INTENTIONALITY, SPEECH ACTS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION
A defense of J. Habermas’ & K.O. Apel’s criticism of Searle

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As the title of this paper perhaps already indicates, I want to confront two further elaborations of Searle’s theory of speech acts. One, by Searle himself, presents itself as an attempt at founding speech act theory in the wider framework of a theory of mind, and what I have in mind is of course Searle’s book *Intentionality* (1983). The other development of speech act theory will be represented by two philosophers, who are treated in the context of analytic philosophy and linguistic pragmatics as rather suspect thinkers: Jürgen Habermas and Karl Otto Apel. The research programme of ‘universal pragmatics’ (Habermas’ term) which is closely related to Apel’s ‘transcendental pragmatics’ obtained its final touch as part of Habermas’ *Theory of Communicative Action* and relies very much on speech act theory. It is never easy to confront philosophers with very different backgrounds and such a confrontation often results in something like a stale mate situation, where each party accuses the other one of misrepresenting its own views or perhaps even perverting them. The discussion between Searle on one side and Apel/Habermas on the other is an example of this.

The discussion between the ‘Frankfurt-pragmatists’ and Searle is from the outset burdened with a very fundamental disagreement, not about details, but about the whole framework in which the problems are discussed. This disagreement amounts to the following situation: Searle - without any doubt - sees in his book *Intentionality* a continuation and further elaboration of his earlier book *Speech Acts*. Apel and Habermas on the other hand have the impression that *Intentionality* is a rather fundamental revision of Searle’s earlier philosophy of language and that the theory of speech acts cannot coherently be incorporated into Searle’s intentionalistic philosophy of mind. They think that with Searle’s ‘intentionalist turn’ the very spirit of the theory of speech acts is lost and that it is better preserved in their own thought.

Apel’s and Habermas’ impression, that the theory of speech acts cannot be appropriately treated in the framework of Searle’s intentionalistic philosophy of mind is founded on an interpretation of Searle’s views which Searle himself does not share. But the misunderstandings which Searle believes he can discover in the representation of his views by Apel and Habermas are very much supported by his own formulations. Therefore - in the first part of this paper - I will try to show how Searle himself caused the ‘misunderstandings’ about which he shows himself so much amazed. In a second part I turn to what could be called the ‘Frankfurt interpretation’ of speech act theory.
The third part tries to show what is the main complaint against Searle and finally I want to reflect upon Searle's defense against Habermas' and Apel's criticism.

1. Intentionality and speech acts

My summary of those parts of Intentionality which deal with the integration of speech act theory into an intentionalistic approach to the philosophy of mind will perhaps appear rather one-sided or selective. But I want to show that Habermas' and Apel's (alleged) misunderstanding of Searle is caused by a number of careless formulations on the part of Searle. It seems to me - as I will try to show later - that Searle in his replies to Habermas and Apel defends a much weaker position than the one which Intentionality suggested.

Searle uses the structure of speech acts as a heuristic guide in order to elucidate the structure of intentional states. With this procedure, however, he does not mean that intentional states are basically linguistic. His standpoint will rather be the opposite: "Language is derived from Intentionality and not conversely" (1983: 5). Searle wants "to explain language in terms of intentionality" and to show that there is a relation of "logical dependence" between intentionality and language (1983: 5).

The theory of speech acts makes a distinction between propositional content and illocutionary force: "I assert that p", "I order, that p", "I predict, that p", "I promise, that p", and so on. We find a very similar distinction if we look at intentional states, where we can make a distinction between a representative content and a psychological mode: I believe that p; I fear that p; I hope that p; and so on. The latter, of course, is similar to Brentano's well-known thesis that intentional states are characterized by their 'directedness': Intentional states must be completed by a content. You can't hope without hoping that......

A second point of similarity concerns what Searle (relying on Anscombe) calls a 'direction of fit'. In using assertive speech acts we want to match an independently existing world. But with orders or promises we want to bring about changes in the world so that the world matches the propositional content of the speech act. Therefore Searle differentiates between a word-to-world direction of fit (for assertives) and a world-to-word direction of fit (e.g. for directives or commissives). This distinction can also be carried over to intentional states. Beliefs have a mind-to-world direction of fit, but a wish, for example, has a world-to-mind direction of fit. In order for a wish (or an order) to be fulfilled, something has to happen in the world which brings it about that the wish or order is fulfilled. (An elaborated version of 'directions of fit' can be found in Searle (1979)).

