a charm-box rite (Practice 4), which were in fact what were commonly known respectively as face washing, tooth brushing, dental visit, and keeping a household medicine box. In the picture selection tasks, participants viewed seven sets of pictures. In each set, two pictures showed tribal or ethnic rituals and the other two modern Chinese people’s daily life. Participants were asked to select the picture which most closely matched their concept of an agent, action, or object involved in each of the four practices. The reason for these tasks was to triangulate participants’ interpretation of the people and practices from multiple data sources. Verbal probing task 1 had participants describe the four practices and their emotions toward them. Verbal probing task 2 instructed participants to summarize the text. It was expected that participants’ stereotypes of tribes and rituals and their prejudice against them would be induced as they performed the first part of the experiment.

The second part of the experiment was conducted to test participants’ reinterpretation of the people and practices as new information became available. Verbal probing task 3 in this part required participants to look for modern Chinese practices that they would consider similar to “the Esenihc” ones. In verbal probing task 4, participants were informed that the text was a fiction. They were asked to
reread the paragraphs on Practices 1–4 and to identify the real referents of the
descriptions. The expected findings were that participants would reinterpret the
practices as their own daily life.

The last part of the experiment tested participants’ CCA. In verbal probing
task 5, participants were instructed to talk about the author’s purpose in writing
the text and to reflect on their reading experience. It was expected that if partici-
pants moved toward CCA in the experiment, their responses to this task would
accomplish the following objectives. Participants would: see people and things
(including themselves and their own actions) from different perspectives; exam-
ine the origins of values, beliefs, and attitudes; and reflect on the construction of
knowledge, cultures, and identities.

Participants were tested individually. During the experiment, the text and the
tasks were presented on PowerPoint slides on a Lenovo Ideapad monitor. After
Think-Aloud training (Ericsson and Simon 1984; Schellings, Aarnoutse and Van
Leeuwe 2006), participants read the slides and completed all tasks as instructed.
All sessions were completed in about 50 minutes and were audio recorded.

Analysis and results

The recordings were transcribed verbatim. Participants’ Think-Aloud protocols
were analyzed with Voyant Tools, a web-based text analysis tool. The most fre-
quently selected pictures were determined. Participants’ responses to the verbal
probing tasks were collated and coded thematically. FrameNet was used to as-
sist in frame identification throughout the analysis. Below are the details of the
analysis and the results.

Think-Aloud protocols

Sentences 15–40 in the text described Practices 1–4 as rituals. Participants’ Think-
Aloud protocols on these sentences were analyzed with Voyant Tools to look for
high frequency and wide distribution words. These words were considered as


3. FrameNet is the official website for the FrameNet Project. Based on Fillmorian frame seman-
tics, this project is building a lexical database of English by annotating examples of how words
are used in actual texts.

4. A word was regarded as having high frequency and wide distribution if it was used by at least
half of the participants who produced Think-Aloud protocols on a sentence.
indications of frames that were activated by most participants as they read the sentences. This approach of identifying frames based on words and constructions of a human language was also taken by Langacker (1987). Results showed that RITE was activated to interpret the scenarios of Practices 1–2 described in Sentences 15–24 and that both RITE and MEDICAL_INTERACTION_SCENARIO were accessed to interpret the scenarios of Practices 3–4 depicted in Sentences 25–40, in both cases by at least half of the participants who produced Think-Aloud protocols on these sentences (see Table 1). The activation of MEDICAL_INTERACTION_SCENARIO was especially prominent in participants’ interpretation of Practice 4.

Table 1. Frames identified based on participants’ think-aloud protocols on sentences 15–40 in the text

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Practice</th>
<th>Sentence</th>
<th>No. of words in the protocols</th>
<th>High frequency and wide distribution word in the protocols</th>
<th>Frame</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>shrines/shrine (7/2)*</td>
<td>RITE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>house/houses (5/5)</td>
<td>BUILDINGS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>houses (6)</td>
<td>BUILDINGS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>poor/poorer (11/1), people (10), pottery (8), rich (6)</td>
<td>WEALTHINESS, PEOPLE, SUBSTANCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>small (5), font (3)</td>
<td>SIZE, X**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>people (9)</td>
<td>PEOPLE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>water/waters (10/1), holy waters/holy water (6/2)</td>
<td>SUBSTANCE, RITE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>mouth rite (6)</td>
<td>RITE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>mouth (13)</td>
<td>OBSERVABLE_BODY_PARTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>X***</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>holy mouth man (6)</td>
<td>RITE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>holy mouth man (4)</td>
<td>RITE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>dentist/dentists/dental (5/1/1)</td>
<td>MEDICAL_INTERACTION_SCENARIO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>teeth/tooth/teeth’s (14/3/1), hole/holes (7/2)</td>
<td>OBSERVABLE_BODY_PARTS, HOLE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>believebelief/view (2/1/2)</td>
<td>OPINION</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continued)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Practice</th>
<th>Sentence</th>
<th>No. of words in the protocols</th>
<th>High frequency and wide distribution word in the protocols</th>
<th>Frame</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>charm box (12), box (6)</td>
<td>CONTAINERS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>doctors/doctor/doctor’s (4/3/1), medicine men/medicine man (6/2)</td>
<td>MEDICAL_INTERACTION_SCENARIO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>Chinese medicine practitioners/doctors/doctor (5/4/2)</td>
<td>MEDICAL_INTERACTION_SCENARIO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>doctor’s/doctor (5/4), medicine/medical/drug (3/2/3), people (7), herbalist/herbalists (4/3), medicine man/medicine men (3/3)</td>
<td>MEDICAL_INTERACTION_SCENARIO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>charm (16), box (7)</td>
<td>MAGIC, CONTAINERS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>charm box (9)</td>
<td>CONTAINERS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>use/used (9/1)</td>
<td>USING</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>box/boxes (7/1), protect/protector (5/2), worship/worshiping (3/2/1)</td>
<td>CONTAINERS, PROTECTING, RITE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The number in the brackets following a word is the raw count of the word in the entire corpus made of participants’ Think-Aloud protocols on a sentence in the text.

**Though “font” was a frequent word in participants’ Think-Aloud protocols on Sentence 19, it cannot be concluded that FONT was activated as participants read the sentence, since the content of their protocols showed that most of them had difficulty understanding what a font was. For example, “What does it mean by a small font? A small print?” (#6).

***There was no word in the Think-Aloud protocols on Sentence 24 which met the conditions listed in Footnote 4.

**Picture choices**

The most frequently selected pictures were taken as indications of concepts – and frames formed by these concepts – that were accessed by most participants to apprehend Practices 1–4. Frames identified this way were compared with those identified through protocol analysis for triangulation. Results showed that RITE, TRIBE, and ETHNIC MINORITY were activated by at least half of the participants (see Table 2). This was congruous with what was found in participants’ Think-Aloud protocols on the descriptions of Practices 1–2 but was different from the
findings of protocol analysis regarding Practices 3–4, which indicated the activation of MEDICAL_INTERACTION_SCENARIO in addition to RITE.

Table 2. Frames identified based on the most frequently selected pictures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Practice</th>
<th>Tested concept</th>
<th>Most frequently selected pic.</th>
<th>Pic. content</th>
<th>Frame</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>household shrine room</td>
<td>a/11*</td>
<td>a shrine room decorated with miniature statues</td>
<td>RITE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>font</td>
<td>a/11*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>c/10 an exotic ancient font for religious purpose</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>mouth rite</td>
<td>a/6</td>
<td>A brown-skinned woman in an ethnic costume was working on her teeth with a stick in her left hand.</td>
<td>ETHNIC MINORITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>holy-mouth-man</td>
<td>c/10</td>
<td>the painted upper body of a brown-skinned man wearing a distinctive tribal headdress and holding some sharp tools in his left hand</td>
<td>TRIBE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>charms and magical potions</td>
<td>d/9</td>
<td>two small quaint corked containers: a round bottom flask and a vial</td>
<td>ETHNIC MINORITY, RITE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>c/9 A brown-skinned old man in an ethnic costume was distributing some leaves.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>medicine men</td>
<td></td>
<td>b/7 a dark-brown wooden case with primitive decorating figures and patterns on its front side</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The figure following a letter indicates the number of participants who selected the picture marked by that letter.

Responses to verbal probing tasks

Participants’ responses to the verbal probing tasks were analyzed using thematic coding. The probes were used as guides for construction of categories. An exploratory approach was adopted to allow for preliminary categories to emerge from the responses, which were thematically coded. A constant comparison between the responses led to confirmation of the preliminary categories and establishment of new categories with similar properties and overlapping themes. The comparison also resulted in subcategories with thematic differences.
**Responses to verbal probing task 1**

Apparently, results were identical to the findings of the Think-Aloud task: RITE was activated to interpret Practices 1–2, and both RITE and MEDICAL_INTERACTION_SCENARIO were accessed to comprehend Practices 3–4. However, a closer reading of participants’ responses to probes about Practices 3–4 revealed that these practices were actually understood in accordance with RITE and that MEDICAL_INTERACTION_SCENARIO was invoked only when the former was likened to the latter (e.g., “charm box, you can think of it as a medical toolkit we use nowadays”, “communicating with the holy mouth men and the medicine men, something like you go to a doctor ask for prescription drugs in modern society”, #6). This was supported by the results of the picture selection tasks, which only showed the activation of RITE in participants’ interpretation of Practices 3–4. As to participants’ interpretation of Practices 1–2, the responses did not show differences with the previous picture selection results.

Results also gave information about participants’ emotions. Interpreted as RITE and TRIBE (or ETHNIC MINORITY) respectively, the practices and their participants were evaluated and felt negatively in most cases, as was expected. Main evaluations of the practices included “mysterious”, “meaningless”, “useless”, “weird”, “cruel”, “revolting”, “painful”, “dirty”, “disgusting”, “unreasonable”, “inhumane”, and the like. The people were mostly regarded to be “superstitious”, “stupid”, and “ignorant”. Participants in the experiment often felt “surprised”, “disgusted”, and “terrified” at the practices and were “sorry” and “sad” for the people.

**Responses to verbal probing task 2**

Results showed that the practices were interpreted as RITE and the people as TRIBE by all participants. This was consistent with the findings from the Think-Aloud protocols, the picture selection tasks, and verbal probing task 1.

**Responses to verbal probing task 3**

Results indicated that three participants (#4, #5, #12) compared certain Chinese medical practices to some practices in the text (e.g., “The holy mouth man is very like the dentist in my culture”, #12). Six participants (#3, #6, #7, #9, #10, #11) considered certain Chinese religious practices as similar to the “Esenihe” practices (e.g., “We put shrines of Buddhas in our own homes, just as the Esenihc families put the shrines … in their homes”, #6), and three participants (#1, #2, #8) did not find any similar practices in China at all (e.g., “In my culture, there are no such practices”, #2).
Responses to verbal probing task 4

Results showed that 11 participants reinterpreted some or all of Practices 1–4 as their own daily life, as was expected (see Table 3). In most reinterpretations, RITE was shifted to frames with which these practices were typically interpreted outside the text, namely, FACE WASHING (e.g., “A brief rite of ablution is washing hand and faces”, #7), TOOTH BRUSHING (e.g., “The mouth rite refers to the brushing of the teeth”, #1), DENTAL VISIT (e.g., “The practice of seeking out a holy mouth man refers to the man visiting his dentist”, #1), and KEEPING A HOUSEHOLD MEDICINE BOX (e.g., “The practice of keeping a charm box is that modern people usually keep emergency box in their house in case of any medical emergency”, #1). Only one participant (#9) continued to interpret all four practices as RITE.

Table 3. Participants’ reinterpretation of practices 1–4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reinterpretation</th>
<th>Practice</th>
<th>Frame-shifting</th>
<th>Participants’ performance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td># 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 RITE → FACE WASHING</td>
<td></td>
<td>v \ x x x v</td>
<td>v \ x x x v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 RITE → TOOTH BRUSHING</td>
<td></td>
<td>v x x v</td>
<td>v v v x v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 RITE → DENTAL VISIT</td>
<td></td>
<td>v v v v</td>
<td>v v v v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 RITE → KEEPING A HOUSE-</td>
<td></td>
<td>v v v v</td>
<td>v v v v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOLD MEDICINE BOX</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The “shrine rooms” were misidentified as bedrooms by Participant #1: “I guess the shrine rooms refers the bedrooms, a small font refers to the washing desk, and the brief rite of ablution refers to the cleaning of faces”.

**The “small font” was misidentified as a mirror and the “ablution” as a water tap by Participant #5: “The shrine rooms refers to washrooms, the small font is the mirror in the washroom, and brief rite of ablution is the water tap”.

Responses to verbal probing task 5

Results indicated that by the definition of CCA in this study five participants (#1, #4, #5, #7, #12) showed CCA in their responses to verbal probing task 5.

There was an awareness of multiple understanding possibilities for a situation with different frames. This was expressed by Participant #1: “The author’s purpose in writing this article is to provide a very different perspective of seeing our modern daily life”. Participants #1 and #4 acknowledged that one’s appraisal of a situation was contingent upon framing: “Some of the things that we took for granted can be rather surprising if viewed in a different light” (#1), and “To see what we see every day from another angle, uh, something different and something amazing uh might occur” (#4).
Some of them also realized the necessity to reflect on biased evaluations of the self and the other resulting from taken-for-granted framings. Participant #4 commented: “Some of our daily activities are ridiculous, but we just don’t aware of that”, and “We can uh review our daily lives and uh to think the way we are living”. Similarly, Participant #12 remarked: “The purpose of the author is to remind people that our behavior is strange and useless, and he wants to provide a chance for us to reflect upon our own behaviors”. Participant #5 referred to stereotypical framing in relation to the reader’s initial biased evaluations of the people in the text: “Because many a people hold a stereotype towards uh groups that are different from us, during the first reading many will um think that the tribe is undeveloped and um different from us”, and she reflected: “If we take a second look, we’ll find that many all the cultures uh are similar in one way, ‘cuz … we’re all human”.

Discussion

The experiment tested cognitive processes and stages in participants’ CCA development. On the basis of the results of this experiment, I propose that their CCA development involved the processes of automatic framing, deframing, reframing, and blending and underwent the corresponding stages of framing absolutivity, framing flexibility, framing plurality, and framing relativity. These processes and stages are defined and discussed below.

Automatic framing and framing absolutivity

Results of Think-Aloud protocols, picture selection tasks, and verbal probing tasks 1–2 were indicative of automatic framing and framing absolutivity. Automatic framing refers to the process of habitually applying a certain frame to a certain group of people or situation. I propose the new term “framing absolutivity” for the attitude and practice of taking one way of framing for granted and neglecting or rejecting other framing possibilities in viewing people and things.

Individuals have culturally specific meaning systems, that is, learned associative networks of ideas, values, beliefs, and knowledge that are shared by individuals within the same culture (D’Andrade 1984). These cultural meaning systems are interpretative frames in our mind for us to organize, classify, and interpret experiences. They structure our conceptual and social life (Fauconnier and Turner 2001; Goffman 1986) and affect our affect, cognition, and behavior (Geertz 1973; Hong, Chiu and Kung 1997; Kashima 2000; Mendoza-Denton, Shoda, Ayduk and Mischel 1999). Framing – the application of a frame to a situation – is reflected and
Chapter 6. A framing-based account of critical cultural awareness

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guided by language (Fauconnier and Turner 2001). Frames can be evoked by their lexical units in a language for the speaker to construe and communicate about people and things in certain ways. Each framing also brings with it, or invites, a kind of emotion from the speaker. In the experiment, prompted by words such as “tribe” and “ritual” in the text, participants initially framed the people and their practices as TRIBE and RITE respectively and generally responded negatively toward them (see Figure 1).

![Figure 1](image)

**Figure 1.** Participant’s automatic framing of the people and practices in “Body Ritual among the Esenihc” and its emotional impact. The circle corresponds to the mental space set up to represent the text. The attached squares correspond to the frames recruited to structure the space. The attached ellipse corresponds to the emotions elicited by the frames.

Framing sets up a relationship between at least three terms: that which frames (a frame), that which is framed (a situation), and that who applies a frame to a situation (the framer). It is crucially important to notice that there is no intrinsic connection between a frame and the situation it is applied to. We can talk of numerous possible framings of the same situation. The relationship between frames and reality is purely conventional and subject to the influence of culture. Goodenough (1957: 167) treats culture as “the form of things that people have in mind, their models for perceiving, relating, and otherwise interpreting them”. Each cultural community has its own sanctioned frame or range of frames for people and things. Culturally sanctioned framings are the coherent and systematic ways in which members of a cultural community make sense of their reality. Such framings, intertwined with dominant values and beliefs in the community, motivate popular emotional responses to those under framing. These framings and solicited emotions are communicated repeatedly. They are distributed throughout the community and thus shared by most of its members. This view is consistent with the cultural sensemaking theory, which suggests that members of a culture draw on widely shared ideas that comprise a common symbolic meaning system to make sense of events (Atran, Medin and Ross 2005; Rohner 1984; Sieck 2010). Such shared mental models form the basis of expectations, judgments, decisions,
and actions (Gentner and Stevens 1983). Therefore, the way we frame is typically conditioned by and grounded in the culture of the community of which we see ourselves as a member. We do not always need to engage in an active cognitive search for frames for all kinds of people, objects, and events. Instead, we often invoke culturalized framings in perceiving, thinking, evaluating, feeling, and communicating. Gradually, these framings become habitualized and unconsciously automatic until their cultural root is thoroughly obscured.

Automatic framing often leads to framing absolutivity. I invented the novel term “framing absolutivity” to refer to cognitive and emotional rigidity caused by habitual way of framing because, for one thing, I did not find a suitable term in the existing literature that describes the detrimental impact of automatic framing on psychological flexibility and, for another, the term “absolutivity” was selected in relation to its opposite, that is, “relativity”, as together they are meant to describe the two ends in the continuous development of critical cultural awareness. An important problem with framing absolutivity is that, first, the way we frame is absolutized as the “natural” and “only” way to see the world; second, that culturally entrenched framings are regarded as “facts”; third, that culturally influenced emotions in response to these framings are justified; and, fourth, that such framing rigidity limits our understanding of our own and other cultural communities and often results in stereotyping and prejudice. Thus, at first to most participants in the experiment, there really existed “the Esenihc”, who were inherently primitive and deserved sympathy; and there were “the Esenihc rituals” indeed, which were essentially inhumane and naturally invoked disgust. They were simply unaware of the possibility of seeing otherwise.

Deframing and framing flexibility

Three participants’ (#4, #5, #12) responses to verbal probing task 3 suggested deframing and framing flexibility. I coin the term “deframing” to refer to the process of weakening the connection between a frame and the situation it is habitually applied to by entertaining other framing possibilities. I employ the term “framing flexibility” to refer to the attitude and practice of suspending or revising one’s automatic framing of a situation and modifying one’s habitualized emotional responses connected with such a framing. 

Take Participant #12 as an example. Like most other participants, she initially framed the practices in the text as RITE, as shown in her response to verbal probing task 2: “This article offered a description of many strange behaviors and practices carried out by this people, usually mainly their religious practices and ritual practices”. While performing verbal probing task 3, however, she was able to discern some “similarities” between “the Esenihc rituals” and modern Chinese practices.
that were customarily framed as DENTAL VISIT (e.g., “The holy mouth man is very like the dentist in my culture”), MEDICAL_INTERACTION_SCENARIO (e.g., “Medicine man is very like doctor in my culture, because they give prescriptions to people uh who need medicine”), and KEEPING A HOUSEHOLD MEDICINE BOX (e.g., “Although we do not have the magic box, but we do have a box’s of tablet, pills, uh all kinds of drugs”).

As she was comparing “the rituals” to the Chinese practices, she was actually reconsidering the former from the perspective provided by frames like DENTAL VISIT and so on (see Figure 2). This deframing process enriched her understanding of “the rituals”, for instance, their medical aspect got noticed. It may have also reduced some bias associated with her initial automatic framing of the practices as RITE. They may have been reconsidered reasonable and acceptable because of the existence of similar practices in her own culture. Therefore, deframing enables us to take different perspectives into consideration when dealing with a cultural community or situation and to adjust our habitualized evaluation and affect. From this angle, deframing generates framing flexibility.

Reframing and framing plurality

Most participants’ responses to verbal probing task 4 indicated reframing and framing plurality. I define reframing as the process of viewing a situation anew with a frame other than the one with which it is habitually construed. I use the term “framing plurality” to mean the awareness of the possibility of many equally viable framings for a situation and the practice of restructuring some automatic framings in one’s sociocultural understanding. Framing plurality is similar to what Hanvey (1976: 5) calls “perspective consciousness”, namely, “the recognition of the existence, the malleability, and the diversity of perspective”.

Reframing is often inextricably linked to the process of frame-shifting, “a semantic reanalysis process that reorganizes existing information into a new
frame” (Coulson 2010: 34). For example, to interpret the joke “I let my accountant do my taxes because it saves time; last spring it saved me ten years,” the reader begins with an evoked frame where a busy professional pays an accountant to do his taxes. However, “years” in the second clause of the joke cannot be integrated into this frame. It prompts the reader to reinterpret “time” in the first clause so as to invoke a frame where a crooked businessman pays an accountant to conceal his illegal business dealings. Frame-shifting occurs because “the currently activated frame does not adequately represent the relationship among two or more objects, actions, or events” (Coulson 2010: 92). A cue for the need to shift frames, such as “years” in the example, is called the “disjunctor”.

While completing verbal probing task 4 in the experiment, participants first reversed the spelling of the word “Esenihc” as instructed. They were further explicitly informed that the text actually concerned modern Chinese people’s daily life. This new information served as the disjunctor. TRIBE – the major frame used in most participants’ initial framing of the people in the text – was immediately shifted to MODERN CHINESE PEOPLE. Meanwhile, RITE – the major frame used in their initial framing of the practices – was found incongruous with their knowledge of the modern Chinese way of life. This frame had to be shifted to those which better represented what they knew about daily life in modern China. Finally, some participants managed to shift it to FACE WASHING, TOOTH BRUSHING, DENTAL VISIT, AND KEEPING A HOUSEHOLD MEDICINE BOX (see Figure 3). In other words, the practices were reframed with these frames.

![Figure 3. Participant’s reframing of the people and practices in the text](image-url)

The way we frame is often conventional and habitual. However, under certain circumstances, for example, when we come across the disjunctor, or when we are doing critical or creative thinking, with effort we can frame people, objects, or situations afresh. Reframing complicates our automatic framings, for it subverts what we think of as “facts”. It counteracts framing absolutivity, strengthens framing flexibility, and facilitates framing plurality by problematizing what we take for
granted and enabling us to realize that there are multiple alternatives to the way we normally understand, evaluate, and feel about the world.

**Blending and framing relativity**

Responses to verbal probing task 5 made by the participants who showed CCA (#1, #4, #5, #7, #12) indicated blending and framing relativity. Fauconnier and Turner (2001) point out that conceptual blending is a basic cognitive process which interacts with framing. In CCA development, blending works on mental spaces constructed during the course of automatic framing, deframing, and reframing to produce an integration network which engenders metacognitive insights into the relationship among a situation, frame (and frame-evoked emotion), and the framer. I create the term “framing relativity” to refer to the awareness that one’s thinking, feeling, and communicating about people and things are relative to frames.

The integration network set up by the participants who showed CCA in the experiment was constituted of two input spaces and a blended space, multiply linked (see Figure 4). Input 1 represented the participants’ automatic framing of the people and practices in the text and its emotional effects. Input 2 represented their reframing of them and its emotional effects. There was a cross-space mapping between the inputs. The mapping connected aligned counterparts in the inputs. It linked the tribe and rituals in one space to the modern Chinese people and their hygiene and health practices in the other space. It also linked the participants’ emotions toward the former to their emotions toward the latter.

There was a third space, the blend. Blends serve as “sites of fundamental cognitive work. They are routinely necessary for constructing central meanings, inferences, and structures, and for motivating emotions” (Fauconnier and Turner 1994: 3). The blend contained a counterpart of participants’ automatic framing of the people and practices and its emotional effects and a counterpart of their reframing of them and the emotional effects of such reframing. In the blend, the two counterpart peoples were mapped onto a single people, and the two groups of counterpart practices were mapped onto a single group of practices. The blend had both TRIBE and RITE (from Input 1) and MODERN CHINESE PEOPLE, FACE WASHING, etc. (from Input 2). These frames had been projected from the inputs in such a way as to preserve their internal structures and emotional effects, and therefore they could not be fused.

The blend had new emergent structure. Composition of elements from the inputs made relations available in the blend that did not exist in the separate inputs. While in each of the inputs there was only one cluster of frames – TRIBE clustered with RITE in Input 1, and MODERN CHINESE PEOPLE clustered with FACE WASHING, etc. in Input 2, in the blend there were two. The frames and their
components were compared since they were used to interpret the same people and practices. Likewise, the frame-evoked emotions were compared as well. The comparison provided the central inference that the same people and practices can be framed differently and that different evaluations and feelings will follow from alternative framings, as evidenced by participants’ remarks such as “Some of the things that we took uh for granted uh can be rather surprising if view in a different light” (#1), and “To see what we see every day from another angle uh something different and something amazing uh might occur” (#4). This inference was crucial to the generation of framing relativity.

The inputs did not disappear once the blend had been formed. The blend remained conceptually connected to the inputs in systematic ways, as Fauconnier and Turner (2001: 1) put it: “Inferences, arguments, and ideas developed in the blend can have effect in cognition, leading us to modify the initial inputs and to change our view of the corresponding situations”. By virtue of this connection, framing relativity developed in the blend was projected back to the inputs and facilitated participants’ reflection on their automatic framings of the other and the self. Participant #5 commented on how our preconceptions and prejudice against the other bias our perception of the people in the text with respect to
Input 1: “Because many a people hold a stereotype towards uh groups that are different from us, during the first reading many will um think that the tribe is undeveloped and um different from us”. Concerning the framings of the self represented by Input 2, Participants #4 and #12 recognized that viewed with a different frame – RITE – our daily life was “ridiculous”, “strange”, and “useless”, hence the need for critical examination. These results run parallel to findings reported in the cross-cultural psychology literature which suggest positive impacts of metacognition on intercultural competence (Leung, Lee and Chiu 2013; Sieck, Smith and Rasumsssen 2013).

**A framing-based model for CCA development**

Table 4 summarizes cognitive processes carried out by the participants and their CCA development during the experiment. Participants’ performance suggested that automatic framing, deframing, reframing, and blending were behind their CCA development. Among the five participants who showed CCA at the end of the experiment, three of them (#4, #5, #12) accomplished all these processes, and the other two (#1, #7) performed all the processes except deframing. This indicated that for functional reasons these processes were unequal. Since blending supplied the key inference and gave birth to framing relativity, it was the most crucial process for participants’ CCA development.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cognitive processes and CCA development</th>
<th>Participants’ performance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automatic framing</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deframing</td>
<td>×</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reframing Practice 1</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reframing Practice 2</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reframing Practice 3</td>
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<tr>
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<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blending</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCA</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*See the first footnote in Table 3.
**See the second footnote in Table 3.

I take the cognitive processes outlined for participants’ CCA achievement to be representative of the ones underlying CCA development in general (see Figure 5). We often automatically think of people and things (including ourselves and our own actions) through culturally imposed framings. We characterize them and make
assumptions about the way they should be on the basis of these framings. Culturally accepted responses to the framings also influence our attitudes and behaviors toward those that are framed. We, however, are usually oblivious of the cultural dimension of the way we frame and its emotional impact. Under certain conditions, we may reconsider people and things from a different perspective. We may even step outside our automatic framings and construe them anew. Such deframing and reframing often generate new understandings, evaluations, and affects. All these processes correspondingly set up mental spaces and build connections among them. Blending works on these spaces to produce an integration network. The network typically consists of two inputs and a blend. One input corresponds to our automatic framing of a situation, and the other input our reframing of it. There is a cross-space mapping of counterpart connections between the inputs and a projection of structure from the inputs to the blend. In the blend, we have the frame used in automatic framing and its emotional impact from one input and the one used in reframing and its emotional impact from the other input. Comparison of the frames and the associated emotional effects produces framing relativity. Framing relativity emergent from the blend can then be exported to the inputs for us to reflect on the way we frame. CCA development involves many mental spaces, simultaneously active, and connections between them. It requires a complex operation of linking and blending over multiple mental spaces which are constructed in the course of our framing activities.

Figure 5. Cognitive processes in CCA development
A model for CCA development is proposed to represent the above processes and the stages that originate in them (see Figure 6). In this model, automatic framing has to do with framing absolutivity, a pre-stage of CCA development. At this stage, we take framings developed in our own cultural community for granted and neglect other framing possibilities. Deframing produces framing flexibility, the first development stage of CCA. At this stage, we adjust culturalized framings in light of an alternative perspective. Reframing generates framing plurality, the second development stage of CCA. During this stage, we restructure some taken-for-granted framings and develop sensitivity to alternative framings of people and things. Blending gives rise to framing relativity, the third stage of CCA development. We become aware that our understanding and emotions about people and things vary with frames. CCA empowers us to transcend framing absolutivity by way of deconstructing culturalized framings, recognizing the relativity of understanding, evaluation, and affect to framing, and realizing the contingency of framing on culture.

**Figure 6.** A framing-based model for CCA development

*Limitations of the study*

While the present study has supplied much useful information about processes and stages in CCA development from a cognitive linguistic perspective, it has several major limitations that must be acknowledged.
First, the current experimental design was not very well balanced. There were more tasks targeting at automatic framing and reframing than deframing and blending. The reason for the under-testing of blending was the difficulty in designing rigorous tasks to elicit valid data on conceptual blending, which is part of backstage cognition that is largely unconscious (Fauconner and Turner 2002). This suggests the need for an improved method for prompting and detecting the blending process.

Furthermore, participants’ English proficiency may affect their task performance. For the reasons explained in the sub-sections on “Materials” and “Tasks and procedure” of the experiment, the experiment was conducted in English. Nevertheless, the use of a foreign language for Chinese participants raised a number of questions, including how well they understood the text and the tasks, how adequately they expressed themselves in their verbal reports and answers, and more importantly, how Mandarin conceptual structures informed the cognitive processes in question. It would be useful to construct and implement a Chinese task environment to seek to obtain converging validation of the results.

Another potential limitation is that while Voyant Tools and thematic coding were used to extract frames from participants’ Think-Aloud protocols and answers, it was not necessarily clear how to demarcate the scopes of some frames in specific instances (Cienki 2007). In addition, the coding was done by the experimenter. This could be problematic in terms of conscious or unconscious bias toward confirmation of hypotheses.

Given these limitations, however, this study initiated a new approach to CCA research. It foregrounded the cognitive dimension of CCA, which is overlooked in the existing literature, and provided a unified account of cognitive processes and stages in CCA development based on experimental evidence. Furthermore, the framing-based account given here helped to explain the relationships among the cognitive, emotional, and cultural elements in CCA that are rarely addressed.

Conclusions

In this chapter, I investigated cognitive processes and stages in CCA development from the perspective of frame semantics and conceptual blending theory. I proposed that CCA is a metacognitive awareness of the impact of framing on one’s construal, emotion, and communication regarding one’s own and other cultural communities and an ability to comprehend, analyze, and reflect on framings that inform one’s own and other cultures. Viewing CCA in this way allowed me to give a unified cognitive account of how CCA develops and also helped to explain the otherwise complex relationships among culture, cognition, and emotion in CCA development.
Based on experimental evidence, I argued that CCA development involves a robust and dynamic assortment of framing-based cognitive processes, which include automatic framing, deframing, reframing, and blending. These processes construct, connect, and integrate numerous mental spaces to forge an integration network that generates metacognitive insights into the relationships among reality, framing, and emotion. In line with these processes, I divided CCA development into the stages of framing absolutivity, framing flexibility, framing plurality, and framing relativity. Each stage represents a different level of our awareness of the impact of framing on our sociocultural understanding. I suggested a model of CCA development to represent these processes, stages, and their relations.

I acknowledge the vital role of the experiment in this study in stimulating participants’ CCA development. “Body Ritual among the Esenihc” exposes and challenges culturalized framings. Having participants read this text and perform specially designed tasks successfully prompted some of them to carry out all or most of the cognitive processes discussed in this chapter, so that they were able to engage critically with some of their taken-for-granted framings within the timespan of the experiment. The next step could be to explore further effective prompts for these cognitive processes. It is equally important to investigate individuals’ CCA development in actual social settings.

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PART 2

CHAPTER 7

Cultural “Signs of life” in politics
A case study of eulogistic idioms for Taiwanese politicians

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This chapter presents a Cognitive Linguistic analysis of Mandarin eulogistic idioms used for politicians as a sub-genre of political communication. The entire collection of idioms is taken from the online eulogy request system in Taiwan and contains 16 idioms. In the analysis of the idioms, it is shown that in addition to conceptual metaphor and metonymy, Cognitive Grammar is another useful theoretical construct in analysing political eulogies. The analysis, in addition, explicates how various cultural conceptualizations and allusions are involved as a basis for understanding the eulogistic expressions. At the social level, a comparison between the Taiwanese political eulogies and data from Western cultures shows that the social role played by the deceased and the mourner is another important sign of life in Taiwanese culture.

Keywords: metaphor, metonymy, profile, textile metaphor

Introduction

Applications of Cognitive Linguistics in the language of politics

In recent years, Cognitive Linguistics has gathered a strong momentum and has been applied to a wide array of fields to study how language relates to human thinking, understanding, and action. In the language of politics, Cognitive Linguistics comes in the form of metaphor and metonymy as two of its main theoretical constructs (Charteris-Black 2005; Chilton 2004; Hart and Lukeš 2007; Lakoff 1996; Musolff 2006, among numerous others). The above studies all made nice contributions by focusing on use of metaphor and metonymy in certain cultural contexts, but it is important to note that another major theory, Cognitive Grammar (Langacker 1987, 2008), has been less employed in studying the interaction between language,
culture, and politics. Therefore, the potential usefulness of Cognitive Grammar in analyzing the language of politics has been relatively under-explored. In light of the issue, the present chapter will try to integrate Cognitive Grammar as part of the analytical toolkit in political communication and will argue that such practice may allow us a better conceptual understanding of political communication.1

Another issue that will be addressed in the present chapter is that despite the achievements thus far, the aforementioned studies use either political figures’ public speeches, governmental announcements or published commentaries on political affairs as research material, so a take based on use of still another different data type is wanting for a more comprehensive understanding of human thinking in the political domain.

In view of the need for a diversified data type, the present chapter adopts as research material eulogistic idioms2 stored in an official online database and presented at political figures’ public funerals, in order to investigate how political thinking is reflected in the actual language use in a certain socio-cultural context. The data come from the official online eulogy request system set up by the Taipei City Government, which contains 16 eulogistic idioms for political figures. The eulogies are presented at public funerals, which means that any person, even only loosely connected to the deceased (a distant colleague or even a fan), may walk into the funeral without invitation. In addition, any person may request a eulogistic idiom for the deceased politician, to be displayed on the electronic banner in the funeral hall. Therefore, at a social level, the 16 eulogistic idioms are to be understood as the repertoire of verbal means via which the public talk about, remember, and conceptualize those figures of national importance after their passing.3

In Chinese political linguistics, attention has been paid to political figures’ public talks (Kuo 2003; Lu 2008; Lu and Ahrens 2008; Wei 2003) and official documents released by the government (Chiang and Chiu 2007), published political commentaries (Chiang and Duann 2007; Lin and Chiang 2015). None that I am aware of is based on political figures’ eulogies as research material, so there is a need to include the different sub-genre for a more comprehensive understanding of Chinese political communication.

1. An exception is Lu’s (2018) study on Martin Luther King Jr’s rhetorical masterpiece, I Have a Dream, which addresses the usefulness of constructional schema (Langacker 2008) in analyzing repetition as King’s signature rhetorical device.

2. The definition of idiom in this chapter largely follows the standard definition in Cognitive Linguistics but is more specific. In addition to being fixed expressions whose meanings are not completely compositional (Langacker 1987, 2008), the idioms studied in this paper has a fixed phonological template that contains four Chinese characters.

3. For a more detailed description of the eulogy request system, see Lu (2017b).
Previous studies on life and death in Cognitive Linguistics

The issue of life and death is central to human affairs. No one escapes death, as that one day will certainly come upon all humans. Consequently, in the private domain, both a person’s close family and their distant relatives must deal with the death; in the public domain, the person’s colleagues and, for important cases, the community where the person was influential suffers the death.

Given the centrality of the issue, in Cognitive Linguistics, there has been a series of studies on how different cultures conceptualize life and death, including life is arrival/a journey; death is departure/the end point of the journey (Coulson and Pascual 2006; Lakoff and Johnson 2003; Lakoff and Turner 1989; Kövecses 2002); life is an opera/show in Chinese (Yu and Jia 2016; Yu 2017). However, the works concern only how life is conceptualized in general language, rather than that in a specific genre. An exception is Lu (2017c) on different religious groups in Taiwan, which addresses the conceptualization of life and death in eulogies by the two sub-cultural groups in Taiwan, including death is rebirth, death is a journey towards rebirth and life is a circle for Taiwanese Buddhists and death is rest, death is a return journey for Taiwanese Christians. But given the narrow scope of Lu (2017c), the way how language and politics interact in terms of cultural conceptualization is not addressed, so there is indeed a need for deeper research in the field.

Using eulogies for politicians as research material constitutes another important niche of the present chapter. From a usage-based point of view (Barlow and Kemmer 2000), eulogies for political figures constitute a highly specialized genre in the language of politics, which allows a study of that genre to offer a unique take on the actual usage of language and language-mediated meaning construction in genre-specific usage events (Langacker 2008: 17). Studying a specialized genre has an important advantage. Lu (2017c), for instance, discusses how studying the use of idioms of a sub-cultural (religious) group reveals cultural thinking that would not be available when one uses a general corpus or only introspection.\(^4\) Therefore, I expect studying politicians’ eulogies, which is a highly specialized genre, to be methodologically fruitful and may yield useful insights, compared to the previous studies based on intuition of use of general corpora.

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\(^4\) A similar view can be seen in Faber (2012), which highlights the importance of contextualized knowledge structures in understanding terminology as highly specialized genres.
Findings

As mentioned in the introductory section, the data come from the official online eulogy request system in Taiwan. When one requests a eulogistic idiom, the system enquires about the occupation of the deceased and then turns up corresponding idioms given the mourner’s choice.¹⁶ 16 idioms show up at the choice of “political figures”. This section presents a linguistic analysis of such idioms.

Out of the full collection of the 16 idioms, I identify 4 idioms that contain 国 guó ‘country’ and 3 idioms that contain 民 mín ‘people’, which shows how the politician is chiefly remembered by the public – The country and its people miss this person so much that the mourner feels an urge to linguistically present those elements in the eulogy, although not every single citizen of the country may have a personal tie with the deceased.

In addition to those 7, the other 9 idioms still indirectly invoke the concept of country or people, although the elements are not linguistically elaborated. A selection of the idioms and how they invoke the concepts of country and people will be addressed in the following sub-section. Then, the next subsection presents some culture-specific metaphors, including allusions to Chinese historical figures or events and use of the concept of textile as a Chinese political metaphor.

Metaphorical idioms with country or people in scope

In this section, I introduce idioms that directly or indirectly invoke the concept country or people in its scope (Langacker 2008: 62) in the domain of politics.

Metaphorical idioms with country or people in profile

In this subsection, I discuss idioms that have country or people in their conceptual profile (Langacker 2008: 66), i.e. with country or people linguistically elaborated and put onstage (Langacker 2008: 63), receiving the conceptualizer’s full attention. There are two special metaphors that are noteworthy.

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¹⁵ The system was set up and maintained by Taipei Mortuary Service Office (http://w9.mso.taipei.gov.tw/TPFScroll/login.aspx). Interested readers are referred to Lu (2017b) for a detailed introduction to the system.

¹⁶ I follow the general Cognitive Linguistic convention where small caps are used for concepts.

¹⁷ A brief account of the connection between the Taiwanese and the Chinese culture is given in Lu (2017b, 2017c). Following that, in the present research context, the two terms are used largely interchangeably.
First, the domain of war is invoked, with the politician remembered as “the country’s shield and stronghold”, as in (1).

(1) 國之干城
   guó zhī gān chéng
   country Link shield city
   ‘(This person was) the country’s shield and stronghold.’

The expression is no longer active in modern Chinese, but the character 干 gān can still be found in lexical constructions in the domain of war, such as 大動干戈 ‘to wage a war’, 化干戈為玉帛 ‘to lay down the weapon and make peace’, etc. Such expressions sound archaic, but they keep the etymology from ancient Chinese, which is important in understanding the use of eulogistic expressions as a sub-type of political communication.8

Another metaphor employed in the idioms is a body metaphor, where the politician is construed as “people’s throat and tongue”, as in (2).

(2) 為民喉舌
   wèi mín hóu shé
   Link people throat tongue
   ‘(This person) spoke for the people.’

In (2), the politician is described as the “throat and tongue” for his people, meaning that he aired people’s complaints to the government openly and conscientiously, always speaking for the people. THROAT and TONGUE are frequent source concepts of cultural conceptualization in the world’s languages. For instance, THROAT is associated with intuitive apprehension in Thaayorre (Gaby 2008: 33–34); TONGUE is associated with language in general in English and Malay (Charteris-Black 2003: 296–302) and with the content of what one says in contrast to one’s true feelings in Persian (Sharifian 2008: 255–256).

However, for two reasons, Example (2) deserves attention. First, the packaging of THROAT and TONGUE into one lexical construction, as seen in (2), has not been reported in the literature, and the strict sequence of hóu before shé, given the idiomatic nature of the entire eulogistic expression, is something that makes (2) special. Second, the idiom is used in a highly specialized context (in the domain of POLITICS) and the concepts invoked in that domain are also very specific (the way in which one speaks: OPEN and CONSCIENTIOUS). Therefore, (2) reflects a Chinese-specific cultural conceptualization that involves both TONGUE and THROAT and constitutes a domain-specific figurative language use.