The third element in comparing intentional states with speech acts concerns a connection between the two. Each speech act which has a propositional content expresses an intentional state with the same content, and that intentional state is the sincerity condition of the speech act. A few examples will be sufficient to illustrate this thesis. Someone who asserts that Hegel is obscure must believe that Hegel is obscure if his assertion is sincere. If I promise to read Hegel I must have the intention to read
Hegel if my promise is sincere. And if you ask someone to read Hegel, you must want him or hear to read Hegel. So we discover something like a parallelism between illocutionary roles and psychological modes, a parallelism which is such that the psychological modes are the sincerity conditions of the speech acts.

A fourth and last point of the comparison leads into the center of Searle’s theory of intentionality, because it states an essential connection between the concept of intentionality and the concept of representation. This point deals with conditions of success or conditions of satisfaction, and this notion is a kind of generalization of the notion of truth conditions for all types of speech acts. The conditions of success of an order are fulfilled, if the order is carried out. The conditions of success of a promise consist in carrying out the promised action, and the conditions of success or satisfaction of an assertion are fulfilled if reality conforms to what the speaker asserted. In exactly the same sense intentional states can be characterized by conditions of success too. The conditions of success of a wish are realized if what is wished happens, the conditions of satisfaction of the intention to do something are fulfilled if one does it and a belief’s conditions of satisfaction are fulfilled if what you believe is the case.

These structural analogies, which are only with a didactic purpose derived from the theory of speech acts, permit Searle to state what an intentional state is. Each intentional state has a representative content in a psychological mode. Intentional states represent in the same sense as speech acts represent. My statement that it is raining is a representation of a state of affairs, and my belief that it is raining represents the same state of affairs. My order to someone to leave the room represents a certain action of a certain person and so does my wish that a certain person leave the room. The notion of representation needs perhaps some explication. To say that a belief or a wish, a statement or an order is a representation is simply to say that it has a propositional content and a psychological mode, that its propositional content determines conditions of satisfaction and its psychological mode determines a direction of fit. The term ‘representation’ is nothing more than an abbreviation of this constellation (cf. Searle 1983: 12). If the propositional content is specified, then the conditions of satisfaction are also already specified. If you believe, that it is raining, it is given with your belief, which conditions must obtain if your belief is to be satisfied. If you wish that the cat lies on the mat, it is specified by the content of your wish which state must be the case in order for your wish to be satisfied. So we could simply say that an intentional state with a direction of fit is a representation of its conditions of satisfaction.

Now that we are equipped with Searle’s key terms, we can look at how Searle proposes to integrate his speech act theory into his theory of intentionality. As already indicated in my brief exposition, Searle wants to defend the thesis that intentional states are more fundamental than speech acts and that there is a logical dependency in the sense that there can be intentional states without speech acts, but no speech acts without intentional states.

Let us see how Searle argues for this.

The production of speech acts is connected with the production of physical
entities, such as marks on paper or noises. Such physical entities are in themselves not intentional. How can we nevertheless turn them into representations? How can we "get mere objects to represent"? (1983: viii). How "do we get from the physics to the semantics"? (1983: 161). "How does the mind impose Intentionality on entities which are not intrinsically Intentional?" (1983: 27). This last formulation of the problem already indicates the solution. Since the physical language signs are not intrinsically intentional (that is, since they do not represent by themselves) in order to become intentional (to get them to represent), their intentionality (or ability to represent) must be derived from something else. This something else must of course be something which is prelinguistic: the mind. I add this very explicitly - much more explicitly than Searle ever does - because here lies the source of Apel's and Habermas' belief that Searle deliberately wants to make an anti-linguistic turn, seeing language as something completely derived from prelinguistic forms of intentionality. Apel's criticism of Searle presupposes from the beginning such an understanding of Searle's thesis of the dependency of linguistic meaning upon intentional states:

"In what follows, I should like to tackle a general and fundamental controversy which has concerned philosophers of this century, the question of whether intentional consciousness or language has methodological priority in the determination of meaning. The question can be stated as follows: What is more basic for the grounding of a theory of meaning? The meanings of signs fixed by linguistic conventions, or the meaning which we give to these signs on the basis of our pre-linguistic intentionality, as we impose physical signs to convey them?" (Apel 1991: 32).

A consequence of this reading, of course, would be that everything we can do with language we could do just so without. This, as will become clear from Searle's response (Searle 1991: 91, 97), is not Searle's intention, whereas Apel in his criticism presupposes that this is what Searle really means. But the proper question is not so much what Searle intends, but whether Searle can avoid the consequences Apel ascribes to his position, if he poses the problem the way he does.

That Apel is not so wrong in his suspicion seems to follow from the further elaboration of Searle's views. Searle's answer to the question as to how we come from physics to semantics is very simple: "The mind imposes Intentionality on entities that are not intrinsically Intentional by intentionally conferring the conditions of satisfaction of the expressed psychological state upon the external physical entity" (1983: 27).

One should expect that this sketch of a theory of language would be further elaborated in Searle's chapter 6 of "Intentionality" which bears the title 'Meaning'. "(...) Let us take a case where a man performs a speech act by performing some simple basic action such as raising his arm. Suppose that you and I have arranged in advance that if I raise my arm that act is to count as a signal that such and such is the case. Suppose, in a military context, I signal to you on one hill while I am standing on another hill that the enemy has
A part of this story is surely this: The raising of the arm has in this context conditions of success with a mind-to-world direction of fit. The conditions of success are that the enemy has retreated. In the context of this example Searle poses again the question how something which is not intrinsically intentional (here a body movement) can represent, and the answer follows the line already sketched. The conditions of success of the belief that the enemy has retreated, are intentionally imposed upon the physical symbol, here the movement of the arm. The raising of the arm can only count as a representation of the state of affairs that the enemy has retreated, because this action was performed with the intention that the conditions of success of the raising of the arm should be the same as the conditions of success of the belief that the enemy has retreated.

The essence of Searle's view therefore lies in the assertion that we find something like a transfer of conditions of success from an intentional mental state (which has such conditions of success intrinsically) to a physical entity (body movements, marks on paper or sounds) which do not have conditions of success intrinsically (and therefore could not represent anything if there was no mind). But as an illustration of the theory of transferring conditions of satisfaction from mental states onto linguistic signs, the example chosen by Searle seems absurd. "Is not the real basic question of the constitution of linguistic meaning through the intentionality of mind simply displaced here, since agreement as to the meaning of the signal already presupposes the existence of linguistic meaning conventions?" (Apel 1991: 33). A charitable reader should have recognized that Searle did not want to illustrate this point with his example. Searle's example illustrates of course how something like a transfer of conditions of satisfaction from one symbol to another symbol is possible. But what it surely cannot demonstrate is the priority of mental states with regard to speech acts, because in this example, as Apel pointed out the, conditions of success are transferred from something which already has a conventional linguistic meaning to something which does not yet have a meaning.

Searle, of course, is conscious of the shortcomings of his example with regard to the thesis of the logical dependence of speech acts on mental intentional states. How could anyone overlook this? He explicitly resumes his discussion with the words: "So far we have described the structure of meaning intentions for people who already have a language" (1983: 176), and he grants that this leaves open the question of the relation between the institution of language and prelinguistic forms of intentionality. But even in conceding this, Searle strongly suggests that he wants to state that the institution of language can be derived from or analyzed in terms of prelinguistic intentionality. Along this line he asks, if there were beings who were capable of having intentional states such as belief, desire and intentions but who did not have language, what more they would require in order to be able to perform linguistic acts. (cf. 1983: 177). Searle's answer is that those beings, in order to perform illocutionary acts, would need "some means for externalizing, for making publicly recognizable to others, the expressions of their Intentional states" (1983: 178).
Though one might now expect a further elaboration of Searle’s thesis (an explanation of the passage from the prelinguistic to the linguistic carrying the theoretical burden), we are already at the end of his chapter on meaning. What follows is only a very sketchy exposition which comprises the following steps:

"first the deliberate expression of Intentional states for the purpose of letting others know that one has them; second, the performance of these acts for the achievement of the extra-linguistic aims which illocutionary acts standardly serve; and, third, the introduction of conventional procedures which conventionalize the illocutionary points that correspond to the various perlocutionary aims" (1983: 179).

2. Habermas on the 'double structure of speech'

I shall now give an outline of what could be called the 'Frankfurt interpretation' of the theory of speech acts. This expression could suggest that Apel's and Habermas' interpretation is a rather idiosyncratic one, but actually Apel and Habermas only want to state what they regard as the true spirit of speech act theory as it was developed by Searle in Speech Acts.