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8. For how etymology reflects the cognitive and cultural basis of lexical semantics, see Sweetser (1990).
Next, I discuss idioms with **country or people** in the periphery of the onstage region, still receiving a certain degree of attention.

**Metaphorical idioms with country or people in the base**

In this subsection, I analyze the idioms that have **country or people** only in the conceptual **base** (Langacker 2008: 66), meaning that **country or people** still lies in the entire knowledge structure invoked, but is not linguistically encoded in the idioms.

(3) 聲 勇 共 仰

\[ xùn \ yóu \ gòng \ yàng \]

victory way together look up

‘(This person’s) victory and way (of living), (people) all look up to.’

In (3), the achievement of the deceased (his victory and way of living) is construed in terms of a physical object at a height. The idiom, therefore, invokes an ontological metaphor **ACHIEVEMENTS ARE OBJECTS** and an orientational metaphor **GOOD IS UP**. However, I suspect that the upward orientation may have multiple motivations, part of that being cultural, which are based on two cultural metaphors **HEAVEN IS FULL OF LOTUSES (FOR SOULS) AND DEATH IS A RETURN JOURNEY TO HEAVEN** (Lu 2017c) – when a person dies, his/her soul (again ontologically conceptualized) returns up to heaven.

The agent of the viewing in (3) is the people of the entire country, all looking up to the achievements of the politician. Although the agent is left unspecified, it still figures in the conceptual base, receiving attention to a certain degree.

Example (4) is a similar case that involves an ontological metaphor and a **JOURNEY** metaphor.

(4) 遗 愛 人间

\[ yí \ ài \ rénjiān \]

leave love world

‘(This person) has left love to the world.’

In this example, the politician has left love to the world after his death. Based on the same reasoning in (3) above and in Lu (2017c), if death is a return journey from the earthly world to heaven, love is also conceptualized in an ontological way as a physical object that **can be left behind** after one’s departure. In addition to **DEATH IS A RETURN JOURNEY TO HEAVEN**, the idiom also involves **LOVE IS AN OBJECT**.

At the linguistic level, the recipient of the politician’s love is the world, but certainly his people and his country are conceptually part of that. Therefore, **PEOPLE AND COUNTRY** are not directly invoked but remain within the **maximal**
scope (Langacker 2008: 63) of attention, i.e. the conceptual background, as they are related to world.

Another idiom that indirectly invokes people or country is (5), for which I argue metonymy is the underlying cognitive mechanism.

(5) 萬 姓 義 思

\[ wàn xìng yì sī \]

‘Ten thousand surnames sing for and miss (this person).’

In (5), the politician is sung for and missed by ten thousand surnames, meaning that he is missed by all people of the country. The meaning extension is based on two conceptual metonymies: A CLAN NAME FOR ALL MEMBERS OF THE CLAN and A HIGH NUMBER FOR COUNTLESSNESS. Note that the latter metonymy is culture-specific, as its linguistic manifestation is 萬 wàn ‘ten thousand’, which is not a measuring unit commonly used in most Indo-European languages. The metonymy also has various linguistic instantiations in modern Chinese, such as 萬物 wàn wù ‘(lit.) ten thousand creatures’, meaning “all creatures”, 萬歳 wàn suì ‘(lit.) ten thousand years old’, referring to the emperor, who “lives forever”, etc. The example, therefore, contains a typical Chinese cultural conceptualization that is essential to conceptualizing a politician’s passing.

What is in the immediate scope of attention (Langacker 2008: 63), i.e. the foregrounded conceptual information, is surname, through which people and country are metonymically invoked, so they remain in the conceptual background, still receiving some attention though not as much as surname.

Metaphorical idioms with allusions

In this section, I introduce idioms that are based on allusions. Example (6) contains a special plant that is reminiscent of a historical figure.

(6) 甘棠 遗 愛

\[ gāntáng yí ài \]

‘(This person was like Duke Shao in the Zhou Dynasty, who used to sit under) a birchleaf pear tree (to work), still fondly (remembered by people).’

The keyword in (6) is 甘棠 gāntáng ‘birchleaf pear (Pyrus betulifolia)’, metonymically referring to Duke Shao (周召伯) in the Zhou Dynasty. According to The Book of Songs (詩經 shijing), Duke Shao was a political figure in the Zhou Dynasty, who used to attend business and rest under a birchleaf pear tree. After his passing, people still missed him so much that they decided to preserve the tree under which
he had worked, in order to commemorate him. The entire historical background is crucial to analyzing the meaning of the idiom, so serves as the cultural-conceptual base against which the idiom is understood in its context.

At the linguistic level, the function of the keyword here is to prompt (Langacker 2008: 42; Lu 2008), or to provide mental access to, a coherent conceptual substrate that can serve as a basis of a highly elaborate and culture-specific conceptualization, i.e. in our case, a metaphorical understanding of the deceased politician in terms of Duke Shao. In understanding the idiom, **people** and **country** are also indirectly invoked, as they reside in the story frame of Duke Shao, so remains in the conceptualizer’s maximal scope of attention.

Another illustrative example is (7), the meaning of which is related to a historical event and a monument.

(7) 功 高 麒閣
gōng gāo língé
achievement high Qilin Building
‘(This person’s) achievement was so great (that his picture should be painted) high (on a plaque on a building like) Qilin Building.’

In (7), the achievement of the deceased is great so that his picture should be painted high on a memorial building. The keyword in this idiom is 麒閣 língé, short for 麒麟閣 qílíngé ‘Qilin Building’, which is a monument erected in the Han Dynasty with 11 national heroes’ pictures painted on it. Again, the keyword provides an indirect access to politics, **people**, and **country** by prompting a historical anecdote as the source of a metaphorical understanding of the politician.

Moreover, note that the orientational metaphor **good is up** is also present in this idiom, but is not the only conceptual element that contributes to the positive evaluation of the deceased. The orientational metaphor nests (in the sense of Charteris-Black 2004: 224, 2005: 53–55) with the cultural allusion to Qilin Building and the pictures high on the building to construct a coherent scenario against which the politician is construed.

An additional example is (8), which also involves an allusion to a historical figure.

(8) 峽首 留 碑
xiànhshǒu liú bèi
Mountain Xianshou leave stone tablet
‘(This person was like General Yang Hu from the Jin Dynasty, for whom) a stone tablet was erected on Mountain Xianshou.’

The keyword in (9) is 峽首 xiànhshǒu ‘Mountain Xianshou’, which is famous for a stone tablet erected for General Yang Hu (羊祜) in the Jin Dynasty. General
Yang had been remembered by his people for his various compassionate policies, so after his passing, a stone tablet was erected in remembrance of him on Mount Xianshou, to which General Yang had paid frequent visits. The stone tablet has a romantic name of 墮淚碑 duòlèi bēi ‘(lit.) drop-tear tablet’, which represents the strong emotion that General Yang’s people had about him. In this idiom, the keyword similarly invokes the story frame about General Yang as the conceptual background, in terms of which the Taiwanese politician is metaphorically conceptualized.

I argue that the orientational metaphor good is up is invoked, although in an indirect way. There is no textual prompt that directly encodes the upward orientation, but since the keyword invokes mountain, height is naturally in the maximal scope of the conceptualization, which forms a natural ingredient for good is up and participates as an evaluative component imminent in the political message. But note that in this sense, good is up is nested with various culture-specific components to form a coherent substrate of the conceptualization and becomes an imminent part of the political rhetorical apparatus in Mandarin.

TEXTILE metaphor in Chinese idioms of politics

This section introduces another cultural metaphor that exists only in Chinese – talking about politics in terms of textile metaphor. Example (9) is the evidence from the request system.

(9) 才厄經綸 (lit. organize-silk-line)
cái è jīnglún

talent difficult political wisdom
‘(This) talent encountered difficulty (and consequently had to stop contributing his/her) political wisdom.’

In (9), the politician who passed is described as a talent who owned political wisdom. The keyword in this idiom is 經綸 jīnglún, a compound formed by jīng ‘organize’ as a verb and lún ‘silk lines’ as a noun, which altogether means “the wisdom for ruling the country”. However, a natural question that follows is: If organizing silk lines can have an extended meaning of dealing in politics, is it a one-shot metaphor or is it used systematically in Mandarin?

Here, I present two additional examples of a similar nature that supports the existence of a systematic textile metaphor in discussing politics, as (10) and (11).

(10) 国事如麻
guó shì rú má
country issue link hemp
‘Various issues (about ruling) the country is like (arranging fibers of) hemp.’
Example (10) is an idiom obviously used exclusively in the political domain, with COUNTRY already linguistically encoded in the idiom. The idiom is based on a simile that compares numerous political issues to hemp fibers, which are difficult to put into place, so the metaphorical meaning of the idiom is the difficulty of organizing the country’s various issues as encountered when one tries to arrange fibers of hemp. Example (11) is similar, although the idiom is not restricted to the political domain.

(11) 治 絲 益 纋
zhi si yi fen
organize silk more mess
‘(When one) organizes silk lines, (if he does not do it right, that will make the lines) even messier.’

The metaphorical meaning of this idiom is similar, presenting the dealing of general business as the organization of lines of silk.

Based on the above examples, I argue that textile metaphor not only has instantiations in general Mandarin but has very specific usages in the political genre. Accordingly, I propose the following cultural conceptual metaphor: LINES ARE (POLITICAL) BUSINESS. ATTENDING (POLITICAL) BUSINESS IS ORGANIZING FIBERS. ORGANIZATION IS WISDOM IN DEALING WITH (POLITICAL) BUSINESS.

Cultural signs of life in Taiwanese political eulogies

From the above analysis, various aspects stand out and should be treated as cultural signs of life in the eulogistic idioms for Taiwanese politicians. I discuss them at the linguistic, conceptual and the social level.

First, at the linguistic level, I showed that archaic constructions under the lexical level may still reflect the etymology as the cultural-historical root of eulogistic idioms. As seen in (1), 千 gàn is a construction that occurs only in idiomatic expressions in modern Chinese. But if we dig deep enough for the etymology, that yields SHIELD in the domain of war. The case of 經綸 jīng lún in (9) is similar; without a deep analysis, one would not uncover the systematicity of the textile metaphor in Mandarin political communication. The meanings of the idioms become more transparent and we may get to get a grip on how the constructions are used in the political genre about a politician’s passing.

In addition to etymology, allusion is another significant cultural linguistic sign of life in Taiwanese political eulogies. We saw that 甘棠 gāntáng in (6), 麟閣 língé in (7), and 峴首 xiànshǒu in (8) are all linguistic signs that allude to specific cultural-historical events and figures. Each of the constructions also affords access
to a highly specialized cultural knowledge structure as the conceptual basis for understanding and evaluating the political figure in an important public occasion. Therefore, a full understanding of the signs of life of any deceased Taiwanese politician simply cannot do without the complete cultural-historical background, so that the conceptualizer may follow the reasoning based on the knowledge frame.

At the conceptual level, there are three figurative usages that should also be discussed as important cultural signs of life.

As has been discussed in the literature, body metaphor is productive in the political genre (cf. Charteris-Black 2004, 2005; Mulsoff 2010), with throat and tongue in (2) as a typical example. However, what remains under-explored is how the various conceptual metaphors are instantiated in actual linguistic constructions. As I mentioned, the packaging of throat and tongue into one single lexical construction is not seen in other languages, although the existence of the two concepts as the metaphorical source has been extensively reported in the literature. Therefore, what makes the Mandarin eulogistic idiom unique is not its use of body parts but the way the body parts are constructionally elaborated in actual language use.9

In addition to metaphor, metonymy is another major foundation of various cultural conceptualizations in the Taiwanese political eulogies (Panther and Radden 1999; Zhang 2016). Although a high number for countlessness exists in many of the world’s languages, ten thousand for countlessness is not that frequent. It is ten thousand clans that mourn for a political figure in Taiwan but may well be constructionally elaborated as a different number of clans in another culture.

Thirdly, although the orientational metaphor good is up is productive in the political eulogies as it is in the general language, we saw that in the idioms it is embedded in various cultural metaphors and allusions as an integral part of an elaborated conceptualization of the deceased politician in question; it is nested with the cultural beliefs about death heaven is full of lotuses (for souls) and death is a return journey to heaven in (3), with the allusions to Qilin Building in (8) and Mountain Xianshou in (9). Therefore, good is up is not only a mere evaluative tool in Mandarin political communication but is loaded with culture-specific details and instantiations as the rhetorical substrate in the Mandarin political genre.10

9. For similar proposals of more closely studying the interplay between construction and metaphor, see Sullivan (2013) and Lu (2017a).

10. For the cultural specificity of orientational metaphor good is up, see also Lu’s (2016: 571–574) discussion of the cognitive motivation of the meaning of “good” of the English particle up.
At the social level, I argue that occupation is a major cultural sign of life in the Taiwanese politics and in the Taiwanese society as a whole. As was seen in the data, in the verbalization, the deceased politician is always conceptualized with COUNTRY or PEOPLE, whether the concepts may be included in the profile or only lie in the maximal scope of conceptualization. That means when people mourn for a politician and remember him by praising him with eulogistic idioms, that person is always remembered and construed only in the political sphere, rather than in the personal. Consequently, his personal traits (being a loving father, an enduring mother or a humorous colleague, etc.) are excluded from the verbalization and conceptualization and do not at all concern the society. This observation echoes with Lu’s (2017b) observation of Taiwanese society’s obsessive emphasis on career success, which in Lu’s article explains why the eulogy request system displays the mourner’s affiliation and job title along with the eulogy.

A cross-cultural comparison of eulogies supports the above argument. In American presidential eulogies, very often the personal traits of the deceased politician are verbalized with a note of affection, which is announced through the president as part of the society’s memory of the national figure. Examples (12) and (13) are illustrative passages both from Barack Obama’s eulogy for Senator Edward M. Kennedy.

(12) But those of us who loved him and ache with his passing know Ted Kennedy by the other titles he held: father; brother; husband; grandfather; Uncle Teddy, or as he was often known to his younger nieces and nephews, “the Grand Fromage,” or “the Big Cheese.” I, like so many others in the city where he worked for nearly half a century, knew him as a colleague, a mentor, and above all, as a friend.

(13) Ted Kennedy was the baby of the family who became its patriarch, the restless dreamer who became its rock. He was the sunny, joyful child who bore the brunt of his brothers’ teasing but learned quickly how to brush it off. When they tossed him off a boat because he didn’t know what a jib was, 6-year-old Teddy got back in and learned to sail.

From (12) and (13), we see that Obama’s eulogy for the politician sounds personal, at least much more so than the Mandarin eulogies that I have analyzed, and elements from the private domain are carried over to serve a public interpersonal function. In (12), the president openly mentions the politician’s various identities from his family’s point of view, even mentioning his nickname to properly reflect their viewpoint (in the sense of Dancygier, Lu and Verhagen (ed.) 2016). In (13), the president takes one step further by even relating to a detailed personal anecdote from the politician’s childhood to show a more vivid picture of the deceased as a person.
A similar rhetorical strategy can be found in another presidents’ speech at a funeral. Example (14) is a passage from Richard Nixon’s eulogy delivered at the State Funeral for General Eisenhower.

(14) I know Mrs. Eisenhower would permit me to share with you the last words he spoke to her on the day he died. He said: “I have always loved my wife. I have always loved my children. I have always loved my grandchildren. And I have always loved my country.” That was Dwight Eisenhower.

In Nixon’s eulogy for Eisenhower, he mixes the two spheres – one of the family and the other of the country. Specifically, Nixon adopts Mrs. Eisenhower’s viewpoint by directly quoting what she heard from Eisenhower before he died. The insertion of Eisenhower’s last sentence verbatim creates a rhetorical effect of portraying him not only as a national hero but also as a loving husband, father, and grandfather in the public’s memory.

In a similar vein, it is reported that in the Italian context, the Catholic priest typically inserts a narration that presents the family’s voice, in addition to viewing the deceased from God’s point of view. Example (15) is a passage taken from Capone (2010: 15).

(15) Le figlie mi hanno detto che è stata una buona madre, che si è sempre spesa per gli altri, che ha sempre dato generosamente.
‘Her daughters told me that she was a good mother, that she has always devoted herself to her families, that she has always given generously.’

Therefore, from a comparison between the Taiwanese Mandarin eulogies for politicians and the Western ones in (12) to (15), we see that the eulogies for Taiwanese politicians are distinct from those in the Western societies: In the Taiwanese eulogistic communication, it is only the social role of the deceased and the mourner (their profession, affiliation, job title, etc.) that is verbalized and conceptually profiled in the communication around a politician’s passing. On the other hand, in American and Italian eulogies, the politician who passed is construed not only as a national figure that used to play a certain social role but was a person of flesh and blood who will be fondly remembered by family and friends in his private life.

The above comparison between samples of eulogies from the Taiwanese culture (a culture in the East) and the American and the Italian cultures (cultures in the West) can be seen as a reaction to Eurocentrism, as thoroughly discussed in Shohat and Stam (1994). As we can see in the field, previous literature on the language of death discussed only data from the Italian context, without due attention paid to cultures from the East. The data and analysis presented in this chapter fills exactly this gap in the field.
In all, the present chapter presents various signs of life in Taiwanese political eulogies at the linguistic, conceptual and the social level by investigating the eulogistic idioms that are displayed at politician’s public funerals and by comparing them with Western eulogies. However, be aware that what was presented in the chapter is only of pilot nature and the topic certainly deserves more in-depth research. It is hoped that this chapter has shown the potential of integrating Cognitive Grammar as part of the analytical arsenal for investigating political communication and has made a case for the necessity of cultural-historical knowledge in understanding the political genre.

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CHAPTER 8

Construing the self in discourse
A socio-cognitive approach

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This chapter explores the topic of signs of life through examining metaphorical representations of the inner self. The frequent use of inner self metaphors by Chinese speakers in talk-in-interaction suggests a close relationship between metaphorical conceptualisation and the communication of identity. The analytical framework departs from the performativity of self-representation. Speakers construe self-reflection by indexing more than one aspect of the self in front of other interlocutors. Conceptually, the split of the subject and the self anchors self-reflective performances. The data is drawn from focus group discussions among Mainland-born Chinese immigrants in Australia. The present chapter uses one focus group as a case study to illustrate the proposed socio-cognitive approach to study inner self metaphors. This approach incorporates elements from sociolinguistics and cognitive linguistics. It is argued that such an approach has the merit of capturing the socio-culturally embedded meanings of inner self metaphors in discursive acts.

Keywords: performance, inner self, metaphorical conceptualisation, socio-cultural meanings

Introduction

Communicating self-identities with one another often involves depicting one’s own perception of the inner being. Descriptions of such can be difficult. Thanks to metaphors and other figurative expressions in language, speakers can reveal their self-understandings symbolically and communicate their various aspects effectively. This chapter continues the discussion of the interaction of language, culture and cognition in individual identity construction and socialisation. It is done by exploring inner self metaphors used by Chinese speakers when representing the individual sense of self in front of others.
The study integrates cognitive linguistic and sociolinguistic analytical methods and establishes an approach that can pinpoint the conceptual patterns of the inner self metaphor in Chinese. It addresses the conceptualisation of inner self and its designated cognitive patterns in Chinese and examines how these conceptual patterns form the basis for the manifestation of the individual sense of self in socio-discursive acts. It also applies a positioning analysis to scrutinise the interaction between speakers and hearers. This well-developed model that sociologists and sociolinguists adopt has the advantage of capturing cultural meanings and socio-culturally oriented discursive rules embedded in each social act (e.g., Bauman 1993; Goffman 1959; Levinson 1983; Ochs 2012; Silverstein 2003). In this way, the analytical framework takes into account the dynamic cognitive process into the reflexive process of social judgment. Conceptual models, such as conceptual metaphors, conceptual metonymies and image schemas, can be activated and negotiated in construing aspects of personalised and situational self in context.

This study uses a focus group discussion made up of five university educated Mainland-born Chinese immigrants in Australia. These participants were born in the 1980s and received formal education in China. Participants exchanged their opinions about their life as immigrants over one discussion session. In their interactions with one another, they drew on their cross-cultural experiences to co-construct their individual sense of self. Their stylistic ways of representing the individual sense of self reflect their understandings of Chinese socio-cultural discursive rules.

Towards a socio-cognitive discourse approach

The self, in the context of the present study, is a socio-culturally constructed and linguistically experienced process. Many linguists and sociologists agree that the self is constructed through narration and interaction (e.g., Bucholtz and Hall 2005; Gergen 2011; Giddens 1984). The social construction of the self thus arises in the dynamic process of becoming in relation to others through language. Therefore, the building blocks of the self are embedded in communicative activities.

The close relationship between the experience of selfhood and language use has been a well-researched area of study. In the field of linguistics, analytical frameworks have been proposed to analyse the co-construction of discursive identities (e.g., Bucholtz and Hall 2005; De Fina 2013; Ochs 1992). The notions of performance and positioning are particularly relevant to this study in terms of informing methods applied to data analysis.

The idea of performance speaks to the fact that speaking constitutes an act of identity and that being someone is a form of doing (De Fina 2013). Goffman
(1959) puts forward a dramaturgical metaphor: social actors stage performances of desirable selves to save ‘face’ in situations of difficulty. This view has been mirrored in studies that focus on the significance of politeness as an interactional force that influences the outcome of the communicative acts we perform, such as Brown and Levinson’s face-management framework (1987). Goffman’s view is particularly influential among linguists and anthropologists, who have focused greatly on the symbolic capacities of language as capturing public cultural meanings embedded in each performance (e.g., Bauman 1993; Levinson 1983; Ochs 2012; Silverstein 2003).

The choices social actors make, which constitute emergent identities, can be analysed with the notion of positioning (Davies and Harré 1990). It refers to the process by which selves are located in the conversation as observably and subjectively coherent participants in jointly produced storylines (Davies and Harré 1990: 48). Through discursive practices, people situationally perceive and produce references to one another (and themselves) as social beings (Bamberg 1997: 336). From an analytical point of view, a person involved in discursive practice is called a positioning subject (Davies and Harré 1990). People position themselves with regard to others in order to “differentiate and integrate a sense of self” (Bamberg 2011: 8). These positions are central to creating meanings in interaction. What is relevant to the current analysis is that the differentiation of subject positions can constitute a means for creating space between different aspects of the individual self in discursive context. For instance, the speaker can represent oneself as someone who delivers one’s own opinion to the audience when that opinion entails a breach of social norms.

The performance-centred approach (Bamberg 1997; Bauman 1993; De Fina et al. 2006; Goffman 1974, 1981; Riessman 2003; Harrison 2011) defines speakers’ communicative acts as comprised of two dimensions, namely the judgements of the self and the perceived evaluations of others. This is because, as far as the interlocutors are concerned, every speech event can be a private as well as a public evaluative act. That is to say, once an individuals have taken up particular positions, they may also accept or reject positions that others take.

Many cognitive linguistic and cognitive anthropological studies address the cognitive basis of language. In this light, a speaker’s choice of language, including the construction of identities and self-representation, is closely related to the cognitive strategies of that speaker (Langacker 2001). Cognition serves as the ground upon which lives are staged and performed. According to Conceptual Metaphor Theory, experiences in the sensorimotor domain such as bodily orientation, objective manipulation and motion, or sense of space, and so on, can be used as the source to conceptualise and reason about subjective experiences (e.g., Lakoff 1996; Lakoff and Johnson 1999; Li 2010). For example, speakers often project social
relationships onto their corresponding physical locations (e.g., Fillmore 1983; Jackendoff and Landau 1991; Talmy 1978, 1983; Zhou 2002; Zhou and Fu 1996). Similarly, social relationship and differentiation that are frequently indicated by metaphors and pronouns often resides upon the spatial relations to ego (e.g., Dancygier 2008; Langacker 2007).

So far as the construal of the self is concerned, it involves the imagination of self-perception in social interactions. From the perspective of perceptual cognition (e.g., Hanks 1992, 2009; Grandy and Jiang 2001), the need for maintaining intersubjective conceptual coordination (Langacker 2001) validates the performative nature of subjectivity. As speakers do not have direct access to their interlocutors’ cognitive states, speakers must estimate their addressees’ knowledge and presuppositions, and hearers must also estimate speakers’ knowledge states (Langacker 2001; Sweetser 2012). Studies have found metaphors and deictic references to be important indicators of the intersubjective perception of self and other (e.g., Dancygier 2008; Langacker 2007). The imagination of self-perception in social interactions arguably constitutes positioning acts, i.e. the current speaker perceives other speakers to be taking up certain perceptions themselves.

The present chapter targets ascriptions and evaluations of the individual self. Cognitive semantic notions, such as metaphorical projections, metonymic correspondence, and image-schematic patterns, form the starting point to scrutinise the cognitive processes of self-perception. The metaphorical meanings for instances of self-references in those self-evaluative remarks are also explored. The examination of how these metaphors are used by the Chinese participants in positioning acts will unpack the ways in which these speakers create space and re-contextualise time frames in discourse across performance roles. This socio-cognitive analysis will then illuminate how Chinese individuals strategically draw upon different linguistic resources and conceptual models in constructing their personalised, situational self in different contexts.

Methodology

Data for the present study consist of a focus group discussion. The participants are five Mainland Chinese first generation immigrants living in Australia. They have a similar background in terms of education and immigration. They are young professionals who have been living in Australia for several years upon receiving tertiary education in Australia. The participants had never met before. They talked about things or situations that they appreciated or found challenging in relation to their immigrant life.
The interview was conducted in Chinese and audio recorded for two hours. Discussion topics encompass issues around identity and ideology in the Australian cultural context, and social and cultural issues that are concerned with participants’ lifestyle. They were also invited to describe their understandings of the various regional, ethnic and national cultures, different religious beliefs, their expectations of life in an unfamiliar environment, their cross-cultural experiences which include things that they appreciated or found challenging, and reflections on the worldview and values that they might hold. These topics opened them up for self-reflective and self-evaluative narration.

As mentioned in the introduction, this study adopts a socio-cognitive approach for the descriptive analysis of participants’ talk-in-interaction (Lu 2019: 153). Utterances that contain self-reflective and self-evaluative narration, from a sociolinguistic point of view, reveal the subject positions (Bamberg 1997, 2011; Davies and Harré 1990) each speaker occupies when stating opinions or evaluating past experiences. Without overgeneralising the types of discourse markers for the identification of subject positions, the present analysis focuses primarily on the use of self-reference markers where speakers claim/disclaim self-reliance across different performance roles with each self-evaluative and self-reflective act.

Firstly, speakers’ self-evaluative and self-reflective acts containing subject positions can be identified with self markers, i.e. lexical expressions signalling the individual sense of self. The most common self markers are the singular self-referential pronoun =wò ‘I’, the impersonal self-reference using the second personal singular nǐ ‘one (literally you)’, and zijī ‘self’. Zijī ‘self’ can be an independent pronoun or form reflexive pronouns with first person and second person pronouns, creating wǒzijī ‘myself’, and the impersonal nǐzijī ‘oneself (literally yourself)’. Zijī ‘self’ can also function as a possessive pronoun with or without the particle de to form an expression ziji(de) which means ‘of one’s own’. Each self markers can represent different performance roles depending on the discourse.

Based on Goffman (1981), the principal, the author, and the animator are three types of performance roles that the speaker can occupy in discourse. Within the current data, the principal is taken to be the active performance role if the self marker identifies the speaker as the originator of the words (Goffman 1981) or as someone who takes full responsibility for the utterance’s content (Manning and Gershon 2013: 111). The author is taken to be the dominant performance role if the primary goal of the speaker’s current turn is to engage the audience, as the author is the one who is accessible to the listeners in the current time frame (Harrison 2011: 197). The animator can be distinguished from the principal, which by contrast, though represented by self markers, holds no responsibility for the wording or intent (Hill and Irvine 1993: 11).
As noted by Harrison (2011: 194), these performance roles are at the discretion of the speaker, that is, each performance represents the speaker’s the conceptualisation of self-perception in social interactions. From a cognitive linguistic point of view, the conceptual structure for self-evaluative and self-reflective acts is characterised by a fundamental split of identity. According to Lakoff (1996) and Lakoff and Johnson (1999), anaphoric pronouns in English reflect the conceptualisation of a split self. They call the subject and self split (Lakoff 1996; Lakoff and Johnson 1999). The variations in how subject and self are connected metaphorically are important for understanding their causal relationship at the conceptual level. According to Lakoff and Johnson (1999), the subject acts as the locus of the speakers’ subjectivity and consciousness, the capacity to feel, their judgement, and will, while the self includes our bodies, our needs, desires and emotions, and parts of us that act in the world such as, personal histories, social roles, religious affiliations, etc.

The subject and self split forms the basis of a number of conceptual metaphors for conceptualising experiences as a unique individual. With reference to the current data set, this split becomes very apparent in utterances where the participants self-reflect or self-evaluate using wǒ-epistemic verb construction preceding zìjī ‘self’ as the object. These constructions are identified as inner self metaphors as the anaphoric relationships between the subject noun and the object noun are expressed metaphorically.

Setting the subject and self split as the primary metaphor, numerous metaphoric or schematic structures of the self on different occasions emerge. They are the physical object self, the locational self and the embodied self. Metaphorical expressions of self-control in terms of object manipulation or choice of location in space fall under the categories of the physical object self and the locational self respectively. The embodied self concerns with body parts which are used as the seat of the self and/or to structure self-related mental processes.

The aforementioned subject and self split anchors the conceptual structure of self-evaluative and self-reflective acts, these self-representations are thoroughly grounded in the here-and-now of the discursive context. Speakers, with varied purposes and in different situations, position themselves differently across different performance roles for the purpose of enacting self-representations for their audience. The next section presents the analysis of the conceptual metaphors in which the subject and the self correspond to different performance roles.
Analysis

As we raise the question ‘what person do I think I am’, we cannot help asking ‘who is asking’ and ‘who is being asked’. These considerations prompt further questions, such as who is in control? Who sets the standards for action? The initial step to conceptualise and rationalise these questions is to conceptualise a person as divided into several parts. As pointed out by Lakoff (1996), the forms of conceptualisation for inner self and self-control can be possession, location and containment, the current section shall examine the evaluative self-representational stances that the speakers take in which these types of divided person metaphors can be identified. As noted before, the notion of performance role guides the determination of the positions that the subject and the self take within the physical object self, the locational self and the embodied self metaphors.

The physical object self

With regard to the physical object self, the manipulation of physical objects forms the basis for the metaphorical representation of self-control. First, the self is often imagined as an entity embodying one’s own interests, personalities or private needs, while the subject stays at the locus of one’s reasons, perceptions and judgements. In this regard, the subject is conceptualised as the cause and the self as the affected party (Lakoff 1996: 112).

Examples (1) and (2) share the same conceptualisation in which the subject takes control of the self. Both examples have the self indexed by the reflexive pronoun zìjǐ ‘self’. While the self denotes a private sense of self as the object for evaluation, the subject is the originator of the evaluation:

(1) Tiáozhěng zìjǐ de xīntài suǒ wǒ bù tài huì qù jìjiào
   Adjust self attitude so I will not go bother
   ‘(I’d) adjust my own attitude, so I do not make a fuss’

(2) Wǒ bùkěnéng shuō wèile tāde xiǎngfǎ gāibiàn wǒzìjǐ
   I impossible say for the sake of his idea change myself
   ‘I won’t change myself to please him’

We can also identify the active performance role of the subject who initiates the self-reflective evaluation as the principal. As explained in the previous section, the principal is the social entity that takes full responsibility of the utterance’s content (Manning and Gershon 2013: 111). Correspondingly the self is represented by

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1. The analysis does not deny the fact that the reflexive pronoun needs to be used in some sentences to refer back to the subject of the clause.
the animator. The metaphorical relationship between the subject and the self in these two examples can be summarised as: subject/principal exerts force over self/animator. In this two cases, the subject/principal that is in control of the self/animator claims full self-reliance. This performance has the effect of presenting the speaker as a self-knowing and self-reliant person.

However, among all the instances of the physical object self, half of them do not follow this conceptualisation pattern. Instead, the self and the subject are represented in a way to express the speaker’s dilemma or lack of self-control. The following examples contain metaphors where the self is depicted as something that is beyond the subject’s control.

(3) Tóngshì hěn yǒu hǎo dànshì nǐ jiù hài pà nǐ zìjǐ shuōde bié rén tīng bù tài dǒng

Colleagues very friendly but you just worry yourself say other people can’t understand fully

‘Colleagues are very friendly, but you worry that other people might not understand what yourself are saying’

(4) 1. Zuòzhe nǐ zìjí bù àizuò de gōngzuò wèile zhège qián

Keep doing yourself not enjoying work for the sake of this money

‘(I end up) working on things just for money which (I) do not enjoy myself’

2. Dànshì nǐ zìjí xiǎngde dōngxi yòu fāngzài hòumiàn

But yourself want things you put behind

‘But what I myself want are actually left behind’

The speakers are describing the issues that immigrants, like themselves, encounter. They can be language barrier in Example (3) and limited job choice in Example (4). In these two examples, zìjí ‘self’ follows the second person singular nǐ ‘one’ (literally ‘you’). The combination of the impersonal use of nǐ ‘one (literally you)’ and zìjí ‘self’2 refers to the speakers themselves. Nǐ zìjí in Examples (3) is confronted with a linguistic situation which is not well handled by the subject which is marked by nǐ. In Example (4), nǐ zìjí is the only self-referencing pronoun. However, we can infer from the context that nǐ zìjí represents what one truly desire for (lines 1 and 2), which should then be taken as a metaphorical representation of the self (Lakoff 1996). The subject in both examples can be taken to be the speaking voice who not only analyses the self but also discusses the self with the audience.

2. In both mandarin Chinese and English, when the second person singular refers to its substitute for an indefinite pronoun in casual speech, it can be classified as an impersonal use (Biq 1991). With the presence of zìjí ‘self’, the impersonal nǐ ‘one’ (literally ‘you’) should, in fact, be a reference to the speaker.
As Kitagawa and Lehrer (1990: 752) explain, using the impersonal \textit{ni} ‘one’ (literally ‘you’), the speaker is letting the hearer enter the speaker’s worldview. This reference implies that the hearers also share the same perspective, which therefore serves to engage other interlocutors better. Based on this, the \textit{subject}’s position in the current interactional frame should be identified as the author, the one who composes the utterance, i.e. “the one the speaker refers to as currently responsible and accessible to the listener” (Goffman 1974: 520).

These two utterances both stress the fact that the \textit{subject}/author’s intention is at odds with that of the \textit{self}’s. The latter is trapped in the current unhappy situation, and the former can do nothing about it. That is to say, while the \textit{subject} is performed by the author, it might not be able to take full control of the \textit{self}. In light of narrative performance, the speaker distributes responsibility for socially oriented acts across these multiple selves (Harrison 2011: 194). The contradiction indicates a sense of insecurity and powerlessness when self-assurance is low and when needs of the private self cannot be accommodated because of the survival pressure. Although both of the utterances embody self-reflective evaluations, the interpersonal touch that characterises the \textit{subject}’s performance is different from what has been presented in relation to Examples (1) and (2).

The next 3 excepts demonstrate the way past events are animated by the speaker in the ‘present’ frame of the story world (Harrison 2011: 200) by re-enacting a past \textit{self}.

(5)  
1. A: \textit{Wǒ juéde wǒ zài zhè biān shēng huò zhēn de shi xí guànle} 
   I think I have become accustomed to life here’

2. \textit{Yòu yào ràng wǒ huí guó qù cóngzhèng wǒ juéde wǒ bù hé shì} 
   If asking \textit{me} go back to China go into politics I think I was not suitable \textit{I don’t think I} was suited to go back to politics if \textit{I} were asked to do so’

3. \textit{Ránhòu wǒ yù jiàn wǒde nán péng you wǒ juéde wǒ gèn tā xiāng de dōu bǐ jiào yí zhi} 
   Then \textit{I} met my boyfriend \textit{I think} \textit{I} and he thought very much the same ‘Then \textit{I} met my boyfriend and \textit{I think} \textit{he} and \textit{I} both shared the same idea’

4. \textit{Suò yí wǒ jiù jué de liú zài zhè biān bù zhù bìng běi huì qù} 
   So \textit{I} decided to stay here not planning to go back ‘So \textit{I} decided to stay here with no plan for going back’

Speaker A takes up the floor with a \textit{wǒ} epistemic (or cognitive) verb construction, \textit{wǒ juéde} ‘I think’, which shows the speaker’s willingness to be responsible for the utterance. The principal is chosen as the active performance role for the \textit{subject} to retell the speaker’s personal story, indexed by the first personal pronoun \textit{wǒ} ‘I’
which proceeds the cognitive verbs. Whereas, the past self is represented by the animator, indexed also by the first personal pronoun wǒ ‘I’ (underlined in lines 1 to 4). This past self exists only in the personal narrative and does not have any direct contact with the audience (Goffman 1981; Harrison 2011). The next except is a continuation of the previous one where speaker B comments on what A has said and brings in the idea of fate. Speaking of fate significantly weakens the role of one’s individual sense of self in terms of whether one has made one’s own choice in migrating to Australia:

(6) 1. A: Wǒ dōushì húhūtútúde bèi ānpái guòlái ānpái guòqù de
   I was in confusion arranged to come and arranged to go
   ‘I was arranged hither and thither in complete confusion’

   2. B: Gǎnjué xiàng mìngyùn de ānpái
   Feels like fate arrangement
   ‘It feels like being arranged by fate’

   3. A: Wǒ juédé zhēnde yǒudiǎn xiàng mìngyùn wǒ juédé wǒ xiànzhài yǒudiǎn xīn míng
   ‘I think it is like fate to me and I think I am somewhat believing in fate now’

   4. R: Tǐng yóuyísi nà dàjiā dōu shì gǎnjué yīnwéi yīxié dōurán
   ‘Very interesting, so do all of us think it is accidental’

Following B’s comment, A continues with her floor whereby the principal is interacting with the past self in line 3. In line 1, the passive voice, marked by the particle bèi, indicates that the first person pronoun (underlined) is a passive receiver of some will that is not originated from the subject/principal. It, therefore, denotes the self/animator. The subject/principal and the self/animator diverge in the way that the subject/principal is no longer holding accountable for the self’s action. In light of positioning, speakers always create space within the discourse that enables a differentiation of selves (Bres 1996; Haviland 1996; Levinson 1988). As with speaker A, the distance between subject/principal and the self/animator has an effect of disclaiming self-reliance.

At the end of Example (6), the researcher asks if everyone in the group agrees with what has been said hoping that different opinions would occur. The theme of self-reliance is then further discussed by a third speaker in except 7.

(7) 1. C: Wǒ juédé shì nǔlì de
   ‘I think it is up to one’s effort’
2. *Bírú nǐ shuō zhàobúdào gōngzuò huòzhě zhàobúdào nánpéngyǒu jiù huíqù*
   For instance you said if can’t find job nor boyfriend you would go back
   ‘For instance you said you would go back if you can’t find a job or boyfriend’

3. *Nà shuōmíng nǐ dìngle yīgè mùbiāo wǒ xiǎng zài zhè’er*
   Then it means you set an objective ‘*I want to remain here*’
   ‘That means you’ve made up your mind which is ‘I want to remain here’”

4. *Zài náohǎi shè dìng liǎnggè tiáojiàn zài wǒng nàgè difāng zhèngqū*
   Inside brain sea installed two conditions then towards that strive
   ‘Having set two goals in the mind before working towards it’

5. *Nǐ zhàodàole yǐhòu nǐ bùshì shuō wǒ jiù bùxiǎng nàxiē dōngxi le*
   You have found then you won’t say “I won’t think about those things”
   ‘After you have obtained it you won’t say “I won’t think about those things”’

Contrary to speaker B who reinforces A’s evaluation with a convergent alignment,
speaker C announces a public disagreement. His utterances are also marked with
a splitting **subject/principal** and the **self/animator**. In particular, the voice of
the animator is embedded in the two instances of represented speech (underlined
parts in line 3 and line 5), which is said to be an important contextualisation cue
for shifts across performance roles (Goffman 1974; Bres 1996; Harrison 2011).
The animator is presented as being self-assertive, who arguably shares the same
quality as the principal. The internal causation between the **subject/principal**
and the **self/animator** is represented by a **container metaphor** (in bold in line 4),
showing that agency is embodied and that the intention of the **subject/principal**
gives rise to the deeds of the **self/animator**.3

As for the first two speakers in Examples (5) and (6) who attribute to *mìngyùn ànpái* ‘arrangement of fate’, the involvement of the **subject** has been downplayed.
Metaphorically speaking, it implies that control over the self is not entirely up to
the **subject**. Lakoff (1996) explains that control over the self by the **subject** is
being in the same place or object possession is grounded in the American culture
and can be deemed as a metaphorical folk theory that American people grew up
with. As a typical characteristic of this folk model, the **subject** is the centre of
agency. In some other cultural cohorts, such as Chinese, the mind/body is at the
locus of self-control instead of a conscious **subject**. The Chinese language is rich

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3. For a discussion of the conceptual basis for the process of thinking in terms of COMING OUT
of the body, please refer to Lu (2016).
in expressions that treat body parts as thinking and feeling organs, revealing a unified concept of body and mind (Yu 2009; Lu 2016).

Together with the speakers’ way of evaluating their personal choices and dictation and the anticipation of reactions from the audience, we can observe a deliberate avoidance of a working egoistic centre in the utterances by speakers A and B. Perhaps (the loss of) self-control in the Chinese encodes particular cultural ethos and the representation of it constitutes a compliance to Chinese pragmatic norm. Therefore, self-control in Chinese cannot be summarised by a general metaphoric model people use to construe normal self-control by the subject and the lack thereof. From the perspective of discursive performance, the subject and self split found in these speakers’ utterances reflects their positioning strategies. As previously mentioned, the animator is the most deeply embedded in the narrative world. Such position adds distance between the speaker’s past self and the audience which exists in the current time frame. The positioning of the loss of self-control helps to present oneself as a modest person who does not take credit for one’s achievement.

The locational self

The analysis of the LOCATIONAL SELF starts from DEEP-SHALLOW, a spatial orientation found in the current data in various Chinese expressions about a person’s inner world. Interpersonal involvement particularly reflects a vertical tendency. For instance, participants use shēn ‘deep’ or qiǎn ‘shallow’ to differentiate good friends from mere acquaintances. In such cases, the relationship between the inner self and the public self is framed in terms of locational verticality. Li (2010: 85) suggests that “when mental activities arrive at the deictic centre, the self has control over these activities”. Drawing on this view, the inner self that occupies the normal location acts as the deictic centre for the speaker to represent the current mental state. If the inner self could be set as the deictic centre, the locational contrast between the inner self and the public self reflects the LOCATION FOR ACTIVITY metonymy.

The evaluation of other people’s sincerity, for instance, frequently draws on the locational difference between the inner self and the public self. It seems to be widely agreed by the participants that etiquette, manners and other socially oriented pragmatics that a person employs exhibit only the superficial and external character of that person. The majority of evaluations of other people that involve the DEEP/SHALLOW dual turn out to be critical. These negative evaluations

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4. I will discuss the participants’ references to the heart to express their ideas and thoughts under the section of EMBODIED SELF.
Chapter 8. Construing the self in discourse

imply that other people’s inner self is often incompatible with what one appears to be in public:

(8)  

\[ \text{Tā biǎomiànshàng zūnzhòng le nǐ dànshì nǐ kàn bù chūlái tāmen nèixīn} \]

He at the surface respect you but you see not able their inner hearts  

‘He respects you at appearance you cannot see what their inner hearts are like’

(9)  

\[ \text{Bùshì zhēnde xīnlǐmiàn kèqì} \]

Not really inside the heart polite  

‘Not truly polite from within the heart’

(10)  

\[ \text{Bùyīdìng xīnlǐmiàn zhēnde sorry} \]

Not necessarily inside the heart is truly sorry  

‘May not be truly sorry from within the heart’

From these three examples, we can see that two sets of selves are assigned with locations in space, namely biǎomiàn ‘surface’ and nèixīn ‘inner heart’ or xīnlǐmiàn ‘inside the heart’. For now, the analysis focuses its attention on the locational aspects of the metaphor, the next section will discuss the embodiment in greater detail. The (in)compatibility between the two selves is represented by a difference in terms of perceptual visibility. According to our perceptual experience, the inner part is always more difficult to view. The apprehension of someone else’s thinking during a social interaction is metaphorically mapped onto the action of seeing. The cognitive process might involve conceptual blending (Fauconnier and Turner 2002). That is, knowing is seeing where the validity of a viewpoint is dependent on the viewing perspective (Kövecses 2005) is blended into representing the (in)visibly of the inner self.

In the social arena, complicated by the fleeting discursive contingency, the meanings of the subject and the self can get ambiguous. For which case, we need to examine their respective performance roles in discourse in order to determine the metaphorical implications of each locational self metaphor. For instance, the following speaker of Example (11) evaluates her own inner self together with others and remarks possibly in a cynical way that so long as everyone remains nice to each other, even the inconsistency can be overlooked:

(11)  

\[ \text{Biǎomiànshàng dàjià guòdeqù politics jiùshì zhèyàng méiyǒu yígè hěn absolute de} \]

At the surface all of us are decent, politics is like this no one absolute (standard)  

‘We are all nice at appearance and play politics, there is not an absolute (standard)’
From the perspective of performance, the active performance role is the author. It is indexed by *dàjiā* ‘all of us’, an indefinite pronoun that can downplay individual involvement of the speakers as well as the intended interlocutors by avoiding linguistically referring to any concrete individuals (Budwig 2000). The public self, being portrayed as the author, is merely a façade and is therefore not to be taken seriously. Dishonesty under certain social circumstances gains legitimacy. If Example (11) is not very clear in showing how much the violation of social norm can be downplayed in a particular scenario, Example (12) shows an explicit act of concealing one’s true opinions:

(12) 1. *Wǒ zhīdào tā gěnběn bù care wǒ dàodǐ xiǎng zuò shénme*

   *I knew he/she completely didn’t care I in the end wanted to do what*

   ’I knew he/she wouldn’t care about what I really wanted to do at all’

   2. *Suǒyǐ wǒ yě bù huì zhēnzhèng shuō chū wǒ xiǎng zuò shénme*

   *Therefore I would not truly say it out in terms of I wanted to do what*

   ’Therefore I would not reveal what I truly intended to do’

In this example, *wǒ* ‘I’ justifies one’s behaviour in certain situations basing on the anticipation of possible reactions from other people which indexed by *tā* ‘he’ or ‘she’. Two performance roles are interacting in the present utterance, they are subject/principal and self/ animator. The pronoun *wǒ* ‘I’, at the start of each line, represents the principal’s voice whereas the other voice, also indexed by *wǒ* ‘I’ (underlined), corresponds to an unspoken self. The voice of the animator stays at the furthest distance from the audience in the narrative space (Harrison 2011). The unspoken self exists only in relation to what the third person might do, which is therefore depicted as of no concern to the current discursive cohort. The speaker succeeds in portraying dishonesty as of pragmatic necessity without offending the audience.

Setting the inside-outside dichotomy as the deictic context (Li 2010), examples found in the data depict either the subject or the self as the substance inside a container or the container itself, and cross a variety of themes, such as the contrast between the private self and the public self and the mismatch between impression and reality.

(13) 1. *Rúguǒ suǒ yǒu shìjiān yònglái kàn diànr wǒ xīnli juéde guilty*

   If say after work all the time spent on TV I inside the heart feel guilty

   ’If (I) were to spend my the time on TV after work, I feel guilty inside the heart’

   2. *Nàyàng de shēnghuó wǒ jiù bù xiǎng zuò wǒ jiù xiǎng yào tiào chūqù*

   That kind of life I just don’t want I just want to jump out

   ’That is not the life I want, so I want to escape from it’
The container model is evoked twice by the same speaker in the two evaluative stances. In line 1, speaker’s heart is represented as the container of feelings. In line 2, living a desirable life is stepping out of a container (in bold). According to Lakoff (1996), both the self and the subject can be construed as a container. Without suggesting a generalisable model for the structural relationship between the self and the subject, it is interesting to notice that even though both stances draw upon the bounded structure of a container, they diverge in terms of their discursive intentions.

The speaker begins with the voice of the author, who contextualises the hypothetical situation for the audience. Then the subject position indexed by the first person pronoun throughout the rest of the turn should be the principal, the one who is committed to what has been conveyed in the utterance, such as affective knowledge in line 1 and preferred lifestyle in line 2. Metaphorically speaking, emotional feelings, a quality of the self/principal, are stored inside the container.

The feelings inside the heart, supposedly not to be known to the public, once said, are revealed. As said earlier, only the author who exists in the current discursive context. When realising the subject, the author can reveal one’s true thoughts to the audience which is otherwise hidden. The subject/author’s obligation to fulfil social expectations due to its direct contact with the social world corresponds to the enclosed structure of the container. In the similar light, the pursuit for living one’s preferred lifestyle to which the self/principal is committed is metaphorically represented by the action of escaping from the bounded area.

In these two cases, it is either the subject/author that shows the interior or the self/principal that purposefully breaks out from an internal position, neither of which represents the loss of control in the same sense as the locational self to which Lakoff and Johnson (1999) refer. Instead, both emphasise the interaction between the subject/author and the self/principal in a concrete discursive context.

The embodied self

The last section of the analysis focuses on the participant’s use of heart metaphors when speaking about their private thoughts. As mentioned earlier, references to a deep-lying inner self, such as those in Examples (9), (10), (11) and (13), show that the heart seems to be a popular location/container for a person’s inner being, as opposed to a public one. The Chinese heart is considered to be the centre of thought in Chinese culture (Yu 2009: 208) and is often construed as the locus of

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5. An analysis of expressions in English concerning self-control metaphors and the unacceptable inner self metaphor can be found in his study (Lakoff 1996).
their inner self (Yu 2009). Linguistically, xīnlǐ ‘inside the heart’ is a substitution for the inner self, as shown in Examples (9), (10) and (13).

Corresponding to the previous deep-shallow dyad, the heart is hidden inside the body, which is therefore used to conceptualise the inner self that is difficult to assess by the public. As illustrated by Examples (8), (9) and (10), the person can appear to be pretentious, insincere, distanced, and defensive if the inner world is not easily seen by the public. On the other hand, as discussed with regard to Examples (11) and (12), one can reserve personal opinions by keeping the true thoughts to oneself, thereby keeping all communication at a superficial level.

People also hope, wish, desire, and expect with their hearts (Yu 2009: 209). The heart, in terms of the container for contents metonymy, represents a person’s most authentic and truthful resolutions, in other words, a person’s true self. At times, the subject needs to reveal the true self to be sincere, whether or not it is appealing to the person who receives it. What can happen is that one’s one-sided expression of sincerity can turn out not to be reciprocated:

(14) Wǒ juéde shì wénhuà wǒmen juéde zhìyào wǒmen xīn dàole jiù OK le
I think is cultural we think as long as our heart reaches it is OK
‘I think it is a cultural (difference). We think it is adequate so long as we remain sincere from the heart (we don’t need to say it out loud)’

Dànshì tāmen tǐ huì bù liǎo tāmen jiù kàn biāomíndé nǐ shuō hái shì méi shuō
But they feel not able they only look at the surface you said it or not
‘But they cannot understand. They only care whether we appear to be polite or not’

One topic of discussion is about the participants’ experiences of culture shock upon arrival to Australia. The speaker of Example (14) starts off with the voice of the principal and states the opinion that cultural difference exists. She soon switches to the voice of the author using the collective self-reference wǒmen ‘we’ or ‘us’ to engage the audience. As mentioned earlier, the subject/author interacts with the audience. Positioning the true self as something that only wǒmen ‘we’ can tǐ huì ‘feel’, the speaker not only includes the audience in her own reasoning process but also evokes empathy from them, thereby rending her opinion more persuasive. The true sincere self which is common to the present cohort, delivered by the animator, is of little significance to the presumably existing tāmen ‘they’. The third party is positioned as a group of people that hold a completely different set of socio-communicative protocols from wǒmen ‘us’.

The heart is also found to be used in conjunction with emotional feelings. The following discussion will turn to the role of heart as the locus of a person’s
emotional life. Participants have produced sentiments of being unfairly treated, the following example is one of them:

(15) 1. Kěnéng jiùshì huárén làobān ránhòu zìjǐ yòu shì huárén
   ‘Maybe (he) is an ethnic Chinese boss and I am also ethnic Chinese’
2. Dàjiā dōu zhīdào nà zhǒng dēngjí suǒyì hěn nán
   ‘We all know that hierarchy makes it very difficult’
3. Ránhòu zuòle yīhòu xīnlǐ tèbié bù shūfú
   ‘Felt very miserable from within the heart after doing (something I didn’t like)’

From the perspective of performance, the speaker in Example (15) is unhappy with her condescending boss. In this utterance, several voices are participating at the same time. At first, the statement is addressed to the audience (lines 1 and 2); hence the subject’s voice comes from the author. And the heart, the seat for the true self, is represented by a different voice, the principal. As explained previously, the principal is the one who is committed to the wording content conveyed in the utterance, who is therefore holding responsible for the truth that has been communicated. The speaker has her heartfelt feelings conveyed through the principal which turns out to be the dominant voice. The co-performance of the socially oriented author and the authentic principal represents the speaker as someone who is caught up in a negative cultural norm, supposedly known to the audience (line 2), and is therefore worthy of the audience’s sympathy.

According to these embodied expressions used by the participants, the situation depicted seems to be one where one is in conflict with oneself. In a similar fashion, the young professionals in Example (13) feels guilty about living an unproductive life. The sense of guilt comes from her inner heart. This emotional feeling could be so strong that it can motivate her to change the way she lives (line 2). In fact, guilt and shame are often expressed literally as heartfelt feelings in Chinese, e.g., wènxīnyǒukuí ‘heart has a guilty conscience’ and kuīxīnshì ‘guilty hearted things’. A person’s emotions and feelings are seated at the heart. An observable interaction of one’s self-representation and embodied reference to those feelings in social interaction seems to suggest a socially oriented conceptualisation of emotion through the heart. The heart, a culturally enriched source concept, helps to involve and engage the listeners or the audience to understanding the speaker’s inner world better, thereby increasing the effectiveness of communication in discursive transactions.
Cognitive scientists believe that each individual interacts with the world under the guidance of cognitive models. Body parts are an important source domain for various self-related conceptual schemes and cognitive categories, which are not static repertoires located in the mind of each individual thinker. Positioning plays a crucial role which “incorporates both a conceptual repertoire and a location for persons within the structure of rights for those that use that repertoire” (Davies and Harré 1991: 46). Idiosyncratic schematic representations, such as heart for inner self metaphors can be the result of personal meaning-construction strategies of self-representation. The discursive practices in which the subject and the self engage shape the meanings of these metaphor.

Discussion

This chapter applies a fine-grained performance analysis to interpret inner self metaphors in the context of talk-in-interaction. The nuances of self-representation in discursive practices can complicate the way in which we analyse the conceptualisation of self. By interpreting conceptual metaphors for inner self in discursive practice, the current study offers an in-depth exploration of the role of inner self metaphors in the process of identity construction in discourse. It is found that the cognitive resources that speakers draw upon to package ideas of self-representation for their interlocutors is contingent upon the socio-cultural discursive conventions in a given speech community. The results show that the conceptual patterns of the inner self metaphor in Chinese are shaped by the ways in which individual sense of self is communicated in socio-discursive acts.

Having taken the subject and self split as the anchoring point for the primary conceptual correspondence between a subject that is evaluating and a self that is the object for evaluation, the physical object self, the locational self, and the embodied self are interpreted in light of performative acts in socio-culturally oriented practices. The interaction between the subject and the self through multiple performance roles depends a lot on speakers’ positioning strategies in the concrete discursive context, which indirectly demonstrates that social positioning has a cognitive basis.

Table 1 summaries the frequency of the speaking voice of the actor’s realisation of the subject or the self along with their respective performance roles among all the examples that are quoted in the previous section.
Table 1. Frequency of the speaking voice of the actor’s realisation of the subject or the self

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Physical object self</th>
<th>Locational self</th>
<th>Embodied self</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Principal Author</td>
<td>Animator</td>
<td>Principal Author</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELF</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The subject and the self are found to be delivered by different performance roles. The subject can be performed by the principal or the author. With respect to subject exerts force over self in the physical object self, speakers make evaluations where subject/principal that is in control of the self/animator to claim full self-reliance. Metaphors representing a lack of self-control, however, emerge from situations where the subject/principal’s intention is at odds with that of the self animator. The subject/author is usually unable to take full control of the self in utterance that are characterised with low self-assurance and self-sacrifice. The difference between the subject/principal and the subject/author is that the latter enhances the interpersonal touch in the positioning where the speakers include the audience in their own reasoning process, using collective inclusive reference as a positioning strategy to evoke empathy among the audience.

The self is mostly positioned as the animator. The role of animator becomes even more apparent under the circumstance of disclaiming self-reliance or enacting a past self. This performance role can position the past self or the true self as far away from the audience in the narrative space. The violation of socio-cultural norm embedded in this position can be downplayed.

Self-control or the loss of self-control in Chinese cannot be summarised by a general metaphoric model. Rather than pre-empting an invariant model for people’s conceptualisation of normal self-control by the subject and the lack thereof, the analysis has been focusing on positions that draw on “interpretive repertoires” (Potter and Wetherell 1987: 138; Bamberg 2011: 18). The results suggest that the interpretation of meaningful representations of the subject and the self in spatial terms has to consider its discursive context. For instance, the interaction between the subject/author and the self/principal with regard to the containment image schema shows that a loss of self-control can be overcome if self/principal purposefully breaks out from an internal position. This result differs from what the locational self in English may entail (Lakoff and Johnson 1999).

The socio-cultural value of the metaphorical associations between the subject and the self in Chinese is also manifested in evaluations that draw on a sense of locational discrepancy. In Chinese, body organs can represent one’s inner beings, expressions containing which imply that people’s inner self is not always
compatible with what one appears to be in public. The heart, in terms of the container for contents metonymy, represents a person’s most authentic emotional feelings and truthful resolutions. In light of social positioning, the heart metaphors help to invite the audience to the speaker’s inner world, thereby increasing the effectiveness of communication and the persuasiveness of one’s opinion in discursive transactions.

Having analysed a few cognitive models that have emerged out of performances of self-reflection, it is found that the cognitive patterns for the inner self and individual mental and emotional activities feature multiplicity. Conceptual models can be activated and negotiated in constructing accounts of personalised and situational selves in context. Arguably, the negotiation of these cognitive and conceptual patterns and the positioning strategies speakers employ in each discursive transaction jointly produce meaningful interpersonal interaction. Having analysed some inner self metaphors and the embodied self in Chinese, the results show that conceptualisation of the self is a situational and discursive organisation.

Conclusion

Speakers perceive and respond to other interlocutors through performing various aspects of the self, literally and metaphorically to participate in socio-culturally oriented practices. Meaningful representations of the self through divided person metaphor are discourse events as much as conceptualisation processes. It is argued that a comprehensive and thorough investigation of self-representation needs to explore the interrelatedness of cognitive centrality and plurality of discursive performances.

The socio-cognitive approach that the current chapter takes reveals the processes in which social actors perform aspect(s) of the self as and when appropriate in front of the intended audience. In a social sense, the individual self is built around who speakers are here-and-now as a person in contrast to other people. Conceptually, the subject takes control of the self. The agentive relationship of the subject and the self can be projected onto the speaker’s social contact with others. Given a specific cultural context, this relationship encompasses metaphorical expressions for demonstrating self-discipline, self-protection and self-conviction for others and for revealing private thoughts for other people.

In addition to subject and the self split which anchors various self-reliant evaluations, positioning plays a crucial role that “incorporates both a conceptual repertoire and a location for persons within the structure of rights for those that use that repertoire” (Davies and Harré 1991: 46). The analysis has shown an increased effectiveness of communication and persuasiveness of speaker’s opinion
in discursive transactions when the audience is positioned as an active part in co-constructing the speaker’s inner world. Based on this perspective, the emergence of the conceptual representations of the self depends on the pragmatic purposes these cognitive representations serve in a local context.

References


In this paper we address ontological metaphorical linguistic expressions in a Brazilian Tupian language and culture, based on conceptual metaphor theory. We focus on metaphors of personification and body part constructions in the Amondawa language; analyzing examples from retellings of mythical narrative texts and from complex sentences and compound words. We explore the relations for the speakers of this indigenous language between their experience of physical and mythical domains and their linguistic conceptualizations, as a window to understanding the relations between language, thought, identity and culture. We offer a speculative interpretation of the pervasiveness of personification in this language in terms of an ontology claimed to be common in Amazonian cultures, that in anthropology goes by the name of PERSPECTIVISM.

Keywords: conceptual metaphor, personification, Amazonian languages, Tupian languages, perspectivism

Introduction

In this chapter we aim to contribute to the discussion about the relations between language, thought, identity and culture by analyzing ontological metaphors of personification in an Amazonian language of Brazil, based on conceptual metaphor theory (Lakoff and Johnson 1980a). This approach is based on the search for relations between the subjective experience of physical and non-physical domains, the conceptual nature of thought and the architecture of language. A close look at the language of daily life, in any culture, is enough to perceive the value and frequency of metaphorical expressions; in addition, metaphors are deeply related
to fundamental cultural concepts, involving cultural, linguistic, contextual and cognitive factors (Sharifian 2011).

Amondawa is a Tupian language belonging to the Tupi Guarani family (Branch VI, Tupi Kawahib cluster) (Rodrigues 1986; Cabral and Rodrigues 2002). The first contacts of this indigenous society with the surrounding Brazilian non-indigenous society date back to 1986. We focus our analysis on metaphorical linguistic expressions in the Amondawa language which reflect the use of the ontological metaphor of *personification*, in which nonhuman entities are conceptualised as persons, which allows us to make sense of many phenomena in the world in human terms (Lakoff and Johnson 2002).

The chapter is organized in four sections: in the first, we present a brief discussion of the relations between language, thought, identity and culture; in the second, we discuss personification as a source of evidence for language-thought-culture-identity relationships; in the third section, we analyze some linguistic expressions in Amondawa that employ metaphors of personification, body-part metaphors and other constructional means. Finally, we present some conclusions and reflections arising from the analysis.

**The language-thought-culture-identity nexus**

It is not easy to define the link between language, thought, culture and identity. Frequently these concepts are confused or imprecisely defined. Norton (1997: 410) understands identity as the way in which “people understand their relationship to the world, how that relationship is constructed across time and space, and how people understand their possibilities for the future”. According Nunan and Choi (2010: 2) “whether we are monolinguals or multilinguals, experts or novices, we all come across and struggle with issues of how language and culture affect or influence our identity.”

Trying to answer the question: “To what extent is it possible to separate culture and identity, language and culture, language and identity?”, Nunan and Choi state:

> Our own stance is that culture is an “outside the individual” construct, while identity is an “inside the individual” construct. Culture, as we have said, has to do with the artefacts, ways of doing, etc. shared by a group of people. Identity is the acceptance and internalization of the artefacts and ways of doing by a member of that group.

(Nunan and Choi 2010: 5)

However, the “external-internal” dichotomy is unsatisfactory, because individual psychology is also cultural (Valsiner 2007), and collectives as well as individuals have identities (Polletta and Jasper 2001). The interiorization of exteriority
necessary for the individual to see themselves as a member of a social group is essential for the development of identity. Leontiev (1980: 35, 46) states that:

Knowledge in humans … depends on the existence of symbolic models of reality, objective and external. Emotionally, the situation is the same. Without the guide of exteriorized images, the sentiments spoken in ritual, myths and art, we would not really know how to feel … the specific capacities and abilities of humans are not transmitted by biological inheritance, but are formed in the course of life, by the appropriation of a cultural process created by previous generations.

From this point of view, a person is constituted and identified in terms of human capacities and abilities only through the appropriation of culture, in terms of symbolic resources and models, including most importantly language. Christison (2010: 78) states that language “is the primary way in which individuals demonstrate their membership in and allegiance to a community. Reciprocal linguistic forms used within a community also create solidarity within a group, and this solidarity is important for the survival of the community”. She goes on to specify this process with reference to individual identity:

Experiences with language play a central role in a person’s individuality. We use language to create an impression of ourselves, and it is an important way in which we communicate our identity to others both within and outside of our social group. Language and identity are responsive to external and internal changes over time; consequently, most of us are negotiating language identity throughout our lives. (Christison 2010: 80)

Silva (2004) affirms that identity and difference are interdependent. That is, it is by means of difference that we identify ourselves, because identity and difference are produced by us in the context of social and cultural relations. It should be emphasized that this applies to groups as well as individuals: a cultural group can only exist in a relation of difference with other groups, as well as being the site of shared knowledge, norms, values and practices (including linguistic practices). The author adds that identity and difference “are the result of acts of linguistic creation and this means that they are created through acts of language” (Silva 2004: 76) and, therefore, identity and difference “are closely linked to systems of signification” (Silva 2004: 89). He further argues that “affirming identity means demarcating borders, it means making distinctions between what is inside and what is outside. Identity is always linked to a strong separation between ‘we’ and ‘they.’” (Silva 2004: 82). We identify ourselves in contrast with the others, and in the process of our identification we establish cultural boundaries that differentiate our group from others. Language, as a cultural artefact, also functions as a factor of affirmation of cultural identity, or even of human identity. We can note here that in many Amerindian languages and cultures, terms that mean ‘real humans’
often function as the self-designation of the cultural community: “the Amerindian words which are usually translated as ‘human being’ … do not denote humanity as a natural species.” (Viveiros de Castro 1998: 476).

From the perspective we adopt here, language, thought, culture and identity are interlaced concepts, since thought cannot be organized or materialized without the existence of signs, whether it be through linguistic signs or by means of other signs; language is a vehicle and product of culture, since language itself is a cultural artefact (albeit one with a biological and cognitive basis; Sinha 2015). In addition, language and culture are factors of the affirmation/negation of individual and cultural identity among the peoples of the world.

One possibility for clarifying this inter-relationship is through the investigation of metaphorical linguistic expressions in the languages of the world. Through these expressions we can perceive what is “underneath” the materialization in linguistic signification: cognition, culture, identity, as well as the architecture of the language. In this sense, experiences with and of language are central to the individuality of a person; but we also must not forget that, before we even develop language, each person is a member of a social group and internalizes cultural knowledge of this group as well as creating, transforming and externalizing knowledge.

**Metaphor, embodiment and personification**

Traditionally, metaphor has been seen as a figure of rhetoric, appropriate to literary language and distanced from the language of everyday life. However, from the perspective of conceptual metaphor, Lakoff and Johnson (1980a) argue that:

> metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language, but in thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature. [....] Our concepts structure what we perceive, how we get around in the world, and how we relate to other people. Our conceptual system thus plays a central role in defining our everyday realities … Since metaphorical expressions in our language are tied to metaphorical concepts in a systematic way, we can use metaphorical linguistic expressions to study the nature of metaphorical concepts and to gain an understanding of the metaphorical nature of our activities. (Lakoff and Johnson 1980b: 454–456)

According to Lakoff (1987), we have the capacity for abstract thinking by virtue of our ability to conceptualize metaphorically. Our conceptions and worldviews are organized and expressed through language, and metaphorization is one of the main instruments for the construction and attribution of meanings. Furthermore, Lakoff (1987: 302) states that “meaning involves not only mental structures, but
the structuring of experience in itself.” Lakoff and Johnson (2002) stress that metaphor is not only a resource of poetic imagination and/or rhetorical ornament: “metaphor is everywhere in everyday life, not only in language but also in thought and action. It is part of our conceptual system which is metaphorically structured and defined” (Lakoff and Johnson 2002: 45). Gibbs (1994: 9) further affirms that:

Metaphor constitutes much of our experience and helps constrain the way we think and speak of our ordinary lives. [...] The metaphoric nature of everyday thought is not only seen in the work of great poets and in the mundane expressions of ordinary speakers, but is also found in the ways people attach meanings to individual words.

Lakoff (1987) proposes that conceptual cognitive models are derived from their correspondence with preconceptual structures based in image schemas and embodied experience. However, in domains where the preconceptual structure is not directly available to our experience, we import such structures through metaphor. In respect to the metaphorical structuration of language and cognition, Gibbs (1994: 5) says that:

Recent advances in cognitive linguistics, philosophy, anthropology, and psychology show that not only is much of our language metaphorically structured, but so is much of our cognition. People conceptualize their experiences in figurative terms via metaphor, metonymy, irony, oxymoron, and so on, and these principles underlie the way we think, reason, and imagine.

Following Lakoff and Johnson (2002), Gibbs (2006: 9) emphasizes the embodied grounding of language and cognition: “People’s subjective, felt experiences of their bodies in action provide part of the fundamental grounding for language and thought. Cognition is what occurs when the body engages the physical, cultural world and must be studied in terms of the dynamical interactions between people and the environment.”

Metaphors are deeply related to the cultural concepts of peoples, involving cultural, linguistic, contextual and cognitive factors. Lakoff and Johnson (1980a: 22) maintain that “the most fundamental values in a culture will be coherent with the metaphorical structure of the most fundamental concepts in the culture.” Moreover:

Metaphorical linguistic expression may vary widely cross-culturally but many conceptual metaphors appear to be potentially universal or near-universal. This happens because people across the world share certain bodily experiences. However, even such potentially universal metaphors may display variation in their specific details because people do not use their cognitive capacities in the same way from culture to culture. Finally, many conceptual metaphors are unique
to particular cultures or sets of cultures because of differences in such factors as social-cultural context, history, or human concern that characterize these cultures. (Kövecses 2010: 754; see also Kövecses 2005)

Sharifian (2011: 3) takes this emphasis on cultural motivation further, stressing that “Human conceptualization is as much a cultural as it is an individual phenomenon”. Sinha and Jensen de López (2000: 37) contend that: “the embodiment thesis needs to be extended to take account of the role of cultural meaning in motivating linguistic structure and, more widely, the sociocultural grounding of language”, arguing for a theoretical approach based upon culturally extended embodiment (see also Kövecses 2015). Yu (2014: 233) reminds us, in the same vein, that:

the body does not terminate with the fleshy boundary of the skin, but rather extends out into its environment that is at once physical, social, and cultural, engaging in all sort of bodily and sociocultural interactions, so that the organism and environment are not independent, but rather interdependent aspects of the basic flow of bodily experience … to fully understand the body, we will have to go beyond the body itself.

Taking into account differences in conceptual metaphors in different socio-cultural contexts, we turn our attention to the ontological metaphor of personification. We have chosen to deal with the ontological metaphor of personification because it is a cognitive and linguistic construction that is very common in all languages, and (as we shall see) especially pervasive in Amondawa, and perhaps other Amazonian cultures and languages and cultures, but little studied in its own right in cultural linguistics and metaphor theory. Personification is a type of metaphor that is strongly motivated by embodiment. Given that all the peoples of the world maintain corporeal relations with the reality that surrounds us, it seems “only natural” to attribute human capacities and abilities to other beings, based on the experience of our own body.

Goschler (2005:35) offers a general definition of Embodiment in relation to metaphor theory to mean that “parts of our conceptual system and therefore some aspects of our language are structured by the features of our bodies and the functioning of our bodies in everyday life.” The motivation of personification by embodiment is highlighted by the fact that its vehicles may be body metaphors and body part metaphors, in which the metaphoric source domain is either the human body, its parts (e.g. hand) or organs (e.g. heart: Mussolf 2004; Yu 2002). However, personification, unlike other (e.g. purely locative) uses of body part metaphors, involves the conceptualization of the entity in the target domain in terms of human attributes such as animacy, agency and perception. Thus, if personification metaphors are seen as a subtype of embodiment metaphor, it should be acknowledged
that it is a subtype that focuses, or at least implies, the psychic and vital aspects of human ontology, rather than its physical structure.

By means of personification, then, we attribute human qualities/abilities to non-human, animate or inanimate, real or imaginary beings and entities. Each metaphor of personification selects different aspects of a person, or different ways in which the person is considered. What these metaphors have in common is “that they are extensions of ontological metaphors, and that they allow us to make sense of phenomena in the world in human terms – terms that we can understand on the basis of our own motivations, goals, actions and characteristics” (Lakoff and Johnson 2003: 33–34).

From the point of view of cultural history, Lurker (1997: 540) defines personification more widely as “the representation of concepts or scopes of the cosmos, of the world, of human life, of knowledge, of the arts and also activities of living beings, animals or humans, usually with the inclusion of significant attributes.” From the perspective of stylistics, Cherubin (1989) sees personification as an enduring process in the individual’s subjective view of nature and of all external reality. In the field of general linguistics, according to Dubois et al. (1993: 466) “personification is a figure of rhetoric which consists in making an inanimate being or abstract being, purely ideal, a real person, endowed with feeling and life”. In anthropology, personification is related to the notion of “animistic” belief systems.

As we can see, cultural history, anthropology and even stylistics consider, in the definition of personification, the conceptual and subjective relations that involve human–culture–nature–society. However, Dubois et al.’s definition clearly applies first and foremost to literary language, to rhetoric, which seems to rule out the possibility that the ordinary speaker (especially if we consider non-literate societies) regularly makes use of it. In literary contexts personification can take place through various linguistic-stylistic processes (these processes are known as figures of speech, of thought, of rhetoric, etc.) such as metonymy, metaphor, synecdoche, catachresis, among others, covering an immense variety of metaphorical constructions. But these same processes also occur in everyday language, because we are, before being poets and writers, human beings endowed with thought and language. Thus, based on the assumptions of cultural and conceptual metaphor theory, we investigate below expressions of personification in the Amondawa language.
Personification in the everyday language of the Amondawa people

In this section we analyze some linguistic expressions of personification in the Amondawa language. The data come from narrative texts produced by indigenous people, and also from lists of words. They will be presented here in three series of examples comprising: examples from mythical narrative texts; examples from everyday narrative texts and examples from word lists. The project was carried out in partnership with the indigenous teachers of the Amondawa School, in the Amondawa village, located into the Uru-eu-wau-wau Indigenous Area, in the state of Rondônia.

With the aim of obtaining linguistic data as naturally as possible and not relying on responses to questionnaire, the team of researchers developed field protocols and various other instruments, such as games and models, all based on indigenous culture and on the spatial layout of the village and its surroundings. Such instruments contributed to a less artificial linguistic production, because the native speaker collaborators produced oral narrative texts, descriptive texts of movements and actions and other discourse genres, all in their mother tongue; these texts were transcribed and glossed with the help of teachers and other indigenous young people, using the ELAN annotation tool.

The data consist of (i) some examples from the oral retelling of one mythical narrative told by two different children from a sequence of images; (ii) some complex sentences obtained through interacting with adults in a game based around a model and (iii) some compound words of the Amondawa language, demonstrating, in their word formation, the occurrence of metaphorical processes involving personification and other related conceptual metaphors (e.g. body part metaphors).


2. The data analyzed here were collected in the period 2005–2007. The research was supported by the PIBIC/UNIR/CNPq, who financed the project “Space, Movement and Metaphor in Amondawa”, developed by the Group of Studies in Cultures, Education and Languages – GECEL, in the period from 2003 to 2008; by the University of Portsmouth and by the European Union (FP7 project SEDSU), as part of the research programme “What it Means to be Human”. The data were collected by Wany Sampaio, Vera da Silva Sinha and project-related students Arlete Vrena Rodrigues, Cristiane de Almeida Anastassioy and Janaina Kelly Leite Chaves. The Amondawa teachers Arikan and Mande’i, and numbers of Amondawa children, adolescents and adults, collaborated enthusiastically in this work. The authors also thank Jörg Zinken for his support in the SEDSU project.

**Personification of moon, stars and night in the retelling of the myth of the moon**

Utterances (1) to (4) are extracted from two retellings of “The origin of the moon”, a mythical narrative of the Amondawa culture. The retellings of this text were performed by two different children (child A and child B) based on the visual reading of a series of images (a visual narrative) representing the mythical narrative. In the text produced by child A, the following linguistic utterances appeared that demonstrate ontological metaphors of personification:

(1) *Jatata’ia hea awape ipieka .... ngã repieka ....*

*Jatata’ia hea awa pe epieka ngã r-epieka*

star she persons in look they REL-look

The star is looking at the persons ... they (the persons) are looking (at the star)

(2) *Iputuna hua pe*

*ipytuna hua pe*

dark come in/into

The night comes in

(3) *Jahya ’ama*

*Jahya ’ama*

moon stand up

The moon stands up

Utterances (1), (2) and (3), we suggest, all involve the ontological metaphor of personification. In (1) there is the personification of the star (*jatata’ia*), to whom child A attributed to the human perceptual capacity of looking; in (2) we have the personification of the night (*ipytuna*), to whom is attributed the agentive capacity of self-movement; and in (3) we can see the personification of the moon (*jahya*), to which is attributed the agentive capacity of standing up.4

We can hypothesize that utterances (1) and (3) are based in the conceptual metaphor celestial bodies are people. According to the traditional myth (which is common to many Tupí cultures and languages), the moon is a pretty young girl, therefore a person; this motivates the projection of properties of personhood onto the moon (there are also many cases of the personification of the sun). The stars and night, as well as the division of day and night, in the mythology of these indigenous people, are creations of *Tupananga*, a god of the Brazilian Tupian peoples.

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4. It might be argued that (2) and (3) are instances of non-agentive changes of location, similar to Eng. “the night fell” or “the moon rose”. However, the mythic context explained below supports the interpretation of these utterances as instances of personification.
Utterance (2) is more problematic to interpret. We might hypothesize that this expression is based on the conceptual metaphor events are [moving] objects, in which events are conceptualized as moving along a timeline. Events, considered as transitions from one existential state to another state, can be (and in many languages frequently are) metaphorically construed as movements of objects in space, as when we say “The holiday is coming”, which is an example of what has been called the ‘Moving Time’ metaphor (Clark 1973). Events, by definition, occur in time, but as reported by Sinha et al. (2011) there is no word corresponding to English ‘time’ in Amondawa; and there are no calendrical terms corresponding to weeks, months and years. Although Amondawa has no lexicalization of time, in the abstract terms in which this is understood in many languages, the Amondawa language is not a “timeless” language. There are names for seasons and parts of seasons, for day and night and parts of day and night, there are temporal deictics and temporal adverbial terms. The event-based time intervals in Amondawa have boundaries that are constituted by events themselves, such as, for example, sunrise, rainfall, nightfall, and so on (Silva Sinha et al. 2012).

Sinha et al. (2011) claimed that space-to-time metaphoric mapping is absent in Amondawa, but utterance (2) could be argued to be an instance of Moving Time. However, in the context of the “myth of the moon”, we hypothesize, on the contrary, that “night” is rather conceptualized as a celestial body (or a manifestation of a celestial being), than as an event or a temporal interval. If this is the case (and we cannot determine, without further evidence, which of the hypotheses is correct), then Utterance (2) is can also be viewed as an instance of personification and of the conceptual metaphor celestial bodies [and beings] are people.

Further evidence for viewing utterance (2) as an instance of personification, rather than as a space-time metaphor, can be found in the utterance corpus produced by child B, in which we find this utterance:

(4)  Pytuna hua pyri hea hoi ‘am
  ipytuna hua pyri hea hoi ‘am
  dark come near by she go to be standing up

The night came close to her. She went to stand up.

In utterance (4), produced by child B, we find the same personification of ‘night’ as in utterance (2) produced by child A: the personification of the night, or darkness (ipytuna), to which is attributed the human agentive faculty of self-movement in space. Utterance 4 is quite evidently not an instance of Moving Time, rather it conceptualizes ‘night’ as a BEING. In this sense, we can plausibly say that the selection of the same aspect of agency (self-movement) for the personification of the night in each child’s narrative reveals the cultural consistency and coherence of the underlying conceptual metaphor CELESTIAL BODIES [AND BEINGS] ARE PEOPLE.
The personification of the house through body part metaphor

Culturally, the house or home figures as an extremely important space in all cultures. For the Amondawa, the house is not only a place to live, it is also a body that has life. Traditionally, the Amondawa house protected not only the living, but also the souls of the dead, who were buried beneath the fires that warmed each nuclear family. Inside the house, the birth of new life was celebrated and the dead were mourned, keeping their souls in the house so that they would not become lost spirits or hauntings.

In the second series of examples, (5)–(8), we analyze some complex sentences orally produced by some indigenous adolescents and young adults. These sentences were obtained through the speakers’ participation in a game using a model of the village, constructed to represent the buildings in the village, such as family houses, the clinic, the school, the manioc storage house; together with animals, trees, cars, etc. In the transcribed corpus, there are many occurrences of ontological metaphorical constructions of personification. Here, we present just a few examples that allow us to propose the hypothesis that houses in Amondawa language and culture are conceptualized according to the conceptual metaphor the house is a person’s body.

In the languages of the world, the use of Body Part Metaphors (BP metaphors) is common. In both English and Brazilian Portuguese, for example, we can speak of “the foot of the table” and “the arms of the chair”; and in the latter language we can also say, using a non-human body part expression, “the wing of the mill”. Body part metaphor is an example of catachresis, a metaphor whose use is so commonplace that it is no longer felt as such. In some languages, such as the Otomanguean languages of Southern Mexico Mixtec (Brugman 1983) and Zapotec (MacLaury 1989; Jensen de López 2002), body part metaphors have been grammaticalized to form closed classes of adpositions applied to all landmark objects, on the basis of the projection of an animal (Mixtec) or human (Zapotec) body schema onto inanimate objects (see also Casad 1982 and Friedrich 1979 for BP metaphors in the meso-American languages Cora and Tarascan, unrelated to the Otomanguean language family).

5. The fieldwork was carried out by Vera da Silva Sinha and Wany Sampaio. The data presented here were previously reported in Sampaio and Anastassioy (2006) and Sampaio and Chaves (2006).

6. According to Dubois et al. (1993: 101), catachresis is a “process of extending the meaning of a word beyond its strict domain”; but this is essentially a definition of conceptual metaphor in general.
BP metaphors also occur in Amondawa, although they are not grammaticalized, and they are applied selectively to particular landmark objects. Here we focus on the particular uses of Body Part metaphor constructions in relation to the landmark object ‘house’, in utterances (5) to (8).

(5) *Inambutinguhua apyryrym awowo tapyia tombeakaty apytawo*

Inambutinguhua a-pyryrym awowo t-apyia -tombea-katy a-pytawo

hen 3s-surround going rel-house rib-next to 3s-stop

The hen went around and stopped at the side of the house (next to the rib of the house).

(6) *Inambutinguhua awata awowo tapyia apyryrym itombeare*

Inambutinguhua a-wata awowo t-apyia a-pyryrym tombea-re

hen 3s-walk going rel-house 3s-surround rib – to/for

The hen walked nearby the house, around the side of the house (around the rib of the house).

(7) *Awata jam ua tapyia ikupekaty*

a-wata jam ua t-apyia kupe-katy

3s-walk again come rel-house back-next to

(The hen) walked over again and came to the back of the house (next to the back of the house).

(8) *Awewe awowo tapyia pyri’apa ikupekaty*

a-wewe awowo t-apyia pyri ’apa i-kupe-katy

3s-fly going rel-house near standing up 3s.poss-back-next to

(The hen) went flying to near (the house) and was standing behind the house (next to the back of the house).

In these examples, features of an animate body are assigned to the house; rib and back are words belonging, if not specifically to the human domain, at least to the domain of animals. In utterances (5) and (6), the house has *ribs* and in (7) and (8) the house has a *back*. This seems at first unremarkable, involving (as in Mixtec and Zapotec) the projection of a body-schema to an inanimate object in order to conceptualize location, with no attribution of personhood; but further analysis suggests that this use of body part metaphor is in fact an instance of personification.