Habermas speaks about the performative-propositional 'double structure' of speech acts (for example 1979a: 41ff). This says nothing more than that we can split up speech acts into a propositional content and an illocutionary force. But Habermas and Apel want to emphasize that these two different components have completely different functions. One of these components, the propositional content, is related to states of affairs 'in the world'. It can be true or false and it is possible to explicate its meaning with the instruments of truth-conditional semantics. In speaking of different functions of the two components it is evident that the meaning of the performative or illocutionary component should not be elucidated by the same strategies as propositional content. It is not the point of the illocutionary component to state that it is the case that I asserted, asked, ordered or promised something. What the illocutionary component expresses is what Habermas calls the validity claim which a speaker raises vis-à-vis another subject. Speech acts cannot be reduced to a representational function, they also have (following Bühler 1934) an appealing and an expressive function. And these two aspects are clearly separated through the performative-propositional double structure. With a speech act the speaker does not only say something about something, he also makes evident what the communicative mode of his utterance is. From Habermas' point of view a speech act is something like an offer from a speaker to a hearer which invites the hearer to accept it or to refuse it. The so-called performative (or illocutitive) component has a dialogue-constitutive function, contrary to the representational function of the propositional content.

If, for example, I promise you to pay back the money I owe to you by saying "I hereby promise to pay back the money next week", the addressee can refuse this offer on different levels.

He can reject the making of the promise as such, for example by saying that the
speaker is much too unreliable in such an affair.

The hearer can express doubts in relation to the sincerity of the speaker, for example by responding "You said this only in order to calm me down, but actually you do not have the intention to fulfill your promise".

And the hearer can doubt the truth of the propositional content, regarding the promise as a forecast which will not come true.

These different possible ways of refusing a speech act reflect the three fundamental validity claims which play a role in communicative interaction: truth (concerning propositional content), correctness or legitimacy (concerning something like the adequacy of the chosen illocutionary role) and the sincerity of the speaker. Habermas himself sees a strong parallelism between this analysis and Karl Bühler's (1934) triadic scheme of the sign-function, where signs have a representational function (in Habermas the validity claim of truth), an appealing function (Habermas' validity claim correctness) and an expressive function (Habermas validity claim sincerity).

Following this analysis, the illocutionary force of the speech act mainly has to do with the possibilities of agreement between speaker and hearer. With the illocutionary component the speaker makes clear to the hearer in which manner he wants to reach an agreement about something which is specified in the propositional content.

This analysis puts Habermas in opposition to the meaning theory of Paul Grice. One of the central notions of Grice (1969) is the notion of an effect which a speaker wants to bring about in his audience. But as Habermas rightly insists, the purposes of verbal communication should not be circumscribed as effects, because the success of the speech act depends on the agreement of the hearer, who is asked to accept validity claims. The purpose of communication can only be reached in a cooperative manner, and therefore Habermas sees a strong difference between strategical forms of communication (such as, for example, reaching effects by ways of threats such as an embargo) and communicative action which tries to reach agreement through the free acceptance of validity claims (cf. Habermas 1988a: 66).

3. The asymmetry of representation and communication

Habermas' analysis seems in its general form fruitful and rather appealing and one would not expect it would give rise to very serious disagreements between him and Searle. But still they emerged and it is not very difficult to discover the source of these troubles. If we take Paul Grice as a point of reference, we could characterize the thought of Searle and Habermas as moving away from Grice in two opposite directions. Following Grice, the purpose of meaning is to reach an effect in an audience by way of the hearer's recognizing that the speaker has the intention to reach this effect. As Habermas correctly points out, the conceptualization of communication in terms of effects is much too poor to capture the social dynamics of communicative actions. He wants to account for the cooperative aspects of linguistic communication and interaction. From his point of view, Grice cannot adequately understand the social
dynamics of communication. But Searle moves in the opposite direction. For a theory of meaning, Grice is too much interested in communication. Searle wants to give an account of meaning without needing concepts which are related to communication at all. This becomes very clear in his paper *Meaning, communication and representation* (Searle 1986).

This paper shows in a programmatic manner, in which direction Searle's opinions developed after *Speech Acts*. Searle's starting point in this paper is Grice. Searle had criticized Grice earlier because he identified meaning with an effort to produce effects in the hearer, such as beliefs or actions. Searle pleaded that it would be better to regard what we want to produce in the hearer not so much as perlocutionary effects but rather as illocutionary effects, i.e. the fact that the hearer understands what the speaker said. This was a convincing move, because otherwise we would be obliged to say that someone who did not carry out an order or did not believe in a statement, did not even understand the meaning of the speech acts. (Searle (1969), chapter 2.6). Following Searle's summary of his earlier criticism of Grice: "Grice argued that meaning-intentions were intentions to produce a response in a hearer". Against this, Searle argued that "meaning intentions were intentions to produce understanding in the hearer." (1986: 211). But in *Meaning, communication, and representation*, and later in *Intentionality*, Searle offered the view that this account was still much too 'Gricean', because it tried to analyze meaning in terms of concepts which were related to a hearer, such as understanding or communication. "Like most speech act theorists " Searle criticizes himself, "I have analyzed meaning in terms of communication. The intentions that are the essence of meaning are intentions to produce effects on hearers, that is, they are intentions to communicate" (1986: 212). This approach is still too similar to Grice's, because it still analyzes meaning in terms of effects on an hearer (that is, in communicative terms), even if the effect is not a response such as a belief or action, but only the hearer's understanding of the speaker's intentions.