In Amondawa, the words -*kupea* (back, posterior part of the body) and -*tombea* (rib) usually occur, when referring to human body parts, with a prefixed possessive pronoun, which is a marker of inalienable human possession, whose generic form is *ae*-; (*aekupea* – back of a person; *aetombea* – person’s rib). This co-occurrence is not evidenced in (5)–(8), which would seem to argue against interpreting these expressions as instances of personification. However, in (8), -*kupe*
'back' is prefixed by the possessive pronoun -i. This argues for a personification reading of (8). Should we then interpret references to the house in (5)–(7) as being to a non-human possessor or spatial landmark? When it comes to a non-human possessor, the possessor’s name is usually positioned before the possessed object (*tapyiakupea*: back of the house; *tapyiatombea*: rib of the house). This construction is not, however, evidenced in utterances (7) and (8). The word -kupea is also used as a locative, to indicate the posterior localization of people, animals, objects, in relation to persons as landmarks. In this case, this word is generally used in composition with the locative katy (next to) – as in utterances (7) and (8) – even though in the Amondawa lexicon other words to indicate the relation of posteriority are available, like the word -ewir- (behind) (see Example 17 below). So the use of the locative suffix -katy in (7) and (8), in combination in (8) with the prefixed pronoun of inalienable possession i, suggests that the house is being conceptualized as an entity like a human person.

To indicate lateral position, there exists the word -awai- (beside), which can be used to indicate the location of people, things and animals in relation to people, things and animals. This word is usually used with a relational prefix r- (which refers to the object, person or thing that is the landmark or reference object) in composition with the locative katy (r-awai-katy = beside, next to). The constructions employed in utterances (5) and (6) shown here did not show the use of this semantic resource to conceptualize laterality; this suggests that the speaker preferred to personify the house, metaphorically attributing to it characteristics of an animated body possessing ribs. The motivation for the personification of the house in the Amondawa language, we suggest, is its almost sacred quality of guarding and preserving the living and the dead in the Amondawa culture.

**Personification in nominal constructions**

The examples in this section are taken from a list of words that name everyday, significant things in the Amondawa world. We will see that in the naming of the inventory of the world the speaker draws on linguistic knowledge, cultural memory and history. Names and naming in Amondawa, we will show, are organized

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7. The pronominal markers of inalienable human possession are: ji (1s); nde (2s) ga/hea/i (3s); nände (inclusive 1pl); oro/ore (1 pl exclusive); pe (2pl); ngâ (3pl).

8. An anonymous reviewer points out that in the Amazonian languages Marubo and Matis (Pano) the terms for ‘house’ and ‘body’ are identical, and that in Kanamari (Katukina) the terms for ‘house’ and ‘chief’ are the same. We are grateful for this information, although we have not been able to identify references. Information about these three languages can be found at [https://pib.socioambiental.org/](https://pib.socioambiental.org/)
around the meanings of “body”, the relations of human beings with the earth and with the environment, all of which structure language, thought and identity.

Traditionally, descriptive linguistics distinguishes two processes of word formation: derivation and composition. Nomination by derivation usually involves changing the grammatical category of the word, but not its semantic category. For example, in Brazilian Portuguese, we say that *marcação* (marking) is a noun derived from the verb *marcar* (to mark) by suffixal addition; *canto* (song) is a noun derived from the verb *cantar* (to sing) by suffixal reduction; in both these cases, the suffixal alteration (either by addition or reduction) changes the semantic content of the base word and transports this semantic content to another category of words (verb to noun).9 In addition, derivation by suffixation can add one (or more) semantic features to the base word, giving it a new profile, as in *casinha* (little house) and *casona* (big house), without changing the category of the word.

By contrast, in nomination by composition, “[whose main function is the naming or characterization of beings], the semantic addition occurs to a maximum degree, causing the deviation, sometimes total, from the initial reference to a new one, thus performing its naming function.” (Silva 2011: 29). As examples, in Brazilian Portuguese we have compound words such *guarda-roupa* (wardrobe), *beija-flor* (hummingbird) and *porta-bandeira* (standard-bearer).

Given that metaphor plays an extremely important role in lexical construction, we report below a preliminary analysis of some compound words of the Amondawa language. In the structure of the first sample of these words, we find evidence of metaphorical processes involving body parts and/or personification and other ontological metaphors.

**Figurative metaphors based on embodiment/personification**

(9)  
Yvapoa

*yva poa*

tree hand

root (hand of the tree)

(10)  
Okajurua

*oka jurua*

house mouth

door (mouth of the house)

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9. In some cases, the word form may remain unchanged after the shift in grammatical class, as in the case of deverbal nouns such as English ['leading the'] 'strike', or denominal verbs such as English 'shoe' ['the horse'].

In Examples (9) to (12) we find metaphorical linguistic expressions of embodiment and/or personification by catachresis: root (hand of the tree); door (mouth of the house); dew (spittle of the sun); shadow (ghost of the sun). (9) and (10) are body part metaphors, that are evidence at a minimum of the projection of a body schema to the object, and may or may not also be instances of the personification of the object (see subsection on “The personification of the house through body part metaphor”, above). (11) is more readily interpretable as personification, in that “producing spittle” is a capacity of an animate being. (12) is complex, and more ambiguous, in the sense that it is not clear whether the “ghostliness” of the shadow is an attribute of the shadow itself, the object that casts the shadow, or the sun. However, irrespective of what it attaches to, ghostliness (the detachment of spirit from body) is an attribute of an animate being. Our contention, then, is that all these linguistic expressions attribute human traits to non-human and in (10)–(12) inanimate beings.

**Descriptive nominalization based on similitude/association**

(13) *Pirakueranhanga*

*pira kuer nhanga*

fish past ghost
rivermaid (a ghost that used to be a fish)

(14) *Jatata’ia (Jahytata’ia)*

*jahy tata ’ia*

moon fire ASP.DIMIN
star (the little fire of the moon)

(15) *Jahyendykatua*

*jahy endy katua*

moon to shine pretty
full moon (the moon that shines beautifully)
Examples (13) to (19) are nominal expressions formed by composition, which name a mythical being (13), celestial objects (14) and (15), a substance (16), a body part (17) and edible objects (18), (19). These words, though figurative, are not metaphorical in any strict sense, since they do not involve inter-domain projections. Two of them (18), (19) are quasi-metaphors based on perceived similitude between that which is named and another object. Two (14), (16) are more metonymic or indexical in the logic of their formation, based on contiguity or association. Example (17) is not really figurative, it is simply descriptive, but it is interesting to note that the expression *ewiri kuara*, “hole behind” or anus, employs the relational word *ewir-* (behind), rather than the body part noun *kupea* (back) (see subsection on “The personification of the house through body part metaphor”); the anus is clearly not, therefore, personified, and indeed it would be unusual to personify a body part rather than personifying an object by the projection onto it of body schema. Example (13), on the other hand, personifies a mythic being (the rivermaid) by attributing to this being both a soul (now departed: it is a ghost) and a body (that of a fish).

It can also be seen from these and the earlier Example (9) to (19) that the formation of words by composition, in addition to being motivated by metaphorical, metonymic and associative processes (figurative or descriptive), reveals different types of compositional structures, such as: noun + noun (9), (10), (11), (12), (18)–(19); noun + time + noun (13); noun + noun + aspect (14); noun + verb + adjective (15); noun + adjective (16); adverb + noun (17), demonstrating...
a very rich productivity in the compositional structure of nominal expressions in Amondawa. These nominal expressions thus offer a window, both conceptual and formal, into the way the Amondawa see their world and their relations with nature and with the supernatural. Moreover, they show how everyday language is permeated by poetics. These different possibilities of constructing words and expressions in a language, according to Rodrigues (1986: 27):

also reveal different ways of focusing certain aspects or certain properties of the objects or situations involving the speakers of a language … they allow us to see that each language has a certain fineness of expression, which may coincide partially with what occurs in other languages, but which, on the whole, characterize a given language as a unique system of human expression, in which the effects of life experience and intelligent analysis of the world accumulate through countless generations of a people. Not only does each Brazilian indigenous language reflect important aspects of the worldview of the people that speak it, but it is also the only gateway to full understanding of this vision of the world of which it is the unique expression.

Concluding reflections

Our aim in this chapter has been to understand ontological metaphorical linguistic expressions in a Brazilian Tupian language, based on conceptual metaphor theory, focusing on embodiment and personification. We have analyzed some examples from the retelling of mythical narrative texts, from complex sentences and from compound words in the Amondawa language; trying to understand, through their everyday language, the relations that speakers articulate between their experience of the physical and mythical world, the conceptual nature of thought and the architecture of language.

We have seen that in the retelling of the myth *The origin of the moon*, through the reading of a sequence of images, speakers performed a process of personification by employing ontological metaphorical linguistic expressions; attributing characteristics of personhood and/or animacy to beings such as the moon, the night and the stars. In the complex sentences elicited in the context of a model of the village, we found occurrences of the personification of the house, to which also is attributed characteristics of personhood and/or animacy, through the use of the conceptual metaphor THE HOUSE IS A LIVING BODY; thus involving more than merely the projection of a spatial schema of the body onto an object conceptualized as inanimate. In the analysis of words formed by composition, we found examples of ontological metaphorical nominations, either by figurative metaphorical processes – such as personification by means of catachresis – or
descriptive nomination based upon the perceptual or ontological characteristics of the named object, according to the worldview of the speaker. These compositional nominal terms revealed the rich productivity of the Amondawa language, as well as their motivation by cultural conceptualizations.

Our analysis must be regarded in some respects as provisional, but it leads us to emphasize two important methodological points. First, in deciding between different plausible interpretations of given utterances, it is important to take into account not just the lexical items employed, but also the obligatory and optional grammatical markers that are relevant for the semantic domains in question – a case in point being Examples (5)–(8), for which the relevant domains are possession/alienability and location. Second, in attempting to identify cultural-cognitive motivations for metaphors, the wider cultural context is indispensable for arriving at the most plausible interpretations, which may not always be the most parsimonious or apparently self-evident ones. Example (2) could be interpreted as a Moving Time metaphor, especially given the frequency of such metaphors in English and other European languages; but when viewed in relation to Example (4), and against the wider background of prevalence of personification in Amondawa, it becomes clear that the personification interpretation is more plausible: night, for the Amondawa speaker, possesses human-like attributes.

We are led by our analysis to the conjecture that in the Amondawa language personification (of the natural world and of artefacts) is an all-pervasive conceptual metaphor. However, in seeking a more general cultural motivation for this phenomenon, we should sound a note of caution about the employment of the term “personification”. The very notion presupposes the existence of a stable boundary between the “human” and the “non-human”, or, in more general terms, Culture and Nature. The opposition between culture and nature is deeply rooted in Western thought, but its relevance to Amazonian (and more generally, Amerindian) cultures and worldviews has been challenged in the last decades in cultural anthropology, notably by Descola (2013) and Viveiros de Castro (1998, 2014).

These anthropologists propose, with reference to the indigenous cultures of Amazonia and beyond, “a redefinition of the classical categories of ‘nature’, ‘culture’ and ‘supernature’ based on the concept of perspective or point of view” (Viveiros de Castro 1998: 469). Perspectivism refers to “an indigenous theory according to which the way humans perceive animals and other subjectivities that inhabit the world – gods, spirits, the dead, inhabitants of other cosmic levels, meteorological phenomena, plants, occasionally even objects and artefacts – differs profoundly from the way in which these beings see humans and themselves” (ibid.: 479; for earlier observations and discussion of such phenomena in anthropological linguistics, see Witherspoon 1980). Viveiros de Castro (2013: 3) elaborates further:
Perspectivism is the presupposition that each living species is human in its own department, human for itself (humano para si), or better, that everything is human for itself (todo para si é humano) or anthropogenic. This idea originates in indigenous cosmogonies, where the primordial form of the being is human: “in the beginning there was nothing,” say some Amazonian myths, “there were only people.” Thus, the different types of beings and phenomena that populate and wander the world are transformations of this primordial humanity.

We do not have space to discuss the notion of perspectivism in any detail. However, against this background, our study of personification in Amondawa prompts a speculative conjecture about culture, ontology and language. The Western metaphysics of Nature is organized around the fundamental ontological categories object, space and time; in opposition to the human domain of Culture characterized by agency and experience. In contrast to this familiar metaphysics, we can propose, based on these data and on our other research, that the cultural ontology of the Amondawa people (and probably of other indigenous Amazonian cultures) is one of being, event and state; all beings potentially possessing agency and experience. If this conjecture, or something similar to it, were to hold true, this could have implications not just for theories of culture, but also for theories of language and linguistic categories.

Finally, let us return to the wider issues of language, thought, identity and culture. If every culture has its own world view, every human being is also an agent in the reproduction of his or her own culture (or cultures). Thought is communicated, structured and manifested through language. Language, in turn, is itself a cultural artefact, as well as the most powerful element in the production, reproduction and transmission of a people’s culture. The culture-language-thought triad is the fundamental support that sustains the individual and collective identities of the peoples of the world.

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**Dictionaries**

Chapter 10

Mid hefigum byrþenum
A study of the burden metaphor in Old English

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Conceptual Metaphor Theory lays a strong emphasis on embodiment; Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 257) for example maintain that “many primary metaphors are universal because everybody has basically the same kinds of bodies and brains”. It might be expected therefore that metaphors grounded in sensory-motor experience will take similar forms cross-culturally. However, the status of weight as a source domain in Old English shows that although the conceptual metaphor difficulties are burdens might be grounded in sensory-motor experience, the various weight-related metaphors arising in the domains of discipline, religion, labour, and health cannot be explained without accounting for the cultural conceptualizations upon which they rest (Sharifian 2011; Yu 2009). This study therefore affirms the role of socio-cultural influence on metaphorical conceptualization. The study is based primarily on a semasiological analysis of hefig ‘heavy’, with data taken from the Dictionary of Old English Web Corpus (Healey et al. 2009), and the Dictionary of Old English (Cameron et al. 2016). This paper situates the Old English burden metaphor within a network of cultural metaphors and culturally-specific proposition-schemas (Quinn 1987), shining light both on the nature of conceptual metaphor, and on Anglo-Saxon world-views.

Keywords: metaphor, cultural schema, Old English, weight

Introduction

For the Anglo-Saxons, many of the troubles of life are conceptualized as being heavy, yielding collocations such as hefig heorte ‘heavy heart’, hefig sar ‘heavy pain’, hefig gylt ‘heavy crime’, hefig syn ‘heavy sin’, hefig wite ‘heavy punishment’, and hefig mod ‘heavy mood/heart’. In the admonishment: “Ne þince þe to hefityme to gehyrenne mine spræce ac gelyf minum wordum” [Do not let it seem too heavy for you to hear my sermon, but believe my words] (ÆAdmon 1: 7.12), listening and learning is
viewed as potentially hefigtyme ‘tedious’. This paper draws on Old English evidence to situate the Old English burden metaphor within a network of cultural metaphors and culturally-specific proposition-schemas, which, as Quinn and Holland explain, “specify concepts and the relations that hold among them” (1987: 25).

Conceptual Metaphor Theory as conceived by Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999) has been criticized for its emphasis on universality following from the embodied and experiential basis for metaphor, and the relative lack of emphasis given to cultural factors (e.g. Geeraerts 2015: 20–24). Though Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 257) do note that universality does not extend to “complex metaphors that are composed of primary metaphors and that make use of culturally based conceptual frames”, many recent accounts of metaphor strive to provide more rigorous explanation for culturally based frames by reading the metaphors in their cultural context and explicating, for example, the culturally-specific proposition and image schemas upon which they may rest (e.g, Kövecses 2000; Kövecses 2005; Yu 2009; Sharifian 2011).

If we assume, following Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 56), that “when the embodied experiences in the world are universal, then the corresponding primary metaphors are universally acquired”, we might expect that metaphors drawing on the domain of weight, being linked inherently to physical sensory experience will be among those showing the greatest degree of universality. But in terms of understanding the conceptual landscape of the Anglo-Saxons, or at least a literate portion of them, the physical grounding for this metaphor only gets us so far. While Old English and Present-Day English both provide evidence for this ‘primary’ metaphor, there is a great asymmetry in terms of prevalence and disparity in terms of use, and to analyze these disparate uses only in terms of this same cognitive motivation would be to overlook an important culturally-specific set of ideas that were significant in the culture of Anglo-Saxon England and reveal much about the world-views at the time. I argue that the burden metaphor in Old English is a rich cultural metaphor and that its intense salience and range across specific domains requires deeper explanation than can be provided by ‘classic’ Conceptual Metaphor Theory, or by the Neural Theory of Conceptual Metaphor (Narayanan 1997). The basis for this metaphor incorporates three elements. The first is sensory-motor experience, the basis of which is given here a more detailed explanation than it has been afforded for weight-related metaphors in other languages (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 1999; Goddard and Wierzbicka 2014). This will be the topic of section on “Metaphor, Embodiment and Culture”. The second is culturally-conditioned sensory-motor experience, where the physical sensations

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1. Henceforth I will use ‘the burden metaphor’ as an abbreviation for the range of sub-metaphors that will be analyzed throughout this paper.
associated with the metaphor are experienced within a specific cultural context. An example of this is is punishment and labour, both of which intersect with social structures and religious frameworks. The final aspect is only distantly connected to the realm of physical experience, and is conditioned by culturally-specific schemas. It is the interrogation of this third basis that allows us to understand why the burden metaphor was so prevalent, how a burdened individual might be viewed, and the contexts in which it could even be considered a positive thing to carry a burden and thus to suffer the related circumstances that are metaphorically characterized as burdensome.

Data and methodology

This study is concerned with the scope of weight-related metaphors and is based on the examination of a selection of source domain terms, specifically the ‘hefig’ word family, including the adjectives hefig ‘heavy’, and hefigtyme ‘tedious’, the noun hefignyss ‘heaviness’, the verb hefigian ‘to weigh down’, and the adverb hefige ‘heavily’. Each of these forms is derived from the adjective hefig, which itself is composed of the noun hefe ‘weight’ with the adjectival forming suffix -ig (OED s.v. heavy). The noun is derived from the strong Class 6 verb hebban ‘to raise up’, and is distinct from the verb hefigian ‘to weigh down’, which is a Class 2 weak verb formation derived from the adjective hefig. I have also examined the use of the noun byrþen ‘burden’. The sense divisions provided in the Dictionary of Old English (Cameron et al. 2016) for each of these terms have been consulted, and a search for the tokens in the Dictionary of Old English Web Corpus (Healey et al. 2009) has been carried out. Based on concordance readings, with additional context being sought where necessary, the usages have been judged to be either literal or metaphorical, and from the metaphorical usages a number of target domains have been identified.

In the case of the adjective hefig, particular attention has been given to the noun that is modified. In some cases the usage is clearly metaphorical, as in hefig gylt ‘heavy crime’. In others, the modification of the noun itself may not reveal the metaphorical nature of the usage. The phrase hefig byrðen, for example could be either literal or metaphorical, and it is only by looking at the wider context that its status can be determined.

Old English texts are in some cases written originally in the vernacular, offering a clear insight into patterns of conceptualization in the writers. In other cases,

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2. All examples are provided with the Old English short titles given in the Dictionary of Old English, e.g. ÆCHom for Ælfric’s Catholic Homilies. The full details of the cited texts can be found in the bibliography.
they are translated from Latin sources, though as Wilcox (1994: 63) points out in his discussion of Ælfric's prefaces, translation can in some cases, as for Ælfric, be better described as 'adaptation'. In the glosses, Latin conceptualizations are most likely to come through owing to the word for word translation practice. In this study, I have taken into account all of the above, but where an example appears only in the glosses, it is treated with caution.

Metaphor, embodiment and culture

Traditional Conceptual Metaphor Theory does not claim that certain conceptual metaphors are hard wired in the brain. However, certain conceptualizations are assumed to be universally acquired if and when individuals find themselves in a consistent environment transculturally. Since embodiment is shared among humanity, physical sensory perception is theorized to be the likely source of the majority of 'primary' metaphors. According to Johnson's *Theory of Conflation* (1997), sensorimotor experiences and subjective experiences are conflated at an early stage in a child’s development. So in the case of the burden metaphor, we could say according this theory that the sensorimotor experience of weight comes together with the subjective and negative feeling of being burdened. As Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 46) explain, it is after the later process of 'differentiation' through which the domains would become separated, that we can say that there is a conceptual metaphor. The example they give is the feeling of warmth and the subjective notion of affection, which are initially experienced together, and later separated out resulting in metaphorical usages such as a *warm smile* (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 46). In the case of the burden metaphor, the differentiation stage would result in metaphorical usage such as *giving bad news is a heavy responsibility*, wherein there is no literal weight sensation. This process lends some insight into how primary metaphors are created, but Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 60) note that many metaphors are not primary but are instead ‘complex’ metaphors composed of a number of primary metaphors. This means that even conceptual metaphors that are not themselves directly grounded in sensorimotor experience rest on primary metaphors that are so grounded. In an often quoted passage from their earlier work, Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 257) state that “since our brains are embodied, our metaphors will reflect our commonplace experiences in the world. Inevitably, many primary metaphors are universal because everybody has basically the same kinds of bodies and brains and lives in basically the same kinds of environments” but they also note that “complex metaphors that are composed of primary metaphors and that make use of culturally based conceptual frames are another matter”. The observation that ‘culturally-based frames’ have a role in
the creation of complex metaphors is therefore not new in Conceptual Metaphor Theory, however it is only more recently that serious attention has been given to the identification and analysis of these frames (e.g. Yu 2009; Kövecses 2000, 2005).

The burden metaphor persists in Present Day English, albeit in a more restricted way than in Old English. In Lakoff and Johnson (1999), difficulties are burdens is cited in their discussion of the Narayanan (1997) model as a primary metaphor that incorporates the grounding of muscular exertion through the “discomfort or disabling effect of lifting or carrying heavy objects” (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 50). The difficulties are burdens metaphor also plays an important role in the structuring of emotion concepts in English, as shown by Kövecses (2000), who argues that this relationship follows from the event structure metaphor (Lakoff 1990, 1993). The event structure metaphor characterises emotions metaphorically, according to Kövecses (2000: 52), “in terms of physical movement, physical force, and physical space”:

Table 1. The EVENT STRUCTURE METAPHOR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-metaphors of the event structure metaphor (Kövecses 2000: 52; Lakoff 1990)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. states are locations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. changes are movements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. causes are forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. action is self-propelled motion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. purposes are destinations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. means (of change of state) are paths (to destinations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. difficulties are impediments to motion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. expected progress is a travel schedule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. external events are large, moving objects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. long-term, purposeful activities are journeys</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kövecses (2000: 53) claims that with the exceptions of (D) and (F), each of these sub-metaphors is in evidence in the ways in which English structures emotions. The influence of (A) can be seen for example in phrases like he’s in love, and (B) is evidenced by phrases like falling in love. The recurrence of the burden metaphor in emotions such as shame, sadness, and anger stems from (G): difficulties are impediments to motion. There are five kinds of impediments to motion that form this element of the event structure metaphor: blockages, features of the terrain, burdens, counterforce, and the lack of an energy source. The example Kövecses (2000: 54) provides for burdens as impediments to motion here is he’s weighed down by assessments, and it raises its head in emotion metaphors such as guilt was weighing him down, and fear weighed heavily on them (Kövecses 2000: 32, 23). As in Present-Day English, difficulties are impediments to motion is manifested conceptually in terms of heavy burdens in Old English, and the usage suggests that weight is also related to counterforce, with weight being
conceptualized as a restraint. This is evident in an example from the Old English version of Bede’s *Ecclesiastical History*, wherein the nun Tortgyth is described as being *gehrinen* ‘seized’ by a *hefigre untrymnesse lichoman* ‘heavy illness of the body’ (Bede 4: 11.288.3). The event structure metaphor interacts with long-term, purposeful activities are journeys, which applies the spatial aspects of a journey to various goals and troubles in life. This metaphor, according to Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 60–61) is formed on the basis of the primary metaphors purposes are destinations and actions are motions, together with a ‘cultural belief’: “people are supposed to have purposes in life, and they are supposed to act so as to achieve those purposes” (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 61, formulated as two distinct propositions in Yu 2009: 267). As I will show in the following two sections, the Old English burden metaphor similarly rests to some extent upon the journey metaphor, but also on related cultural metaphors such as a spiritual life is a journey.

Sharifian (2011) provides a model of cultural conceptualization that takes into account among other things, proposition schemas, image schemas, cultural categories, and also cultural metaphors. Importantly, this model assumes that different members of a cultural group will “draw more or less on a schema” (Sharifian 2011: 7. Emphasis original), so each element of a schema may not necessarily be represented equally in the minds of all members. In a hypothetical situation where a cultural schema includes five elements, A, B, C, D, and E, one member of the cultural group could only be aware of B and C, and another of A and D. How such a situation would not simply destroy the cohesiveness of cultural beliefs in the group is explained through the idea that they would share many features of other cultural schemas (Sharifian 2011: 7). This distributed model might help explain diachronic changes in conceptualizations, since it allows for a degree of synchronic variation within the cultural community. Present-Day English shares many aspects of the Old English schemas, but others have become less prevalent.

Before providing an account of these schemas and metaphors, I will first address the question of why weight serves as a metaphorical source domain and what *hefig* means in Old English.

**Weight in Old English**

A subtle but important distinction exists between something being heavy and something being perceived as such, though the former is typically judged to be so through the latter. For this reason, adjectival usage of *hefig* in Old English does not simply ascribe a quality of relative weight to an object, but also the emotive value associated with that experience. Unsurprisingly, this value is more often
than not negative, as a result of the image schema that judgements of weight are based upon. The image schema of a heavy load being carried on the back from one place to another would account for the negative emotive judgements, and is suggested by a range of collocations. There are 212 instances of the noun byrþen,\(^3\) and the following conceptualizations, which may be both literal and metaphorical are suggested by a range of verb, adjective, and preposition collocations.

**Burden as carried:**
- *on [...] bæc* (2 tokens) ‘on … back’
- *on hiora eaxle* (2 tokens) ‘on their shoulder’
- *under byrðen* (2 tokens) ‘under burden’
- *beran* (29 tokens) ‘to bear’
- *on byrdene* (1 token) ‘by burden, (as opposed to by horse)’

**Burden as crushing or oppressing**
- *hefigian* (18 tokens) ‘to oppress’
- *ofðryht* (3 tokens) ‘to crush’
- *geðryscе* (1 token) ‘to oppress’

We see that burden collocates with the verb beran ‘to bear’, and also appears with a few instances of the adjective hefig (8 tokens) and swær ‘heavy’ (4 tokens). Taken together with the instances of hefigian ‘to oppress/weigh down’, it seems that sensations of weight are tied up closely with experiences of physical labour. Notably, in Ælfric’s *Colloquy on the Occupations*: a Latin text designed for use in language instruction that was subsequently translated into Old English, the ierþling ‘ploughman’ is lauded as having the most valuable occupation among the woruldcræftum. That is, after the foremost occupation of seeking the gospel, the laborious and unprivileged occupation of tilling the land is the most important. The imageschematic conception of the literal sense of hefig fuses experience together with the objective notion of weight, resulting in usage that is coloured by the value judgements of the experiencer. Carrying a weight is seen as a responsibility, which is also evident in the use of the words *fleon ‘flee’* (5 tokens), and *todælan ‘divide’* (8 tokens) together with byrþen.

Overall, only a minority of usages of the adjective hefig (28 tokens) are literal in nature,\(^4\) and where there is emotively neutral usage, it tends to occur when the experience of handling the object is not relevant:

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3. This number takes into account all variant spellings.

4. 185 tokens of hefig reflect figurative use.
Eorðe is hefigre oðrum gesceaftum. (Met A6: 20.133)
[The earth is heavier than other creations].

…7 Hafað hefigne steort, heafod lytel, tungan lange, toð nægnigne.… (Rid 58: A3.22.58)
[….and have a heavy tail, a little head, a long tongue, no teeth…].

Hefigere ic eom micle þonne se hara stan oþþe unlytel leades clympre, leohtre ic eom micle þonne þes lytla wyrm þe her on flode gæð fotum dryge. (Rid 40: 74)
[Much heavier I am than the grey stone or great clump of lead, much lighter I am than the little insect that walks here on the water with dry feet].

liged him behindan hefig hrusan dæl. (Met A6: 29.47)
[behind it lies a heavy portion of earth].

Often, we see explicit allegorical use of a literal formation, wherein objects that are literally heavy such as stones and lead are likened to metaphorical burdens:

Dæt lead ðonne is hefigre ðonne ænig oðer andweorc. Forðy bið inne on ðæm ofne geworden to leade se se ðe sua bið gedřysced mid ðære hefignesse his synna dæt he furðum on ðæm broce nyle alætan his geornfulnesse & ðas eorðiclan wilnunga. (CP: 37.269.7)
[Lead is heavier than any other material; therefore he who is so oppressed with the heaviness of his sins that he won’t even under affliction let go of his lusts and earthly desires is made into lead inside the furnace].

The effect of experience upon the literal conceptualization of hefig will provide the necessary groundwork for the subsequent account of weight metaphors in Old English.

As argued above, hefig as a conceptualization is not just a quality ascribed to an object, but incorporates also the emotive value associated with an image schematic representation of an experience. Goddard and Wierzbicka (2014) include this kind of notion, albeit from a different theoretical perspective and with different implications for the way in which concepts are formed in the mind, in their Natural Semantic Metalanguage (henceforth NSM) explication for Present Day English heavy. NSM is a neo-structuralist semantic theory that aims to explicate culturally-specific concepts using a metalanguage composed of basic `primes' and `molecules'. The majority of concepts are argued to be culturally specific, with a very small number of basic forms that are argued to be universal. The NSM explication for English heavy is as follows:
(6) This thing is heavy.
   a. this thing is like this:
   b. if someone does something to this thing with some parts of their body
   c. like people do something to a thing when they want to be above the place where it is,
   d. this someone can feel something in their body because of it
   e. because of this, this someone can know something about this thing
   f. because of this, this someone can think like this:
   g. “if someone does something to this thing for some time with parts of their body
   h. because this someone wants it to be in a place far from the place where it was before,
   i. this someone can’t not feel something bad in their body because of it” (Goddard and Wierzbicka 2014: 72)

Noteworthy here is the inclusion of a line within this explication that encodes the notion of labour: “if someone does something to this thing for some time with parts of their body because this someone wants it to be in a place far from the place where it was before […]”. This would certainly be appropriate in Old English, where byrþen appears relatively frequently with beran. It also encodes the notion similar to that of pain, since someone “can’t not feel something bad in their body because of it”\(^5\) The third point of interest here is that it is a sensation that occurs only after ‘some time’, and as we will see, the linking of lengthy periods of time with burdens is prevalent in Old English. The inclusion of these factors in the explication for Present-Day English heavy makes this explication appropriate in certain ways also for Old English hefig, which is used in an emotively negative sense the majority of the time. It may even be more appropriate for the range of use in Old English than for the intended Present-Day English usage, since it seems to predict fewer neutral usages than Present-Day English attests. For Old English, however, once we start to take into account metaphorical usage, a similar explication would also have to encode the notion not only of a weight making you feel something bad in the body, but also of restricting movement:

\(^5\) This line is not identical to the NSM explication for ‘she felt pain’ proposed in Goddard and Wierzbicka 2014: “(d) this someone feels something bad in this part of the body because of this (e) this someone can’t not think like this at this time: ‘I don’t want this’”. The overwhelming aspect of ‘pain’, wherein someone ‘can’t not’ think that they ‘don’t want it’ is absent from the sensation of feeling that something is ‘heavy’. But in common is the sensation of ‘something bad in the body’.
(7) …wæs heo semninga gehrinen mid hefigre untrymnesse lichoman.
(Bede 4: 11.288.3)
[…]she was always seized (held) with heavy bodily weakness].

(8) In þa ilcan tid se biscop þære mægðe, se wæs Bosel haten, wæs mid swa micle untrymnesse his lichoman hefigad, þæt he þa bispçegnunge þurh hine þegnian ne meahte.
(Bede 4: 24.336.8)
[At the same time the bishop of that region, he was called Bosel, was with such great illness of his body oppressed, that he could not serve the episcopal ministration].

In the first of these examples from the Old English version of Bede’s *Ecclesiastical History*, the ‘heavy’ illness is a restrainer. The second example, which uses the related verb *hefigian* to describe the restraining effect of illness shows that it is the figurative heaviness itself that causes the feeling of restraint.

Although the above NSM explication sets us off on the right track, encoding the experiential basis for the concept of *heavy*, it is unclear how metaphorical meanings are to be accounted for, and indeed polysemy more generally. Goddard and Wierzbicka’s (2014) explication does not explicate metaphorical usage, though they address the issue of metaphor, highlighting the need to pay attention to the “cultural underpinnings of language-specific metaphorical transfers” (Goddard and Wierzbicka 2014: 78). Since the explication above is for PDE, and they argue that PDE is lacking in the metaphorization of ‘heavy’ in all except a few phrases, it is to be expected that the explication might not take into account metaphors. However, they explain that Polish has a rich array of metaphorical collocations with the adjective *ciężki* ‘heavy’, including *ciężkie czasy* ‘heavy times’, *ciężka choroba* ‘heavy illness’ and *ciężka walka* ‘heavy struggle’ (Goddard and Wierzbicka 2014: 76), stating that “in one case, living is seen as being like carrying a heavy burden, and in the other, like trying to change the shape of a hard object” (Goddard and Wierzbicka 2014: 77). They go on to say that while ‘hardness’ in English collocations suggest “difficulties which possibly can be overcome (through determination, effort, and resourcefulness)”, collocations in Polish involving the adjective *ciężki* by contrast reveal the idea of problems as “burdens which simply have to be borne” (Goddard and Wierzbicka 2014: 77). The metaphors underpinning the Polish collocations, or at least metaphors spanning some of the same domains as well as others are also evident in Old English. The problem is that the metaphorical usages are not accounted for within the NSM explication, and if we take for example a common Present-Day English expression such as *heavy traffic*, we can see that it does not fit with a number of the elements of the explication in (6), hence a different explication would be required for that sense. A possible zeugma such as *the traffic was heavy, and so were the trucks* suggests that this
should be deemed polysemy rather than merely vagueness (Zwicky and Sadock 1975; Cruse 1986). It seems that in order to reflect the different senses of heavy, we would either need an explication so general as to be uninformative, or we would need an explication for each sense. In order to model such polysemy, particularly that stemming from the rich metaphorization in Old English, I assume a Prototype Theoretic account of word meaning (Langacker 1987; Lakoff 1987), and more specifically, that the individual senses are extended from a prototype to form a Family Resemblance category (Wittgenstein 1978; Taylor 2003: 119). Since a sense might extend metaphorically from one other sense, and another from elsewhere in the category, the result is meaning chains, wherein A and B are linked, and B and C, but A and C do not necessarily share features (Taylor 2003: 119). In our case, the prototype would be a sense of heavy not unlike that explicated in Goddard and Wierzbicka (2014: 76) talk about the metaphorical transfer and its cultural significance, the metaphorization itself is not accounted for theoretically. In our case, the prototype would be a sense of heavy not unlike that explicated in Goddard and Wierzbicka (2014), where the weight is borne by a person. This is based on the image schema of a weight pressing down on the back, and is experiential and negatively emoted. Etymologically this would seem to be the primary sense of hefig since it is based on hefe, which itself is derived from the Strong Class 6 verb hebban ‘raise up’. The noun and adjective are newer formations than the verb, and it is therefore not surprising to see an image schema representing experience of an action underpinning the sense. The metaphorical transfer of this image schema is predictable in this theoretical position, and it can be explained without the need for a different explanation for each lexeme. Likewise, the schematic underpinning of this sense extension allows for the metaphorization of distinct lexemes such as byrþen and hefig, as well as beran to be accounted for at the same time. This would not be possible in a neostructuralist account such as NSM.

The Dictionary of Old English (Cameron et al. 2016) lists 14 senses for hefig, which are summarized in the table below.

The majority of the sub-senses here are metaphorical in nature, but what we see is not just one conceptual metaphor, but a series of burden-related metaphors through which the sensory motor domain is linked with domains of religion, emotion, justice and punishment. Among senses (7) and (6) we find synesthetic metaphors, which cross from one sensory domain to another, in this case from touch to taste and hearing. These metaphors, though related, fall outside of the

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6. It is worth noting here that the metaphor likely pre-dates Old English, and is evident in related languages. For example, in Danish svær can mean ‘heavy’ and ‘difficult’. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.

7. The sense wordings are taken directly from the DOE (Cameron et al. 2016), with some deletions of examples due to space considerations This citation can be replaced with (DOE s.v. hefig)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2.  Senses as listed in the DOE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1.</strong> heavy, of great weight (e.g. of earth: heavy in relation to bulk),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2.</strong> glossing oneratus (here fig.) ‘weighted, burdened, laden (with care, trouble, etc.)’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3.</strong> ponderous, sluggish, torpid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.a. weighed down, torpid, heavy (with sleep dat./instr.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.b. of the stomach: heavy, weighed down (by indigestion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4.</strong> of sleep: heavy, overpowering, deep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.a. glossing ferreus “hard as iron, cold, inexorable”, evidently interpreted in this context, ferreus leti somnus “the hard sleep of death”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5.</strong> weighed down, oppressed (by sorrow), sorrowful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.a. of moaning, groaning, lamentation: expressing or indicative of grief; sorrowful, doleful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>6.</strong> of a smell, taste, flavour: ? strong, ? unpleasant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>7.</strong> having the aspect, effect or sound of heaviness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.a. of thick mist / fog (here fig.): heavy, dense, lowering, gloomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.b. of a sound: low in pitch, deep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.b.i. of an accent: grave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>8.</strong> hard to bear, onerous, grievous, difficult, oppressive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.a. of servitude, poverty, loss, hardship, torment, illness, affliction, etc.: Also used predicatively</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.b.i. used predicatively, of a person: oppressive, troublesome, annoying (to someone dat.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.b.ii. used predicatively, of a person: strongly opposed to, hostile toward, disapproving of (something gen.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.c. of advice, instruction: burdensome, tedious, irksome 8.d. of a task, labour, duty, responsibility, etc.: hard to perform, onerous, burdensome, arduous, laborious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.d.i. used predicatively: onerous, difficult</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.d.ii. used predicatively: onerous, difficult</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.d.iii. glossing difficile adv. “careful, scrupulous; demanding”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2. (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>9. stern, severe, harsh</th>
<th>9.a. of a law, reproach, punishment, retribution; martyrdom: stern, severe; harsh, unsparing, cruel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 10. grave, serious      | 10.a. of a legal duty, obligation: grave, serious, important  
10.b. of sins, faults, offences; folly; peril, danger, etc.: not to be taken lightly, grave, serious |
|                         | 10.c. of a dispute, argument, quarrel: ? serious, weighty; not trilling |
|                         | 10.d. used predicatively: grave, serious, important (introducing þæt clause with subj.) |

11. of strife, conflict, fighting, battle: fierce, intense, severe
12. used as an intensive, of anger, hatred: severe, vehement, deep, profound, intense, extreme
13. glossing gravis, here “great in number, large, numerous”
14. glossing vim, acc.sg. of vis “force, violence”
BURDEN metaphors that are the focus of this chapter, though it is noteworthy that they also show a negative emotive value. The status of hefig as a polysemous family resemblance category is demonstrated by senses (3) (ponderous, sluggish, torpid), (4), and (9) (stern, severe, harsh). It would not be possible, in a structuralist or an NSM analysis, to come up with a set of semantic invariants that would allow heavy to denote a harsh law, deep sleep, and sluggishness. Not all of these draw on the idea of feeling ‘something bad in the body’ (in the case of sleep), and while the sleep sense and the sluggish sense both encode the sense of sloth, the harsh sense does not. In terms of image schemas, they also differ in terms of the referent, since a harsh law might be conceptualized as an external impediment to motion, that is, a restrainer, while torpid refers instead to the attribute of a person who is subject to a burden, and has thus been slowed down.

From this initial examination of the various senses of hefig, we can infer the following metaphors, which span four domains:

Religion

SIN IS A BURDEN

Justice

CRIME IS A BURDEN
LAWS ARE BURDENS
PUNISHMENTS ARE BURDENS

Emotion\(^8\)

SORROW IS A BURDEN
ANGER IS A BURDEN

Illness

ILLNESS IS A BURDEN

Labour

A DIFFICULT TASK IS A BURDEN
LISTENING IS A BURDEN
WORDS ARE HEAVY

Clearly, some of these metaphors do not simply involve mappings from the source domain of sensory motor experience to their target domains, but also involve other

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8. According to Leslie Lockett, hefig features as one of the lexical idioms pointing to a hydraulic model of the mind in Anglo-Saxon England, along with notions of swelling and binding (Lockett 2011: 88)
cross-domain mappings. **sin and crime** for example involve another metaphor, which is **a spiritual life is a journey**. This metaphor structures many aspects of life in terms of religion, and thus the various obstacles on life’s journey become the source domains for obstacles to spiritual life, including **sins are crimes** (and therefore **god is a judge** (Kövecses 2016)), **illness is a burden, sin is illness** (and **god is a doctor**), therefore **sin is a burden**. This correspondence is manifested in a range of usages pertaining to sub-metaphors, with it being possible in Old English therefore to talk about the *heofenlican læcedome* ‘the heavenly cure’, and God as a *leech*. I will begin with the justice domain, examining the burdens of crimes, punishments, and laws.

**Sins and crimes**

(10) *Hefig maan* is & godwrecnis þæt mon hine menge mid his steopmeder (Bede 1: 16.70.12)

[It is a **heavy crime** and wickedness that a man himself sleeps with his stepmother].

(11) Sum mann wæs gebunden onbutan þæt heafod for his *hefigum gylte*, se com to þam halgan, and his *swara* heafodbend sona tobaerst, swa he hine gebæd. (ÆLS (Swithun): 421)

[Some man was bound about the head for his **heavy crime**, he came to the saint, and his **heavy** head bond soon burst asunder, just as as he had prayed].

(12) Eac is manna gehwilcum þearf, þæt he hine forhæbbe fram leasum cyðnyssum, forðam hit is swiðe *hefig gylt* and fram urum drihtne sylfum forboden. (HomS 16 (Ass 12): 95)

[Also it is the need of all men, that he abstain from false witness, because it is (a) **very heavy crime** and from our lord himself forbidden].

**Punishments**

(13) […] *hu micel wite is* and *hu hefigtyme*, þæt man on amansumunge sie […] (BenR: 30.53.20)

[…how great a punishment and how *arduous* (it) is that a man is *excommunicated* …].

(14) Swa bið ðæm ðæm he his gedonan synna wepē, & hi swaðæah ne forlæt: *hefigran scylde & hefigran witum* he hine underōiet, gif he hit ne forlæt. (CP: 54.421.4)

[So it is with him who weeps at the sins he has committed, and nevertheless he does not give them up; he subjects himself to **heavier guilt** and **heavier punishments** if he will not forsake it].
(15) Gyf þæt riht to hefig sy, sece siþþan ða lihtinge to þam cynge. (LawIIIIEg: 2.1) [If the law is too heavy, seek to the king afterwards for lightening (alleviation)].

(16) Geburgerihta syn mislice: gehwar hy syn hefige, gehwar eac medeme. (LawRect: 4) [The boor’s rights are various, in some places they are heavy, also in some places they are moderate].

(17) Ðeos landlagu stænt on suman lande; gehwar hit is, swa ic ær cwæð, hefigre, gehwar eac leohtre; forðam ealle landsida ne syn gelice. (LawRect: 4.4) [This district law stands on a particular land, in some places it is, as I said before, heavy, also in some places light, because all countries’ customs are not alike].

The three sub-metaphors that motivate the conceptualization of justice, punishment and discipline as heavy are CRIMES ARE HEAVY OBJECTS THAT WEIGH ON YOU, LAWS ARE RESTRAINTS, and JUSTICE IS BALANCE. The notion of balance is implicit in the legal systems of Anglo-Saxon England (Kövecses 2016), and weight provides the measure by which a punishment is deemed to be appropriate or not. This notion of balance allows for punishment to be mitigated by wergeld, through which an appropriate payment can be viewed as equivalent to a condign punishment such as the removal of a hand (O’Brien O’Keeffe 1998: 215; Frotscher 2013; Kövecses 2016). Thus, through punishment or wergeld payments, one can be alleviated of their crimes. This intersects with the CRIMES ARE HEAVY OBJECTS THAT WEIGH ON YOU metaphor, which turns an event into an object, thus solidifying it, removing its transience, and manifesting it as something with continuing existence and effect. O’Brien O’Keeffe (1998: 216) discusses the shift from capital punishment in Late Anglo-Saxon England, which can be seen in Æthelred’s law code that orders that punishments other than death should be sought in the cases of lesser crimes. In her analysis of the Chronicle annal for 1036, O’Brien O’Keeffe (1998: 229–230) discusses the significance of punishments involving the mutilation of living bodies, observing that “the spectacle of such a body continually announces both crime and punishment”, but also that “by construing juridical mutilation as a mercy, by making it a happy alternative to eternal death, [it] makes the criminal a partner in his punishment”. Therefore, not only do such punishments stem from the notion that crimes are intransient things, making the figurative burden of guilt have a physical presence, but also from the belief that the criminal should have the opportunity to redeem their soul. This demonstrates that the concepts of SIN, CRIME, and GUILT often overlap with respect to the religious and justice domains: criminal justice thus becomes as much a spiritual matter as a matter of retribution.
or deterrence. It is therefore unsurprising to find also that sin is a burden and more specifically that sin is a heavy object that weighs on you.

18) Ac him is ðearf ðæt hi for ðære orsorgnesse ne ðurhtion hefigran scylda
   (CP: 57.439.1)
   [But it is necessary to them that they, on account of their confidence, do not
    commit heavier sins].

19) Ðætte hwilum ða leohan scylæa biod ðæs ðæa
    hefigran weordæn ðurhtogene
    (CP: 62.457.7)
    [That sometimes the light sins are better to let go, lest the heavier (sins) be
     committed].

20) …þa þe mid hefigum synnum ofsettedæ heora sawle…
    (GDPref and 4 (C): 52.340.7)
    […they who oppress their soul with heavy sins...].

21) For þæm min unriht me hlypð nu ofer heafod, and, swa swa hefig byrðen, hy
    synt gehefegode ofer me.
    (PPs (prose): 37.4)
    [Therefore my wrongdoing leaps now onto my head, and, alike a heavy
     burden, they are weighing on me].

Example (20) demonstrates how sins can be thought of as not only heavy, but as ‘oppressing’ the soul, and in (19) we see the more serious sins characterised as 'heavy' and the less serious as leoh ‘light’. In Example (21), the unriht is clearly given substance, and weighs upon the head as a heavy object. It is through the metonymic association between a gylt ‘crime’ and the emotion associated with it that the emotion of guilt is metaphorized as heavy. The other emotions connected to weight are less likely to be linked to the justice domain, but instead follow, like illness is a burden: and difficult tasks are burdens, from the conceptualization of difficulties on life’s journey as heavy burdens.

ILLNESS IS A BURDEN:

22) …se wæs mid þa grimmestan untrymnisse hefigad & ðrycced.
    (Bede 5: 5.396.15)
    […he was with the most horrible illness oppressed and crushed].

23) Se leofa biscop Eadbryht wæs mid grimre adle ðread & gestanden; & seo
    dæghwamlice weox & hefigode.
    (Bede 4: 31.376.31)
    [The beloved bishop Eadbryht was vexed and grounded with a grim disease;
     and every day it waxed and grew in heaviness].

In these examples of illness as a burden, the burden is not one that you carry and that wearies you, but one that crushes you. The individual is not the agent,
carrying a heavy load, but is the passive patient of the force exerted by a heavy weight. All of the burden sub-metaphors incorporate some degree of a burden as an impediment to motion but these additionally feed off happy is up (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 14), since the image schema here is of a load exerting pressure in a vertical downwards direction. This is further exemplified in the following uses of the word byrþen:

(24) gyf ðu geseo his assan licgan under byrðene, ne ga ðu þanon, ac hefe hine up mid him (Exod: 23.5) [if you see his ass lying under a burden, do not go thence, but heave it up with him].

(25) gif hiora hwilc geseah, þæt hiora hwilc gefeoll under þam byrðenum, þonne wærôn þa oðre sona in hiora fultume and gesetton þa byrþene eft on hiora eaxle (LS 35 (VitPatr): 324) [if any of them saw, that any of them fell under the burdens, then the others were immediately in support of them and set the burden again on their shoulder].

In one case, an animal is seen lying under the burden, and in the other, someone has fallen under the burden. The end point of an unbearable burden is not only cessation of movement, but a fall. Notably, the two Christian texts make the same point which is that one should help and lift up the burdens. The following examples show how difficult tasks are conceptualized as heavy, which is arguably the closest to the more common collocations in Present-Day English that stem from the burden metaphor in Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 50), such as heavy responsibility, this job is burdensome.

(26) Ne wiðcweðe we þæt hit micel gedeorf ne sy: Ac gif hit is hefigyme on ðyssere worulde. hit becymð to micelre mede on ðære toweardan. (ÆCHom I: 3 204.174) [We do not contradict that it is a great difficulty; but if it is burdensome in this world, it turns into a great reward in the future (one)].

As stated above with regard to the necessity for worldly punishment, we again see that the bearing of burdens in the Earthly life has implications for the afterlife. Many instances of difficulties are burdens refer to words and teachings, which is something that can only be understood in the religious context of the time.

(27) Abraham þa undernam hefiglice ðas word. (Gen: 21.11) [Abraham then heavily (‘gravely’) received the word].
Chapter 10. Mid hefigum byrþenum

(28) Gregorius se trahtnere cwæð þæt þis godspel hæfð langne tige on his 
trahntunge. ða he wile mid sceortre race befon. þæt hit to hefigtyme ne 
dince. þam heorcnigendum. (ÆCHom II, 5: 42.34)
[Gregory the expositor said that this gospel has a long drawing out in its 
interpretation, which he will contain with a short narrative, (so) that it will 
not seem too tedious to the hearers].

(29) Þis is swiðe hefigtyme. eow to gehyrenne. gif we hit forsuwian dorston. ne 
sæde we hit eow. (ÆCHom II, 21: 185.184)
[This is very burdensome for you to hear; if we had dared to pass over it in 
silence, we would not have said it to you].

Though a long lesson might restrict movement (burdens are impediments to 
movement), the Gospel itself is conceptualized in a sense as burdensome because 
it is salvation after death that is emphasized, and a difficult life, including restric-
tions and difficult lessons can be seen as pertinent to this goal. The following 
proposition-schemas motivate these metaphors:

a. Physical life involves suffering
b. Heaven is free of suffering
c. Troubles in life are a test of faith

A further schema that follows from the Augustinian doctrine of purgatory is:
d. It is better to suffer in this life than in the next

Therefore

e. The opportunity to suffer can be a gift

While sensations of weight and the bearing of burdens sometimes reflects that 
which one is unavoidably subjected to, constituting, as Goddard and Wierzbicka 
(2014: 77) suggest, “burdens which simply have to be borne,” some burdens are 
dæled ‘divided’ and shared, while others may be ‘fled’ from. There is a degree of 
choice implicit in the discussions of literal and figurative burdens, with virtue being 
tied up with the acceptance of this responsibility and the alleviation of the burdens 
of others. The salient figure of Christ bearing the cross, as well as the Augustinian 
doctrine of purgatory from the 5th Century onwards means that to suffer and bear 
a burden in life is not only virtuous, but might also reduce the severity of penance 
required after death. The opportunity to suffer, as well as to chance to offer charity 
to those who are suffering, is discussed by Rawcliffe (2006: 56), who shows that 
these cultural ideas even affect the way in which leprosy is seen in later Medieval 
England. We can add to this two cultural metaphors that arise on account of the 
interaction of schemas (A) and (B) above, together with the burden metaphor:
f. **HEAVENLY LIFE IS LIGHT**  
g. **EARTHLY LIFE IS HEAVY**

We can see these evidenced not only in the multitude of weight-related metaphors referring to earthly suffering, but also in Ælfric’s description of the saints’ bodies after death:

(30) heora lichama bið þonne swiðe leoht and wynsum, ðeah ðe he him hefig  
waere her on life ælor. \(\text{(ÆHom 11: 243)}\)  
[Their bodies were then very light and pleasant, though they were heavy here in life before]

These schemas represent conceptualizations that, as Sharifian (2011: 15) puts it, “encompass worldviews and ideologies that have been constructed and developed over centuries”. They might be expected to arise in a number of forms, therefore, going beyond instances of metaphor represented through language. We have seen that the legal system is one way in which these schemas are exemplified. These cultural schemas reveal why the metaphorical conceptions of weight were of such great import to the Anglo-Saxons, and why to be burdened is not only something that must be borne in many circumstances, but in some cases can be held up as a model of how to live one’s life.

**Conclusion**

The literal concept of heaviness is experiential and embodied, and is therefore precisely the kind of source domain from which universal metaphorization might be expected. We have seen that Lakoff and Johnson (1999: Table 4.1) list **DIFFICULTIES ARE BURDENS** as a primary metaphor, identifying the primary experience as the discomfort of lifting heavy objects. However, through examination of the sub-metaphors of **DIFFICULTIES ARE BURDENS**, we have seen that while physical experience is a factor in the construction of this metaphor, it falls short of explaining in full the conceptualization in Old English, particularly with respect to the cultural significance of the burden metaphor and its interactions with other cultural metaphors such as **RELIGION IS MEDICINE**, and **A SPIRITUAL LIFE IS A JOURNEY**. The burden metaphor is a salient cultural conceptualization in Old English among the literate portion of society represented in the extant texts, and is based on the interaction of a number of cultural metaphors and cultural proposition-schemas. Inevitably, these conceptualizations have left their trace in Present-Day English, though as Goddard and Wierzbicka (2014) point out, only in a relatively small number of collocations. Sharifian’s (2011) distributed model
of cultural conceptualization, which allows for variation between members of a speech community at a given time, would allow for such diachronic development, with certain schemas being re-negotiated or lost over time while other related ones are retained.

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CHAPTER 11

Cultural and cognitive aspects of narrative
A cross-linguistic study

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This article proposes an integrated cognitive-cultural approach to conducting narrative analysis that not only accounts for the ways speakers perceive, construe and structure narrative, but also explores constraints and motivations underlying the narrative process. The approach is exemplified by using data elicited from native speakers of Mandarin Chinese and American English, who produced narratives after watching the same short film and under the same conditions. The results have given evidence to narrative as a complex process motivated and governed by the cognition-culture-language interaction, as reflected in cross-linguistic characteristics of narrative structure and organization on the one hand, and culture-specific differences in lexical choice, event coding, and degree of objectivity and empathy on the other.

Keywords: narrative discourse, cross-linguistic study, cognitive aspects, cultural characteristics, linguistic coding

Introduction

This article aims to explore important constraints and motivations underlying the process in which speakers perceive, construe and structure narrative: a basic human experience. It seeks to answer three specific questions that are central to our understanding and analysis of narrative discourse: (1) what major factors influence the general narrative process as people tell and make sense of stories, (2) how these factors constrain and motivate linguistic coding of stories, and (3) what universal and language-specific patterns emerge from the interaction of these factors in the narrative process.

The article draws on prior research on narrative study from various perspectives but also departs from it in proposing an integrated approach to conducting narrative analysis that describes ways in which language, culture, cognition, and
rhetoric situation come together to shape narrative as it is. It accounts for not only how speakers organize narratives, recount events, select details, and evaluate characters, actions and consequences, but also why speakers of different languages agree and differ in the ways they construct narratives. It focuses on cognitive bases of language processing on the one hand and cultural influence on meaning construal on the other, while explicating linguistic and rhetorical strategies and devices that manifest cognitive and cultural constraints.

The article is organized as follows: The following section presents a brief literature review of narrative theory and analysis from varying fields of research, while the subsequent section proposes an integrated approach to conducting narrative analysis. The fourth section of this chapter describes an empirical study that exemplifies the integrated approach, and discusses the results and validity of the approach, and the last section summarizes the major findings of the study and draws attention to the culture-cognition-language interaction in narrative analysis.

**Prior research on narrative theory and structure**

For more than half a century, narrative theorists from diverse fields of research such as (socio-)linguistics, discourse analysis, sociology, linguistic anthropology, as well as literary studies (Barthes 1977; Chafe 1980; Herman et al. 2012; Labov 1972; Ochs and Capps 2001; van Dijk and Kintsch 1983, *inter alia*) have been focusing on the nature of narration, the relation between narrative text and social reality, the cultural value encoded in narrative, the interpretive process as well as typical features and structural elements of narrative. Narrative, as defined by Labov (1972: 359), is “one method of recapitulating past experience by matching a verbal sequence of clauses to the sequence of events which (it is inferred) actually occurred”. It is a universally pervasive form of language with which people transmit and understand personal and vicarious experiences via explicit and implicit meanings of events, and with which they provide important information about their experience in relation to identity and social life (Holley and Colyar 2009). In other words, narratives are truly signs of life because they closely reflect people’s sense-making strategies for coming to terms with essential elements of human experience. Narrative theory, hence, explores how narratives work both as kinds of texts and as strategies for navigating human experience.

One of the most fundamental structural elements of narrative is its temporal organization (Labov 1972; Hopper and Thompson 1980), which distinguishes narrative texts from other types of discourse such as arguments, expositions, lists, descriptions, and poetic discourse. Narrative theorists in general emphasize the sequential nature of narrative as reflecting the temporal character of the human
experience (Herman et al. 2012; Ricouer 1984), and they also frequently identify and describe other typical features such a protagonist (and perhaps an antagonist), a narrative voice, an evaluative frame of reference and context (Barthes 1977; Bruner 1986; Franzosi 1998).

Obviously, as important as the chronological aspect of narrative is, most narrative includes a great deal more than just sequences of events. Of the aforementioned typical constructs of narrative, the evaluative feature is often highlighted in narrative theory because narrative can inform us of the values of a cultural group more than any other kind of data (Pentland 1999). Even the temporal sequencing of narrative events is not freed from evaluation because narrative is “an effort to make something out of those events, to render, or to signify, the experiences of persons-in-flux in a personally and culturally coherent, plausible manner” (Sandelowski 1991: 162). The evaluative aspect of narrative entails the significant role that the narrator and audience play in their constructing, understanding and interpreting process because narrators position themselves through telling stories to an audience in the context of broader social life at given historical moments and under the influence of prevailing cultural conventions (Bruner 1986; Rosaldo 1989).

While prior research has made significant contributions to narrative theory and facilitated the further deconstruction of boundaries among disciplines and realms of meaning, we have yet to find an approach that investigates, describes and explains, in a unified and systematic way, how narrative process brings to light the fundamental relationship between culture, cognition, and language.

**An integrated approach to narrative analysis**

In addition to drawing insights from prior narrative studies, we consider narrative a complex mosaic formed by the combined forces of cognition, culture and discourse function, and propose an integrated approach to conducting narrative analysis that accounts for, from a cross-linguistic perspective, what people do and how/why they do it in the course of producing and comprehending narrative. This approach emphasizes and delineates the cognitive basis of narrative processing, while attempting to find a way to incorporate views that see narrative either as a predetermined process because of its pervasive nature cross-linguistically or as a spontaneous process that is governed by the unique cultural and linguistic background of the individual.

As any type of linguistic communication, narrating is first of all a strategic process in which a mental representation of the discourse is constructed in memory, using both external and internal kinds of information, with the goal of discourse understanding (Chafe 1980; Tannen 1993; Johnson-Laird 1983). Constrained
by limited working memory capacity (Baddeley 1986; Cowan 2005, *inter alia*), people have to organize the overall narrative into sizable and comprehensible chunks or episodes so that incoming information can be better structured, stored and retrieved in both production and comprehension processes. According to the episode theory and the related episode boundary hypothesis (Black and Bower 1979; Tomlin and Pu 1991; Schank and Abelson 1977; van Dijk and Kintsch 1983), an episode in text consists of a sequence of sentences dominated by a higher-level topical proposition, and it persists until the incoming information no longer coheres with the higher-level (or macro) proposition (i.e., a predicate and its arguments), when a new episode is to be structured. An episode boundary (i.e., the beginning of a new episode) would be triggered by linguistic or nonlinguistic cues such as a change of character, time, location and/or scene as well as a shift in narrative perspective.

The mental representation of narrative as episodes has been found to have psychological relevance in the literatures of psychology and psycholinguistics, Black and Bower (1979), for example, demonstrate the existence of episode as chunks in narrative memory. Their study of story yields three basic results. First, episodes in a story are stored as separate chunks in the memory representation of the story. Second, the addition of related but relatively unimportant actions to a story episode increases the recall probability of the important statements in the episode. Third, the recall probability of a general superordinate action in a story increases with the number of subordinate actions that further specify it. Similarly, Guindon and Kintsch (1982), in their experiment studying the macrostructure of texts, found that macrostructure formation appears to be a virtually automatic process. Readers appear to form macrostructures during reading and derive relevant macro-propositions of a passage as soon as possible.

Moreover, speakers and readers are found to slow their processing at or around episode boundaries, which reflects the heavier encoding load at such junctures where exist several overlapping cognitive processes such as identifying new or reinstating old characters, establishing a new memory location for the characters, shifting perspectives in time, location, and scene changes, and grasping and encoding topical event of the episode (Gernsbacher 1990; Haberlandt et al. 1980; Pu 1995; Tomlin and Pu 1991; van Dijk and Kintsch 1983).

The present study argues, based on the episode theory and the boundary hypothesis, that the overall text organization of narrative discourse into separate yet interrelated episodes is universal across languages due to general human cognitive constraints underlying information processing. The marking of episode boundaries, explicitly and/or implicitly, is an integral part of this organization, as a gap in mind would produce a gap in speech/text (Givón 1995) and more coding materials or marked linguistic forms are required to fill such a gap.
Also contributing to the universal characteristics of narrative organization are general expectations about stories and fulfillment of these expectations about how stories should be told. These cross-linguistic expectations also pertain to our cognitive and the resulting linguistic strategies for having to present linearly the hierarchical mental structure of story information via a story frame (i.e., a beginning, a middle, and an end), organized and characterized by temporal sequences of events, consistent tracking of characters, and systematic encoding of foreground and background information, etc. (Chafe 1980; Gundel 1985; Hopper and Thompson 1980; Tannen 1993).

On the other hand, narrative provides a window not only onto general story structure and its underlying mental processes but also onto the specific meanings and values of a cultural group because people tell stories with implicit or explicit standards against which events and actions of characters can be evaluated and judged. In encoding story information, people’s attention is culturally guided, i.e., they are influenced by cultural assumptions about what meaning is valuable, what information is important, and what relation they would render and signify as salient between events, between characters and events, and between events and social reality. This cultural dimension would naturally and inevitably be manifested in the process of narrative construction and interpretation, in which same events and relations between events may well be interpreted and encoded differently in different cultural frameworks.

Hence, we contend that the proposed integrated approach would explain, to a large extent, what constitutes a narrative, how it is construed and structured, what motivates and influences the construction process, and why the same story is presented in similar and different ways by speakers of different languages. To exemplify the integrated approach, we conducted an experimental study to elicit narratives from the same stimulus material by native speakers of American English and Mandarin Chinese. The integrated approach predicts, specifically, that the organization of episodes, the sequential account of events, and the management of reference would be very similar due to cognitive constraints and strategies in narrative processing, while detailed encoding of events, their relations, significance, and interpretations would be distinct due to speakers’ cultural and social backgrounds.

The empirical study

This section details the design, purpose and procedure of the experimental study, and reports and discusses its results and significance.


**Stimulus material**

The stimulus material of the experiment was a Dutch animated short film entitled “Father and Daughter” written and directed by Jennings, Thijssen and de Wit (2000). The 8-minute film ‘tells’ a story in which a father says goodbye to his very young daughter one day and goes on a journey, and the daughter lives her whole life waiting for the father who never returns. It is a silent film without any form of language except its English title. Such stimulus material would give us sufficient control over variables that might influence the resulting narrative such as content, complexity, perspective, emotional attachment as well as the time and setting of storytelling. In addition, the film is neither Chinese nor American so that whatever cultural elements present in the film would be equally familiar or alien to participants. Further, speakers would have to ‘create’ a story without being dependent on or affected by speech (i.e., monologues and/or dialogues) or scripts (i.e., subtitles or captions). We trusted that narratives produced under such conditions would give us a clearer picture of what makes speakers agree and differ in the narratives they produce.

**Episodes**

The film was analyzed as composing of ten episodes, the boundaries of which are presented by transitional breaks, i.e., fade-out screens (2–7 seconds) in addition to thematic changes of some kind (e.g., time, weather, location, character, age, etc.) immediately following a fade-out. The ten episodes are listed in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Episode (E)</th>
<th>Episode Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E1</td>
<td>Farewell between father and daughter (as a little girl)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E2</td>
<td>The next day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E3</td>
<td>On a rainy day (daughter as a teenager)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E4</td>
<td>On a windy day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E5</td>
<td>With friends (daughter as a young woman)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E6</td>
<td>With a young man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E7</td>
<td>With family (daughter as a mother)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E8</td>
<td>Alone again (daughter as a middle-aged woman)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E9</td>
<td>In her old days (as an elderly woman)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E10</td>
<td>Final reunion of father and daughter</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

As in any other typical story, “Father and Daughter” consists of a beginning that introduces the main characters and the setting (E1), an evolving plot (E2–9) that
develops the storyline, and an end that shows the outcome of the story. The overall linear and hierarchical structure is schematized in Figure 1.

![Diagram of Father and Daughter narrative structure](Figure 1. Story and episode structure)

The middle episodes of the story can be organized chronologically based on the girl’s age, i.e., as a little girl (E2), as a teenager (E3–4), as a young woman (E5–6), as a mother (E7), as an elderly woman (E8–9). It would be interesting to see how speakers organize story information, respond to boundary cues, separate episodes, and relate episodes hierarchically to achieve coherence.

**Participants and procedure**

Thirty native speakers of American English from University of Maine at Farmington, USA and thirty native speakers of Mandarin Chinese from Huabei Electric Power University, China participated in the experiment. They were all undergraduate students of similar age, majoring in various disciplines except language or linguistics. At the beginning of the experiment they were randomly assigned into ‘oral’ and ‘written’ groups of equal numbers, and then given a written instruction to “first watch a film and then recall it orally (or in written form) so that someone who hasn’t watched the film will be able to know well what has happened in the film by listening (or reading) your description”. The oral narratives were tape-recorded individually and later transcribed; the written ones were collected immediately after participants had finished composing the story.

**Results and discussion**

In discussing the results of the experimental study, we maintain that linguistic coding of narrative is strongly influenced by cognitive, social and cultural factors in addition to being intertwined with semantic and pragmatic characteristics, and hence has to be discussed in the context of those variables. The remainder of this section examines and explains the similarities and differences found in the linguistic coding between the two languages as a result of the interaction of cognition, culture and language.
Cognitive basis and linguistic coding

In general, the participants of all groups organized the story information into episodes and consistently marked episode boundaries. Table 1 summarizes the episode results of the four groups, where CO stands for Chinese oral group, CW Chinese written, EO English oral and EW English written.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2. Episode results</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EO</td>
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<tr>
<td>EW</td>
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</table>

While there is no statistically significant difference within either language, American participants produced more episodes than their Chinese counterparts. The majority of narratives (70% in Chinese and 93% in English) consist of at least six episodes, and the overall organization of the story information was consistent across the modalities and languages. The episodic structure of the narrative is clearly shown in how the boundary information was encoded. Speakers systematically marked episode boundaries both overtly and covertly: the common overt markers include mostly adverbial and prepositional phrases such as ‘the next day,’ ‘in the next scene,’ ‘then,’ ‘at another time,’ and ‘on the last day of her life’ in both modalities as well as paragraph structure in the written narrative; the covert markers that occurred in the oral narrative included mostly pauses, false starts and hesitations with filler words such as ‘well,’ ‘um,’ ‘uh,’ ‘er’ at the beginning of an episode. Our narrative data lend further support to the episode theory and the boundary hypothesis: participants indeed placed locally coherent information in an episode and shifted to build a new episode when a thematic change occurred in the flow of information.

Although not all participants constructed the story in ten episodes, they performed quite uniformly across languages in that the episodes they produced were not just coherent locally but also related both to the global structure of the narrative and to other thematic episodes. All narratives feature a beginning (characters and setting), a middle (evolving plot) and an end (resolution), as schematized in Figure 1, in which actions and events were sequenced strictly following their chronological order and organized as varying numbers of individual or combined episodes, as listed in Table 1. The first and last episodes were invariably structured as two individual segments, while the middle eight episodes were most often compressed and combined in their chronological order as four parts: E2–4 (as a
young girl), E5–6 (as a young woman), E7 (as a mother), and E8–9 (as an elderly woman). In other words, important, backbone episodes and events were always described as stand-alone ones, while less vital episodes were more prone to be conjoined, confounded or even omitted.

Furthermore, not only were E1 and E10 presented as stand-alone episodes, they were also verbalized with much more detail by participants of both languages in terms of propositions. On average, about 60% of all propositions in a narrative describe these two episodes. The results are striking, though not surprising, because E1 and E10, the longest episodes in the film (1'30 and 1'57” respectively) are indispensable to the storyline as E1 introduces the main characters and anchors the (sole) setting of the entire story (i.e., the riverside), and E10 ends the story with a twist and a resolution (i.e., the daughter and father reunite im/possibly in an after-life). On the other hand, although the middle eight episodes run for 4'01”, longer than E1 plus E10, they mainly show the passage of time with a recurring ‘waiting’ scene, the description of which is thus more condensed in most narratives.

Another common feature between the two languages was found in the reference tracking process throughout the narrative: speakers consistently focused on the protagonist of the story, encoding ‘daughter’ as the topic and/or grammatical subject of almost every sentence between E2 and E10. They systematically encoded the focal and peripheral characters in different referential forms, pronominalizing ‘daughter’ with a pronoun or zero anaphor while nominalizing the other characters with a full noun phrase such as ‘the/her friend(s), ‘the/her husband, ‘the/her children, etc. For the secondary character, ‘father’, pronominal forms were used more often for its reference in E1, where ‘he’ is the main character, but dropped drastically from E2 onward, as the ‘daughter’ becomes the sole main character.

The alternative use of referential forms is a further manifestation of cognitive strategies operative in language processing, as abundant research shows that more attenuated linguistic forms (the pronoun and zero anaphor) are used to code referents that are in high focus, and less attenuated forms (various types of NPs) are used to code referents that are cognitively less accessible (Aries 1991; Chafe 1994; Pu 2011; Tomlin and Pu 1991). In watching the film, participants naturally focused their attention on the main character of an episode, and closely followed his/her movements and actions. The longer the character stays in focus, the more persistent the attenuated coding form. This was evidenced in the occurrence of topic chain in both languages, a device that consists of a sequence of clauses in which a referent is explicitly mentioned in the first clause by either a full NP or a lexical pronoun, and then left unspecified (by zero anaphors) in the rest of the clause sequence. For example,
(1) *fuqin zhongyu fangxia nuer, Ø pao xia po, Ø shangle xiao chuan, Ø manmande huazoule.*
Father finally puts down daughter, runs down hill, gets in small boat.
slowly row.away
‘Father finally puts the daughter down, runs down the hill, gets in the boat
and slowly rows off.’

(2) *lao furen zoujinle nazhi xiao chuan, Ø quansuo zai chuande yijiao Ø chenchendi shuiqule.*
old woman step.in that small boat curl.up at boat’s corner deeply sleep
‘The old woman steps in the boat, curled up at the corner, and falls into a
deep sleep.’

(3) The father turns around and Ø looks up at his daughter and Ø runs up the
hill and Ø grabs her, and Ø picks her up in the air and Ø twirls her around
and Ø hugs her.

(4) She finds this boat, Ø lays [lies] down on it, and Ø falls asleep or Ø dies.

Topic chain is a coding device traditionally considered in linguistics to be prevalent in *discourse-oriented* languages such as Chinese, in which discourse properties figure prominently in grammatical encoding, but unusual in *subject-oriented* languages such as English, in which clause-level properties are deemed important in grammatical encoding. Nonetheless, our data show the same tendency in English to code a topical referent and his/her action sequence in a topic chain when the referent stays in focus for a span of the discourse. It makes perfect processing sense that such a persistently recurring topical referent receives minimal coding after its first mention because it is being focused on and thus requires nothing explicit linguistically for its further identification.

An additional pattern of similarity of interest between the two languages is the use of verb tense. The English narrative is characterized by a preponderance of present tense verbs, contrary to the findings of most prior research on narrative discourse, where past tense verbs occur frequently (Biber 1988; Hopper and Thompson 1980). Our data show that twenty-six of the thirty English speakers (87%) used present tense verbs in their narratives, as exemplified in the Excerpts (3)–(4) and those that follow. The use of present tense verbs as a variant of the sequential past is discussed in Givón (1993: 166), who argues that this usage renders the events somehow more vivid or immediate, “as if the narrator invites the hearer to be present on the scene, observe the action from closer quarters, be more emotionally involved”. Indeed, the manipulation of tense alters the pragmatic perspective of the discourse, viz., present tense verbs bring the story to life.
by creating a more animated and ongoing imagery of events so that the audience can 'see' what's happening as they hear or read the story.

Although Chinese does not have overt marking for verb tense, the majority of participants (twenty-five) did begin their narratives similarly as their English counterparts, i.e., attempting the immediacy of the film without any specific mention of time. They typically started the story description by bringing the audience to the very day that the story begins (e.g., 'on a sunny day' or 'it’s a sunny day') followed by the depiction of events in temporal sequences (often with evaluative comments), as if they were telling the story simultaneously as it was progressing. The other five speakers started their narration with phrases such as 'a long time ago' or 'when the daughter was very young,' suggesting that they were recounting the past events.

Cultural dimension and linguistic coding

While important similarities found in the narrative were grounded in cognitive activities, differences found between the two languages were mostly due to cultural factors, which included, on the part of the narrator, the degrees of objectivity, the empathy and involvement with the protagonist, the evaluative process, as well as choices of event descriptions and specific details of an event or episode, as predicted by the proposed approach.

The first difference lay in the narrator’s empathy with the protagonist. Though all assuming a third-person voice in the storytelling, American speakers acted as mere observers and reporters but Chinese speakers took a more personal approach to the story and were more deeply invested in the protagonist. The viewpoint difference was most strikingly shown in the description of the boat wreck scene in which the old woman found the wreck of a boat in the dried riverbed (E10). All Chinese participants regarded the boat as the father's and made assertions such as 'she sees the wreck of her father's boat' and 'she finds her father's boat buried in the sand.' American participants, on the other hand, were more objective and tentative in their verbalization: only eight claimed that the boat was the father’s, whereas thirteen made it as 'presumably her father’s' or 'similar to/supposedly the one her father took away,' and the other nine simply described it as '(the wreck of) a boat' without making any connection to the one that the father rowed away in.

The difference in perspective was further evidenced in the general description of events between the Chinese and American participants, as illustrated in the Excerpts (5)–(8).
Since then, she comes to the riverside everyday to wait for her father, regardless of rain or shine because she firmly believes that her father will soon come back.

She nestles herself in her father’s boat, remembering the happy times she and her father had together years ago.

Then they show a scene where it is a windy day when the same child is a couple years older than originally. She comes back against the wind to see if her father has returned, but doesn’t see him. And then, another scene shows a rainy day and she bikes in the rain to the same spot to see if her father has returned but never sees him.

She finds a wooden rowboat, which seems to be similar to the one that her father had taken away years ago, surrounded in dirt. She walks over to the boat, climbs in, lays down in the sand in the boat, and curls into a ball. She’s there for a little bit.

Obviously, the English speakers adhered to the actions and events shown in the film and focused their description on what happened to the protagonist. They told the story as an objective narrator, using words such as ‘the movie shows …,’ ‘they show …,’ ‘the next scene …’ and ‘we see her now as a very old woman,’ etc., which seem to impose a considerable distance between the narrator and the story/characters. The Chinese speakers, on the other hand, apparently empathized more with the protagonist and were interested in what she felt and thought in addition to what she did. Their description often contained actions and events that could only be inferred by the narrator, e.g., ‘she firmly believes that her dad would come back soon,’ ‘she tells her husband the story of her father,’ or ‘she feels so sad that she cries for a long time in the boat,’ which not only offered explanations about the character’s actions and purposes but also added a personal touch to the story. Similar differences in narrator’s objectivity have been observed between Greek and English narratives as well (Tannen 1990).

Related to objectivity of the narrator was the difference in the description and details of episodes between the Chinese and English narratives. Besides
coding more episodes of the story, American speakers generally produced more propositions per narrative (69 on average) than their Chinese counterparts (52 on average), and followed closely the chronological order of the story. Their narratives typically feature detailed depictions of events in an episode and temporally sequenced actions that move the story forward. Chinese narratives, though showing higher degree of personal involvement, were scanty and terse with regard to description of actions and events. In the farewell scene (E1), for example, the father hugs the daughter, lifts her in the air and walks down to the river; he stops halfway down the slope and returns to give the daughter another hug, and then proceeds to the boat and rows away in it. More than half of the American speakers described the event sequence in detail including the second hug while most Chinese speakers recounted the scene in one or two sentences. The contrast is shown in Excerpts (9)–(10), which are common descriptions of this particular event in each language.

(9) The father hugs the child and ventures down the hill to a waiting rowboat. He stops suddenly, turns back to his child and walks back up the hill and hugs her for what seems longer this time, then goes down the hill, gets in the boat, and begins to row out onto open water.

(10) baba gei xiao nuhai yige linbiede yongbao, tanhou dengshang hubiande yitiao a xiao chuan ligule. ‘Dad gives the little girl a good-bye hug, and then boards a small boat at the edge of the lake and leaves.’

Another example was found in the description of a scene in the final episode, where the old woman leaves her bicycle on the riverbank before walking down to the river. The scene shows her trying to balance the bicycle on its kickstand three times as it keeps falling on the ground. Again, about half of the American speakers described her repeated attempts to get the bike to stand, whereas most of the Chinese speakers omitted this scene altogether in the last episode. Similar cases were found in the description of the middle episodes between the two languages, as illustrated by Excerpts (5)–(8). In general, American speakers coded middle episodes as individual ones more often and described temporal events more literally and rigidly than their Chinese counterparts, who tended to combine middle episodes in fewer and shorter segments with compendious and sweeping depictions of event sequences.

In terms of the interpretive and evaluative aspect of the storytelling, the narratives between the two languages differed greatly. While American speakers
reported objectively and precisely what happened in the story, Chinese speakers focused on assigning meaning to and making sense of the story. They frequently ascribed motives and purposes to characters and their actions, explained causes and effects of events, conjured up images and even sounds, and accorded meaning and significance to the story. In describing the scene when the old woman finds a boat half-buried in the riverbed, as shown in Excerpts (11)–(12), nineteen Chinese participants explored the legitimate cause for an otherwise inexplicable fact that the father never returned, thus making the story more credible, purposeful and emotionally more desirable.

(11)  

zai hechuang zhongjian ta  kanjianle fuqin dangnian huazoude xiao chuan,  
in riverbed middle she see father years.ago row-away small boat  
ta liji mingbai fuqin zaoyi zangsheng zai ci he zhong, yinci ta  
she at.once realize father early die at this river in so he  
zongshimeiyou guilai.  
ever come.back  
‘In the middle of the riverbed she sees the small boat her father rowed away in years ago. She realizes right away that her father died in the river a long time ago, so he has never come back.’

(12)  

ta faxianle fuqin nazhi chuande canhai. Yuanlai fuqin yizhi mei  
she find father that boat wreck that’s why father all.time not  
huilai, shi yinwei fuqin zai chuhaide dangtian yunanle.  
come.back is because father on out.to.the.sea that.day die  
‘She finds the wreck of her father’s boat. Her father has never come back because he died on the day he went out to the sea.’

On the contrary, the overwhelming majority of American speakers simply recounted the event sequentially, as shown in (4) and (8); only two made the explicit connection between the wreck of the boat and the father’s demise.

In sharp contrast is also how Chinese and American speakers considered and evaluated the father-daughter relationship throughout the storytelling. The Chinese participants viewed the relationship as vital and significant to the story (and hence the story is worth telling) and characterized it as ‘familial love,’ ‘familial bond,’ or ‘special affection.’ They frequently commented on how this kind of love or bonding never diminishes regardless of how large a gap grows in time, space and even reality between the loved ones; their American counterparts very rarely did so other than a curt mention, if any, that the story is ‘about father and daughter.’ The difference is illustrated in Excerpts (13)–(16).

(13)  

zhe shi yige guanyu fu nu qinqingde ganren gushi.  
this is a about father daughter familial.love touching story  
‘This is a touching story of the familial father-daughter bond.’
Chapter 11. Cultural and cognitive aspects of narrative

(14) *liushide shijian, dan bubiande shi fu nu qinqing.*
    elapse is time but unchange is father daughter familial love
    ‘Time elapses, but the father-daughter bond remains strong.’

(15) It’s a story about father and daughter.

(16) They are finally back together again. And that’s the story of father and daughter.

The theme of the special love and bonding between father and daughter permeates the Chinese narrative, where the daughter’s lifelong waiting and yearning is depicted as a glowing testimonial to the special bond. Throughout the storytelling, Chinese speakers not only simply recounted the events of the daughter’s ‘going to the riverside, watching and waiting,’ but described her inner world and emotional state as she experiences these events. Clearly, the Chinese participants were the narrator and the protagonist in one, while the American speakers remained an objective, distant observer. The stark contrast is shown in Excerpts (17)–(20).

(17) *fuqinde shenying zhujian xiaoshi, tongshi ye mingke zai nuerde xin shang.*
    father’s silhouette slowly disappear at sunset in meanwhile also etch at daughter’s heart in
    ‘The father’s silhouette gradually disappears in the sunset, but it is etched in the daughter’s memory.’

(18) *ta dui fuqin shuo: “ni gei wo yisheng, wo nian ni yishi.”*
    she to father say you give me life I miss you forever
    ‘She tells her father: “You give me life; I will miss you forever.”’

(19) She comes back the following day to the tree area on her bike at night, gets off, leans the bike on the tree and looks out to the river. Then she gets back on her bike and rides back.

(20) The little girl gets old and would return to the spot later with her husband and children. We see her stand on the top of the bank and look out into the water while her husband takes the children to play by the edge of the water.

The difference between the two languages in terms of evaluative interpretations of the story and events is further evidenced in participants’ lexical choice. In describing the recurring scene of the daughter standing on the riverbank looking into the distance, the English participants almost always used basic, neutral lexical items such as ‘stand,’ ‘watch/look/see,’ and ‘wait for,’ but their Chinese counterparts mostly opted for words of greater variety that are more intense and expansive in
meaning than the basic forms. Also, words expressing a subjective perspective such as ‘think of/remember’ or ‘hope’ occurred only occasionally in the English narrative (by four speakers), but such words, in a number of emotion-charged synonyms, were abundant in the Chinese narrative. Table 3 summarizes the verb choices between speakers of the two languages in depicting the recurring event of ‘standing and waiting by the riverbank’.