What Searle now wants is to separate representation clearly from communication. An analysis of meaning can be given and should be given in terms which do not rely on hearers or communication. The representation intention, which is essential for meaning, is clearly disjoined from the communication intention and there even is something like an asymmetry, because it is possible to represent without an intention to communicate, but it is impossible to communicate without representation. Notice that this asymmetry would even remain if all representations were actually intended to be communicated, because communication presupposes representation but representation does not presuppose communication.

What we find at this stage of Searle's intellectual development is something like a twofold reduction, a reduction in two steps. In a first phase of explicating meaning, all references to hearers or communication are eliminated. One could call this the anti-pragmatic turn in Searle's speech act theory. The result is a purified notion of representation which only depends on the notion of conditions of success or satisfaction and the notion of a direction of fit. The second reduction step starts from this purified notion of representation and is intended to show that 'speakers' meaning should be entirely definable in terms of more primitive forms of Intentionality (...) in terms of
forms of Intentionality that are not intrinsically linguistic. (...) In its most general form it amounts to the view that certain fundamental semantic notions such as meaning are analyzable in terms of even more fundamental psychological notions such as belief, desire and intention" (Searle 1983: 160f). It is this second move which leads to Apel's opinion that Searle intended not only an anti-pragmatic turn but even an anti-linguistic one. This opinion is shared by Habermas, who offered the view, that Searle's examples in Meaning, communication, and representation where not only intended "to make (...) the trivial claim that we can bring before our eyes a linguistically representable state of affairs independently of actual communicative intentions", but that Searle had chosen his examples "to support the less trivial claim that we can visualize a certain state of affairs in mente without using any language wether for the purpose of representation or communication" (Habermas 1991: 20).

Before I come to Apel's and Habermas' criticism, I want to fill a gap in my account of Searle, and that is the answer to the question "What does communication add to representation?" Searle's answer is of a baffling simplicity: A speaker's intention to communicate is the intention that the hearer should recognize the speaker's representation intention (see Searle 1986: 215f; 1983: 170f). Therefore there must be primarily a representation intention before there can be a communication intention, and in this sense communication totally depends on representation.

4. Habermas' and Apel's criticism

Now it is rather easy to see in which direction a conflict must inevitably a rise between the Frankfurt pragmatists and Searle. The thesis of the performative-propositional double structure of the speech act differentiates between the communicative function of the expressed illocutionary mode and the representational function of the propositional content. Now Habermas' and Apel's critical question is: if you want to clear the notion of meaning from all communicative connotations, how can you still give an account of illocutionary force? If it is the very meaning of illocutionary force to determine a certain communicative mode by way of making explicit which validity claims are raised to be accepted or refused by an audience, if this is the point of the force-content distinction, how could you cover those essentially communicative functions of the speech act if you explicitly refuse, as Searle does, an account of meaning which is based on communicational concepts? How can you, for example, grasp the meaning of an order, if you are not allowed to speak about communication?

Therefore, it is Apel's and Habermas' strategy to show that illocutionary forces cannot be adequately explained in the framework which Searle now permits himself to use. This is the reason why both Habermas and Apel think that the achievements of speech act theory are destroyed by its foremost proponent, Searle himself. One would expect Searle to react clearly to this complaint. But instead Searle offers a repetition of his point of view that representation and communication must be separated. He proposes some kind of division of labor between Habermas and himself. Habermas - as Searle sees it - is not so much dealing with a theory of meaning, but with something
which in the logical development must come later than meaning. Searle’s offer of a division of labor amounts to the following: the features which Habermas mentions are "simply features of conversations as opposed to features of individual speech acts. It is characteristic of a normal conversation that each participant takes turns of being now a speaker, now a hearer, and the overall aim of conversation is to reach agreement, to reach what he (Habermas) calls a 'mutual consensus with respect to a (potentially questionable) matter'." (Searle 1991: 90) "But notice", Searle goes on, "that there is no inconsistency between saying on the one hand that each individual speech act is designed to communicate an Intentional content from speaker to hearer (...) and on the other saying that the overall aim of the conversation is to achieve consensus." (1991: 90) But "in order for there to be intersubjective consensus in conversation there have to be Intentional contents that are communicated in the first place". (1991: 90 f).