Table 3. Lexical choice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>stand</td>
<td>zhuli, jingli, moli (‘stand long, erect and silent’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>look/see/watch</td>
<td>ninwang, yaowang, zhushi, shouwang (‘gaze in reverie, ’gaze in waiting’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wait for</td>
<td>denghou, qidai, qipan (‘wait anxiously/longingly’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>think of/remember</td>
<td>sinian, niannianbuwang, diannian, huainian (‘long/yearn for, ‘crave, ‘hanker’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hope</td>
<td>xiwang, qiwang, kewang, panwang (‘hope with a passion, ‘desire’)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Again, the Chinese speakers empathized greatly with the protagonist, describing her emotion and state of mind and offering explanations and judgments about her actions. In addition to the simple sequence of the protagonist’s ‘standing on the riverbank waiting,’ they portrayed her ‘unwavering belief in her father’s return,’ ‘yearning for her father’s return,’ ‘remembering the happy time they had together,’ and ‘keeping the father very close to her heart’. In contrast, the American speakers seemed to be content with recounting events without much probing into why they happened. Consequently, the English narrative was prominently characterized by foregrounded sequences of events that advance the storyline with little diversion, while the Chinese narrative consisted of as much, if not more, background or supporting information as foregrounded events, thus making the storytelling as well as the story itself more purposeful and consequential.

The high degree of empathy and personal involvement in the Chinese narrative reflects the general norm of being empathetic with and considerate of others in Chinese culture. In a densely populated society with small interpersonal space, people who are able to feel for and relate to others get along well with others. Further, the complex and intricate interpersonal relationship in Chinese society makes it crucial for its members to be more observant of others and sensitive to others’ interest, emotion and desire as well as motives and consequences of their actions and reactions (Brewer and Chen 2007; Hummel 1960; Oyserman et al. 2002). In American society, on the other hand, independence is more strongly encouraged than interdependency among people, and Americans guard their privacy and personal space to a much greater degree than Chinese, and hence
‘minding-one’s-own-business’ may be viewed as social norm whereas asking ‘what’s on your mind’ may be considered intrusive (Clarke 1999; Hummel 1960).

Moreover, the importance of family and kinship in Chinese society contributes to the copious evaluative and interpretive elements of this particular story. In China, close family ties and protective roles of parents are highly valued, and the father-daughter relationship is viewed as somewhat unique. A father is usually more affectionate and less critical toward his daughter(s) than his son(s), especially in modern urban society, and hence seen as bonding more with the daughter(s) (Liu 1999, Qu 2014). The cultural interpretation of the close relationship between father and daughter may have made the Chinese speakers more inclined to offer explanations and comments of the events, to seek cause and effect of the actions, and to find deeper meaning and significance of the story.

The differences between the two languages are further exhibited in the coding of foreground and background information, or rather, what is viewed as foreground or background information, as best exemplified in the description of the scene where the river dries out and becomes sort of grassland (E10). While twenty-five Chinese speakers (75%) describe the scene in two or more independent clauses, twenty-one American speakers (70%) encoded it in various dependent structures such as using a relative clause, object clause, adverbial clause, and object of preposition. Excerpts (21)–(24) illustrate the contrast.

(21) 

wuhuanxingyi, shiguangliushi. napian dahai yi jianjiandi ganhe, things.change time.fly that sea already slowly dry

huaweile yipian pingdi.

‘Time flies! The sea gradually dries out and turns into a field.’

(22) 

shijian feishi. zheshi heshui yijing ganhe, chengweile yipian caoyuan. time fly now river already dry turn.into a grassland

‘Time flies! Now the river has dried out and turned into grassland.’

(23) She comes back one last time to the river, where there is no water now and just a field of tall grass.

(24) She gets off her bike, walks down the hill, and steps into the river, which is now a field.

Prior research on grounding and grammatical coding has found that in narrative discourse independent clauses, especially ones with perfective aspect predicates, tend to record foreground events that are temporally sequenced, and the vast majority of subordinate clauses encode background information that are not in sequence but concurrent to the foreground events (Chafe 1980; Givón 1987; Hopper and Thompson 1980). It seems that the American participants viewed the
scene of dried river as background information that is not part of the backbone of the story, and encoded it as a static event in subordinate structure accordingly (e.g., ‘it/there is now a field’). In sharp contrast, the Chinese speakers appeared to regard the scene as an evolving event (e.g., it turns/turned into a field) that significantly moves the story time forward because the scene makes possible the continued sequencing of the protagonist’s actions (i.e., why she can walk into the river in the next scene) on the one hand, and shows the unforgiving effect of time on people and nature alike on the other. The significance of the scene as viewed by the Chinese speakers motivated them to devote independent, separate clauses for its description, often accompanied by a prepended phrase or clause emphasizing the elapse of time, as shown in Excerpts (21)–(22).

The difference in the coding of fore-and-background information between the Chinese and English speakers is further shown in the use of conceptual metaphors of time (c.f., Kövecses 2002, inter alia). Whereas time figured prominently and often repeatedly commented in most Chinese narratives, it was largely treated as background information by the English speakers. In the English narrative, on the one hand, time was deemed only as ‘a moving object’ and the metaphor was invariably “time has passed,” “time is passing,” or “you can tell time is passing because the seasons change.” In the Chinese narrative, on the other hand, time is much more than a moving object: different concepts were employed to understand time metaphorically: time as flowing water in “time flows past,” time as medicine in “time doesn’t heal the pain of parting,” time as a person in “time is unforgiving,” and time as a transient flying object in “time flies by.” Time was also expressed metonymically by the Chinese speakers, e.g., time as change in “seas have become marshlands,” or time as movement (in space) in “big dipper rotates and stars move.” The varied and colorful time metaphors seem to reveal that the Chinese speakers were more emotional about time and its effect on people, events and the world than their English counterparts who appeared to regard time as monotonous and mundane.

Our narrative study has several theoretical implications. First, narrative organization (such as structure-building, chronological sequencing and reference tracking) is independent of any specific language, which manifests cognitive activities underlying discourse processing. Second, narrative is culturally grounded: narrators are guided by their cultural assumptions about what matters or what meanings are valuable. Hence, the analysis of the narratives of a culture is, to a large extent, the exploration of the culture itself. Third, linguistic devices (such as overt and covert markers between episodes, lexical choice, alternative use between nominals and pronominals, and topic chain) are motivated and constrained by the cognitive and cultural dimensions of narrative. To this end, language as well as grammar may be best understood as shaped by its interaction with cognitive activities, cultural values and communicative intent.
Conclusion

This article has proposed an integrated cognitive-cultural approach to narrative analysis and has argued that narrative production is governed by an interaction of cognitive constraints, cultural considerations, and linguistic mechanisms. We contend that the universal characteristics of cognitive activities underlying language processing and the cultural assumptions and values surrounding storytelling would naturally and inevitably be reflected in cross-linguistic similarities and distinctions in the narrative process.

To exemplify and test the validity of the approach, we conducted an empirical study to elicit narratives from native Chinese and English speakers of homogeneous backgrounds with the same stimulus material. Our production data have lent support to the proposed approach to narrative study, as evidenced in the encoding and verbalizations of the story between speakers of the two languages. On the one hand, important similarities are found in the experimental results which include episodic organization and reference tracking as well as story-frame and iconic order of temporal events, which manifest cognitive constraints of memory and attention operative in language processing and general cognitive strategies in composing and telling a story. On the other hand, significant differences exist between the two languages, which provide much insight into the sentiment, value and wisdom of different cultural groups. While the American speakers focused on the film itself, coding more individual episodes and events and giving more details of each, they kept their perspective strictly objective and refrained from the speech acts of inferring, judging, commenting and evaluating. In contrast, the Chinese speakers focused more on interpreting the film: they empathized greatly with the protagonist by constantly inferring her emotions and feelings, and often explored the inner worlds of the characters, ascribing motive, rationale and purpose to their actions. As a result, the English narrative presented an objective and more precise recount of the chronological events of the story, whereas the Chinese narrative was more subjective and evaluative that shows a higher degree of personal and emotional involvement.

The present study has demonstrated that only by exploring the interaction of cognition, culture and language can we systematically describe and explain how and why narratives produced by speakers of different languages exhibit remarkable similarities as well as distinct characteristics. Although we speculate that the integrated approach, with minor modifications, is applicable to the analysis of other types of discourse, further research and empirical studies need to be conducted before any serious claims can be made.
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CHAPTER 12

How can I persuade you without making self-assertions?
A cognitive rhetorical analysis of the use of fictive questions in an early Daoist text

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This chapter explores the cognitive underpinnings of rhetoric by presenting a case study of the rhetorical use of non-information-seeking questions in the Zhuangzi (4th c. B.C.), a foundational Daoist text. These questions are: expository questions (“Why do I say this? Because…”) and rhetorical questions (“Why bother?”) (Xiang and Pascual 2016). We analyze fictive questions as constructions of intersubjectivity (Verhagen 2005, 2008), involving a viewpoint blend (Dancygier and Sweetser 2012) of the perspectives of the writer, the assumed readers and possibly also the discourse characters. We argue that the ubiquitous rhetorical use of fictive questions in ancient written texts is closely related to our basic human capacities such as mental simulation and perspective taking and emerges from our intrinsically conversational mind.

Keywords: fictive questions, intersubjectivity, mental simulation, perspective taking, self-persuasion, viewpoint blending, the Zhuangzi

I know something about you. You will answer a question … any question … every question. You will answer it even if not aloud. You will answer it at least in your own head, even if you don’t know the answer. (Hogan and Speakman 2006: 166)

Introduction

Throughout the history of the Western rhetorical tradition, different definitions of rhetoric have been proposed to characterize its nature, delimit its scope of research and pinpoint its functions (for a most recent comprehensive overview of definitions by ancient and modern rhetorical scholars, see Enos 2013). In the
most general sense, rhetoric can be defined as “the energy inherent in emotion and thought, transmitted through a system of signs, including language, to others to influence their decisions or actions” (Kennedy 1991: 7). In other words, when we express our emotions and thoughts using language or other semiotic resources with a view to influence others, we are engaged in rhetoric. Apparently, Kennedy’s conceptualization of rhetoric is rather broad. Understood as such, rhetoric is “simply part of who we are as human beings” (Herrick 2015: 6). Consequently, rhetoric constitutes a universal phenomenon across languages and cultures and is claimed to be “conditioned by the basic workings of the human mind and heart and by the nature of all human society” (Kennedy 1984: 10).

The intimate relationship between rhetoric and cognitive operations has been recognized by rhetoricians since antiquity. For instance, Aristotle pointed out that awakening attention is common to all figures of speech: 

But men are attentive to objects of importance, of a peculiar description, or deserving admiration, or pleasing. Hence we ought to throw in a hint that the speech is concerning subjects of this nature. [...] the business of exciting attention is common to all the divisions of a speech, wherever it may be necessary [...]. (1853: 253–254)

This view has been adopted by later rhetorical scholars such as Cicero (1954), Quintilian (1922), Winans (1920), Burke (1966), Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969), Lanham (1993), and more recently Oakley (2009, 2011). Among these scholars, Winans suggested that “persuasion is the process of inducing others to give fair, favorable, or undivided attention to propositions” (1920: 194); while Oakley (2009, 2011) developed a unified attentional account of meaning construction in rhetorical practices. Despite this, it is our contention that rhetoric is never just about “how human attention is created and allocated” (Lanham 1993: 277) and that other basic human capacities are also involved. In this chapter, we explore the cognitive underpinnings of rhetoric by presenting a case study of rhetorical practices in the pre-Qin period (before 221 B.C.), the embryonic stage of the Chinese rhetorical tradition (Zhou 1991: 9).

The pre-Qin period, subdivided into the Spring and Autumn period (771–476 B.C.) and the Warring States period (477–221 B.C.), is the “Axial Age” in the intellectual history of China (Ge 2014: 121). This period witnessed the emergence of philosophical debates among the so-called “Hundred Schools of Thought”, which produced an abundance of philosophical writings. Since the fundamental concern of these writings is to convince one’s intellectual opponent rather than define the proper way to represent Truth, the Platonic distinction between philosophy and rhetoric is entirely absent in the landscape of early Chinese thought (Lu 1998: 300–301; Puett 2013: 72). Despite this, ancient Chinese philosophers already made extensive use of
rhetorical strategies in their writings, and they also “discussed [these strategies] at a meta-level with a highly developed technical vocabulary” (van Els and Sabattini 2012: 9). Consequently, most, if not all, pre-Qin philosophical texts can be considered as canonical rhetorical texts. These meta-discussions on rhetoric simultaneously constitute part and parcel of the philosophy of various schools of thought, which in turn may have a constraining effect on the use of rhetorical strategies in these texts. This is especially true when it comes to Daoist classics, such as the *Daodejing* (6th c. B.C.) and the *Zhuangzi* (4th c. B.C.), of which the latter, characterized with “awesome imaginative powers and linguistic dexterity” (Mair 2000: 30), is applauded as “an unprecedented work, surpassing all the others in the late Zhou Dynasty [i.e., the Warring States period]” (X. Lu 2005: 375). Different from the *Daodejing*, in which Laozi, the founder of the Daoist philosophical tradition, puts forward some general guidelines for rhetorical practice in Daoism (e.g. “Truthful words are not beautiful; beautiful words are not truthful. Good words are not persuasive; persuasive words are not good.”), the *Zhuangzi* text contains not only Daoist rhetorical principles but also abundant use of rhetorical strategies conforming to these principles. This makes the *Zhuangzi* text an ideal object of investigation for rhetorical studies (e.g. Oliver 1961, 1971; Jensen 1987, 1992; Lu 1998; Combs 2004, 2005; Lee 2015).

Unlike philosophers from other schools of thought, the Daoists, represented by Laozi (6th c. B.C.) and Zhuangzi (c.369–c.286 B.C.), generally deprecate language and persuasion (e.g. Oliver 1961, 1971; Jensen 1987, 1992; Lu 1998; Wang 2003; Combs 2004, 2005). Zhuangzi, for instance, is fundamentally skeptical about language, arguing that it cannot fully represent reality and potentially creates distinctions, which ultimately baffle people’s mind and preclude the attainment of Dao (Combs 2005: 46). More generally, the Daoist masters claim that Dao or the Way that can be discoursed upon is not the Way they aim at. This, however, should not be taken to mean that the Daoists reject the use of speech and argumentation entirely. What they are opposed to is such uses of language that are antagonistic to their view of Daoism, which “advocated a return to nature and *wu wei* (nonaction), valued humility and quietude, and rejected the folly of pride and self-assertion” (Xu 2012: 115–116, italics in the original).


1. This quote is translated by Din Cheuk Lau (1963: 88).

2. Regardless of its inadequacy, language is still necessary for the Daoists to understand what they have experienced. The resolution to the dilemma Daoists seem to be caught in, according to Zhuangzi, is to forget words once we grasp the meaning. That is to say, language is “to be tolerated only as a suggestive aid to the attainment of truth, and to be discarded the moment truth is obtained” (Shih 1959: xvi).
up with appropriate rhetorical strategies to “communicate a philosophy that is based on the ineffable, and teach without striving to uphold a particular point of view” (Combs 2005: 48). To this end, Zhuangzi resorts to “discourse that consists of stories, not arguments; perspectives, not evidence; and relativity, not arbitrary categories” (Heisey 1998: 8–9). This is motivated by his objection to assertions which can be subject to ‘judgments of true and false’ and which harden into a ‘saying something’, that is, doctrine. Zhuangzi “does not affirm through words, or doctrines, he affirms through practice, or the arts of ordinary experience, which is categorically different from linguistic assertion” (Eno 1996: 133). In this sense, Zhuangzi’s rhetoric is a rhetoric of experience (Lee 2015: 136).

The defining characteristic of Zhuangzi’s rhetorical strategy, according to Combs, is “evocativeness – the use of rhetoric designed to induce others to join in a communication interaction and engage in self-persuasion” (2005: 38). However, with little additional explanation of or elaboration on the ontological nature of this “communication interaction”, it remains unclear how self-persuasion is achieved in the Zhuangzi text. Drawing on a combination of the theory of conceptual integration or ‘blending’ (Fauconnier and Turner 1994, 1996, 1998, 2002) and Pascual’s (2002, 2006a, 2014) idea of fictive interaction, we aim to shed light on how the philosopher engages the readers in self-persuasion by mobilizing their basic human capacities through examining the rhetorical use of conversational structures, more specifically non-information-seeking questions, in the Zhuangzi text.

Basics of fictive questions

The non-information-seeking questions dealt with in this chapter are: expository questions (“Why do I say this? Because…”) and rhetorical questions (“Why bother?”) (Xiang and Pascual 2016). Despite their interrogative forms, these two kinds of questions do not call for an overt answer from the addressee, their corresponding answers being either directly provided or presupposed in the immediate discourse. Considering this characteristic feature, we can describe non-information-seeking questions as ‘virtual’ or ‘fictive’ questions in the sense of Talmy (1996], 2000), Langacker (1999), and Pascual (2002, 2006b, 2014). In this chapter, we treat expository questions and rhetorical questions as subtypes of fictive questions.

Following the common assumption that questions are mental response-elicit- ing, we argue that fictive questions are modeled or structured by the intersubjective experience of situated face-to-face conversation and hence constitute an instance of fictive interaction (Pascual 2002, 2006a, 2014). As it is, the basic conversational structure underlying fictive questions is characterized by the alternation of the
addresser and addressee roles, and involves cognitive engagement in which the addressee is presented as sharing the addresser’s common ground (cf. Oakley and Tobin 2014). Indeed, the processing of fictive questions involves the cognitive coordination of the epistemic stances of the addresser and the addressee. The addressee will have to negotiate with the addresser’s commitment to a particular viewpoint expressed in a presupposed or follow-up answer, and ideally get convinced by reaching alignment. It is in this sense that we understand fictive questions as being intersubjective in nature and thus invariably involving mixed viewpoints.

**Data and methodology**

This chapter presents a case study of the rhetorical use of fictive questions in the *Zhuangzi* text, the second foundational text of the Chinese Daoist philosophical and religious tradition (Roth 2008). The philosopher Zhuangzi, the putative author of the text bearing the same name, is considered probably the greatest one of early Daoist thinkers (Fung [1948] 1997: 104). The *Zhuangzi* text comprises a total of 33 chapters, which are subdivided into three parts: the ‘Inner Chapters’ (1–7), the ‘Outer Chapters’ (8–22) and the ‘Miscellaneous Chapters’ (23–33). In each chapter there are several interrelated argumentative episodes, including a variety of literary styles, such as didactic narratives, poetry, and very short prose essays (Roth 2008). Zhuangzi’s writings, as the historian Sima Qian (145–90? B.C.) summarizes in his biography of the philosopher, “for the most part were allegories” (Mair 2000: 31). The allegories are presented largely in the form of dialogues, amounting to seventy percent of the approximate total count of 80,000 Chinese characters of the entire text (Huang 2013: 58–59). The discourse participants of the allegorical dialogues in the *Zhuangzi* text are: real historical or contemporary figures, entirely fictional characters, deities or personified entities such as animals or plants as well as abstract concepts (Xiang 2016). Even when involving real historical figures (e.g. ancient Chinese philosophers like Confucius and Zhuangzi himself), these dialogues never happen (X. Lu 2005: 375) and are hence fictional, very much like Plato’s *Dialogues* (e.g. Kahn 1998; Blondell 2002). Critically, these dialogues are not set up for their own sake, for entertainment, or embellishment purposes. Rather, they serve as a rhetorical strategy to present something that is very real, namely, the philosopher’s actual thought (Zhang [1948] 2007; Ye [1979] 2004; B. Wang 2013). In this sense, these dialogues are also fictive.

The version of the original *Zhuangzi* text used here comes from *Zhuangzi Yinde* (‘A Concordance to Chuang Tzu’) (Harvard-Yenching Institute 1956), reproducing the recension of the text in the most comprehensively annotated *Collected Commentaries on Zhuangzi* (Guo [1894] 2013). In the classical Chinese
original, there are no punctuation marks and consequently text parsing is
carried out “on the basis of context, relying on an array of grammatical and modal
particles” as well as the “often parallel structure of sentences, its organic symmetry
and rhythm” (Galambos 2014: 341).\(^3\) Despite this, the absence of punctuation
marks does pose challenges for modern readers. This is especially the case when it
comes to the identification and interpretation of rhetorical questions. In the most
comprehensively punctuated and commented recensions of ancient Chinese texts,
rhetorical questions sometimes end with full stops or exclamatory marks, which
were added by modern commentators to the unpunctuated original to reinforce
the rhetorical reading of these questions as strong assertions. However, these
punctuation marks are not always reliable in that the commentators sometimes
disagree among themselves regarding where to pause, which leads to possible
different interpretations in terms of both syntax and semantics (Bodde 1991: 16).

Furthermore, given the fact that classical Chinese is grammatically highly
underspecified and context-dependent (Bisang 2008, 2013), we found it necessary
to consult translations of the text in English, which show a much more overt gram-
matical structure. The English version we mostly used for reference is translated
by Burton Watson ([1968] 2013), which has been accepted in the Chinese Series
of the Translations Collection of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and is regarded as one of the best English
renditions of the text, “eclips[ing] all others for many years” (Classe 2000: 1515).
We occasionally also consulted modern Chinese commentaries of the text (Cao
2007; Chen 2007; Zhang [1948] 1997) and two other English translations (Legge
1891a, b; R. Wang 1999) for a proper identification and interpretation of fictive
questions in the text.

The allegorical dialogues in the *Zhuangzi* text, modeled by the frame of
intersubjective face-to-face communication (Xiang 2016), feature prototypical
conversational structures and sometimes comprise exclusively question-answer
adjacency pairs. It should be pointed out that the occurrence of the question(-
answer sequence)s is not solely restricted to the non-genuine dialogues. They can
also be found in the monologic argumentative episodes, where occasionally the
frequency of occurrence can be amazingly high. In order to count the number of
fictive questions in the *Zhuangzi* text, we first carried out a manual identification
of the possible candidates in terms of the characteristic formal features of inter-
rogatives in classical Chinese (e.g. von der Gabelentz 1881; Pulleyblank 1995; Yang

\(^3\) A crude proto-punctuation was adopted in certain classical Chinese texts until the third
century B.C. (Bodde 1991: 15) and consistent practice of using European punctuation marks in
all printed texts in China belongs to the twentieth century, starting in 1912 (Brown 1993: 86);
Harbsmeier 1998: 175.
and He 2001; Yi 2005) and then we double-checked these candidates against the entries listed in the Dictionary of Laozi and Zhuangzi (Sh. Wang and Han 1993). Altogether we found 208 instances of expository questions and 419 instances of rhetorical questions out of 950 questions in the entire text.

Analysis

In the following, we analyze fictive questions in the Zhuangzi text as pragmatic manifestations of fictive interaction blends (Pascual 2002, 2006b, 2014; Xiang and Pascual 2016; Xiang 2016). In written texts, where the writer and prospective readers may be separated by vast time and space, fictive questions can set up a general scenario, in which they are conceptualized as present at the same time and space. The experience of writing and reading can then be construed as a simultaneous fictive conversation between the writer and reader, in which ideally they can draw the same conclusions regarding the issue under discussion (Herman 1999; Fauconnier and Turner 2002). Alternatively, the writer can engage in talking with him- or herself through a split-self, while the readers become the bystander of this fictive conversation (Xiang and Pascual 2016; Xiang 2016). The split-self is a general cognitive mechanism in which one individual in one conceptual domain is construed as two or more individuals in a different domain (Mead [1934] 1955; Fauconnier 1994; Lakoff 1996). In the Zhuangzi text, the writer conceptually splits himself up into two or more selves, taking the roles of either the fictive questioner and answerer in the monologic argumentative episodes or the conversing discourse characters in the allegorical dialogues. The writer-reader interactional network underlying the Zhuangzi text can be diagramed as follows:

As can be seen in Figure 1, we have fictive interaction in both the Here-and-Now Space and the Current Discourse Space (Langacker 2001, 2008, 2013). These correspond respectively to the level of the discourse context, where language is produced and interpreted and that of the discourse content, where the allegories are introduced (Xiang and Pascual 2016: 141). In the Here-and-Now Space, we have the writer(s) writing and the reader(s) reading the Zhuangzi text. The elements in the Writer Space and the Reader Space and the conversational roles from the conversation frame are projected into the fictive writer-reader blend, where the writer is conceptualized as directly speaking to the reader (cf. Herman 1999;
Fauconnier and Turner (2002). In the embedded Current Discourse Space, we have the writer and reader jointly attending to the story enacted by the discourse characters in the Allegory Space. In the fictive interaction blend, the writer talks to himself through other discourse participants, the reader becoming the bystander (Goffman 1963: 88–99) of the ongoing fictional conversation. In the following, we discuss several prototypical instances of fictive questions in both the Here-and-Now Space and the Current Discourse Space.

**Fictive questions in the Here-and-Now Space**

In this section we analyze fictive questions in the Here-and-Now Space. Despite the fact that the Here-and-Now Space naturally applies through the entire *Zhuangzi* text, as shown in Figure 1, we restrict our discussion to fictive questions in the monologic argumentative episodes in this section. These include chiefly the often short argumentative essays in the *Zhuangzi* text. Consider first an instance of expository question from Chapter 2, ‘Discussion on Making All Things Equal’:

![Figure 1. Fictive interaction blends in the *Zhuangzi* text](image)
Chapter 12. How can I persuade you without making self-assertions?

(1) 劳神明为一而不知其同也，谓之朝三。何谓朝三？狙公赋芧曰：“朝三而暮四。”众狙皆怒。曰：“然则朝四而暮三。”众狙皆悦。名实未亏而喜怒为用，亦因是也。是以圣人和之以是非而休乎天钧，是之谓两行。 ([5/2/37–40])

But to wear out your brain trying to make things into one without realizing that they are all the same—this is called “three in the morning.” *What do I mean by “three in the morning”?* When the monkey trainer was handing out acorns, he said, “You get three in the morning and four at night.” This made all the monkeys furious. “Well, then,” he said, “you get four in the morning and three at night.” The monkeys were all delighted. There was no change in the reality behind the words, and yet the monkeys responded with joy and anger. Let them, if they want to. So the sage harmonizes with both right and wrong and rests in Heaven the Equalizer. This is called walking two roads. (Watson [1968] 2013: 40)

In this excerpt, we have only one question using the interrogative construction “何 ‘hé’ [‘what’] 谓 ‘wèi’ [‘call’] ‘X’?” (lit. *What is called ‘X’?*). This construction is often used by ancient Chinese philosophers when they want to ask or explain what a word or sentence means, as in the above example (*What do I mean by “three in the morning”?*). The underspecified subject of the predicate 谓, rendered as ‘I’, is the person who has referred to ‘X’ earlier in discourse. Questions of this kind are always followed by a self-answer (Harbsmeier 1998: 187), which indicates that the questions asked are non-information-seeking and thus expository in nature.

At the very beginning of this piece of discourse, the writer puts forward his observation of or argument about a given issue, which introduces a new concept, namely “three in the morning” that he considers potentially perplexing for curious readers and hence worthy of further discussion. Instead of having his elaboration immediately after his viewpoint, the writer asks a question, which he proceeds to answer himself by telling the story of a monkey keeper, who successfully manipulates the emotions of the monkeys by reversing the number of acorns given to them in the morning and at night. The punch line of the story constitutes the ultimate philosophical message the writer wants to convey. Hence, the expository question-answer sequence captures the gist of this argumentative episode and is

5. While citing examples from the classical Chinese original, we follow the Yenching convention by indicating the page, chapter, and line number(s) from left to right (p/c/l) (Harvard-Yenching Institute 1956: v–vi). The p/c/l numbers of the examples analyzed in this chapter are searched on the website of the Chinese Text Project (http://ctext.org/zhuangzi/zhs). Discourse fragments relevant to the analysis appear underlined in the classical Chinese original, while their corresponding English translations are generally italicized.

6. The definitions of Chinese characters provided in the analysis are searched on Thesaurus Linguae Sericae (http://tls.uni-hd.de/procSearch/procSearchLex.lasso).
used as a rhetorical strategy to present the philosopher’s thoughts. More specifically, the question is used to preface the writer’s own argument (cf. Ilie 1999: 997).

We analyze the above expository question-answer pair as involving the writer conceptually splitting himself into two selves, assuming the roles of the fictive questioner and the fictive answerer simultaneously. Therefore, the writer is engaged in a fictive conversation with himself, while prospective readers become the fictive bystander of this conversation. While writing, the writer will mentally simulate the possible question that readers may have when they read his argument and asks a question for them; while reading, readers will also mentally simulate the questioning and engage themselves in a reasoning process that can yield an answer that may be relevant to the answer the writer provides. This bi-directional mental simulation (Hogan 2013: 5–6) suggests that there is a viewpoint blend of the perspective of the writer and that of the readers (Dancygier and Sweetser 2012). The successful interpretation of the above expository question-answer is contingent upon the alignment of the possibly different viewpoints of the writer and the readers in the fictive interaction blend.

Take now the following instance of rhetorical questions from Chapter 5, ‘The Sign of Virtue Complete’:

(2) 闉跂支离无脤说卫灵公，灵公说之；而视全人，其脰肩肩。瓮盎大瘿
说齐桓公，桓公说之；而视全人：其脰肩肩。

‘Mr. Lame-Hunchback-No-Lips talked to Duke Ling of Wei, and Duke Ling was so pleased with him that when he looked at normal men, he thought their necks looked too lean and skinny. Mr. Pitcher-Sized-Wen talked to Duke Huan of Qi, and Duke Huan was so pleased with him that when he looked at normal men, he thought their necks looked too lean and skinny. […]

So the sage has his wanderings. For him, knowledge is an offshoot, promises are glue, favors are a patching up, and skill is a peddler. The sage hatches no schemes, so what use has he for knowledge? He does no carving, so what use has he for glue? He suffers no loss, so what use has he for favors? He hawks no goods, so what use has he for peddling? These four are called Heavenly Gruel. Heavenly Gruel is the food of Heaven, and if he’s already gotten food from Heaven, what use does he have for men? […]’ (Watson [1968] 2013: 40)

7. Lame-Hunchback-No-Lips is the name given to “a person who had no lips, whose legs were bent so that he could only walk on his toes and who was (otherwise) deformed”, while Pitcher-Sized-Wen is the name of “a person who had a large goitre like an earthenware jar” (Legge 1891a: 233).
In the above piece of discourse, the writer tells stories about how the deformed bodies of two men with preeminent virtues are considered by their consultees before putting forward his argument (‘So the sage has his wanderings. For him, knowledge is an offshoot, promises are glue, favors are a patching up, and skill is a peddler.’), which he elaborates subsequently. Altogether we have a succession of five rhetorical questions with exactly the same syntactic structures (恶‘wū’ [‘what’] 用 ‘yòng’ [‘use’] ‘X’?, lit. Of what use is ‘X’?), each of which constitutes the latter component of a complex sentence. Given the immediate discourse context, these questions express strong negative assertions (i.e. ‘X’ is of no use.) and are used to reinforce his argument in the immediately preceding discourse.

In the Here-and-Now Space, we have the writer conceptualized as directly speaking to the subsequent readers, who ‘talk’ back to the writer by silently producing the corresponding answers to the rhetorical questions in their mind. The philosophical messages that the writer wants to convey lies not in the interrogative forms but rather in the silent answers evoked in the readers’ mind, which correspond to the ultimate moral that the philosopher is intending to convey. The successful interpretation of rhetorical questions hence involves the resolution of the mixed viewpoints of the writer/narrator and the potential readers. In the writer-reader blend, the possibly different viewpoints between the writer and the assumed readers are aligned. This requires the writer to make mental contact with the common ground of potential readers and thus adopt their viewpoint, just as readers have to adopt the narrator’s and thus the original writer’s.

**Fictive questions in the Current Discourse Space**

In this section, we analyze non-information-seeking questions in the Current Discourse Space, in which we have the constructed allegorical dialogues between discourse characters as presented by the narrator, thereby also involving the writer’s perspective. In the allegories, Zhuangzi employs two modes of speech:寓言 ‘yùyán’ [‘imputed words’] and 重言 ‘chóngyán’ [‘repeated words’], either separately or in combination (Ye [1979] 2004). According to the philosopher himself, imputed words “that make up nine-tenths of [the text] are like persons brought in from outside for the purpose of exposition”, while repeated words “that make up seven-tenths of [the text] are intended to put an end to argument. They can do this

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8. Coined by Zhuangzi and first used in the title of Chapter 27, the term “yù yán” (lit. ‘lodged words’) in the original sense refers to a particular literary device employed by the philosopher in his writing and has been rendered differently as “imputed words” (Watson [1968] 2013), “dwelling words” (Wu 1988), “metaphor” (Mair 1994), and “fable” (R. Wang 1999), to cite but a few examples. In this chapter, we adopt Burton Watson’s translation of the term.
because they are the words of the elders”.9 It should be pointed out that these two literary devices are not mutually exclusive; in fact, repeated words can be viewed as a particular subtype of imputed words. Additionally, repeated words are “backed by depth of experience, not merely the respect given to age” (Graham 1989: 26), which explains why the philosopher sometimes has the inferior (e.g. people with lower social status but greater skill in their own profession such as Cook Ding and Wheel-wright Pian) to be the wiser. More generally, the philosopher is like a puppeteer or ventriloquist (cf. Cooren 2010, 2012) behind all the allegorical dialogues and his voice can be ‘heard’ through all the characters.

First, we examine an instance of expository question-answer pair in a non-genuine dialogue from Chapter 6, ‘The Great and Venerable Teacher’:

(3) 颜回曰：“回益矣。”仲尼曰：“何谓也？”曰：“回忘仁义矣。”曰：“可矣，犹未也。”他日复见，曰：“回益矣。”曰：“何谓也？”曰：“回忘礼乐矣！”曰：“可矣，犹未也。”他日复见，曰：“回益矣！”曰：“何谓也？”曰：“回坐忘矣。”仲尼蹴然曰：“何谓坐忘？”颜回曰：“堕肢体，黜聪明，离形去知，同于大通，此谓坐忘。”仲尼曰：“同则无好也，化则无常也。而果其贤乎！丘也请从而后也。” (17/6/89–93)

‘Yan Hui said, “I’m improving!” Confucius said, "What do you mean by that?” “I’ve forgotten benevolence and righteousness!” “That’s good. But you still haven’t got it.” Another day, the two met again, and Yan Hui said, “I’m improving!” “What do you mean by that?” “I’ve forgotten rites and music!” “That’s good. But you still haven’t got it.” Another day, the two met again, and Yan Hui said, “I’m improving!” “What do you mean by that?” “I can sit down and forget everything” Confucius looked very startled and said, “What do you mean, sit down and forget everything?” Yan Hui said, “I smash up my limbs and body, drive out perception and intellect, cast off form, do away with understanding, and make myself identical with the Great Thoroughfare. This is what I mean by sitting down and forgetting everything.” Confucius said, “If you’re identical with it, you must have no more likes! If you’ve been transformed, you must have no more constancy! So you really are a worthy man after all! With your permission, I’d like to become your follower.”’


The above piece of discourse is enacted between real historical figures Yan Hui and Zhongni (literary name of Confucius). Yan Hui, Confucius’s most favorite disciple, reports the progress he made in his studies to his master. Confucius in his speech to Yan Hui produces four questions to ask the latter to clarify his ideas, which Yan Hui answers in subsequent conversational turns. Intriguingly, Yan Hui,

an ardent Confucian, completely forgets his master’s teachings (“benevolence and righteousness”, “rites and music”) and imparts Daoist teaching about the state of “Sitting and Forgetting”, which later becomes a fundamental tenet of Daoist spiritual cultivation; while Confucius, the founder of Confucianism, talks like a Daoist. He not only acknowledges the teaching by anticipating the potential outcome of practicing “Sitting and Forgetting” but also wants to become his student’s student. The presentation of Confucius as a humble scholar willing to learn from others in the above dialogue is consistent with the historical Confucius (e.g. Lewis 1999: 89). However, Confucius’ embracing of Daoist teachings, which are fundamentally different from his own philosophy of life, is constructed (Lu 1998: 254). Hence, the above piece of discourse is no quote from an actual conversation between these two historical figures, which necessarily makes all the questions fictional. This non-genuine dialogue is an instance of Zhuangzi’s combined use of ‘imputed words’ and ‘repeated words’ (Ye [1979] 2004: 120). The philosopher here speaks through other discourse characters and quotes from Yan Hui, Confucius’s junior in the Fiction Space. The ultimate philosophical message is presented through the last question-answer pair between Yan Hui and Confucius. Hence, the fictional information-seeking question (‘What do you mean, sit down and forget everything?’) is further used fictively as expository question, which can elicit not only a mental response but also an actual verbalized answer from the character Yan Hui.

Given that Confucius and Yan Hui are no Daoist philosophers, their actual viewpoints are necessarily blended with the Daoist writer as narrator. Furthermore, in his response to Confucius, Yan Hui also needs to be construed as making mental contact with the possible question that the latter could have in his mind, thereby taking his interlocutor’s viewpoint so as to provide a corresponding answer. While reading the text, the readers will also mentally simulate the conversation, thus also adopting the viewpoints of the discourse characters. The successful interpretation of the above expository question-answer pair lies in the alignment of the viewpoints of the writer and the assumed readers as well as those ascribed to the discourse characters, namely, Confucius and Yan Hui.

Consider now an instance of rhetorical questions in the following allegorical dialogue from Chapter 12, ‘Heaven and Earth’:

“Long life, riches, many sons – these are what all men desire!” said the border guard. “How is it that you alone do not desire them?” Yao said, “Many sons mean many fears. Riches mean many troubles. Long life means many shames. These three are of no use in nourishing Virtue – therefore I decline them.” The border guard said, “At first I took you for a sage. Now I see you are a mere gentleman. When Heaven gives birth to the ten thousand people, it is certain to have jobs to assign to them. If you have many sons and their jobs are assigned to them, what is there to fear? If you share your riches with other men, what troubles will you have? The true sage is a quail at rest, a little fledgling at its meal, a bird in flight that leaves no trail behind. When the world has the Way, he joins in the chorus with all other things. When the world is without the Way, he nurses his Virtue and retires in leisure. […] The three worries you have cited never touch him; his body is forever free of peril. How can he suffer any shame?” The border guard turned and left. Yao followed him, saying, “Please – I would like to ask you …” “Go away!” said the border guard.


This excerpt comes from the allegorical dialogue between the sage king Yao and the border guard Hua. In the preceding extract of this story, Hua offered to pray for Yao so that he could be blessed with long life, riches and many sons. Yao declined his offer and pointed out the possible harms underlying these blessings in his answer to Hua’s inquiry (“How is it that you alone do not desire them?”). The border guard then challenged these worries in Yao’s mind by three questions with the same syntactic structure (i.e. 则 ‘zé’ [‘then’] 何 ‘hé’ [‘what’] ‘X’ 之 ‘zhī’ [particle] 有 ‘yǒu’ [‘exist’]? , lit. Then what is there to ‘X’?). Given the immediately preceding discourse context, the implied answers to all these questions are negative (e.g. ‘There is nothing to fear’, et cetera). Thus, these questions are non-genuine and have a rhetorical reading. Yao’s subsequent behavior suggests that he is enlightened by Hua’s speech and no longer obsessed with his concerns. However, Yao’s enlightenment seems to come a bit too late, as the border guard ruthlessly interrupted his speech and turned down his request (‘Please – I would like to ask you … ’).

This dialogue again instantiates the philosopher’s use of both ‘imputed words’ and ‘repeated words’ (Ye [1979] 2004: 137). Since we have the philosopher speaking through the discourse characters, King Yao and Hua, their viewpoints are also blended with the writer as narrator. Rhetorical questions are meant to evoke silent answers in Yao’s mind, leading to the reinforcement of the arguments Hua is making. In the Current Discourse Space, the viewpoints of Yao and Hua are blended so that they can identify and interpret the message each wants to convey. While reading the text, readers will also mentally simulate these questions and come up with possible answers of their own, thereby taking the viewpoints of both discourse characters. In the Here-and-Now Space, we have the conventional
writer-reader blend, in which the viewpoints of the writer and the assumed readers are aligned. In the above piece of discourse, we have the mixed viewpoints of the writer as narrator, the assumed readers and the discourse characters, namely, King Yao and the guard Hua.

Finally, consider the following allegorical dialogue where a succession of expository questions co-occur with an instance of rhetorical question:

(5) "When Zhuangzi went to Chu, he saw an old skull, all dry and parched. He poked it with his carriage whip and then asked, “Sir, were you greedy for life and forgetful of reason and so came to this? Was your state overthrown, and did you bow beneath the ax and so came to this? Did you do some evil deed, and were you ashamed to bring disgrace on your parents and family and so came to this? Was it through the pangs of cold and hunger that you came to this? Or did your springs and autumns pile up until they brought you to this?” When he had finished speaking, he dragged the skull over and, using it for a pillow, lay down to sleep. In the middle of the night, the skull came to him in a dream and said, “You chatter like a rhetorician, and all your words betray the entanglements of a living man. The dead know nothing of these! Would you like to hear a lecture on the dead?” “Indeed,” said Zhuangzi. The skull said, “Among the dead, there are no rulers above, no subjects below, and no chores of the four seasons. With nothing to do, our springs and autumns are as endless as heaven and earth. A king facing south on his throne could have no more happiness than this!” Zhuangzi couldn’t believe this and said, “If I got the Arbiter of Fate to give you a body again, make you some bones and flesh, return you to your parents and family and your old home and friends, you would want that, wouldn’t you?” The skull frowned severely, wrinkling up its brow. “How should I cast away the enjoyment of my royal court, and undertake again the toils of life among mankind?” it said.’

(Watson [1968] 2013: 141–142, slightly modified)10

10. Burton Watson translated the rhetorical question as “Why would I throw away more happiness than that of a king on a throne and take on the troubles of a human being again?”. Given the
In this extract from Chapter 18, entitled “Supreme Happiness”, the discourse character Zhuangzi has a dream conversation with a roadside skull. At the very beginning of this non-genuine dialogue, we have five declarative questions ending with the final interrogative particle 乎 ‘hū’, which suggests an intonation contour. These questions are primarily information-seeking, as they are posed to the skull to inquire about “its life choices which led to its abandonment by the side of the road” (Chai 2016: 490). Meanwhile, they can be further analyzed as expository questions, as they serve to introduce the topic “the struggle of life” into discourse (cf. Ilie 1999: 987–988), which the skull refers to and elaborates on subsequently. Devoid of life, the skull cannot be a conversation partner, let alone answer the questions in reality, so it appears in Zhuangzi’s dream and has a conversation about death with him, in which the skull has a confession about the joy of mortality. Zhuangzi, in disbelief, asks the skull if it would like to have the Arbiter of Fate restore its previous life with its body, family, and friends. Annoyed by this proposal as suggested by the paralinguistic cues, the skull terminates the conversation with a wh-question (‘How should I …?’), which is marked with the conventionalized phrase of rhetorical questioning 安能 ‘ānnéng’ ['how should'] (H. Wang 2015: 372). The rhetorical question functions as a valid answer to Zhuangzi’s question and is used to challenge the belief assumed to be in his mind.

The moral of this allegory that one should “[nurture] oneself in Dao through the equalization of life and death” (Chai 2016: 496) is presented through the skull’s mouth, thereby exemplifying Zhuangzi’s use of ‘imputed words’ (Ye [1979] 2004: 173). Hence, the writer’s viewpoint is blended with both discourse characters. While writing, the writer mentally simulates the possible questions that readers may have about the death of the man (metonymically represented by the skull) and asks the questions for them. The expository questions, though addressed to the skull, aim to draw the readers’ attention and get them cognitively involved in the discussion. Meanwhile, the rhetorical question can elicit mental response in both the discourse character Zhuangzi and the potential readers. The immediate discourse context, namely the skull’s preceding lecture on the dead, provides cues for the readers to recognize it as a strong negative assertion. The successful inter-

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standard English definition of the interrogative pronoun 安 ‘ān’ is ‘how’, we replaced Watson’s translation with a corresponding rendition by James Legge (1891b: 7) for clarification purposes.

11. Despite the fact the philosopher himself appears on stage, his conversation with the skull in the Dream Space is still imaginary and cannot be regarded as reliable information about the author in view of the deliberate fantasy characterizing the whole text (Watson [1968] 2013: vii). We thus add “the discourse character” before the philosopher’s name to avoid possible misinterpretation.
Summary and conclusions

In this chapter, we analyzed five instances of fictive questions in the Zhuangzi text. Our analysis shows that fictive questions can occur in isolation (egs. 1 & 3), clustered (egs. 2 & 4) or in combination (eg. 5). In terms of discursive function, expository questions can be used to: (i) preface an argument (eg. 1); (ii) elicit argumentative reactions in the addressee (eg. 3); and (iii) introduce a topic into discourse (eg. 5); while rhetorical questions can serve to: (i) reinforce one’s own argument (eg. 2) and (ii) challenge the assertion assumed to be in the addressee’s mind (egs. 4 & 5). In general, fictive questions constitute a highly successful rhetorical strategy and are essential for structuring the text and/or presenting its argument (Pascual 2002, 2006b, 2014; Xiang and Pascual 2016). This can be attributed to the fact that they have a self-involving dimension and can engage readers in a parsimonious, implicit manner (e.g. Adams 2006: 138; Maxwell 2007: 87–88; Farnsworth 2011: 226–227). Expository questions can encourage cognitive engagement on the part of the readers by prompting them to retrieve information or come up with their own conclusions (Maxwell 2007: 87); while rhetorical questions, due to their strong persuasive power, can force the reader “to frame the expected answer in his mind, and by doing so he actually becomes a co-expresser of the [writer’s] conviction” (Labuschagne 1966: 23).

We argue that fictive questions are intersubjectively grounded, since they involve the mutual sharing and management of the viewpoints of the addresser and addressee (cf. Verhagen 2005, 2008; Zlatev et al. 2008). This intersubjective nature of fictive questions is inherently presupposed by the mismatch between the overt grammatical form and the covert pragmatic function, which constitutes a coordination problem that the addresser expects the addressee to resolve in his mind and that the addressee knows that he is expected to do so (Verhagen 2008: 307). Fictive questions in the Here-and-Now Space and the Current Discourse Space involve the integration of different viewpoints. In the Zhuangzi, the writer blends his own perspective and that of the assumed readers through fictive questions (cf. Dancygier and Sweetser 2012), which are ascribed to the narrator or discourse characters, in order to convince subsequent readers of his philosophy of life. In a text abundant with multiple viewpoints, our approach of viewing fictive questions

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12. It should be pointed out that fictive questions in the Zhuangzi text can have other functions that are not found in the above examples (cf. Xiang and Pascual 2016).
as intersubjective mixed viewpoint constructions becomes even more manifest, as we know all the different viewpoints are set up to present the writer’s actual views (Zhang [1948] 2007; Ye [1979] 2004; B. Wang 2013).

Our analysis further suggests that mental simulation and perspective taking play an important role in rhetoric. This becomes more evident in the Zhuangzi text given its unique and unusual style of philosophizing and argumentation. On the one hand, the story characters, actions and sometimes the setting in Zhuangzi’s allegories, as illustrated in the above examples, introduce readers to certain dimensions of their experience, which can be familiar or previously unseen or unconsidered. Indeed, the most effective, persuasive use of language in the text is “the argument that makes one forget about the words and pay attention to the complex reality of experience” (Lee 2015: 142). On the other hand, the allegories are told from a multiplicity of perspectives, which enables the philosopher to “explore the value of each view without implying commitment to any of them, and without using any one of them to provide an overall evaluation of the others” (Coutinho 2015: 168). The trick of understanding the Zhuangzi text is then to take these different perspectives without committing to any of them, relate them to our individual relative situations and engage in self-persuasion. We understand self-persuasion as “the internalization or voluntary acceptance of new cognitive states or patterns of overt behavior through the exchange of messages” (Smith 1982: 7). In other words, externally-generated messages, as a stimulus, can “elicit a kind of authoritative intrapersonal conversation in the [recipient]” (Meyers 2007: 13, emphasis in the original), which eventually leads to a self-generated conviction of what is expressed by these messages. This indicates that self-persuasion is achieved through talking to ourselves (cf. Nienkamp 2001). Different from self-addressed speeches we make in everyday life, as when we ask ourselves the whereabouts of our missing wallet, this kind of self-talk, prompted by rhetorical forms and structured by the pattern of ordinary face-to-face conversation, is entirely fictive.

In this chapter, we consider rhetoric as essentially a process of inducing self-persuasion in the recipient by the use of rhetorical energy. In our view, rhetorical energy, which is conveyed by “volume, pitch, or repetition” in its simplest form or by “logical reasons, pathetic narratives, metaphor and other tropes, or lively figures of speech such as apostrophe, rhetorical question, or simile” in more complex forms (Kennedy 1998: 215), has both a foregrounding effect and a cueing effect. The foregrounding effect makes the rhetorical forms prominent in communication, thereby attracting the recipient’s attention; while the cueing effect activates sensorimotor representations in the recipient’s mind. This involves such cognitive operations as mental simulation and perspective taking. Mental simulation is “the reenactment of perceptual, motor, and introspective states acquired during interaction with the word, body, and mind” (Barsalou 2008: 618). As it is, mental
simulations are representations of “experiential traces” (Zwaan 2004) cued by situated external stimuli. In language comprehension, readers mentally simulate described events with fine-grained details, which can manifest as “rehearsals of likely future events, fantasizing about less likely future events, realistically re-experiencing past events, or reconstructing past events, mixing in hypothetical elements” (Taylor and Schneider 1989: 175). These hypothetical scenarios make it possible for readers to take the perspective of and infer the likely mental state of the other person (e.g. Ruby and Decety 2001; Decety 2005; Adolphs 2006). The outcome of mental simulation and perspective taking on the part of the reader is what may be referred to as ‘embodied identification’ (i.e. the identification between the sensorimotor representations activated in the reader’s mind and his embodied experience) and subsequently ‘cognitive identification’ (i.e. the alignment of possibly different viewpoints) (cf. van Krieken et al. 2017), which completes the process of self-persuasion in the reader.

The abundant rhetorical use of fictive questions in the *Zhuangzi* (Xiang and Pascual 2016), as is also the case in the (Hebrew) Bible (e.g. Beekman and Callow 1974: 229; Kuntz 1997, 2009; Moshavi 2009; Estes 2012, 2017) and the Quran (e.g. Badarneh 2003), seems to suggest that rhetoric constitutes a universal phenomenon across languages and cultures. Mediated by language and possibly also other semiotic resources, rhetoric contributes to the emergence and diversity of culture (e.g. Strecker and Tyler 2009; Meyer and Girke 2011) and helps to define and preserve the cultural identities of individuals and communities in a globalized world. Furthermore, the fact that conversationalized structures are typical in ancient written texts may have to do with their orality feature, since these texts were meant to be read aloud and commented on in a community (Bowery 2007: 82). More generally, we argue that the ubiquitous use of conversational structures as rhetorical strategies in ancient texts across languages and cultures emerge from our intrinsically conversational mind as interacting social beings (Brandt 2013; Pascual 2014).

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References


Chapter 12. How can I persuade you without making self-assertions?


Chapter 12. How can I persuade you without making self-assertions?


CHAPTER 13

“Keeping up with the times”

Nüxing, funü and the affective value of the formulated text

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Formulations (Schoenhals 1992; Hershatter 1997) are fixed ways of distributing political norms in Chinese politics. This paper reads re-formulations on the two pivotal categories of women – nüxing (woman-sex) in the republican era and funü (wife-woman) in the revolutionary era – and the propaganda of “keeping up with the times” (“与时俱进”) in the post-Mao People’s Daily. It argues that these categories’ embodied historical affects produce new affective values in the post-Mao public discourse, thus attaching women to the nation in specific ways; these values are used by the state to mediate the tensions between different female social groups in China’s rapidly-changing society and its self-positioning in the global context.

**Keywords:** formulation, time, categories of women, affect, the People’s Daily

Introduction

The emancipation of woman/funü will only be possible when woman/nüxing can take part in production on a large, social scale, and domestic work no longer claims anything but an insignificant amount of her time.

Friedrich Engels (The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State)¹

This is a frequently quoted sentence addressing the question of women’s liberation in the official discourse of China’s party-state. In translating the word “women” into Chinese language, a particular distinction was made between nüxing (“女性”, female-sex) and funü (“妇女”, wife-female) – both being pivotal categories of women in different periods of China’s modern history.

¹ The Chinese translation of this sentence is: “恩格斯曾经指出: ‘妇女解放的第一个先决条件就是一切女性重新回到公共的事业中去.’”
This paper draws its attention to this deliberate choice of words: why is nüxing used in some sentences while funü in other circumstances? As both Schoenhals (1992) and Hershatter (1997) have taught us, formulations, as fixed ways of saying things, can help us better understand the structure of power within China’s political system. Their studies are informative, but have only offered diachronic accounts of meaning changes in words. This paper follows this line of inquiring “formulation”, changing the direction slightly to the affective value of the present texts that may speak to different historical pasts. It is made possible because the affective values of nüxing and funü accumulate through the history of the 20th-century China and their co-presence in the post-Mao era brings these values together in the meantime and thus becomes crucial to better understand CCP’s cultural politics on women in China’s rapidly transformative society.

To do this, this paper critically analyzes the People’s Daily’s text related to nüxing and funü, particularly those formulated with “keeping up with the times”. It argues, “the times” is formalized as an affective object – an orientation for the connections and attachment between women and the nation. Specifically, funü is formulated with suzhi/quality and nüxing with jiaoyu/education. The formulation of funü and suzhi reflects the tension between urban and rural space in China’s re-centering cultural and economic development into cities and the mediation of female migrant labor in the urban space. The formulation of nüxing with jiaoyu reflects China’s self-positioning as a modern nation in relationship with its own tradition and the global economy.

Categories of women and the affective value of formulated texts

Formulation: Doing things with words in Chinese politics

A formulation is tieba (“提法”) in Chinese, a fixed way of saying things in CCP (Chinese Communist Party)’s political discourse. It has long been a crucial site for CCP to practice direct control over public opinion and official discourse. For example, drawing upon the publications in the People’s Daily, Michael Schoenhals (1992) noticed that “formalized language and formalized speech acts help(ed) constitute the structure of power within China’s political system” (1992: 1–2). Using five cases ranging from the early 1920s to the late 1970s, Schoenhals showed how CCP managed the formulation of problems so that the masses (“人民群众”) would not be confused or misled. Schoenhals argued that the CCP’s reliance on formulation in official discourse was diminishing in the post-Mao reform era; however, Gail Hershatter (1997) found that its practice was more profoundly and systematically incorporated in the cluster of officialdom, scholarship, journalism,
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etc., thus becoming “a means of understanding the complex nexus of language, regulation, and social flux” (329). Based on Schoenhals’ discussion on formulation, Hershatter read the discourse on prostitution in relation to the changing conceptions of modernity throughout the 20th-century China and argued that prostitution was not only a changing site of work for women, but “a metaphor, a medium of articulation in which the city’s changing elites and emerging middle classes discussed their problems, fears, agendas, and visions” (4). In a word, through “formulation” as a means of practicing cultural politics, China was structured into a more uniformed society.

Nüxing and Funü: Women, nation and the affective value of text

Based on Tani E. Barlow’s work in The Question of Women in Chinese Feminism (2004), nüxing was a compound word of niü/not-yet-married women and xing/sex; it was introduced into China in the early 20th century. Its connotations were embedded in the European humanistic discourse where “women” was situated as a more individualized and sexualized “men’s other.” Because of the intellectuals’ priority of cities as the site of revolution rather than villages in that period, nüxing, as an idealized female citizen, was more associated with urban space. Its counterpart, funü, was a compound word of fu/married women and niü/not-yet-married women and a composite used since the transitional period of the Ming and Qing (the 17th century). Its contemporary meaning derived from Marxist discourse and was used in the Maoist period to identify collective and “desexualized” state subjects. Because of the priority of rural area as the advanced site of culture and productivity in the socialist years, funü, as a category of female constructors, was more associated with rural space.

In the public discourse, nüxing was prevalent in the 1920s and 1930s and disappeared close to the foundation of PRC (the People’s Republic of China) in 1949. Funü was the general female category in the post-1949 era till the end of the Maoist socialist period in the late 1970s. With the economic reform following the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), China steps into the post-Mao era and nüxing reemerges into public discourse. Both categories are used in contemporary China.

As Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Lakoff and Johnson 1980) informs us, the conceptual, metaphorical and metonymical expressions in our languages do not only shape our community, but also the ways we think and act. Sara Ahmed (2014) uses “stickiness” to describe the surfacing effects of the historical contacts between bodies, objects and signs. In terms of language as signs of life, Ahmed reminds us that, oftentimes when we get used to the repetition of words, their associations with other words get concealed. This concealment allows the accumulation of affective
value in texts. To attend to these sticky signs and their associations historically is thus to carefully unpack the emotions and acts produced in our social life.

_Nüxing_ and _funü_ are such sticky signs, embodying the sticky historical contacts between women and their nation. For _nüxing_, her nation has yearned for modernity in the “western” model and has demanded her of the capacity to become civilized female citizens through receiving education and practicing free choice of marriage (the making of the “good wife”), and the capacity to become “wise mother” who breeds and cultivates better offspring for the prosperity of the nation; for _funü_, her nation has conducted communist/socialist revolution and needed her to be a desexualized socialist constructor: a woman to “hold up half the sky” as a man does. When they are co-present in the contemporary public discourse, questions might be asked: who sticks out and how? In what ways do their sticky relations with their nation re-surface their own body? What affective values are being produced, circulated, and accumulated?

Our attachment to the nation tells us how we understand time (Ahmed 2010). In the following part, this paper examines the formulation of “keeping up with the times” starting in 2001 and its application to the issues of women in the _People’s Daily_ to better understand this particular (re-)formulation of the lived pasts, the constructed presents, and imagined futures in the Chinese political system.

**Reading formulations in _People’s Daily_: _Funü, Nüxing_ and “Keeping up with the Times”**

**Formulating “Keeping up with the Times”: The times as affective object**

The term “keeping up with the times” (“与时俱进”) was first brought into the state discourse in 2001 through the then Chinese president Jiang Zemin’s speech. The _People’s Daily_ gradually coined it as a continuous development and adaptation of Marxism-Leninism in China and for China.

On June 11, 2002, the _People’s Daily_ published an essay _Understanding and Reading “Keeping up with the Times”_. In this essay, a word-to-word explanation of the term was provided – “what (wa)s ‘与时俱进’? ‘与’ (wa)s to follow, ‘时’ (wa)s the times, ‘俱’ (wa)s from all aspects, and ‘进’ (wa)s to move forward. ‘与时俱进’ mean(t) to follow the development of the times and move forward from all aspects.”

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2. The Chinese text is as such, “什么是“与时俱进”? “与”就是跟随, “时”就是时代, “俱”就是全面, “进”就是前进, 与时俱进就是跟着时代发展而全面前进”。
After that, the term was used as orientation of the state to China-characterized Marxism-Leninism. On June 29, 2011, in *The CCP and Its Two Historical Breakthroughs*, the *People’s Daily* summed up the sinicization of Marxism in two breakthroughs: Mao Zedong Thought and the series of theories of Constructing China-characterized Socialism, including the Deng Xiaoping Theory, “Three Represents”, and “The Perspective of Scientific Development”. These achievements, according to *People’s Daily*, were the effects of CCP’s “keeping up with the times”.

In the reflection on the historical mistakes of isolating theory from practice in the *People’s Daily*, three mistakes were regarded catastrophic: holistically taking theories from other nations, practicing theories beyond the level of the development in real life, and being lagged behind by the development of the times. According to the *People’s Daily*, in the contemporary context, it was important to avoid the first and the third mistakes, but the most important was to avoid the third mistake.

Here, we see two orientations of “the times”: the first being global times; the second and more importantly, being the party-state’s perception of the times to guide Chinese people under its leadership. The discourse of “keeping up with the times” is a manipulation of time so as to construct a national present in the global times, making China and Chinese people a collective actor, a community where women are attached to their nation and feel with and for this nation accordingly. As Gilles Deleuze writes, the present is “a simultaneity of a present of past, a present of present and a present of future.” (Deleuze 1989: 101) That is to say, the present is a synthesis of past, present and future. The question to ask is, which past, present and future are articulated and how? In terms of *nüxing* and *funü*, this “national present” is in plural forms: they perceive different past, present and future.

This paper thus looks into *the People’s Daily* in the post-Mao era. There are totally thirty-four essays addressing women and “keeping up with the times” where particular differentiation between *nüxing* and *funü* are also made. These thirty-four essays become my primary source. However, following Hershatter, the analysis

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3. This essay is written by Bao Xinjian and published on June 29, 2011. The headline in Chinese is “中国共产党与两次历史性飞跃”.

4. The CCP represents “the developmental requirement of the advanced productive forces in China”, “the progressive direction of the advanced culture in China”, and “the fundamental interest of the vast majority of the people”. Quoted in Ren 2010; p. 14.

5. This essay is written by Su Rong and published on October 31, 2008. The headline in Chinese is “科学发展观的时代特征和重大意义”. Original Chinese text is: “理论脱离实际的情况大体有三种：一种是生搬硬套别国的理论；一种是超越实际生活的发展水平；一种是落后于时代的发展……鉴于我们现在处于全面开放的社会环境，世界的发展变化空前迅速，更要注意防止第一种尤其是第三种情况”.

of this paper goes beyond the *People’s Daily* and involves sources of officialdom, scholarship, and journalism for an integrated understanding of formulation.

**Women and the spirit of the times**

As the one and only nation-wide conference to specifically discuss women’s issues, National Women’s Conference of China has been routinely held every five years since the PRC. On August 22, 2003, the ninth conference was held and the *People’s Daily* published an essay titled “Living a Splendid Life in the Era of Development” written by Hu Guo. The essay formulated women’s development in the following text.

To effectively promote funü’s overall development, (we should) promote with great efforts the spirit of the times – self-respect, self-confidence, self-dependence, and self-strength (“四自”, the “Four-self”); (we should) openly broadcast the models of the Four-Self; (we should) further incorporate thought and moral education, legal and propaganda education, and science and culture education (“jiaoyu”); (we should) incorporate occupational and technical training and the cultivation of the ability of innovation; (we should) incorporate the promotion of the quality (“suzhi”) of physical and mental health and the direction to civilized life style; (thus we can) encourage funü to learn and make progress and realize overall development.6

In this formulation, “the spirit of the times” is interpreted as the “Four-Self Spirit” for funü, so that they can “learn and make progress and realize overall development”. This is the *People’s Daily*’s application of “keeping up with the times” to women. Core components in this formulation include education (“jiaoyu”), quality (“suzhi”), training, innovation/creating the new, and civilized life style. To become a female citizen in this “nation” community of the new times, funü needs to be equipped with the above-mentioned qualities. However, when nüxing is brought back into the public discourse, the potentiality and limits of both categories have provided an opportunity for the CCP to manage the historical affects in China’s rapidly transformative society in the reform era. As this paper argues in the following part, in the formulation of women and education, nüxing won over funü and nüxing jiaoyu has been formalized as a scene in China’s

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6. This essay is published on August 22, 2003 and is written by Hu Guo. The headline in Chinese is “发展时代展亮丽人生——写在中国妇女九大开幕之际”. The translated text in Chinese is “要有效促进妇女全面发展，在广大妇女群众中，大力弘扬自尊、自信、自立、自强的时代精神，大张旗鼓地宣传“四自”典型，进一步把思想道德教育、法制宣传教育与科学文化教育结合起来，把职业技能培训与创新能力培养结合起来，把提升身心健康素质与倡导文明生活方式结合起来，激励妇女学习成才、全面发展”. 
market economy. Drawing upon the historical connections between *nüxing*, *funü* and the *jiaoyu* discourse, this paper argues that the formulation of *nüxing jiaoyu* reflects China’s self-positioning as a “modern” nation, its demand on qualified and educated female citizens, and its reinforcement of heterogeneous gender norms as a solution to the new social mobility.

**Women and education/ “Jiaoyu”**

This part starts with a discussion of two reports in 1989 to demonstrate that in the formulation of women’s problems and education, the *People’s Daily* experienced a careful diction between *funü* and *nüxing*; after that, an anecdote in Guangdong province shows the education of *nüxing* was also formalized as the solution to *funü*’s problems among scholarship and professional workers in education. Following this discussion, more examples on the formulation of *nüxing jiaoyu* (education) in the *People’s Daily* are provided. *Jiaoyu* is education in English; from here, this paper ceases from using education and turns to *jiaoyu* because the idea of “women’s education” has been produced as a scene in China’s market economy and made into a governmental discourse. This part ends with a historical account on the formulation of women and education and an analysis on the differential affects that might have been produced if *funü* were to be used in this context.

The problem of *funü*’s education, *nüxing*’s education and *nüxing jiaoyu*

On March 24, 1989, the *People’s Daily* published a report named “How can one employ Wu Dalang instead of Mu Guiying”?7 This was a report of a seminar during the 7th NPC (National People’s Congress) work meeting in 1989 at ACWF (“妇联”, All-China Women’s Federation). ACWF’s vice chairperson, Zhang Guoying, welcomed female NPC members to *hui niangjia* (“回娘家”, literally, to return to the maiden home after women getting married) and encouraged them to discuss national and social issues. According to the report, several members of ethnic minority groups expressed the frustrations faced by *funü* such as inequality in employment and education. One NPC member from Hunan province, Sima Qiong, recalled *funü*’s uncivil behavior and advocated the significance of *nüxing jiaoyu* as a solution. The report said,

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7. Wu Dalang and Mu guiying are both historical figures; Wu, a fictional character, symbolizes an incapable man who cannot keep his home in order and Mu, arguably a real figure in the Song dynasty (960–2127), is a worthy woman who broke the gender taboo that women cannot join the military and gained glory in war for her nation.
Hunan representative Sima Qiong started her talk from the uncivil words and behavior of some young funü in the society, called upon reinforcing nüxing’s education and suggested that middle schools hire principals specifically for girls (My translation)\textsuperscript{8}

Her words were resonated with by representatives from other ethnic groups. As the report kept going, a Korean-ethnic representative Yan Zaishun followed Sima and said, the elevation of funü’s social status was determined to a great extent by funü’s Suzhi (“素质”, quality). Therefore, funü should establish the “Four-self Spirit”.\textsuperscript{9}

Three days later, on March 27th, another report titled “NPC Member Huang Qizao Appealing More Attention to Nüxing’s Education” was published. The passage consistently used nüxing instead of funü. After recruiting data on the gendered enrollment of school education and the illegal employment of juvenile citizens and its gendered imbalance (prevalent employment of girls over boys), the report ended with Huang’s calling for actions,

...the law of compulsory education should be propagated and reinforced, the social consensus be constructed and the issues on nüxing’s education be paid more attention to by the whole society. Meanwhile, the law terms and conditions of the compulsory education should be specified so that nüxing’s right to receive education is protected by law (My translation)\textsuperscript{10}

The two above-mentioned reports address similar issues. However, funü is more tied to the suzhi discourse and nüxing’s education has been formulated as the solution to funü’s problems – “uncivil words and behavior”, the preference of incapable men over capable women, etc. Similarly, formulations were seen beyond the People’s Daily. For example, in March 2011, Guangdong province (an economically and culturally advanced region) hosted a Netizen-consulting-regulation Seminar titled the “2011–2020 Guangdong Province Women and Children Development Regulation”.\textsuperscript{11}

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\textsuperscript{8} The Chinese text is: 湖南代表司马琼从社会上一些青年妇女言行不文明谈起，呼吁加强女性教育，建议在中学设专门的女生训导主任。

\textsuperscript{9} The “Four-self Spirit” is “四自精神” in Chinese. The term is crucial for this project. In the later part of this paper, I will offer a discussion on it.

\textsuperscript{10} …要加强对义务教育法的宣传教育，形成强大的社会舆论，让整个社会来关心女性的教育问题。还应根据义务教育法制定具体的实施细则或条例，切实从立法上保护女性受教育的权利。

\textsuperscript{11} The Chinese title to this consulting conference is 《广东省妇女儿童发展规划2011–2020》网络问策活动的网友代表座谈会. It was hosted from mid-February to late March 2011. In this period, Internet users can sign up on the government’s official website to consult the contents of the Regulation and provide their own opinions and suggestions.
province, reflected on the social “disharmonious phenomena” – women’s mis-
conducts such as “bangdakuan” (傍大款, being mistresses of rich men), practic-
ing prostitutions and “willingly living as (甘当, gandang) full-time moms”, etc.
To diminish these phenomena, she proposed to include “nüxing jiaoyu” in the
primary and secondary school curriculum. This proposal became controversial
and triggered public debates immediately. Later, retired renowned educator
Miao Meixian wrote articles to support Lei’s proposal. Miao highlighted that the
core content of nüxing jiaoyu was the “Four-self Spirit” and it was in accordance
with the interest of the party-state.

Though the discursive practice involved in the above examples ranged in
a time period of twenty years, the formulation of nüxing jiaoyu as solution to
women’s problems has not changed. In the People’s Daily where nüxing jiaoyu was
developed into a specific term, funü’s education usually appeared in the govern-
ment’s statistical reports on the distribution of education resources.

However, it is significant to note that nüxing jiaoyu was conceptualized differ-
ently in these examples. In the first 1989 report, it was more associated with gaining
knowledge for higher productivity; in the second, it was the CCP’s affirmative re-
sponse to issues raised by the ACWF representatives; in the Guangdong anecdote,
it had a reference to the conception of the “harmonious society”. Different as they
are, nüxing jiaoyu remains a governmental discourse lack of concrete referents.

Nüxing jiaoyu in the market economy

There are more examples in the People’s Daily. On June 9th, 1998, it published an
interview with the president of All-China Women’s University, Hui Chunru. In the
interview, Hui proudly commented on the achievements made in her university,

    (From) the first class of first year students, teachers teach how to dine, how to hold
chopsticks, from nüxing’s sitting, standing, walking, to the Yellow-line concept, etc. Every trivial thing is taught … (we) send more inter-disciplinary and appli-
cation-oriented nüxing talents to the society… Our students are neither arrogant

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12. Reports on the original seminar and editorials and reviews are still accessible today on official
and many social websites, such as http://news.southcn.com/c/node_210291.htm, http://www.
scio.gov.cn/xwfbh/gssxwfbh/xwfbh/guangdong/Document/1079157/1079157.htm, etc.

13. The headline of this essay is “女性人才的摇篮——访中华女子学院” written by 刘卫星

14. Yellow-line Concept is originally used in the discourse of traffic, meaning “yield” to incom-
ing traffic. Later it is adopted in the political discourse and used to remind government officials
of the importance of stepping away from power abuse. Here it refers to stepping away from
inappropriate relationships with the other gender.
nor fragile. Once, we climbed Xiangshan Mountain with another university; our students all kept up … As for girls in the other university, boys helped carry their bags…

On December 11th 1999, an essay featuring Kunming Women’s Middle School was published in the *People’s Daily*. The essay summarized the achievement of this middle school as having “cultivated tens of thousands of female talents for both revolution and construction” in history and announced that at present the school is actively exploring “a special new road of combining general education, nüxing jiaoyu, and occupational education”.

Similarly, another essay titled “宣武区：让学校走特色办学之路” (Xuanwu District: letting schools head for specialized education) was published on February 9th, 2006. The essay featured on four junior high schools: Guang’an Middle School for providing education opportunities to children of migrant workers; Nancaiyuan Middle School for specializing in foreign languages; Huaxia Women’s Middle School for conducting nüxing jiaoyu; and Xu Beihong Middle School specializing in painting.

Despite the well-known “women’s liberation”, Chinese women are still underpaid. For one example, based on the Global Gender Gap Report 2016, women who offer an equal amount of workforce receive only around 60 percent of payment as men do. However, in the above examples, in women’s education, there is no challenge to gender inequality or norms. All innovations have been made in the logic of marketing: nüxing jiaoyu becomes the selling points of the educational institution and a site of creativity in the market economy. Nüxing in this formulation once again becomes a gazed object. Thus, in People’s Daily’s contemporary construction, when nüxing and jiaoyu stick together, it encounters and embodies feminine manner, the moral of self-dependence, and training of the occupational skills.

The following section traces the historical emergence of nüxing jiaoyu in the early twentieth century and highlights the trans-historical associations between nüxing, jiaoyu/education and China’s nation-building project.

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15. The Chinese text is “新生入校的第一课, 老师们从怎么吃饭, 如何拿筷子, 从女性的坐、站、行，到什么是黄线意识等等，事无巨细都一一讲到…向社会输送更多的复合型、应用型的女性人才。… 我们的学生少有娇骄二气。有一次，我们和外校搞联谊爬香山，我们的学生没有一个掉队的…而别的学校的女生，男生帮她们背着包…”

16. The headline of this essay is “百年老校芳香巾帼——昆明女子中学特色育人略记”. This quoted Chinese text is “积极探索普通教育、女性教育与职业教育相结合的特色育人新路”.

**Nüxing jiaoyu** as a historical discourse

As introduced earlier, Tani Barlow (1994 & 2004)’s trajectory of nüxing showed that the production of the term was based on the Victorian literature and the humanist discourses that emerged with the Chinese bourgeoisie class and the conception of women being the sexual “other” of men in the republican era (1912–1949). In *Women’s Bell* (1903), the so-called Chinese Feminist Manifesto, Jin Tianyu titled one of the nine chapters “Methods for Educating Women”. In this chapter, Jin advocated, “Education (was) a machine for manufacturing a national people.” Jin argued that education was the means for women to obtain ideal female citizenship.

More interestingly, in his essay, Jin imagined a life he would enjoy when China became a “modern” nation: he was traveling in Europe, being accompanied by an educated and worldly woman. Ever since this moment, the image of a modern woman has become an important metaphor in China’s modernization. Therefore, even though nüxing emerges in the colonial time, it embodies both the national longing for modernity and colonial humiliation starting from the Opium Wars (since 1840s), and nüxing jiaoyu has been the solution that male intellectuals coined for the national project of modernization.

With this sticky meaning, re-formulating nüxing jiaoyu in the market economy elicits an independent, sexy, and erotic female figure that desires and can be desired in a modern nation. As Lisa Rofel (2007) observed, China’s negotiation with the world in the post-socialist period was on “desire”, a coming-into-terms with the world as both a “desiring China” and a “China being desired”. Under a global context, China had to perform as a consumer desiring the international goods and service and meanwhile as “an object which others could desire freely, without obstruction” (2007: 159) Domestically, the neoliberal ideology of a DIY style of life (Ren 2010) and the distribution of the middle-class norms (Ren 2013) was and is changing the life of Chinese citizens dramatically. The historical temporal experience of nüxing as a national fantasy of modernizing like the European nations makes nüxing jiaoyu a trendy, innovative, and marketing image of a China modernizing in the global economy. However, because of the colonial connotations embodied in the term, nüxing has to be re-formulated to meet the new ideological demand in the new era.

**Why not funü jiaoyu?**

There are several reasons why funü cannot be the signifier of this modern female figure. First, funü is embedded in the revolutionary culture where the gender

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policy circumvented sexuality and funü was constructed the “same as men”. Thus, funü jiaoyu would not engage much erotic effect and cannot represent the desiring figure of the transformative China.

Second, although the 1950s also witnessed a fever called “funü tuomang re” (妇女脱盲热, funü getting rid of illiteracy), the way funü was associated with jiaoyu in the Mao era had to do with labor (“劳动”). In a famous essay published in 1958,19 Mao argued,

> For several thousand years, jiaoyu has been separated from labor; now (it) needs to be re-connected with labor. This is a basic principle; the crucial issue is the combination of jiaoyu and labor. (My translation)20

From both the Marxist and Maoist perspectives, the conception and practice of labor are always class-specific. This re-connection of jiaoyu with labor by Mao is thus another instance to construct the peasant’s revolutionary quality as a major element of the advanced culture in the Mao era. When the PRC was building its new socialist culture, the most oppressed and the most “backward” in the old society (“旧社会”) – the peasantry – were constructed as the most advanced. For example, in the political campaign – *Up to the Mountains and Down to the Countryside Movement* in the late 1960s and early 1970s, urban youths were sent down to receive education (“jiaoyu”) from funü and laonong (老农, old peasants). (Schmalzer 2016: 109) However, in the post-Mao era, when revolutionary memory is negated or simply circumvented, the tradition of the Chinese-ness, particularly Confucian traditional values, has been used as venues to re-build national cultural confidence, such as the “Seeking Roots” campaign in the 1980s, the notion of building “harmonious society” in the 2000s and the “Chinese Dream” project in the 2010s. The prioritization of mental labor over manual labor in the traditional Confucian values and the rise of the global creative economy make it inappropriate for China’s nation-state to advocate funü’s labor as an orientation in the contemporary context.

Third, the location of the advanced culture has shifted from the countryside to the cities. In Mao’s revolutionary era, the mobilization of funü has started in the countryside. In the post-Mao era, however, urbanization has been significant in the economic reform and the orientation of funü is toward the urban space. In this sense, the path to funü cannot be the idealized destination of individual development in the “keeping up with the times” discourse.


20. Its Chinese text is “几千年来, 都是教育脱离劳动, 现在要与劳动相结合, 这是一个基本原则, 中心问题是教育与劳动相结合”.

In a word, what sticks in the formulations of nüxing jiaoyu and funü’s education historically produce different affective values in the new context of post-Mao China. For this reason, nüxing jiaoyu has been formulated as both a governmental discourse and a creative scene in the market economy.

**Funü, nüxing and the suzhi discourse**

One generation of mothers affects one generation of children; one generation of children determines one period of future. Funü’s quality (“suzhi”) is associated with the total quality of the people; funü’s development is associated with the gross national power (my translation)

This is the opening sentence of the above-mentioned 2003 essay – the People’s Daily’s application of “keeping up with the times” to women. Here, funü is constructed as the national mother: she breeds her biological children who become the future of the nation; her own quality is associated with the quality of her children that in turn determines the quality of the people; therefore, her development becomes a determining factor of the national power. Such formulation of women as a national mother was seen earlier in the formulation of nüxing jiaoyu. However, this time, the formulation around funü is more directly associated with suzhi.

This part thus offers a review of scholarship on suzhi to highlight that the suzhi discourse has been used to mediate the tensions between rural migrant labor in cities and city residents. Through the suzhi discourse, funü, which had been deeply rooted in rural space in its revolutionary past, is conceptualized as “less” than an urban citizen. To “keep up with the times”, funü is required to gain suzhi and become “new nüxing” (“新女性”) with the “Four-self Spirit”.

What is quality (“suzhi”)?

Writing in different contexts, both Yan Hairong (2008) and Alexander Day (2017) have defined quality (“suzhi”) as a political discourse embodying fundamentally a sense of inferiority or lack in the subject. In her work on rural migrant women working in the cities as domestic workers (baomu, 保姆), Yan (2008) traced the conception of “intellectuals’ burdens” in the 1980s through Shen Rong’s literature work “At Middle Age” (1980) in which the protagonist Dr. Lu failed her role as

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21. This essay is published on August 22, 2003 written by Hu guo. The headline in Chinese is “发展时代展亮丽人生——写在中国妇女九大开幕之际”. The translated Chinese text originally is “一代母亲影响一代孩子，一代孩子决定一段未来。妇女素质牵连一个民族的整体素质，妇女发展关乎一个国家的综合国力.”
either a wife or a mother because of the heavy “double burdens” from the domestic work and a paid job. This had been a gendered issue – “women’s burdens”, but was re-configured as “intellectuals’ burdens”, thus becoming burdens of a social stratum. In this way, domestic workers as a common profession for migrant women were valorized in urban sphere. However, in this process, what was also constructed within rural women was “a vague sense of shame on the urban front: they embodied a trace of the past in the socialist present” (33). In the family service companies in cities where migrant women found job positions, they were also trained to experience their dual process of labor migration: “economic process of exchange of labor power for wages” and “a social process that enable(d) rural women to gain suzhi” (112). As such, Yan defined, “suzhi, for which ‘quality’ (wa)s in many respects an inadequate translation, refer(ed) to the somewhat ephemeral qualities of civility, self-discipline, and modernity. Suzhi mark(ed) a sense and sensibility of the self’s value in the market economy” (113). This is why the laboring masses’ lack of suzhi is often seen in elite or intellectual discourse. This is also why funü as a category that addresses women of different backgrounds is always conveniently used together with poverty and backwardness in People’s Daily.

Alexander Day (2013)’s focus was on the figure of peasant in intellectual discourse. He argued, “the dominant meaning of suzhi within postsocialist discourse ... (wa)s closely linked to the changing notion of the value of labor power at a time in which China was integrating with global capitalism. Without paying close attention to that frame, the predominance of the discourse of suzhi is impossible to understand.” (Day 2013: 37, n73) In other words, suzhi is a social, cultural, political, and historical construction attributed and contributing to social integration. Day traced post-Mao Chinese intellectuals’ definition of suzhi as “the quality of engaging in commodity production and management” (41) and argued the suzhi discourse was how peasants were motivated to enter into the urban labor market; “the discourse of suzhi not only replaced discussions of class, but (was) a reformulation of peasant”. And more importantly, the suzhi discourse and the related practice thus produced “a lack of a quality in the peasant that needed to be introduced from the outside” (41).

Obviously, the suzhi discourse is a social mobilizer that drives rural people to become urban work force and transgresses gender issues as issues of social strata that are supposedly digested by rural female workers.

As for the urban life of these female migrant workers, Hong Kong-based anthropologist Pun Ngai (2005) investigated into the life and work of dagongmei (“打工妹”, young rural girls taking temporary jobs in cities that are usually based on daily payment). Pun argued that the state attracted the foreign capital at the expense of the dagongmei’s interest and the state’s Hukou system (the Chinese birthplace-based ID registration system) deprived the dagongmei of the opportunity
to stay in the cities they worked in. They became women of “low suzhi” (“低素质”) with low fashion tastes and lack of self-esteem. Even their menstruation was viewed as the symbol of their gender inferiority, which in turn legitimated women’s lower pay than men.

Seen from the above scholarship, the suzhi discourse has produced a sense of lack, less-ness, and inferiority in female migrant workers from multiple registers of class, region and corporeality. Based on this, the following section explores the subsequent formulations of suzhi, funü and new nüxing.

**Suzhi, funü and new nüxing**

Back to the People’s Daily when suzhi has been applied to the figure of women, the path to fulfill the sense of lack, less-ness, and inferiority is the improvement of suzhi.

One example is an essay addressing funü work, ACWF cadres are called upon to “to formulate suzhi from inside and establish image outside”.22 “Where there is funü, there is funü work and funü organization … (and there requires) the cadre teams with high suzhi”.23 In this way, their work can keep up with the times. Through the suzhi discourse, women are called upon to adjust to the new state time by receiving training, organizing work-team and thus fundamentally gaining and internalizing the suzhi that they lack. As such, even though funü are not ideal female neoliberal citizens, through this process, they are attached to the nation and promised a future when they “keep up with the times”.

Those women who have had their suzhi improved may be addressed as new nüxing (“新女性”). In the then Chinese President Hu Jintao’s seminar with the cadres in ACWF in 2003,24 he called upon women “to continually increase one’s suzhi through learning and become a new nüxing of the times with the ‘Four-Self Spirit’”.25 This same phrase was used in his speech addressing the 100th anniversary of Deng Yingchao’s birth in 2004, the speech from Zhao Yinying, a female NPC

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22. Its Chinese text is “内提素质外树形象” from an essay named “肩负新使命 实现新跨越——妇联组织创新发展纪实” by 孙钱斌 and 柳晓森 published on October 28, 2008.

23. Its Chinese text is “哪里有妇女,哪里就有妇女工作,哪里就应该有妇女组织.……（就需要）高素质的干部队伍” . Ibid.

24. This essay is published on August 28, 2003 written by Wu Ke. The headline in Chinese is “胡锦涛在同全国妇联新一届领导班子成员和中国妇女九大部分代表座谈时希望广大妇女自强不息艰苦奋斗开拓创新 开创我国妇女事业的新局面 曾庆红李长春出席座谈会”.