At first sight this might seem reasonable, and there is a way of interpreting Searle with which Habermas could agree. Namely, you cannot have communication without propositional contents, and that is what Habermas himself acknowledged in speaking of the illocutionary-propositional double structure. For Habermas distinguishes with his thesis of the double structure "(1) the level of intersubjectivity on which speaker and hearer, through illocutionary acts, establish the relations that permit them to come to an understanding with one another, and (2) the level of propositional content which is communicated" (Habermas 1979a: 42). And in this sense there is an agreement between Habermas and Searle, because Habermas himself would have to agree that the question of 'coming to an understanding' could not arise if there would not be something - the propositional content - about which speaker and hearer want to come to an understanding or to reach a consensus. You cannot have just illocutionary forces with no further propositional content at all. But as a reaction against Habermas’ complaints this does not do the job. Searle, in summarizing his view that meaning must claim priority over conversation, gives this example: "If for example I say, 'Bush is doing a good job', before you can agree or disagree you have to understand me. I have to succeed in communicating a meaning in the performance of my speech act before the question of consensus can arise." (Searle 1991: 92)

It is not at all clear what Searle wants to say with this alleged counterexample. If this utterance has an illocutionary force, and without any doubt Searle must agree with this, then the utterance "Bush is doing a good job" does not only mention Bush and does not only say something about him, but it does more. It simultaneously makes it clear that this utterance is intended as an assertion for which the speaker thinks he has good reasons. The utterance embodies validity claims which invite a reaction from the audience. ("You can’t mean this, you are only joking." - "Look what happened in Los Angeles" - "Did you ever read the Wall Street Journal?") Of course, before the hearer can accept or refute the speaker’s claims, he must know the propositional content. But propositional content is not enough to specify a speech act, because the speech act must convey information concerning its communicative mood or its illocutionary force.

What remains unclear in Searle’s reaction is the answer to Habermas’ question as to the manner in which the illocutionary force is to be analyzed if one clearly
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separates meaning from communication. If Searle wanted to answer this question, he
would have two possible strategies, but both would bring him in an uncomfortable
position. Either he could say: meaning only has to do with propositional content. But
then Habermas is right in saying that Searle’s new way of thinking no longer contains
the true spirit of speech act theory, which revolves around illocutionary force. Or Searle
could say: my explication of meaning also wants to cover illocutionary forces. But then
it remains mysterious how Searle wants to separate meaning intentions from
communication intentions, because illocutionary force is precisely the expression of
communication intentions. Not the communication intention about which Searle is
speaking - the intention to communicate a propositional content - but the
communication intention in the sense of Habermas’ double structure, where on the
level of intersubjectivity communicative modes are constituted through the choice of
illocutionary forces. Searle could of course say that he takes illocutionary force into
consideration. But the only theoretical instruments his analysis permits are directions
of fit. And directions of fit are, as Searle himself admits (1991: 97), far too weak to
explicate the differences between different illocutionary forces.

Searle does not only offer Habermas a division of labor - something like a
fruitful and peaceful coexistence - between a theory of representation (Searle’s job)
which is presupposed by a theory of conversation (Habermas’ job), but he finally makes
a counterattack accusing Habermas of entertaining deeply flawed views. This
counterattack is centered around the unhappy George Bush example which I already
mentioned. It runs as follows: "Habermas thinks that the existence of validity claims is
not a consequence of the analysis of certain sorts of speech acts, rather he thinks that
the validity claims are constitutive of all speech acts" (Searle 1991: 91). This is a correct
characterization and we should rather ask why Searle cannot agree with this. Searle
does not disagree at all that there are validity claims involved in the speech act. But he
tries to formulate the relation between validity claims and speech acts in a rather queer
way. "That there are validity claims", Searle says, "seems to me a strict consequence of
my analysis. However, what I do claim is that it is philosophically back to front to
suppose that the validity claims provide a basis for the understanding of the phenomena
of speech acts, rather it is the theory of speech acts that has to explain the validity claims".
(Searle 1991: 93f). It seems to me an unfruitful approach to state the problem in terms
of the question as to whether validity claims are a consequence derived from speech
acts or something which is constitutive of speech acts. And I think Searle could agree
with this, because he unintentionally refutes his own attack in explaining what validity
claims really are. In an effort to explain validity claims as a consequence of speech acts
(rather than constitutive of speech acts), Searle discusses the following example. In a
discussion in the context of the budget of an University department someone states:
"The University budget will not permit us to expand the library in the next year." Searle
admits that in this statement there are several validity claims which can be revealed by
the following challenges:

1. What you say is false. There is plenty of money in the University budget.
2. You do not actually believe what you are saying. You have some strategic
motive to deceive us.