25. Its Chinese text is “要通过学习不断提高自己各方面的素质，具有自尊、自信、自立、自强精神的时代新女性”.
representative from Macau in 2006, and other editorials at other moments in the *People's Daily*. When new *nüxing* appears, she is often formulated together with “the times” – new *nüxing* of the times (“时代新女性”); many of such formulations have the “Four-self Spirit” as a qualifier.

The formulation of the “Four-self Spirit” deserves some explanation here. The term first appeared in Kang Keqing (the then ACWF’s core member)’s report in the Fifth National Women’s Conference on September 12, 1983. The report named five aspects as paths for *funū*’s developments and the Four-self was mentioned as self-respect (“自尊”), self-love (“自爱”), self-esteem (“自重”) and self-strength (“自强”).

In ACWF’s work report during the Sixth National Women’s Conference in 1988, the “Four-self Spirit” was officially interpreted and re-formulated. “Self-respect (wa)s to respect one’s own human character, maintain one’s own esteem, and protest self-lightening and self-lowering; self-confidence (wa)s to have confidence in one’s own power, stick to one’s own belief, and protest self-denial; self-dependence (wa)s to establish independence, fulfill one’s own social value, and protest dependency; and self-strength (wa)s to strive, exert oneself to make progress, and protest self-abasement and self-weakening.” Since then, this “Four-self Spirit” became the so-called new *nüxing*’s consciousness (“新女性意识”). In the same conference, the “Four-self Spirit” was officially written into the ACWF protocol to “educate and lead the *funū* mass, strengthen the spirits of self-esteem, self-confidence, self-dependence, and self-strengthening, increase *suzhi* from all aspects, and promote the development of *funū* personnel.”

Throughout the formulations, the problems of *funū*’s *suzhi* were stressed to legitimate the needs of promoting the “Four-self Spirit”. As the scholarship on *suzhi* has informed us, the subjects who need to work on *suzhi* are less, lack and inferior. To apply the “Four-self Spirit” here into this complex, the self-hood of *funū* is constructed as lack of “respect”, “confidence”, “independence” and “strength”; the nation offers fulfillment of these “qualities” and then *funū* becomes new *nüxing*. In this way, when the rural labor is mobilized into the urban-oriented market economy and the urban space is constructed as culturally privileged space, the efforts *funū* has to take and the sacrifices she has to make in order to “keep up with the times” are legitimated as such.

26. The Chinese text is “自尊,就是尊重自己的人格,維護自己的尊嚴,反對自輕自賤;自信,就是相信自己的力量,堅定自己的信念,反對妄自菲薄;自立,就是樹立獨立意識,體現自己的社會價值,反對依附順從;自強,就是頑強拼搏;奮發進取,反對自卑自弱”.

27. The Chinese text is “教育引導廣大婦女,增強自尊、自信、自立、自強精神,全面提高素質,促進婦女人才成長”.

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As mentioned earlier, the formulation of “keeping up with the times” also involves the notion of ceaseless movement and the flexibility that comes along with it. This is why “keeping up with the times” can always be formulated with the idea of “new”-ness. If nüxing has embodied a controversial past – the fantasy and failure of the western bourgeois modernity and the tension and conflicts between different ideologies inherited in the colonial and revolutionary pasts, the formulation of “new nüxing with the ‘Four-self Spirit’” can serve as a mediator in the reform era.

Conclusion: Time, women and the affective value of the formulated text

To conclude, this paper investigates into the formulated texts on “keeping up with the times” and categories of women (funü and/or nüxing) in the post-Mao People’s Daily. It makes two arguments accordingly.

First, in contemporary China, nüxing jiaoyu (women’s education), as a marketing strategy that attracts both capital and desire, becomes a creative scene where both the corporeal women and their images in text can be gazed at and consumed. Becoming new nüxing through education is advocated as an individual achievement in China’s neoliberalization in the global world.

Second, the formulation of funü and suzhi reveals the conception of funü as the less, the lack and the inferior in China’s urbanization. As such, funü is attached to the nation through the promise it offers: when her suzhi is improved, there is potentiality that she becomes new nüxing with the “Four-self Spirit”. The re-appropriation of funü provides a site for the CCP to mediate its own relationship with the revolutionary past and to legitimate the obstacles it may encounter in its ongoing development.

In the early twentieth century, nüxing broke up with the Confucian traditions and took the “western” path to modernity; in contemporary China, the new nüxing starts to embody a different virtuous model of the times related to both the traditional gender norms and the engendering global relations. For one thing, since the reform era has to find new gender ideologies different from those in the socialist era, the traditional gender norms may be used as a convenient source to maintain and reinforce the existent social order, especially the institutions of hetero-normative families. For another, nüxing’s past relations with the Euro-American modernity makes it stick out for building international relations in the global world. As such, the “new nüxing” mediates the tensions between the traditional and the modern in China’s self-positioning historically and globally.

With the strategic syntheses of pasts, presents and futures, a “time” is constructed. In it, these historical signs (funü, nüxing, jiaoyu and suzhi) stick together
and accumulate affective values. As such, a new “womanhood” in relation to the nation is constructed, circulates and intensifies. Encountering these signs of life, women identify their historical pasts and presents, their differences in class and regions, thus feeling their gendered ways in the rapidly-changing China.

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References


CHAPTER 14

A study of Chinese non-basic color terms from the perspective of cognitive semantics

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This paper makes a study from the perspective of cognitive semantics of Chinese non-basic color terms, the subcategories of color terms, on their representation, cognitive motivation and cultural connotation. It is found that there are four major representation forms of non-basic color terms in Chinese: object color terms, proper noun color terms, color terms denoting degree, color terms denoting mixed color. The major cognitive motivations are metaphor, metonymy and conceptual integration. The use of cultural-specific terms to capture fine distinctions of color reveals from one aspect how the Chinese subcategorize color concept and construe color experience as meaning as well as the close relationship between linguistic categories, cognitive capacity and ethnic traditions.

Keywords: non-basic color terms, categorization, transcategorization, representation forms, cognitive motivation

Introduction

Color terms, as the products of human perception, categorization and encoding of color with natural language, are words and expressions denoting the color attributes of things, including hue, brightness and saturation and form a relatively independent yet dynamic lexical system of natural language, which were viewed as a best-case argument for linguistic relativity prior to Berlin and Kay (1999)'s linguistic universalist tradition, have been a concern of some of the best minds in the linguistic discipline and remain one of the leading issues in the linguistic studies of the day.

Relevant studies have been carried out from different perspectives and achieved fruitful results. In the early stage of linguistic studies of color terms,

When Chinese scholars carry out linguistic studies of color terms, they mainly focus on the traditional exegetic study of Chinese color terms (Hu Pu’an 1941; Zhang Qingchang 1991; Zhang Yongyan 1992), the semantic study of Chinese color terms (Liu Junjie 1985; Yao Xiaoping 1988; Zhan Renfeng 1990; Liu Danqing 1990; Ye Jun 2001) and the cognitive semantic study of Chinese color terms (Li Hongyin 2007). Besides, some Chinese scholars also conduct a study of English color terms in terms of their classification (Zhang Peiji 1964), a socio-cognitive study of Chinese students’ color codability in English (Yang Yonglin 2002) as well as contrastive studies of English and Chinese color terms (Xie Haijiang and Zhang Liping 2004) and of English and Chinese non-basic color terms (Xue Yahong 2013; Xue Yahong and Yang Zhong 2014). Some foreign scholars also carry out studies of Chinese color terms on the history of these color terms (Baxter 1983), on the use of them (Jin Funian 2003) and on cross-cultural color-naming of English and Mandarin Chinese (Lin, Luo, MacDonald and Tarrant 2001a, 2001b, 2001c).

These studies offer deeper insight into the universal acquisition sequence of the color categories, their features as well as their semantic structures, which lay a solid foundation and provide valuable data for the further studies of them. Yet there are also limitations in the above studies. For example, when doing relevant research, the scholars often take basic color terms as the research focus, following the theoretical paradigms of either linguistic relativity or linguistic universality, with non-basic color terms – the subcategories of color – terms infrequently investigated or often ignored, with little quantitative study and little interpretation of the inner semantic mechanism, and the socio-cultural factors involved in their formation, thus revealing just several aspects of the many problems in the study of color terms. So this paper conducts a study of the subcategories of the Chinese color terms with cognitive categorization theory and conceptual mapping theory as its theoretical framework, aiming to answer the following three research questions:

1. What are the representation forms of Chinese non-basic color terms?
2. What are the cognitive motivations involved in the naming of Chinese non-basic color terms?
3. What are the most frequently used non-basic color terms in Chinese? Are Chinese non-basic color terms culture-specific? If so, what socio-cultural factors are involved in the naming of these non-basic color terms?

In order to clarify the distinctions between the actual colors and their corresponding color terms, in this paper, the words for the colors themselves are written in the normal lowercase, whereas the color terms are written in the uppercase with the Chinese color terms in italics and English translations of these Chinese color terms are attached to them in brackets. Thus, “lan (blue)” signifies the Chinese blue color, while “lan (blue)” represents the Chinese color term for BLUE.

Defining Chinese basic color terms and non-basic color terms

Color terms hold an important position in the study of categorization, “in many respects color terminology provides an ideal testing ground for theories of categorization” (Taylor 2001: 2). As one of the most important cognitive functions by which people learn about color, color categorization allows a color to be assigned to a specific color group. Based on the cognitive categorization theory (Rosch 1975a, 1975b, 1975c, 1978), color terms, as the results of the color categorization and encoding of color with natural language, are of three hierarchical levels: superordinate level – the whole concept of “color”, basic level – the focal colors and subordinate level – a finer subdivision of the focal colors. And Berlin and Kay (1999)’s theory of basic color terms are the results of their research of color terms at the basic level category. According to Berlin and Kay (1999: 6), ideally, each basic color term should exhibit the following four characteristics:

i. It is monolexemic; that is, its meaning is not predictable from the meaning of its parts;
ii. Its signification is not included in that of any other color term;
iii. Its application must not be restricted to a narrow class of objects;
iv. It must be psychologically salient for informants.

By these linguistic and psychological criteria, they conclude that there are eleven basic color terms in English: WHITE, BLACK, RED, YELLOW, GREEN, BLUE, BROWN, PURPLE, PINK, ORANGE, and GRAY (Berlin and Kay 1999: 2–3) and six basic color terms in Chinese: WHITE, BLACK, RED, GREEN, YELLOW, BLUE (Berlin and Kay 1999: 84).

However, Berlin and Kay’s criteria neglect such factors as the historical development, the frequency of use and word-forming capacity of color terms in defining the basic color terms. Taking these factors into consideration together
with Berlin and Kay’s criteria, I conclude that there are also eleven basic color terms in Chinese: bai (white), hei (black), hong (red), huang (yellow), li (green), lan (blue), zi (purple), fen (pink), hui (gray), zong (brown) and he (dark brown), with the English basic color term orange put in the category of huang (yellow) in Chinese, because when cheng, the Chinese equivalent for the English color term orange, is used as a color term in Chinese, it often occurs with se (color) or with basic color terms, such as hong (red), huang (yellow), as in cheng se (orange color) or cheng huang (orange yellow), instead of being used independently. The reason why zi (purple), fen (pink), hui (gray) and zong (brown) are defined as basic color terms is that according to Berlin and Kay (1999: 14), the evolution of basic color terms is gradual and sequential. And in the dynamic development of Chinese basic color terms, these four color terms have gained higher percentage of use frequency and stronger word formation capacity, manifesting their nature as basic color terms. He (dark brown), as a color term, though appearing fairly late and not often used independently, can form a relatively large number of new color terms when combined with se (color) or other basic color terms, thus can be considered a basic color term. What is worth noticing is that both the two basic color terms zong (brown) and he (dark brown) denote the color range between red and yellow and they are often used interchangeably.

Non-basic color terms are the subcategories of color terms, which are categories formed by further cutting of the color continuum with basic color terms as the cognitive reference points, and which, like the basic color terms, also have the features of boundary fuzziness, semantic vagueness and open-endedness of the denotational range. But unlike the basic color terms, which are broad color categories of the color continuum, non-basic color terms capture the fine and minute distinctions of colors and often have meanings predictable from their parts. For example, xiangjiao huang (banana yellow), jiemhuang (mustard yellow) and huang cancan (bright yellow) are the non-basic color terms within the same basic color category of huang (yellow), yet they denote different tints and shades of yellow, with xiangjiao huang (banana yellow) denoting the kind of yellow like the color of the ripe banana, jiemhuang (mustard yellow), the yellow color of mustard, and huang cancan (bright yellow), the color of bright and shining gold yellow.

Research procedure

After the Chinese basic color terms and non-basic color terms have been defined, the data for the present study are collected from the Corpus of Chinese Language (CCL for short) and from an experiment involving a panel of 100 native speakers of Chinese.
CCL is a corpus developed by the Center for Chinese Linguistics of Peking University, one of the largest computerized corpus of Chinese in the world, consisting of an ancient Chinese corpus of 201 million characters and a modern Chinese corpus of 582 million characters, and is freely-available online. The latter corpus is divided among contemporary spoken Chinese, popular magazines, newspapers, literary works, movies and translation works.

The data of Chinese non-basic color terms are collected from the modern Chinese corpus of CCL with Chinese basic color terms and the Chinese word se (color) as the search words. Those non-basic color terms frequently used today yet not included in CCL are collected from an experiment in which 100 native speakers of Chinese who are undergraduates majoring in English language and literature are asked to write down as many Chinese color terms as they can in the order they think of them in 10 minutes. They are given one piece of paper with 50 numbered spaces and are told if they need more space they can use the back of the sheet.

Then the frequency of each of the collected Chinese non-basic color terms is calculated, the results being shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2. After that, the most frequently used Chinese non-basic color terms are categorized into different representation types based on their morphological structure and semantic structure. Next, the cognitive motivations of these Chinese non-basic color terms are analyzed based on the cognitive mapping theory. Finally, the socio-cultural factors involved in the naming of these Chinese non-basic color terms are discussed.

The representation forms of Chinese non-basic color terms

From CCL, 535 Chinese non-basic color terms are collected, and the result of the data of the 30 most frequently used Chinese non-basic color terms collected from it is shown in Figure 1.

It is shown in Figure 1 that cang bai (pale white) and jin huang (gold yellow) rank first and second in the most frequently used Chinese non-basic color terms, and it is also revealed that the morphological structure and the semantic structure of these non-basic color terms are quite different from one another.


2. Since conceptual metonymy, conceptual metaphor and conceptual integration all involve conceptual mapping, with conceptual metonymy mapping occurring in one and the same cognitive domain, conceptual metaphor and conceptual integration mapping cross domains respectively, here in this paper, they are collectively called cognitive mapping.
From the experiment, 298 Chinese non-basic color terms are collected, 47 of which get a score higher than ten. The 30 most salient Chinese non-basic color terms collected from the experiment are shown in Figure 2.

From Figure 2, it is found that cheng (orange) and qing (black, green or blue) rank first and second in the 30 most salient Chinese non-basic color terms, while cheng se (orange color) and qing se (black, green or blue color), the two synonymous Chinese non-basic color terms denoting the same color as cheng (orange) and qing (black, green or blue) are also among the most frequently used non-basic

Figure 2. The 30 most salient Chinese non-basic color terms collected from the experiment
color terms found in CCL, where they rank 25th and 26th respectively. Similar results can also be found for yin se (silver color), jin se (gold color), jin huang (gold yellow), fen hong (pink red) and mo lü (black-ink green) as is seen in Figure 1 and Figure 2, showing their popularity in the Chinese culture.

It is also found, from the experiment, that there are 40 Chinese non-basic color terms which are quite popular nowadays yet not included in CCL, such as luo se (nude color), nainai hui (granny gray), xiangbin jin (champagne gold), APEC lan (APEC blue), and dream zi (dream purple) etc., making the representation of the Chinese non-basic color terms more diversified.

The analysis of the morphological structure and the semantic structure of the 833 Chinese non-basic color terms collected from CCL and from the experiment reveals that Chinese non-basic color terms are of the following four major representation forms:

Object color terms

Object color terms refer to the color terms denoting quite precisely the colors of particular kinds of objects in the physical world, which are of five sub-types: object name; object name + BCT3; object name + se (color); BCT + object name + se (color); object name + object name, as is represented by jin (gold), xigua hong (watermelon red), cha se (tea color), hong qi se (red paint color) and meigui jin (rose gold) respectively. Jin (gold), originally, is the name for the metal “jin” (gold), since it has its particular shining color, the word develops a new sense, denoting the color of the metal. In a similar vein, xigua hong (watermelon red) denotes the color of the juicy red flesh of watermelon, and meigui jin (rose gold) is the Chinese translation of rose gold, a color of iPhone 5S, which is formed by combining two object names “rose” and “gold”, denoting the color of pink with the shining tint of gold.

Proper noun color terms

Proper noun color terms refer to the color terms denoting the color associated with the user, the institution or the place related to the color, which are of five major sub-types: place name + BCT; institution name + BCT; person name + BCT; car name + BCT; place name + object color term, as is represented by gugong hong (The Imperial Palace red), APEC lan (APEC blue), lixiu hui (Rikyu gray), fengtian bai (Toyota white) and kailuo jin (Cairo gold) respectively, with gugong hong (The Imperial Palace red) denoting the bright red color with which the Imperial Palace in Beijing is painted, also termed zhongguo hong (China red), a color that the

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3. In this paper, BCT is the abbreviation of “basic color term”.
Chinese people favor in decorating their houses in their traditional holidays like the Spring Festival and on other important occasions like the wedding ceremony, APEC lan (APEC blue) the clean and clear azure sky during the APEC Conference held in Beijing in autumn 2014, showing the longing for the blue sky of the local Beijing people when air pollution was a serious problem there.

There are also Chinese proper noun color terms which are translation of color terms in other languages. For example guoji kelaiyin lan (international Klein blue), ailisi lan (Alice blue) and difuni lan (Tiffany blue) are introduced to Chinese from English, and maqinta hong is Chinese equivalent of the English color term MAGENTA, with the basic color term HONG added to the Chinese transliteration of MAGENTA, to mark it a color term due to the different rules of morphology, syntax and lexical coining of the two languages, while lixiu hui (Rikyū gray) is the transliteration of the Japanese color term りきゅうはい (Rikyū gray), which gets its name from Sen Rikyū (1522-1591), also known simply as Rikyū, a master of tea ceremony and adviser of Toyotomi Hideyoshi. Rikyū redefined the tea ceremony, established the concepts of wabi, that is, deliberate simplicity in daily living and preferred cigarette ash-dyed gray cotton clothes to the luxurious ones in serving tea. In time, this color became very popular and りきゅうはい” (Rikyū gray) was established as a color term and was often used in Japanese Waka, as is shown in the following example:

It continues drizzling, at the rocky shore of Jogashima.---  
The rain of the Rikyū gray …

Color terms denoting degree

Color terms denoting degree refer to those color terms which signify the brightness and saturation of color, often formed with adjectives showing different shades of color modifying basic color terms. For instance, shen hong (deep red), xian huang (bright yellow), dan lan (light blue), etc. Besides, in Chinese color terms denoting degree, there is also one type that is formed by BCT + post-modifiers, such as

4. Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1537–98) is a preeminent warrior of the Azuchi-Momoyama period in Japan, originally known as Kinoshita Toshiro. He is regarded as Japan’s second “great unifier” and noted for a number of cultural legacies, including the restriction that only members of the samurai class could bear arms. He financed the construction, restoration and rebuilding of many temples standing today in Kyoto. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Toyotomi_Hideyoshi

5. Waka is a type of poetry in classical Japanese literature. It is a general term for several different types of poems, each with its own composing format.

6. The reduplicatives such as “yaya”, “youyou”, “mangmang” and other words such as “bu liu qiu” and “gu long dong” are post-modifiers rather than suffixes as is thought of by some
hong tongtong (bright red), lan wangwang (dazzling blue), hei bu liu qiu (swarthy). These color terms convey not only color information but also the feelings and emotions of the color term users, their love or hate of the things described. However, these post-modifiers have limited collocations and limited usage, some of which can only collocate with certain basic color terms. For instance, “youyou”, literally meaning “smooth”, “shiny”, often collocates with lü (green) and hei (black) as in lü youyou (shiny green) and hei youyou (shiny black), but not in huang youyou (shiny yellow) or bai youyou (shiny white). The reason is that “youyou” is mainly used to describe the color of grass, plant, or forest with thriving and burgeoning vitality, or describe the soil which is shining or moist. Similarly, “mangmang”, literally meaning “(often describing water) having no boundaries or not be seen clearly”, is often attached to the basic color term bai (white), giving people the feeling of a vast expansion of visual vagueness and strengthening the diffusion of endless whiteness of snow, cloud or fog. Likewise, hei yaya (dark mass of) is used only to describe the density of a crowd of people or the dark cloud, giving people the feeling of vagueness and depression, hong pupu (glowing red) describing the human complexion, while lü yinyin (lush meadow green), the grassland. Besides, there are another two types of color terms denoting degree, formed by evaluation adjective + BCT and BCT + evaluation adjective respectively, used to describe human complexion and its skin moisture, for example, sha bai (pallid), referring to the kind of pale as a result of fear, anger, or disease, hong run (rosy), tender and rosy (skin, cheeks, etc.), huang shou (unhealthily yellow), pale yellow, etc., which also convey the user’s feelings and emotions towards the things described.

Color terms denoting mixed color

Color terms denoting mixed color refer to those color terms that are formed by combining two basic color terms to signify a color resulting from a mix of two different colors. For example: lan lü (blue-green) and zi hong (purple-red) refer to the kind of color that is between blue and green, purple and red, respectively. It is found that there are altogether 74 color terms denoting mixed color in Chinese.

Besides the above four major representation forms of Chinese non-basic color terms, there are also some Chinese non-basic color terms which get their names from the specific types of people or occupations associated with the color. For example: tuhao jin (Beverly Hillbillies gold), ying’er lan (baby blue), ying’er fen (baby pink), zumu lü (granny green), xuesheng lan (student blue), nainai hui (granny gray), jun lü (army man green), of which nainai hui (granny gray) denotes Chinese scholars, because they are not very productive and can only be attached to a limited number of words.
the color of granny’s gray hair, while zumu lü (granny green) denoting the color of emerald is a transliteration of the ancient Persian color term zumurud, though the color of which almost has nothing to do with “zumu” (granny). xuesheng lan (student blue) refers to the color of the deep blue trousers traditionally worn by the primary school students. Most of these color terms are often culture-specific, peculiar to the Chinese culture.

From the above analysis, it is found that there are four major representation forms of the 833 Chinese non-basic color terms collected from CCL and from the experiment in terms of the morphological structure and semantic structure: object color terms, proper noun color terms, color terms denoting degree, color terms denoting mixed color. Besides there are also some Chinese non-basic color terms which cannot be put in the above four categories, thus they are put in “other non-basic color terms” type, which can be shown in Figure 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types</th>
<th>Morphological structure</th>
<th>Examples</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Object color terms</td>
<td>Object name+BCT</td>
<td><em>hu lan</em> (lake blue)</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Object name+color</td>
<td><em>kafei se</em> (coffee color)</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Object name</td>
<td><em>jin</em> (gold)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BCT+Object name + color</td>
<td><em>huangtong se</em> (yellow copper color)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Object name+object color term</td>
<td><em>xiangbin jin</em> (champagne gold)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Place name+BCT</td>
<td><em>beijing lan</em> (Beijing blue)</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Institution name+BCT</td>
<td><em>APEC lan</em> (APEC blue)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proper noun color terms</td>
<td>Person name+BCT</td>
<td><em>lixiu hui</em> (Rikyū gray)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Car name+BCT</td>
<td><em>fengtian bai</em> (Toyota white)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Place name+ object color term</td>
<td><em>taiguo yin</em> (Thailand silver)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adj. showing degree +BCT</td>
<td><em>dan hong</em> (light red)</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Color terms denoting degree</td>
<td>Evaluation Adj.+BCT</td>
<td><em>sha huang</em> (pale yellow)</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BCT+evaluation adj.</td>
<td><em>huang shou</em> (unhealthily yellow)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BCT+post-modifier</td>
<td><em>lü youyou</em> (shiny green)</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>color terms denoting mixed color</td>
<td>BCT+BCT</td>
<td><em>lan lü</em> (blue-green)</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 14. A cognitive semantic study of Chinese non-basic color terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types</th>
<th>Morphological structure</th>
<th>Examples</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other non-basic color terms</td>
<td>Address terms+BCT</td>
<td>nainai hui (granny gray)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X²+BCT</td>
<td>jun lì (army man green)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>833</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3. The representation forms of Chinese non-basic color terms collected from CCL and from the experiment

Cognitive motivations of Chinese non-basic color terms

The analysis of the above data based on the cognitive mapping theory reveals that the derivation of the Chinese non-basic color terms from the basic color categories is the cognitive process of subcategorization, during which such cognitive means as metaphor, metonymy and conceptual integration are resorted to.

Metaphor

According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 1), “our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature.” Metaphor is a basic way of human cognition, a process of transcategorization, in other words, it is a cognitive instrument by which we understand and experience the unknown things by resorting to the known. Metaphor is conceptual in nature. Conceptual metaphor is to project the unidirectional cognitive mapping from source domain to target domain. The source domain is a concrete cognitive domain that we can experience directly, whereas the target domain is an abstract and im palpable cognitive domain. According to Kövecses (2005: 9), metaphor is not simply linguistic and conceptual but also bodily in nature. Metaphors fall into three categories: structural metaphor, ontological metaphor and orientational metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). In the derivation of Chinese non-basic color terms, two of them are mainly involved: ontological metaphor and orientational metaphor.

There are also some Chinese non-basic color terms which are formed by modifiers of various kinds combined with BCTs. For instance, words showing the identities of the users or occupations, such as students, army men, etc. can be combined with BCTs to form color terms, like xuesheng lan (student blue) that we mentioned above. There are also color terms formed by combining English words as modifiers and Chinese BCTs together, for example: dream zi (dream purple) and ink lan (black-ink blue). Since there is no umbrella term to cover these modifiers, X is used instead.
Most of the object color terms and the proper noun color terms are cognitively motivated by ontological metaphors, that is, our bodily experience with physical objects provides us with the basis for ways of conceptualizing and viewing the colors as entities and substances. It is found that the source domains of the ontological metaphors mainly include the domains of plants, animals, minerals/metals, jewels, natural phenomena and human activities, of which the plant domain ranks first in both the color terms formed by object names and basic color terms combined and the color terms formed by object names and se (color) combined. For example, in the naming of *bajiao lü* (plantain green), the plant domain is taken as the source domain, with the specific color of the plant “plantain” mapped onto color in the target domain, while in the naming of *yeying hei* (nightingale black), a body color of Honda Accord, a famous Japanese car brand, the shining black of the feather of the nightingale from the animal domain is mapped onto the body color of the car, matching the metallic black of the car body in the target domain. In this case, there is not only the color connection but also an added non-color element involved, that is, by naming the black color of the car body *yeying hei* (nightingale black), “the manufacturer hopes to evoke pleasant feelings in the potential buyer” (Biggam 2012: 50). *Yeying hei* (nightingale black) refers unmistakably to black, but is, simultaneously, likely to remind the potential buyers of zingy taste, thus motivating them to buy the product. In this way, such color terms are called “evocative” (Biggam 2012: 50).

Besides, the choices of entities in the source domains also reveal the culture-specific features in Chinese, as is illustrated by such Chinese object color terms as *zao hong* (Chinese date red), *mi se* (millet color) and *jiang se* (soybean paste color), which get their names from the typical Chinese foods: Chinese date, 8 millet9 and flavoring yellow soybean paste10 respectively, denoting the specific colors of these favorite foods of the Chinese.

Ontological metaphors also work as the cognitive motivation in the naming of proper noun color terms, where the names of persons, places, and institutions are metaphorically mapped onto the target domain to convey the color sense. Actually, it is obvious that neither the persons, nor the places, still less the institutions involved bear any color attribute in themselves, but in actual language use, people

8. Chinese date is native to China and is therefore named. It is also the favorite food for many Chinese.

9. Millet here refers to the small light yellow seeds of certain grass-like plants used as food, an important staple food in northern China, while in English the same color is often referred to as CREAM.

10. Yellow soybean paste is produced in China and is used primarily in Beijing cuisine and other cuisines of northern China, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yellow_soybean_paste).
tend to associate these given entities with the related events or things connected with them and endow them with the desired color attributes and in this way create more complicated metaphorical expressions such as lixiu hui (Rikyū gray), aomen lù (Macao green) and APEC lan (APEC blue) in their color subcategorization and color naming. As can be seen in Figure 6, “place” as the source domain of these proper noun color terms ranks first, much higher than the other entities, bearing it out that the Chinese prefer to take the names of relevant places as the cognitive reference point to denote the colors associated with them, revealing from one aspect that in the naming of non-basic color terms, the Chinese resort to more complex source domains than before, and also revealing the deepening of human coding capacity and the increasing diversity of linguistic expressions.

Figure 4, Figure 5 and Figure 6 show respectively the source domains of the Chinese object color terms (object name + BCT), object color terms (object name + se (color)) and proper noun color terms that are motivated by ontological metaphors.

It is also found that most of the Chinese non-basic color terms denoting degree are motivated by orientational metaphors, which have a basis in our physical and cultural experience and give the color concept a spatial orientation. For example, shen hui (deep gray) and qian zi (shallow purple), which are typically used in Chinese to denote the brightness and saturation of color, are motivated by the orientational metaphors: more is deep and less is shallow.

In addition, it is found that the Chinese non-basic color terms denoting degree formed with BCT and post-modifier combined are motivated by synesthesia, by which is meant “stimulation of one sensory or cognitive pathway leads to automatic, involuntary experiences in a second sensory or cognitive pathway” (Cytowic 2002). Synesthesia is another type of metaphor, an important cognitive vehicle to understand the world and construe reality. “The color terms which are synesthetically motivated can be divided into four subcategories: synesthesia between color vision and audition, synesthesia between color vision and gustation, synesthesia between color vision and dermal sense and synesthesia between color vision and olfactory sense” (Xue Yahong 2013). For example, “dudu” is an onomatopoeic word, motivated phonologically by the sound made by a trumpet. And fen dudu (pleasant pink) is formed by communicating between color vision and audition, meaning pleasant pink. In a similar vein, lü rongrong (lush medow green), huang nennen (tender yellow) and fen fufu (sweet-smelling pink) are formed by communicating between the color vision and dermal sense, color vision and gustation, and color vision and olfactory sense. Formed by communicating between color vision and different senses, these color terms are more vivid and denote not only information of color but also people’s feelings and emotions of love or hate towards the things described.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source domain</th>
<th>Plant</th>
<th>Natural phenomenon</th>
<th>Animal</th>
<th>Chemical industry</th>
<th>Food</th>
<th>Artifact</th>
<th>Gem</th>
<th>Human activity</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>44</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>29.78</td>
<td>16.18</td>
<td>13.23</td>
<td>12.13</td>
<td>11.03</td>
<td>9.93</td>
<td>5.88</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 4.** The source domains of Chinese object color terms (object name + BCT) motivated by ontological metaphors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source domain</th>
<th>Plant</th>
<th>Chemical industry</th>
<th>Food</th>
<th>Animal</th>
<th>Artifact</th>
<th>Natural phenomenon</th>
<th>Gem</th>
<th>Human activity</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>16.67</td>
<td>15.83</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>9.17</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>4.17</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 5.** The source domains of Chinese object color terms (object name + se (color)) motivated by ontological metaphors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source domain</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Car</th>
<th>Place+object</th>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Person</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 6.** The source domains of Chinese proper noun color terms motivated by ontological metaphors
Metonymy

Like metaphor, metonymy is also conceptual in nature and can be explained as mapping processes. The main difference between the two is that while in metaphor, there are two conceptual domains and a mapping occurs across the two domains, metonymy involves only one conceptual domain, and a metonymic mapping occurs within a single domain, not across domains (Lakoff and Turner 1989: 103). For instance, the White House, the official residence and workplace of the President of the United States, can metonymically stand for the government of the United States. In the case of color naming, people often associate the relevant, salient colors with the names of plants, animals, artifacts, chemical products and jewels which bear those colors by means of metonymy. Sometimes, people also associate colors with the names of some relevant events. For example, Magenta is the name of a town in northern Italy, where the famous Battle of Magenta took place in 1859. Coincidentally, the purplish-red aniline dye was discovered shortly after the battle. In honor of the battle, people come to refer to fuchsin, the purplish red of the dye, metonymically as “magenta”.11 The same is true for the Chinese object color terms, where the names of animals, plants, metals, fabrics or natural phenomena are metonymically used to refer to their unique colors, with the names of these entities and the colors of these entities belonging to the same domains. The original senses of the color terms wu (black), zhu (bright red), jin (gold), yin (silver), su (pure white), shuang (white) and xue (snow white) are “crow”, “red tree”, gold”, “silver”, “white raw silk”, “frost” and “snow”. When these entities belonging to the domains of animals, plants, metals, fabrics and natural phenomena are mapped onto the domain of color to stand for their specific colors, these color terms come into existence as the results of ontological metonyms which can be expressed as “entity stands for entity’s color” (Casson 1994: 17). However, such color terms are fewer in Chinese, accounting for only 1.32% in the Chinese non-basic color terms, as is shown in Figure 7 and Figure 8.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source domain</th>
<th>Animal</th>
<th>Mineral</th>
<th>Natural phenomenon</th>
<th>Plant</th>
<th>Fabric</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>27.27</td>
<td>27.27</td>
<td>27.27</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7. The source domains of the object color terms motivated by metonymy

Unlike the object color terms and proper noun color terms which are metaphorically motivated, the formation of the metonymically motivated color terms has

totally gone beyond the color category, in other words, they are not formed with
the basic color terms as the cognitive reference points and there is no morpheme
in their component parts denoting the color sense, such as se, or red, yellow,
blue, etc. But rather, these color terms are originally the names of the entities
people are familiar with, passing down from ancient Chinese, and are more
contextually restricted, that is, their reference as color can only be defined in the
specific context. For example, only when they are used in such collocations as
“hefa tongyan” (having white hair and a ruby complexion), “xueji” (snow-white
skin), can “he” (crane), and “xue” (snow) acquire the color senses of white, which
are often restricted to the description of human hair and complexion. The same is
true of such color terms as jin (gold), bi (green), yin (silver) and shuang (white), as
in collocations of “jina biyan” (blonde); “yinsi” (threads of silver running through
the hair), “shuangbin” (gray or hoary temples), “yinzhuang suguo” (snow-covered),
etc. Without the proper context, these words would lose their color senses.

**Conceptual integration**

The cognitive motivation of Chinese non-basic color terms denoting mixed colors
is conceptual integration, a basic mental capacity that leads to new meaning,
global insight and conceptual compressions useful for memory and manipulation
of otherwise diffuse ranges of meaning (Fauconnier and Turner 2003: 2).
It involves cross-domain mapping among input spaces, a generic space and the
blended space to generate new meanings. Take the color term heihong (black red)
as an example. It is formed by integrating the basic color terms hei (black) and
hong (red), with hei (black) and hong (red) belonging to two different input spaces,
hei (black) being the color of coal or ink and hong (red) the color of blood. The
two components from the input spaces form a new color concept heihong (black
red) through cross-domain mapping in the blended space, meaning a color with
“black” and “red” combined.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cognitive motivations</th>
<th>Examples</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Metaphor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ontological metaphor</td>
<td>xing se (chestnut)</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>51.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orientational metaphor</td>
<td>qian lü (light green)</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>10.33</td>
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<tr>
<td>Synesthesia</td>
<td>fen dudu (pleasant pink)</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>27.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conceptual integration</td>
<td>heihong (black red)</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>8.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metonymy</td>
<td>jin (gold)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>833</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 8.* Cognitive motivations of Chinese non-basic color terms
As is shown in Figure 8, metaphor, metonymy and conceptual integration are the three major cognitive motivations in the formation of Chinese non-basic color terms. Most of them are motivated by metaphors, with ontological metaphors, synesthesia and orientational metaphors, accounting for 51.98%, 27.49% and 10.33% respectively. Making use of metaphors in naming non-basic color terms reflect from one aspect the Chinese metaphorical thinking in understanding the abstract concepts of color by resorting to concrete entities and bodily experience in their daily lives.

Socio-cultural factors involved in the naming of Chinese non-basic color terms

The naming of the non-basic color terms could reflect how a speech community construes color experience as meaning by drawing on a wide variety of affective, social and cultural features, as is illustrated by such widely used Chinese non-basic color terms as 風情 (China red), 楸 (black-ink green) and APEC 兰 (APEC blue), to name but a few. Zhongguo hong (China red), denotes a color similar to vermeil. It is a preferred color on the important and joyous occasions such as wedding, childbirth and other festive ceremonies in Chinese culture, embodying the special veneration of the red color of the Chinese which originates from their worship of the sun in ancient times, when they expressed their instinct sentimental attachment and worship of the sun in the form of worship dance. In time 紅 (red) comes to occupy a special position in Chinese culture, carrying rich symbolic meanings of turning ill luck into good, festivity, happiness and prosperity, making it a very productive Chinese basic color term in forming non-basic color terms, which can be manifested by the large number of non-basic color terms within the category of 紅 in CCL and in the experiment where there are 109 and 41 non-basic color terms in the category of 紅 respectively, as compared with the fewer numbers of non-basic color terms in other color categories. And the Chinese love and veneration of red comes to get its embodiment in the Chinese language with the color terms 風情 (China red), 廷紅 (The Imperial Palace red) and 伊馬紅 (aunt red) as three typical examples, the first two meaning vermeil, the third meaning deep red.

The origin of the Chinese non-basic color term 伊馬紅 (aunt red), also termed 風情 (aunt color), is associated with a Chinese love story between a girl and a boy in Han Dynasty in ancient China. It is said that before the girl married the boy they dated often, but since the girl lived with her aunt after the death of her parents, they were afraid of being seen by her aunt when the boy came to visit her, so hearing the aunt coming near, the girl would warn the boy by saying “My
aunt is coming”. Later on “My aunt is coming” is used as a euphemistic expression for the monthly menstruation, and now *yima hong* (aunt red) has become a popular color term for blood red or deep red found in fashion magazines and on the Internet loaded with a special emotive experience of the Chinese culture. It has even become the Chinese translation of *Marsala*, the 2015 fashion color issued by Pantone, an international authority on color, getting its name from the fortified wine Marsala.

*Mo lü* (black-ink green) is another color term deep-seated within the Chinese culture, manifesting the Chinese love of painting and calligraphy, with black ink as one of the four treasures in the study (the other three being writing brush, ink slab and paper). And *APEC lan* (APEC blue), as is mentioned earlier, is also a color term carrying the same socio-cultural connotation, showing the yearning for better air quality and the clear blue sky when air quality became one of the top concerns of the local people, thus with Chinese characteristics.

What is worth mentioning is another widely used Chinese non-basic color term *tuhao jin* (Beverly Hillbillies gold), the Chinese translation of *gold*, a color of the high-end product, iPhone 5S. When it first came into the Chinese market, iPhone 5S enjoyed quite a good sale, so some businessmen stored it up to corner the market, making it quite expensive and soon out of supply. Those who admired the brand yet could not get it or afford it, simply nicknamed it “*tuhao jin*” (Beverly Hillbillies gold), associating the holders of the phone with rich rednecks or Beverly Hillbillies to show with a sly humour their “sour grape” envy of them.

Actually, the naming of the such non-basic color terms as *tuhao jin* (Beverly Hillbillies gold), *meigui jin* (rose gold) has gone beyond the basic color terms category, that is, they are not the result of subcategorization of color with basic color terms as the cognitive reference point, but rather with the object color terms as their cognitive reference point.

Besides, unlike English, where some object names can be directly used metonymically to carry the color sense, as is shown in coffee, in Chinese the word “*kafei*” (coffee) can not in itself be used to mean the color of coffee unless it is combined with the headword “*se*” (color), as in *kafei se* (coffee color) or *ka se* (coffee color). This reveals the constraints of the Chinese language system on its language expressions.

**Conclusion**

This paper carries out a study of Chinese non-basic color terms from the perspective of cognitive semantics on their representation forms, cognitive motivations as well as the socio-cultural factors involved in the naming of these color terms.
It is found that there are four main representation forms of non-basic color terms in Chinese: object color terms, proper noun color terms, color terms denoting degree, color terms denoting mixed color. In addition, the Chinese non-basic color terms are the products of the subcategorization of color concepts as well as the products of human transcategorization, during which processes, metaphor, metonymy and conceptual integration work as the major cognitive motivations.

It is also found that most of the Chinese non-basic color terms are culture-specific and are the results of the influence of socio-cultural factors, having great bearing on the ethnic culture. The use of such cultural-specific terms as zhongguo hong (China red), mo lü (black-ink green), APEC lan (APEC blue) and yima hong (aunt red) to capture fine distinctions of color directly reflects how the Chinese subcategorize color concept and construe color experience as meaning, thus throwing some new light on the idea of signs of life: changes and continuity in language, thought and identity, to be more specific, the close relationship between linguistic categories, non-linguistic thinking, cognitive capacity and ethnic traditions. In this sense, the present study lends to some extent cross-cultural support to the new interpretation of Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis by Levinson (1997, 2003), namely, there is universality at the atomic level but differences at the molecular level in human languages (Xue Yahong 2013; Xue Yahong and Yang Zhong 2014). It is hope that the findings of the research into the Chinese non-basic color terms will provide reference for teaching Chinese as a foreign language, English-Chinese translation as well as dictionary compiling.

References


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<td>27</td>
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<td>254</td>
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The dynamics of language, culture and identity are a major focus for many linguists and cognitive and cultural researchers. This book explores the inextricable connection that language has with cultural identity and cultural practices, with a particular emphasis on how they contribute to shaping personal identity. The volume brings together selected peer-reviewed papers from the 7th International Conference on Language, Culture and Mind with other specially commissioned chapters. Like the conference, this book aims to enhance mutual understanding among researchers from diverse disciplinary and theoretical perspectives, offering a wealth of insights to a wide range of readers on recent culturally oriented cognitive studies of language.