3 You do not really have enough evidence to say that. The figures about next year's budget are not yet available.

Searle correctly notices that "the relevance of such complaints is already determined by the internal features of the speech act in question. And the three validity claims in question are those of truth, sincerity and legitimacy, in this case having sufficient evidence for one's claims." (1991: 93). Without any doubt, Habermas would agree with this picture, which is intended to show where there is agreement between Habermas and Searle. Searle remarks that Habermas' validity claims derive exactly from his conditions on illocutionary acts as stated in *Speech Acts*, namely the types of rules which specify a certain speech act (1991: 93). Habermas, to be sure, never tried to conceal that his validity claims were derived from Searle's analysis of different types of rules for illocutionary forces. When Searle himself states such conditions on speech acts, for example the essential condition, the sincerity condition and the preparatory condition, he is not stating something from which in a later phase of analysis validity claims could be derived, but he is stating the very validity claims themselves. There is no difference (except for a terminological one) between Searle's constitutive rules in *Speech Acts* and Habermas' validity claims. "The validity claims discussed by Habermas and Apel are just these various conditions generalized", Searle admits himself (1991: 98). But these rules are, as Searle himself would not doubt, constitutive. But how then can Searle complaint that Habermas falsely thinks that validity claims are constitutive of speech acts, if validity claims are nothing more than a generalization of types of constitutive rules? The illocutionary force of a speech act can completely be characterized by the validity claims which someone makes in performing it. Searle is confused in thinking that validity claims are something which should come into the debate later, after speech acts are constituted by sets of constitutive rules. Nevertheless, Searle's attack is understandable. Habermas' terminology explicitly focuses on the social communicative dimension which is embodied in illocutionary force. Recognizing this essential communication-constituting force of the illocutionary component would make it difficult for Searle to maintain his rather sharp distinction between communication and meaning. Therefore he must in some way try to dissociate Habermas' intentions from his own. But the result will be inevitably that the character of illocutionary force remains very much underexposed, to the extent that we can very well understand that the Frankfurt pragmatists have the impression that Searle - though unintentionally - said goodbye to his earlier ideas.

Searle defends his thesis of the priority of representation-intentions over communication-intentions on the level of propositional content. And on this level Searle's proposal is clear and plausible. But by way of illustrating his view on the level of propositional content, he manifests that he did not even recognize the essentials of Habermas' criticism. Habermas deals with the communicative function of illocutionary forces (which he explicates in terms of validity claims), but in his response to Habermas Searle kept silent about illocutionary forces. How is it possible that someone who wants to ground speech act theory in a theory of mind only speaks about representational or propositional contents but never gives an explicit analysis of illocutionary forces?
I started with a sketch of Searle's *Intentionality* and its relation to speech act theory. But in my critical discussion I mainly drew upon the problems which emerged from Searle's strategy of making a sharp distinction between representation and communication. In Searle's texts ther is evidence - as I already mentioned - that his research programme is developed in two phases: the first consisting in his attempt to separate meaning intentions clearly from communication intentions. Here my complaint is, with Habermas and Apel, that we cannot carry this strategy over to the analysis of illocutionary force. The second phase consists in Searle's attempt to give an analysis of this purified notion of representation in terms of concepts which are not semantic or linguistic, but which are completely derived from an intentionalistic psychology.

Habermas' criticism concentrated on Searle's attempt to reduce the proper understanding of meaning to the understanding of what it means to represent. Apel is more concerned with the alleged reducibility of speech act theory to an intentionalistic theory of mind. But of the already mentioned arguments can be carried over to this second step. If Searle's theory of representation cannot give a sufficient account of illocutionary force, then *a fortiori* an analysis of this notion of representation in intentionalistic terms cannot do it either. Therefore we find in Apel's criticism many arguments which were already used by Habermas against Searle's first step. Nevertheless we are left with the question as to what Searle's intentionalistic reducibility thesis amounts to, and I still have to explain my impression that in *Intentionality* Searle defended a much stronger thesis than the one which he maintains in his critical discussion with Apel.

Following Apel, the main thesis of Searle's *Intentionality* was that the meaning of a speech act can be explicated by the conditions of success which the mind intentionally transfers to the physical signs together with the direction of fit. No doubt Searle's exposition in *Intentionality* strongly suggests such a reading. And against this strategy Apel uses the same arguments we already know from our discussion of Habermas, namely that this conceptual inventory is much too weak to account for the diversity of speech acts. Using only conditions of satisfaction and directions of fit, an order to do p, a demand to do p, a request and even a directive threat all would amount to the same thing: the expression of the speaker's wish that p should happen through an action by the hearer. But of course there are differences. An order requires some form of institutionalized authorization. A request must be worthy of fulfillment, a demand legitimate and in the case of a threat the hearer must fear negative consequences for himself.

Apel's objection amounts simply to the idea that the illocutionary force of a speech act cannot be explained in non-linguistic terms. And this argumentation strategy seems to me quite reasonable, because Searle strongly suggested that he just wanted to defend the thesis that all speech acts can be explained in non-linguistic terms. He explicitly stated that he wanted to show that "speaker's meaning should be entirely definable in terms of more primitive forms of Intentionality. (...) we define speaker's meaning in terms of forms of intentionality that are not intrinsically linguistic." (Searle 1983: 160) Therefore, Searle continues, "the philosophy of language is a branch of the philosophy of mind. In its most general form it amounts to the view that certain
fundamental semantic notions such as meaning are analyzable in terms of even more fundamental psychological notions, such as belief, desire, and intention." (1983: 160 f) It must have seemed to many readers that for example the story of conditions of satisfaction which are conferred (1983: 27) or transferred (1983: 167) from a (prelinguistic) psychological state to an external physical entity, committed Searle to the view that (prelinguistic) intentional states would have exactly the same representation capacity as the one language users can dispose of. Maybe such a strong interpretation of Intentionality would be a very uncharitable one, but there is much in Intentionality that makes such a reading coherent. If Searle complains that such a strong reductionist reading would result in the absurdity that speech acts would be possible without any language at all (1991: 97), this interpretation could still fall back on Searle’s thesis that there is a strict separation between representation and communication, that representation can be analyzed in a reductionistic manner in terms of prelinguistic forms of intentionality, and that language only comes into play as a means of expressing one’s prelinguistic mental states in order to communicate them (Searle 1983: 178).

It is clear from Searle’s response to Apel (1991: 96-99), that Searle thinks that his views are extremely misrepresented in Apel’s reading of Intentionality. There cannot be any doubt that Searle does not intend his thesis in ‘Intentionality’ to mean that we can explain the meaning of illocutionary forces without linguistic notions: "It is emphatically not part of my claim that there are no illocutionary acts which are so to speak essentially linguistic. It is not my view that all speech acts could be performed by beings who had no language at all, nor is it my view that all speech acts have conditions of satisfaction which can be specified in terms that make no reference to conventions of language" (1991: 97). It is mainly this last formulation, in particular the question as to whether ‘conditions of satisfaction can be specified in terms that make no reference to conventions of language’, where I have the strong feeling that Searle is committed to this view even if he explicitly denies it. And this impression is not only grounded in Searle’s answer to the question of how we get from physics to semantics, but it is reinforced by Searle’s reaction to a quite similar problem which William Alston (1991: 74ff) formulated.

Alston had doubts about the fruitfulness of the notion of conditions of satisfaction, because he had the impression that conditions of satisfaction had to make reference to linguistic rules. "The notion of conditions of satisfaction for illocutionary acts", Alston writes, "is derived from the previous specification of illocutionary points and directions of fit, and so is heir to all the ills that plague the latter. Conditions of satisfaction do not, contrary to what one might at first suppose, give us a new and independent way of analyzing illocutionary-act concepts." (1991: 75) Of course one should now expect an answer quite similar to the answer Searle gave to Apel, namely that it is a misunderstanding to think that he - Searle - thought that the conditions of satisfaction of speech acts could be specified without any reference to linguistic rules. But Searle argues against Alston in a totally unexpected manner: "He (Alston) seems to think that the analysis of Intentional states in terms of conditions of satisfaction essentially requires a reference to speech acts. But in my view that is not correct. (...) The conditions of satisfaction of linguistic entities are derived from those of intentional
states and not conversely."

These two reactions seem to me quite inconsistent. Against Apel's interpretation Searle offers the view that in order to specify the conditions of satisfaction of a speech act we must refer to conventions of language. But when Alston complains that in this case conditions of satisfaction would not give us an independent way of analyzing illocutionary-act concepts, he falls back upon the thesis that the conditions of satisfaction of linguistic entities are derived from those of intentional states. And this inconsistency makes it impossible for me to develop for myself a clear view of which thesis it is that Searle wanted to develop in his book *Intentionality* and to defend against Habermas' and Apel's critical complaints.

References


